Was Rep. Murtha right?

[Bill Moore]

Sen Murtha set off a superficial debate over the Iraq War in Congress that was disguised as a heated debate. Unfortunately what should have been a lively debate on strategy degenerated into a simple debate between stay the course and turn tail and run. With the exception of a few extreme left leaning folks, our fellow citizens want to see us win in Iraq; however, continued support for the war will depend on articulating a strategy that resonates with both the American and Iraqi people. Both the “turn tail and run” and “stay the course” strategies do not offer much hope.

Sen. Murtha didn’t say turn tail and run, he said pull back. There is a significant difference, and it should at least be discussed from a strategy perspective. He also stated that the military did all it could do, (paraphrasing) and now the military was becoming part of the problem.

Going back to a discussion we were having elsewhere on this site, could a pull back of conventional forces from urban areas in Iraq actually be a moral offensive? This argument has been put forth by many people. Our presence in urban areas is frequently an antithesis to security. Our forces are constantly attacked and the collateral damage is high. Even when we kill one incident civilian the IO impact is extreme. The terrorists purposely target civilians and the blame still comes back to us to bear because we’re there in the first place. It is twisted logic, but that is what we must contend with. We have to deal with the world as it is, not the way we want it to be.

The real question then is what happens if we pull our forces out of the urban areas (minus a few advisors), and turn it over to Iraqi security forces?

1. If the terrorists/insurgents target them, then the argument can now be made they’re targeting the Iraqi people, and then it is possible (even probable) that the terrorists/insurgents will rapidly get to the tipping point and experience a cascading IO defeat. I’m not convinced that the Iraqi forces can’t defeat these guys, “if” they fight them with their rules. It may be ugly at first, but in the long run there would be fewer casualties. The Iraqis can keep the press out, minus a few hidden cameras that will inevitably get through. In the Washington Post today there is an article where the Shiite’s are asking for more leeway in fighting the insurgents. Here are a couple of key excerpts from that article: (note these are from a key Shi’te with an agenda, but I’m sure Kurds have similar thoughts, and some Sunni’s who desire to have a stable Iraq)

“The Americans are guilty of "major interference, and preventing the forces of the Interior or Defense ministries from carrying out tasks they are capable of doing, and also in the way they are dealing with the terrorists," Hakim charged.
He also urged the United States to take a tougher stand against countries harboring insurgents and their supporters, and called for faster trials of insurgent suspects.
The United States was being too weak against Iraq's insurgency, allowing attacks to mushroom. There are plans to confront terrorists, approved by security agencies, but the Americans reject that," Hakim said. "Because of that mistaken policy, we have lost a lot.
"For instance, the ministries of Interior and Defense want to carry out some operations to clean out some areas" in Baghdad and around the country, including the volatile Anbar province, in the west, he said. "There were plans that should have been implemented months ago, but American officials and forces rejected them," he said. "This has led to the expansion of terrorism.
"We have a capacity to move more quickly than currently," he said. Hakim charged that the United States, evidently fearful of alienating Sunnis, was blocking the arrests of Sunni political leaders who had ties to insurgents. "The mixing of security and political issues" was just another U.S. mistake, he said. "Terrorists should know there would be no dealing with them."End of excerpts

While not trying to be melodramatic, we seemed to have forgot that war is hell, and that someone will lose. I sometimes wonder if our sense of political correctness has invaded our strategy policy due to our attempts to baby the Sunni as they continue to wage a bloody terrorist campaign against our troops and the citizens of Iraq. The Kurds and Shi’te can bring the Sunni to the negotiating table much quicker than we can. While simplistic, it is a perfect example of being cruel to be kind.

