ANSF performance 2015 onwards

[davidbfpo]

Cross-posted from the thread on the Taliban.

A report from the probably independent Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN) on the recent attack on Farah city. It opens with:

An attack on Farah city had long been feared. For years now, the Taleban have been taking control of the provincial capital’s outlying districts and inching their way towards the central hub. For a few days in mid-May, it looked as though the Taleban were about to take Farah city, which would have been their most significant military triumph since capturing Kunduz for two weeks in 2015. Their strategy of consolidating control over rural areas then digging in at a provincial centre’s outskirts before launching an attack appears to be an increasing trend. While they lost the battle in Farah on this occasion, the Taleban still pose a serious threat to the area. AAN co-director Thomas Ruttig together with Ali Mohammad Sabawoon, Rohullah Soroush and Obaid Ali unpack the attack and its aftermath.
This is the first of two dispatches examining the recent attack on the city of Farah. This first dispatch focuses on the attack and its aftermath. The second contextualises the attack in light of post-2001 developments in Farah.

It ends with:

With regards to Farah, the fact that the Taleban were only pushed back to positions just outside the provincial capital from where they started their attack means that new attacks can be expected. Farah is only one example for a situation that prevails in at least a quarter of Afghanistan’s provinces.

Link:https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org...e-for-farah-i/

[davidbfpo]

The author is:

Tamim Asey is the Chairman of the Institute of War and Peace Studies (IWPS). Previously, he served as Deputy Minister of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan.

It is a curious article which seeks to provide an answer to:

Back in 2004, when Afghan and American generals were laying the foundations for the post-Taliban Afghan army and security forces the number one question in the minds of everybody around the table was “who will pay for it?” In those days, it was assumed the burden would fall on the United States and its allies, but that calculation is changing fast with President Trump in office and war fatigue across the capitals in Europe. Today, the answer is simple: Afghans will pay for it through revenues from its vast natural resources and geographical position combined with a national conscription system.

Link:https://globalsecurityreview.com/eco...curity-forces/

Sorry from this faraway armchair the answer is bizarre - when will these revenues come on stream? Leaving aside the likelihood others will divert such revenues.