Tom and Rob, I just finished reading the article and in general it is fantastic, but I would like to let it soak in some. The parts on LE functions particularly undercover, HUMINT are critical in the long run, but they will also be some of the most dangerous. I will post some thoughts later.
Sully, you don't have anything on the National Police that you could send me do you? There is still a huge break in comms between the different types of TTs. Mostly all we have visible up here are the IPs, and they are understrength and need some love. As for the 9mm rounds, I think that might have been another Rob Thornton, I often get mail for at least three different R. Thorntons - small Army
Slapout - I was hoping you put some LE thoughts into this - those were the parts I was making some big leaps on.
Regards all, Rob
Last edited by Rob Thornton; 02-09-2007 at 03:44 PM.
Small Wars Journal...
Rob,
We are finally getting Small Wars Journal Magazine Vol. 7 up and are already putting together Vol 8. I would like to run your article in 8 - that still gives some time to tweak based on Council members input.
Let me know and keep on keeping on...
Dave
Great!
CoolOriginally Posted by SWJED
But I will recycle with CALL as well; I believe we can make this MiTT newsletter something relevant beyond current ops.
Tom
Rob,
Let me dig around a little. I was working with the 18th MP BDE last month as they get ready to take over the PTT mission. I'm also working with guys from the Office of the Provost Marshall General as they prepare a "tiger team" to prepart the PTTs and NPTTs. I'll shoot you an e-mail if I find anything worthwhile. The national police definately are the red-headed step children in this training effort, and a good portion of it is their own fault.
Yeah, must be another Rob Thorton. I'll keep my 9mm rounds then!
Sully, I am pretty familiar with NYPD in the 70's and I know about their stakeout teams which some consider NYPD's original version of SWAT, but I am not familiar with the TPF. What does that stand for?
quick thoughts
Rob,
I enjoyed your paper and I think it is an important subject. Having worked as an advisor for years in numerous countries, I am very frustrated with the U.S. approach, especially as a tax payer. There are issues we're not going to resolve related to the business end, such as our requirement to push U.S. equipment on our friends, whether it is the best equipment for their military or not (especially when you look at the maintenance tail and price tag associated with it). However, the cultural bias we bring when we feel compelled to train and organize their military forces in our image has been our downfall for years. This is simply arrogance and cultural ignorance.
Here are some quick (and rough) thoughts on your paper:
we have to decide first what the desired endstate (there is not an end state, but a transition point, all security force elements will continue to evolve).
Is there a need to perform every BOS function in the manner we consider them: (whatever it is that “they” decide to implement and resource, it needs to be a complete and functional system). Most of our MTTs have failed long term, because we only establish subsystems. It doesn't matter if you train the mechanic, but there is no mechanism for the mechanic to get spare parts.
It has proved entirely inadequate because they are too small and too limited to respond to all the IEDs that occur (this implies that this then must become a common task to some extent, so I would think the trick is determining what training is equipment is required at the Squad level to reduce IEDs).
We should be careful not to push our IO procedures upon the Iraqis, ours is encumbered with a non-functional bureaucracy. The terrorists are running circles around us. Tell the Iraqis what the problem is, then let them solve it.
Reference your C4I structure, Great in concept, but does it really fit the “Iraqi” reality? This assumes that everyone in the security forces is vetted; therefore, trustworthy, which is far from the reality. We’re damned if we do, and damned to a lesser degree if we don’t.
Reference structure: I have a lot of thoughts on that, but the bottom line you first have to have a strategy and a C2 structure set up, then design the forces based on allocated missions and strategies. Iraq is a tough nut to crack, because we're trying to dig out of the grave we dug for ourselves.
I think the paper is great as it is now, and hopefully it will generate a lot of discussion in the ranks.
Slapout, TPF was the tactical patrol force. There were handpicked officers who basically were "flexed" to the precients which were having the most trouble to augment the guys in the station house. This was all pre comp-stat times but when, for example, if the 42d PCT was having a hard time dealing with an increase in drug related violence, the TPF could basically "flood the zone" to help out the local PCT commander. A link about the TPF is below:
http://www.policeny.com/TPF1.html
My Dad started out working in the Bronx then moved to the TPF. From there he was promoted to detective and worked with the Bronx DAs office. He did polygraphings and Hostage negotations on the side as well. Hence my interest in the NYPD and law enforcement tools we can use in COIN!
Posting Permissions
Bookmarks