Building Indigenous Security Forces to match the realities of METT-TC

[Rob Thornton]

SWC folks,
I showed this DRAFT (I've still not decided what to do with it) to Dave and Tom and a couple of others. I've attached a draft of something I've been thinking about for the last six months or so and wanted to get out prior to going into the redeployment black hole, leave and PCS to new schools and job. Not all of this is applicable to what we've done here working with the IA, but think of it as an outgrowth ref. thoughts on security forces. If it fosters some useful discussion then its all good - I think we're going to be doing this job awhile (if not here, then in other locations)

The purpose of this paper is to foster discussion on the organizational design, functions and capabilities of security forces in developing and transitioning states to counter the threats of enemies whose goals, strategies and tactics are opposed to long term security and stability. This is an important question for U.S. security because the expenditure of our own resources is better spent if it requires minimal maintenance and can serve to advance the relationships needed in the generational struggle we face in the Global War on Terror.
Working as an advisor with the Iraqi Security Forces over the last year has caused me to consider the question of how do you help indigenous leaders to build something that may look and act differently from anything you’re used to seeing, are comfortable with, or is beyond your experience? How do you (you being the agency, command or group tasked) provide the analytical foresight to ensure that the security forces you are helping them build both meet the current needs, but are also adaptable/flexible enough to evolve to meet emerging threats? It is probable that we will be doing this more often in different capacities and on varying scales in different locations around the globe in support of the Global War on Terror (GWOT)......

[Tom Odom]

All,

I am currently assembling a Transition Team newsletter. Other folks are working a handbook; I want to provide a companion reader that samples current experiences and thoughts on MiTTs and ETTs. I also am going heavy on the cultural and experience aspects of advisor duty. To that end I am trying right now to boil my book down to 10 pages or less, reflacting my experiences and the insights and lessons I gained along the way.

Rob has been a real trooper in this effort: he has produced 4 articles and countless emails on this subject. If you have insights to offer based on current or past operations, get them to me.

But first, look at Rob's work and offer constructive thoughts. He is downrange and he is making the professional effort to assist those who will follow him.

Best
Tom

[sullygoarmy]

Rob,
Well thought out paper and I like the fact that you focus on identifying the stengths and weaknesses of the HN forces. We as a US military tend to make everyone and everything look like us, which culturally is a huge mistake. I wasted a good month or two as an advisor trying to bang my head against iraqi military culture trying to shape it like US military culture. After a large headache, I came to the realization that we (our AST back then) needed to work with the organic Iraqi strengths to shape them into their own force, not a "mini-me" approach where they looked and functioned like a US unit.

On another note, I'd argue that the Iraqi national police and their transistion teams (NPTTs) are trying to get to that exact internal security force you described. Whereas the IPs are more of a local and regional based force, the NP has a broader internal security function very similiar to what you describe in your article. I think the biggest problem right now, however, is the IA and IPs are progressing at a significantly faster pace that the national police. There lies the gap. Without that internal security force well established and led, either the IPs have to step up or the IA focuses internal until the national police is up and running.

Those of you familiar with the history of the NYPD may remember when the TPF existed. This force was used as a police "QRF" to assist in taming the more dangerous and difficult areas of NYC back in the 60s and 70s. I can see a section of the Iraqi National Police taking over a similar TPF role but in a nationwide arena.

BTW Rob, where you in 1-63 AR as an LT? If so, I may still owe you some 9mm rounds I bummed from you in Taji when you were with 1 CD!! Stay safe!

Sully

[slapout9]

Tom and Rob, I just finished reading the article and in general it is fantastic, but I would like to let it soak in some. The parts on LE functions particularly undercover, HUMINT are critical in the long run, but they will also be some of the most dangerous. I will post some thoughts later.

[Rob Thornton]

Sully, you don't have anything on the National Police that you could send me do you? There is still a huge break in comms between the different types of TTs. Mostly all we have visible up here are the IPs, and they are understrength and need some love. As for the 9mm rounds, I think that might have been another Rob Thornton, I often get mail for at least three different R. Thorntons - small Army

Slapout - I was hoping you put some LE thoughts into this - those were the parts I was making some big leaps on.

Regards all, Rob

[SWJED]

Rob,

We are finally getting Small Wars Journal Magazine Vol. 7 up and are already putting together Vol 8. I would like to run your article in 8 - that still gives some time to tweak based on Council members input.

Let me know and keep on keeping on...

Dave

[Tom Odom]

Rob,

We are finally getting Small Wars Journal Magazine Vol. 7 up and are already putting together Vol 8. I would like to run your article in 8 - that still gives some time to tweak based on Council members input.

Let me know and keep on keeping on...

Dave

Cool

But I will recycle with CALL as well; I believe we can make this MiTT newsletter something relevant beyond current ops.

Tom