ANSF performance 2015 onwards

[Bob's World]

We will never get better at COIN, until we first get better at our understanding of insurgency.
Revolution, internal to a single system and non-war; resistance, the continuation of warfare by an undefeated populace in a clash between systems - and the fusion of the two when one goes abroad and attempts to create and secure a government more pleasing to that creator than to so many forced to live under it.

These are indeed great references, particularly when read for the facts they gather, organize and offer - and not for conclusions too often overly colored by the bias of our own culture, perspective and doctrine.

Highly recommended these as a cornerstone of references for all who study, think about, and engage in some way in these conflicts.

[davidbfpo]

It struck me that this section could apply to the democratic political process, with different words:

Political Struggle:

Dan Van - Action among your people - total mobilization of propaganda, motivational & organizational measures to manipulate internal masses and fighting units

Binh Van - Action among enemy military - subversion, proselytizing, propaganda to encourage desertion, defection and lowered morale among enemy troops.

Dich Van - Action among enemy's people - total propaganda effort to sow discontent, defeatism, dissent, and disloyalty among enemy's population.

A quick re-write: Mobilise your people and potential voters; keep interference to a minimum (domestic and external) and discourage your opponent's people and their voters.

[max161]

It struck me that this section could apply to the democratic political process, with different words:

A quick re-write: Mobilise your people and potential voters; keep interference to a minimum (domestic and external) and discourage your opponent's people and their voters.

It is all about politics whether in peace, conflict, and war. That is the thread that connects all of these human situations.

[Bob's World]

Democracy has four fundamental components:
1. Political in primary purpose,
2. Population - based,
3. Internal to a single system of governance, &
4. Legal in form.

Revolutionary insurgency shares the same fundamental components, except the 4th is "illegal" in form.

Thus, the fundamental distinction between revolution and democracy is legality.

Most revolutions occur when trusted, certain and legal participation in governance is denied to all or some identity - based portion of the population.

[davidbfpo]

I missed this film showing and talk @ The Frontline Club (London) and was reminded today:http://www.frontlineclub.com/tell-sp...national-army/

directors Michael McEvoy and Saeed Taji Farouky follow an Afghan National Army (ANA) battalion for a year as they confront the transition of power in Helmand Province — one of the most unstable areas of the country.....The whole point was that for the past 14 years we’ve heard almost nothing from, not only the Afghans, but particularly the Afghan army. That’s why, he explained, there’s no voiceover in the film, which is told completely by Afghan soldiers. “It would be unjust for us to now speak on their behalf..said Taji Farouky.

A telling explanation:

Why they fight
Even though a soldier in the film complains at one point that he hasn’t been paid for nine months, and another says he hasn’t been on leave in four or five months, the battalion appears to remain committed to their mission.
“Unemployment is obviously pretty big in Afghanistan. Many of the soldiers are from the north and they would join up in big groups of lads from their villages just to find work,” McAvoy said, adding that the ANA is one of the most stable employers in the entire country.
Although that’s a big part of why many join up, “there is a genuine sense of national pride: ‘We are Afghan, the Taliban are enemies of Afghanistan. We genuinely want to be here to defend our country,’” he said. “I think it’s simpler when you’re fighting in your own country and you feel like you’re defending your own home than if you go on some foreign campaign.”
It’s a testament that they stick on, he continued. “They’re not paid very well, they don’t go on leave for ages, the food sucks — big time. The U.S. stopped paying for their food budget and the ministry of finance turned to the ministry of defence and said ‘well, we haven’t got any money.’ So basically they just cut the food budget in half. By the end it was a piece of bread for breakfast, a plate of plain rice for lunch, and then for dinner some sort of watery soup with essence of meat.

There is a very short film clip and I have not been able to find a full version (those on YouTube are deleted or behind a "wall").

Strictly speaking the film is from 2014, so should be in another thread, ah well Moderator's discretion rules.

[Colin Robinson]

Be a very interesting video to look at, I suspect.

You were asking about my research in regard to the AFL, after Sean's latest paper. My impression, backed by more recent research than Sean's, is that while DynCorp did pretty well, the collective training that PA&E did not.

The experience of trying to maintain a cordon around Mamba Point, and having it broken, will not have helped.

Regards
Colin

[Bob's World]

One cannot train a soldier to fight for what he does not believe in.

We always want to make these things objective and measureable. Create a government. Check. Create a military. Check. Employ military to preserve said government. Fail

There is a reason retention has always been horrible in Afghanistan. There is a reason the Taliban fighters fight rings around most ANA units. Legitimacy of the Taliban, and illegitimacy of GIRoA and the ANA. Legality does not equal popular legitimacy. Revolution and Resistance against foreign forces and the collaborating governments and forces they create in those foreign lands historically enjoy tremendous legitimacy across the rest of the society involved.

We need to stop believing that because what we bring is so good, that we will be exempt from this natural human response. The nature of our actions create the nature of the response. The character of our actions, and the character of what we seek to change does have a mitigating effect on the degree of that natural response. But nature is what nature is.

We see SecDef Ash Carter publicly criticizing the "Iraqi Military" for lacking the will to fight. That shows his own lack of understanding of this type of conflict. First, the state of Iraq and the Iraqi military have not existed in fact for months. What is left is a Shia remnant of that state. Second, this is a government WE created and a military WE created to preserve that government. To criticize these men and their lack of will, while not recognizing and appreciating the fundamental nature of the conflict and fundamental flaws of the system we created is our own failure. Our strategic failure of understanding far exceeds any failure of performance on the part of those we have seduced into those systems.