ANSF performance 2015 onwards

[Bob's World]

While all of this is very unfortunate, it is certainly not unpredictable.

Governments and security forces established by a foreign power are going to be fundamentally lacking in popular legitimacy with a large segment of the society. Doubly true in a heavily patronage society like Afghanistan where life is so often an "all or nothing" affair. One is either in the right family or tribe to be rewarded by patronage, or one is not.

The have-nots are always waiting in the wings as a ready-willing and able guerrilla force to attach themselves to whatever foreign invader / manipulator happens to come along, be that Russia, Pakistan, Iran, the US or anyone else.

The US has tried three times now to employ a Democracy/Security Force Capacity strategy in support of de facto illegitimate governments of our design. Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan. It is a proven failure of a strategy.

I used to think the British model of raising local security forces under the auspices of British legitimacy was a bad model. I was wrong. Security forces need to be in support of legitimate government, and while one can lend their legitimacy to a host nation forces; one cannot lend their legitimacy to host nation government.

If the US had employed the British approach to raising local forces as US forces, I believe strongly that those units would have performed far better than the illegitimate ones we helped to train for their own illegitimate governments.

Better yet, if we would have had the vision and risk tolerance to allow self-determination of governance and diplomacy with whatever emerged to take place - we likely would have secured our interests in ways that avoided the conflicts all together.

[davidbfpo]

Late last week, a spokesman for the (US) Defense Department said that since January, a staggering 4,302 Afghan soldiers and police have been killed in action along with 8,009 wounded in what has by far been the bloodiest year for Kabul’s security forces since the ouster of the Taliban in 2002. Overall, 13,000 Afghan security forces have been killed over the past three years.

Link, via FP mailing:http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/13000...d-years/story?

[omarali50]

The current Afghan state has more legitimacy and more capability than any of its opponents. But may have major money issues if foreign support dries up.
The only way they can be defeated is if Western powers (aka US) has decided it is a better bet to have a Pakistan-run militia in power in Afghanistan (or if the US has decided a division of Afghanistan is somehow in their interest).
The US has that kind of leverage because it leads the support effort. Russia and Iran and India can support the Northern alliance but probably wont pay for the whole place.
Minus that kind of US treachery (no other word for it), this state will survive.
Bets?

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to WoTR for recirculating a commentary by Ben Anderson, once with the BBC & other outlets, now with VICE, for his June 2015 report on a visit to Helmand Province; the video (5 mins):http://www.vice.com/read/watch-host-...fghanistan-869

The Q&A interview:http://warontherocks.com/2015/09/a-d...n-afghanistan/

I cannot readily find his film report, but this is his written report, which covers the ANSF, ALP and the Taliban:http://www.vice.com/read/notes-from-...s-province-102

[davidbfpo]

From WoTR:warontherocks.com/2015/09/how-to-lose-a-civil-war-lessons-for-afghanistan-and-syria/?

I had missed this detail, hence my emphasis:

While Afghanistan’s situation is not yet as dire as that of Syria, Kabul’s decisions need to be shaped by a clearer recognition of what can be accomplished on the battlefield. The long-vacant position of defense minister needs to be filled with a permanent appointment.

Perhaps having a minister in Kabul means little given Afghan politics power lies elsewhere?

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to WoTR for this commentary by a RAND analyst, who has been "on the ground" and gives an excellent overview of the context:http://warontherocks.com/2015/10/the...-afghanistan/?

He ends with:

What is readily apparent is that losing Kunduz city, even temporarily, has exposed a number of shortcomings within the Afghan government and security forces. In the aftermath of this, Afghan officials and their coalition partners need to ask some hard questions about where their efforts have gone wrong and what can credibly be done to recover from the most significant blow yet to the post-Taliban Afghan state.