2. If we pull back as defined above, then what role do our conventional forces provide? They are still required to be in proximity to back up the struggling Iraqi Security forces. Pull back is not retreating, it is strategically positioning for optimal effect. Furthermore, if we’re truly fighting a war on terror, then there will be no safe havens for terrorists, so conventional forces “could” be postured in an offensive manner on key border areas to eliminate those safe havens, which would do more to ensure the success of the Iraqi security forces than for us to attempt to provide security in the urban centers where we simply alienate the Iraqi people and feed the insurgency, and suffer casualties disproportionate to the effect we’re achieving. Using conventional forces to pacify areas such as Falujah is appropriate, but these areas must rapidly be turned over to Iraqi Security Forces, then our fighting units pull back to refit for the next fight.

Now going back to SEN Murpha’s plan of pulling back (not retreating) so many days after the election, is it such a bad idea? While I expect a heated conversation on this, I ask the readers not to degenerate to slander and to stay focused on a strategy that will get us to victory. If you don’t think it work, then state why? This wasn’t done on the hill.

[Martin]

Mr Moore: What do you think about the militias' assertiveness in case of a pull back?

Martin

[Hansmeister]

We should and we will pull back and give the Iraqis the lead in combating the terrorists, but we'll do it when we judge the Iraqis to be ready, not on an artificial timeline imposed by political fiat based on opinion polls.

[Bill Moore]

Our faulty assumption is that we think we must wait until the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are at some standard of readiness that only makes sense in the West before we step back. The only reason they're not ready is that we're trying to make them like us, and to maneuver them like Western military forces. It's time to get a grip on reality and realize that they're not western forces, but they're good enough, and in some ways better for dealing with the security problem at hand.

Forget the so called ISF readiness pre-conditions, since these preconditions change constantly depending on what way the political wind is blowing in Washington. Cut them lose to fight now before the threat increases in sophistication. The problem isn't their ability to fight, it is that we're handicapping their tactics. You really don't think Arabs know how to deal with terrorists?

This isn't a call to end training, we can continue to march down this road, but stop trying to produce a Western standard Army.

What the ISF needs now besides continued training, is logisitcs support. They also need us to get out of the way, so they can solve their problem without us tying their arms behind their backs with our rules. It will get messy for a while, but it will also get to an end point.

The sooner we fall back to a QRF and supporting role, and put the ISF up front the better for all concerned. This option will take the ideolgical wind out of the insurgent's sails. If they're not fighting an occupying power, just what are they fighting for? The terrorists will fight on for Sharia Law, but the Iraqi people will reject them and more than likely kill them.

The terrorists don't want us to pull out, that is why they continue to target the ISF. They know if we pull out and the ISF leads the fight, their days are numbered. Pulling our forces back, again back, not out of the fight, will once again put us in the position we desire to be in, that of the liberater.

The conventional military should focus its combat power on key centers of gravity that will have an impact on the terrorist and insurgent ability to continue the fight. A QRF to crush any insurgents foolish enough to mass to engage ISF is important. More importantly, our forces need to be positioned to destroy cross border safe havens. Why do we allow our fighting men and women to be killed, and allow Iraqi citizens murdered by terrorists with safe havens in Syria and Iran? Again, we have to ask ourselves if we are fighting a war on a global war on terrorism or not?

In a more perfect world, the ISF is taking care of their problems, we're simply setting conditions for their success by sealing the borders and providing logistical support. Let them fight by their rules, so no imbeded press.

As for the militias being controlled, that is a problem that will have to be solved down the road. Right now the militias could actually be used to strike terror in the terrorist's hearts for a change. Once they have a political system in place that works, then the militias can eventually be put away. I'm not writing this problem off, because it is complex and serious, but it is secondary to addressing the main threat at the moment.

15 DEC is right around the corner, and the terrorists should be scared, because we stated we would pull back to a position of greater effect, instead of continuing with a strategy that plays into their hands. The ISF should be preparing for a near immediate transition to become the lead in the fight, because they "know" we're going to pull back to a supporting role on a specified date. Nothing like necessity to drive change.

[Hansmeister]

I don't think we're trying to bring them up to our level, but train them adequately for the mission at hand. If we unleash them too soon we could have a pr nightmare on our hands if they resolve to use a typical arab way of dealing with dissent, by committing a massacre.

