Was Rep. Murtha right?

[Hansmeister]

I don't think we're trying to bring them up to our level, but train them adequately for the mission at hand. If we unleash them too soon we could have a pr nightmare on our hands if they resolve to use a typical arab way of dealing with dissent, by committing a massacre.

They are already handed more and more responsibility as is, so I don't really see a need to change course at this time.

Oh, and it is Congressman Murtha, not Senator.

[CPT Holzbach]

Bill Moore makes a convincing case for our pullback out of the cities. As Ive said elsewhere, I would like to see a CAP type program instituted, rather than just a scattering of advisers. The problem is really assessing an ISF unit. Its still questionable how many would stand in a Fallujah type battle. There are many who would, some who wouldnt. Because of militia infiltration, some units would evaporate if ordered to fight by the government, but told to stand down by their imam or sheik or whoever. They will listen to their religious and tribal leaders before the government. One of the best things we can do to strengthen the ISF is get those community leaders on board. Now, there are undoubtably things that the ISF do better than us. When it comes to counter-insurgency, they know the score. Ive heard of civilians throwing those guys a few hand gestures, and the ISF suddenly charge into a house and drag out the sh*thead they were lookin for. A lot of people here really do want to help, but theyre afraid to because we have failed to provide security for them. But the ISF, they can go in plain cloths and talk to people. There was one dude who spent his week of leave riding a donkey cart around Salman Pak to stake out some insurgent cell. Did it on his own free time. A lot of the ISF really seem to ENJOY the counter-insurgency sneaky squirrel stuff. And a lot of them are highly motivated. If they can stack the deck in their favor, they'll fight like lions. I led my platoon on plenty of cordon and knocks/searches and came up with nothing. But the ISF have a far better track record, because theyre locals. I think if let them, they could really smoke the insurgents. Only the most hardcore fighters in heavy urban combat can scare away the ISF.

[DDilegge]

Congressman Murtha's plan (points) for Iraq:

1. Immediately redeploy U.S. troops consistent with the safety of U.S. forces.

2. Create a quick reaction force in the region.

3. Create an over- the- horizon presence of Marines.

4. Diplomatically pursue security and stability in Iraq.

I cannot agree with Murtha's proposal to "immediately redeploy" U.S. troops if it means a complete withdraw from Iraq. Moreover, his caveat (point 1) of redeploying to an area consistent with the safety of U.S. forces is quite ambiguous and could mean anything from Fort Apache type bases in-country to a complete redeployment to home bases. Neither option contributes to a favorable end-state in Iraq.

The implication of Congressman Murtha’s point is that force protection is the focus of main effort. Force protection as a friendly center of gravity has never won battles nor contributed to winning a war. Force protection is inherent in all operations we conduct and must be looked at as risk vs. gain – not as the mission statement, not as a specified task nor an implied task. The trick here is to define the desired end-state and the lines of operations that, if successfully accomplished, lead to achieving that end-state. A part of the lines of operations analysis addresses risk vs. gain and naturally includes force protection.

In consideration of points two and three in his plan; create a quick reaction force in the region and create an over-the-horizon Marine presence – again, fairly ambiguous statements. A quick reaction force is a desirable and normally planned for capability in any military operation.

The bottom line here is “quick” and able to “react” decisively. The QRF cannot be, either real or perceived, an impotent force laying in wait while a thinking and adaptive enemy conducts an intelligence preparation of that battlefield and concludes their actions can be conducted decisively before a decision to commit the QRF is made, the QRF can be properly in-briefed on the situation (actionable intelligence), deployed and decisively engage the enemy. Our enemy is acting on the tactical level and desires our forces to “react” rather than act. This is a “boots on the ground war”, the implication that a regional quick reaction force may be successful is wishful thinking and a throwback to the Cold War era when the U.S. and our NATO allies could template the two-up and one-back doctrine and tactics of our Soviet foe should they attempt a punch-through in the Fulda Gap.

On an over-the-horizon Marine presence – we have that now – wherever our National Command Authority wants it. That said - I assume Congressman Murtha is considering such a presence as being afloat and stationed in the Persian Gulf. This proposal has the same drawbacks I addressed in the discussion on the QRF, compounded.

A sea-based over-the-horizon capability is a good thing, a very good thing. But there are limitations - fine if your destination is Basra or even maybe Nasiriya, but complicated at best if your final destination might be Baghdad, the volatile An Anbar province or even further north in such urban areas as Tikrit, Mosul and Kirkuk. We are talking distances that range 300 – 500 miles. I submit that this would be a bridge too far.

Considering Congressman Murtha’s fourth point - diplomatically pursue security and stability in Iraq. I will be the first to jump on the bandwagon – especially when our Congress properly funds and otherwise resources our sister departments / agencies to ensure that their full capabilities can be brought to bear to ensure all elements of our national power are executed and coordinated. Unity of command comes to mind here.

This means pushing those capabilities and resources out of “inside the beltway” and the Combatant Commander level down to the tactical level - where decisive military, political, economic, security, cultural, and information actions make a difference.

We are building a legacy of attempting to build from the top – down. Fine if you just defeated Nazi Germany – not so fine if you just placed a tribal centered culture into a situation of no central control and removed all elements of what might have been considered “normal” in that culture only hours / days after crossing the LOD…

In summation, and to avoid writing a tome here, I’ve addressed what I consider the weak points in Congressman Murtha’s plan. Next post – after I finish researching tomorrow’s SWJ news links – will be some suggestions to address the issues that Murtha posed.

