A bit surprised that he didnt bring up what was probably the most prominent example of "victor's rage" in modern Europe: the Russian victory on the Eastern Front 1944-45..(in the interview, i have obviously not read the book yet)
A bit surprised that he didnt bring up what was probably the most prominent example of "victor's rage" in modern Europe: the Russian victory on the Eastern Front 1944-45..(in the interview, i have obviously not read the book yet)
A UK defence blog 'Think Defence' enters the fray on this issue, with a number of graphics:http://www.thinkdefence.co.uk/2015/0...ent-savagery/?
davidbfpo
The title of the strategy is misleading, yes it promotes violence, but it is tied to political aims. You destroy the existing forms of governance, create chaos, and then the people desire someone, anyone, to establish predictable rules so they can go about their daily lives. It is the competitive control theory.
A rather odd title for an intelbrief from The Soufan Group, which links a number of outrages or attacks where mass casualties result, clearly prompted by last week's attack @ Garissa, Kenya and here is one clear phrase:The last sentence makes sense:The reality is far more troubling, as groups that have little-to-no-connection are linked by a unifying motivation to kill civilians.Link:http://soufangroup.com/tsg-intelbrie...ion-of-terror/These groups began as localized insurgencies but have morphed into a homogenized terrorist movement that cares less about local impact than global influence.
Unconventional warfare, whether the users are called guerillas or terrorists, often prefers "soft" targets and inhibit the security forces by such tactics as IEDs. Is it 'new' this preference for killing civilians? No. So what is the difference today? Simple we know about it and see the imageery.
davidbfpo
Incorrect David, there are changes in their operational and strategic approaches. It is less about what we see, than what they see, how they share information, and how differentiated conflicts become increasingly homogenized. In addition to the Internet and social media increasingly blending tactics, there are new economic factors that shape these conflicts. External state support is less important in many cases. These groups can now sustain themselves multiple ways, not only through illicit activity in a growing and global black market, but via fund rising by competing with other groups to see who can conduct the largest and most dramatic atrocities. This is another difference, in the past local insurgents normally conducted attacks to influence the local audience. Thus their attacks were conducted locally to create relatively local effects, and the scope of their killing was generally limited (not in all cases) to achieve their political objectives. That is not the case now, which is why need to be skeptical about considering the populace as the center of gravity as the default center of gravity for COIN.
Last edited by Bill Moore; 04-08-2015 at 02:32 PM.
Will McCants reviews ISIS and the book's theme after Paris; hat tip to WoTR:http://warontherocks.com/2015/11/how-the-islamic-states-favorite-strategy-book-explains-recent-terrorist-attacks/?
davidbfpo
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