They are already handed more and more responsibility as is, so I don't really see a need to change course at this time.

Oh, and it is Congressman Murtha, not Senator.

[CPT Holzbach]

Bill Moore makes a convincing case for our pullback out of the cities. As Ive said elsewhere, I would like to see a CAP type program instituted, rather than just a scattering of advisers. The problem is really assessing an ISF unit. Its still questionable how many would stand in a Fallujah type battle. There are many who would, some who wouldnt. Because of militia infiltration, some units would evaporate if ordered to fight by the government, but told to stand down by their imam or sheik or whoever. They will listen to their religious and tribal leaders before the government. One of the best things we can do to strengthen the ISF is get those community leaders on board. Now, there are undoubtably things that the ISF do better than us. When it comes to counter-insurgency, they know the score. Ive heard of civilians throwing those guys a few hand gestures, and the ISF suddenly charge into a house and drag out the sh*thead they were lookin for. A lot of people here really do want to help, but theyre afraid to because we have failed to provide security for them. But the ISF, they can go in plain cloths and talk to people. There was one dude who spent his week of leave riding a donkey cart around Salman Pak to stake out some insurgent cell. Did it on his own free time. A lot of the ISF really seem to ENJOY the counter-insurgency sneaky squirrel stuff. And a lot of them are highly motivated. If they can stack the deck in their favor, they'll fight like lions. I led my platoon on plenty of cordon and knocks/searches and came up with nothing. But the ISF have a far better track record, because theyre locals. I think if let them, they could really smoke the insurgents. Only the most hardcore fighters in heavy urban combat can scare away the ISF.

[DDilegge]

Congressman Murtha's plan (points) for Iraq:

1. Immediately redeploy U.S. troops consistent with the safety of U.S. forces.

2. Create a quick reaction force in the region.

3. Create an over- the- horizon presence of Marines.

4. Diplomatically pursue security and stability in Iraq.

I cannot agree with Murtha's proposal to "immediately redeploy" U.S. troops if it means a complete withdraw from Iraq. Moreover, his caveat (point 1) of redeploying to an area consistent with the safety of U.S. forces is quite ambiguous and could mean anything from Fort Apache type bases in-country to a complete redeployment to home bases. Neither option contributes to a favorable end-state in Iraq.

The implication of Congressman Murtha’s point is that force protection is the focus of main effort. Force protection as a friendly center of gravity has never won battles nor contributed to winning a war. Force protection is inherent in all operations we conduct and must be looked at as risk vs. gain – not as the mission statement, not as a specified task nor an implied task. The trick here is to define the desired end-state and the lines of operations that, if successfully accomplished, lead to achieving that end-state. A part of the lines of operations analysis addresses risk vs. gain and naturally includes force protection.

In consideration of points two and three in his plan; create a quick reaction force in the region and create an over-the-horizon Marine presence – again, fairly ambiguous statements. A quick reaction force is a desirable and normally planned for capability in any military operation.

The bottom line here is “quick” and able to “react” decisively. The QRF cannot be, either real or perceived, an impotent force laying in wait while a thinking and adaptive enemy conducts an intelligence preparation of that battlefield and concludes their actions can be conducted decisively before a decision to commit the QRF is made, the QRF can be properly in-briefed on the situation (actionable intelligence), deployed and decisively engage the enemy. Our enemy is acting on the tactical level and desires our forces to “react” rather than act. This is a “boots on the ground war”, the implication that a regional quick reaction force may be successful is wishful thinking and a throwback to the Cold War era when the U.S. and our NATO allies could template the two-up and one-back doctrine and tactics of our Soviet foe should they attempt a punch-through in the Fulda Gap.

On an over-the-horizon Marine presence – we have that now – wherever our National Command Authority wants it. That said - I assume Congressman Murtha is considering such a presence as being afloat and stationed in the Persian Gulf. This proposal has the same drawbacks I addressed in the discussion on the QRF, compounded.