[Jedburgh]

This was published by the Strategic Studies Institute in Oct:

Precedents, Variables, and Options in Planning a U.S. Military Disengagement Strategy from Iraq

Here are Drs Terrill and Crane's points from the Conclusion:

1. U.S. Government leaders must never forget that the United States will achieve its key objectives once the Iraqi government is viewed by the majority of its people, regardless of sect or ethnicity, as a legitimate government that is worth fighting and dying for; and the Iraqi security forces have the training, know-how, and equipment to put these convictions into practice.

2. The United States must develop detailed plans for implementing a withdrawal of significant numbers of troops under a variety of much less than optimal conditions.

3. U.S. military and intelligence leaders must be painfully honest in addressing the question of when Iraqi security forces will be able to function without a coalition troop presence to prop them up.

4. Senior U.S. military leaders must resist the view that they are “grading themselves” when they are asked to train the security forces and to evaluate Iraqi readiness to assume more expanded duties for military and security operations.

5. The United States MUST NOT establish a timetable to withdraw from Iraq so long as U.S. leaders consider the situation in Iraq to be redeemable.

6. As a last resort for preventing near-term civil war, the United States may have to swallow the bitter pill of allowing local militias to retain a significant and ongoing role in Iraqi politics if the Iraqi government is interested in pursuing this option and if the Iraqi security forces cannot take full responsibility for the nation’s safety.

7. The United States needs to renounce interest in permanent bases in Iraq on a strong and continuing basis.

8. The United States needs to deemphasize rhetoric that may cause Iraqi citizens to believe their government has been put in place to wage war on U.S. enemies in the Muslim World and otherwise serve U.S. interests.

9. U.S. leadership must recognize that it may still continue to support democracy after U.S. forces are withdrawn from Iraq, providing that the nation is stable when it leaves.

10. U.S. leaders should continually note the courage, commitment, and sacrifice of our troops in the field, while realizing that these same qualities are reasons to safeguard their lives even more carefully.

[Strickland]

Excellent question for discussion...here are my two cents:

While I agree that announcing a timeline for withdrawing our forces would be a mistake at this point, I must agree with one of the earlier comments that the insurgents don’t want us to leave.

1. In an attempt to positively influence public opinion, the United States should admit mistakes in the course of pacification, articulate a clear course of action with goals and milestones, and “break the code” on US force levels in Iraq, so that the public actually knows what 145,000 troops equals in terms of actual trigger pullers. The actual number of trigger pullers is approx. 37,000, or roughly the same size as the NYC Police force. We need to demonstrate our national will and public support for this endeavor.
2. We need to let the public have its way in a manner that also supports our campaign in Iraq. While it is true that we have 145,000 troops in Iraq, most of these are support, and not actually trigger pullers. I believe that it is possible to bring more trigger pullers into Iraq, while decreasing our foot-print, and decreasing the numbers of non-essential support personnel. This is also an area where we could employ more contractors. We need to pull as many National Guard troops (currently 7 brigades worth) out of Iraq.
3. We need to establish a CORDS-like pacification command under MNF-I. This command should employ methods such as the USMC CAPs, Hamlet Evaluation System, and Colby’s Accelerated Pacification Camapign of 1968-1969. We should also aggressively implement a Phoenix-type program to go after the insurgent infrastructure, regardless of its current state of development. This group should further focus on addressing grievances: food, water, electricity, agricultural assitance, etc.
4. We should take full advantage of the Shi’ite and Kurdish militias, and utilize them as Popular and Regional Forces were used in Vietnam. I trust that Sunni terrorists/insurgents are more fearful of the Peshmerga Militia than they are of the National Guard.
5. We need to provide a “way-out” or alternative to the insurgents through a program of general amnesty. We should try to utilize as many of these folks as ISF or counter-gangs as possible.
6. On the diplomacy front, we should seek Indian, Chinese, and increased Japanese assistance, for these are the countries that will benefit from Iraqi oil, not the US. We need to continue to pressure the Saudis, Syrians, and Jordanians to secure their borders. We should not discourage Iranian involvement in the Shi’ite dominated areas. Having Najaf return as the center of Shi’a Islam in place of Qom, Iran may not be a bad thing, and may help infuse Iranians to seek reform.
7. We should shake up the current mission assignments in Iraq to give the USMC Baghdad, and the Mech Infantry dominated Army the responsibility for Al Anbar.
8. We should turn over areas and missions as quickly as humanly possible to the 130 Iraqi Battalions that are stood up currently. These do not have to be trained to the standard of US Soldiers or Marines. These units should be integrated with US personnel to continue to train and support them in garrison and the field. You should add one USMC or USA rifle company to each ISF Battalion.
9. In an attempt to influence Iraqis and Muslims across the region, we should stop focusing on democracy, and focus on justice. Justice for all versus democracy for all should be our message.

". . . make a display of a mass of troops proportioned to the obstacles and resistance likely to be encountered, calm the popluar passions in every possible way, exhaust them by time and patience, display courtesey, gentleness, and severity united, and particularly, deal justly." - Jomini