A sea-based over-the-horizon capability is a good thing, a very good thing. But there are limitations - fine if your destination is Basra or even maybe Nasiriya, but complicated at best if your final destination might be Baghdad, the volatile An Anbar province or even further north in such urban areas as Tikrit, Mosul and Kirkuk. We are talking distances that range 300 – 500 miles. I submit that this would be a bridge too far.

Considering Congressman Murtha’s fourth point - diplomatically pursue security and stability in Iraq. I will be the first to jump on the bandwagon – especially when our Congress properly funds and otherwise resources our sister departments / agencies to ensure that their full capabilities can be brought to bear to ensure all elements of our national power are executed and coordinated. Unity of command comes to mind here.

This means pushing those capabilities and resources out of “inside the beltway” and the Combatant Commander level down to the tactical level - where decisive military, political, economic, security, cultural, and information actions make a difference.

We are building a legacy of attempting to build from the top – down. Fine if you just defeated Nazi Germany – not so fine if you just placed a tribal centered culture into a situation of no central control and removed all elements of what might have been considered “normal” in that culture only hours / days after crossing the LOD…

In summation, and to avoid writing a tome here, I’ve addressed what I consider the weak points in Congressman Murtha’s plan. Next post – after I finish researching tomorrow’s SWJ news links – will be some suggestions to address the issues that Murtha posed.

[Jedburgh]

This was published by the Strategic Studies Institute in Oct:

Precedents, Variables, and Options in Planning a U.S. Military Disengagement Strategy from Iraq

Here are Drs Terrill and Crane's points from the Conclusion:

1. U.S. Government leaders must never forget that the United States will achieve its key objectives once the Iraqi government is viewed by the majority of its people, regardless of sect or ethnicity, as a legitimate government that is worth fighting and dying for; and the Iraqi security forces have the training, know-how, and equipment to put these convictions into practice.

2. The United States must develop detailed plans for implementing a withdrawal of significant numbers of troops under a variety of much less than optimal conditions.

3. U.S. military and intelligence leaders must be painfully honest in addressing the question of when Iraqi security forces will be able to function without a coalition troop presence to prop them up.

4. Senior U.S. military leaders must resist the view that they are “grading themselves” when they are asked to train the security forces and to evaluate Iraqi readiness to assume more expanded duties for military and security operations.

5. The United States MUST NOT establish a timetable to withdraw from Iraq so long as U.S. leaders consider the situation in Iraq to be redeemable.

6. As a last resort for preventing near-term civil war, the United States may have to swallow the bitter pill of allowing local militias to retain a significant and ongoing role in Iraqi politics if the Iraqi government is interested in pursuing this option and if the Iraqi security forces cannot take full responsibility for the nation’s safety.

7. The United States needs to renounce interest in permanent bases in Iraq on a strong and continuing basis.

8. The United States needs to deemphasize rhetoric that may cause Iraqi citizens to believe their government has been put in place to wage war on U.S. enemies in the Muslim World and otherwise serve U.S. interests.

9. U.S. leadership must recognize that it may still continue to support democracy after U.S. forces are withdrawn from Iraq, providing that the nation is stable when it leaves.

10. U.S. leaders should continually note the courage, commitment, and sacrifice of our troops in the field, while realizing that these same qualities are reasons to safeguard their lives even more carefully.

[Strickland]

Excellent question for discussion...here are my two cents:

While I agree that announcing a timeline for withdrawing our forces would be a mistake at this point, I must agree with one of the earlier comments that the insurgents don’t want us to leave.

1. In an attempt to positively influence public opinion, the United States should admit mistakes in the course of pacification, articulate a clear course of action with goals and milestones, and “break the code” on US force levels in Iraq, so that the public actually knows what 145,000 troops equals in terms of actual trigger pullers. The actual number of trigger pullers is approx. 37,000, or roughly the same size as the NYC Police force. We need to demonstrate our national will and public support for this endeavor.
2. We need to let the public have its way in a manner that also supports our campaign in Iraq. While it is true that we have 145,000 troops in Iraq, most of these are support, and not actually trigger pullers. I believe that it is possible to bring more trigger pullers into Iraq, while decreasing our foot-print, and decreasing the numbers of non-essential support personnel. This is also an area where we could employ more contractors. We need to pull as many National Guard troops (currently 7 brigades worth) out of Iraq.
3. We need to establish a CORDS-like pacification command under MNF-I. This command should employ methods such as the USMC CAPs, Hamlet Evaluation System, and Colby’s Accelerated Pacification Camapign of 1968-1969. We should also aggressively implement a Phoenix-type program to go after the insurgent infrastructure, regardless of its current state of development. This group should further focus on addressing grievances: food, water, electricity, agricultural assitance, etc.
4. We should take full advantage of the Shi’ite and Kurdish militias, and utilize them as Popular and Regional Forces were used in Vietnam. I trust that Sunni terrorists/insurgents are more fearful of the Peshmerga Militia than they are of the National Guard.
5. We need to provide a “way-out” or alternative to the insurgents through a program of general amnesty. We should try to utilize as many of these folks as ISF or counter-gangs as possible.
6. On the diplomacy front, we should seek Indian, Chinese, and increased Japanese assistance, for these are the countries that will benefit from Iraqi oil, not the US. We need to continue to pressure the Saudis, Syrians, and Jordanians to secure their borders. We should not discourage Iranian involvement in the Shi’ite dominated areas. Having Najaf return as the center of Shi’a Islam in place of Qom, Iran may not be a bad thing, and may help infuse Iranians to seek reform.
7. We should shake up the current mission assignments in Iraq to give the USMC Baghdad, and the Mech Infantry dominated Army the responsibility for Al Anbar.
8. We should turn over areas and missions as quickly as humanly possible to the 130 Iraqi Battalions that are stood up currently. These do not have to be trained to the standard of US Soldiers or Marines. These units should be integrated with US personnel to continue to train and support them in garrison and the field. You should add one USMC or USA rifle company to each ISF Battalion.
9. In an attempt to influence Iraqis and Muslims across the region, we should stop focusing on democracy, and focus on justice. Justice for all versus democracy for all should be our message.

". . . make a display of a mass of troops proportioned to the obstacles and resistance likely to be encountered, calm the popluar passions in every possible way, exhaust them by time and patience, display courtesey, gentleness, and severity united, and particularly, deal justly." - Jomini

[Tom Odom]

To quote Bill Moore
"Here are a couple of key excerpts from that article: (note these are from a key Shi’te with an agenda, but I’m sure Kurds have similar thoughts, and some Sunni’s who desire to have a stable Iraq)

“The Americans are guilty of "major interference, and preventing the forces of the Interior or Defense ministries from carrying out tasks they are capable of doing, and also in the way they are dealing with the terrorists," Hakim charged.
He also urged the United States to take a tougher stand against countries harboring insurgents and their supporters, and called for faster trials of insurgent suspects.
The United States was being too weak against Iraq's insurgency, allowing attacks to mushroom. There are plans to confront terrorists, approved by security agencies, but the Americans reject that," Hakim said. "Because of that mistaken policy, we have lost a lot.
"For instance, the ministries of Interior and Defense want to carry out some operations to clean out some areas" in Baghdad and around the country, including the volatile Anbar province, in the west, he said. "There were plans that should have been implemented months ago, but American officials and forces rejected them," he said. "This has led to the expansion of terrorism.
"We have a capacity to move more quickly than currently," he said. Hakim charged that the United States, evidently fearful of alienating Sunnis, was blocking the arrests of Sunni political leaders who had ties to insurgents. "The mixing of security and political issues" was just another U.S. mistake, he said. "Terrorists should know there would be no dealing with them."End of excerpts end of Bill's quote.

This discussion hinges to my mind on a key word that Bill Moore used, that is "agenda." Admittedly I am pretty much limited to assessing what goes on these days via media, open forums, and veterans. The reason I say agenda is key is simple: the Shia gentlemen quoted above would undoubtedly like to take the gloves off in Anbar Province. The Interior Ministry according to some has become aligned with the Badr Brigade. The spate of Sunni killings laid at their door step is not surprising. As for the Kurds, agenda is certainly operative; happily it has been in line with that of the Coalition, albeit with some significant hiccups in power sharing with the Arabs.

When I dicuss cultural awareness with O/Cs here I always offer my 2 base rules on cultural awarness derived from 15 years as a FAO:

a. Remember always they do not think like you do

b. Remember always that they always have an agenda in all their dealings with you

Admittedly that is hardly rocket science but it has stood me in good stead. As those 2 rules relate to this discussion, I believe that agendas stand to disrupt what we apparently see as victory. A unified stable democracy seems attractive to us; per rule a. I believe that is hardly the case from the viewpoint of any of the components in Iraq's ethnic and religious salad.

With that in mind, pull back may work if we are willing to allow the frictions to work themselves out. That process will not be neat. I still believe that we will ultimately see a Balkanization process take hold with 3 semi-independent states under a nominally central government. The alternatives are indeed less desireable.

Best all,
Tom

[DDilegge]

In a previous post I outlined what I believe are the flaws in Rep. Murtha’s plan. Most of the argument I presented centered on the ambiguity of his proposal, not a mention of this in the Mainstream Media (MSM) to date. Yet, the MSM was quick as lightening in claiming the President’s National Strategy for Victory in Iraq was vague. Go figure…

All that said and with an attempt not to digress, I offer these bullets on what I would like to see referencing our efforts in Iraq.

• Tooth-to-Tail: Reduce non-essential support troops and staffs. Reduce overall troop commitment while increasing trigger-pullers and other essential BOS-related personnel – civil affairs and PYSOP comes to mind here.

• Combined Action Program: CAP-like program implemented (see previous posts and threads for discussion). What I add is the CAP personnel would be on a one-year staggered individual rotation to ensure continuity of relationships and avoid “abrupt turnovers” with Iraqi forces a particular CAP unit is embedded with. Offer a significant pay-bonus to high-performer CAP personnel who sign on for an extended tour. All CAP units must have the authority to conduct forward air-control.

• Quick Reaction Force: In-country combined arms QRF. Suitable to rapidly deploy and capable of conducting “precision” urban operations. Must be repeatedly / randomly employed in a “pre-emptive” manner to ensure operations are more than “reactive” and to get within the enemy’s decision-making cycle. Pre-emptive and “show of force” operations must be accompanied by significant information and humanitarian – good will actions.

• Border Security: Okay, okay, we can’t even secure our own southern border. Still, the Syrian and Iranian (Saudi Arabian too) borders must be policed to ensure free passage of legitimate traffic and blocked at all costs to terrorist transit and logistics-related activities. Most likely scenario is the preponderance of the ground forces are Iraqi (with US embeds) backed by US air assets in a reconnaissance / surveillance and strike capacity. UAVs are a must here.

• Information Operations: Drop the whole term (IO) and do it right. Be upfront and attempt to influence through media venues directly attributed to the US and yet popular with the local population. If Hollywood and Madison Avenue can get it right I opine the Department that invented the Internet (sorry Mr. Gore) can too. Getting the right and truthful word out must also extend to CONUS. We are being defeated by US and international press coverage in the sheer volume of “if it bleeds, it leads” articles and news spots. Moreover, the DoD must devote a significant effort to “fact checking” each and every MSM article that is blatantly false or implies a position that does not mirror “ground truth”. Right now it is ###-for-tat; DoD releases five or so positive articles to the hundreds released by the MSM. Now is the time to take the MSM to task. While some may think this extreme – many MSM articles, editorials and opinion pieces are indirectly (and with some - directly) “aiding and abetting” our nation’s enemies. Bottom-line – call them on this, often and prominently.

• “No Better Friend, No Worse Enemy”: General Mattis’ guidance still holds true and needs to be ingrained at every level of command. That said, no worse enemy must be brutal and decisive. We aren’t in Kansas anymore and our actions, velvet glove and the stick, go a long way in at least aiding our information campaign. Operating in a tribal culture such as Iraq, the stick must sting and sting hard and the recipients of the sting must include those aiding and abetting our terrorist foes. The velvet glove must be extended after careful consideration, the alliances we make often seem to backfire in the long run. Still, we must reward our allies and punish our foes with consistency (everyone knows the score) and decisiveness.

[joegregg]

the discussion has / is very detailed here. i am just a bit intimidated to join in but will give it a shot.

Yes the insurgents, in my estimation, are very afraid of the Shia and Kurd militas going after them. The gloves will come off and the insurgents along with many other sunnis will pay the price. The problem comes when the sunni minority sees that they are being brutalized and decides they must fight back.

Our worst case scenario is a failed state with an enduring civil war. See Lebanon times 20. Continued training, mostly in restraint and rule of law, to develop a professional military instead of armed gangs and assination squads is the only way out that is favorable to the US. El Salvador is an example of what can go wrong when militias are unleashed. I think the availability of weaponry and large condensed population centers would make it much worse than anywhere in central America.

[Strickland]

The argument about creating a failed State in Iraq is an interesting one. Would there be some benefits to Iraq devolving into civil war or a semi-failed State such as Lebanon post 1975? While it could possibly create a vortex that attracts jihaadists from around the globe, it would undeniably force other countries in the region such as Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia to come to grips with fundamentalism, and perhaps destroy it. By pulling jihaadists in from around the globe, it would also create a situation where it was easier to identify who was coming from where to go to Iraq. It could also provide a useful tool to destabilize the Iranians. The oil coming out of Iraq goes to China, India, and Japan, and thus, if a civil war was to occur, maybe it would force others in the international community to take action.

[Stu-6]

I am curious why you think it would force other countries in the region such as Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia to come to grips with fundamentalism, and perhaps destroy it? I also am skeptical about the idea of it destabilizing Iran, if for no other reason than it would keep oil prices very high which would in turn pump billions into the hands of the Iranian leadership.

[Strickland]

I am curious why you think it would force other countries in the region such as Egypt, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia to come to grips with fundamentalism, and perhaps destroy it? I also am skeptical about the idea of it destabilizing Iran, if for no other reason than it would keep oil prices very high which would in turn pump billions into the hands of the Iranian leadership.

Admittedly, the previous assertion was provided only to stimulate additional thought. However, I do not believe that the moderate regime in Turkey seeking European favor, or Mubarrak's would tolerate the presence of any State that would destabilize either. I cannot imagine that Mubarrak would tolerate the presence of any group providing assistance to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, or creating additional problems with the Sudanese that would spill into Egypt. I would further assert that the Saudi Royal Family, regardless of their personal fundamentalism, would not tolerate any group or potential threat to their hold on power and wealth in the Kingdom. Due to the fact a failed State would surely attract radical elements from Pakistan that would return to destabilize Musharref's Regime, I trust he would deal harshly with the threat as well.

Hopefully, nations such as China, India, and Japan that are dependent on Middle East oil would recognize the need to protect this resource, and step in as a security force. Surely, these nations would be subject to the same terrorist acts, casualites, etc., and thus would potentially partner with the US to bring the GWOT to a successful conclusion.

As for the Iranians, their oil and natural gas resources are such that they will always have the means to purchase wepaons, or assist the militias in Lebanon / Palestine. We have tried to deal with them by cutting off diplomatic relations since 1979, and this course of action has failed. We can only hope that the US chooses the "reasonable man" approach with them, re-opens our embassay in Tehran, and influences the Iranians to spend money on internal projects.

[Stu-6]

I have no doubt that the regimes of both Egypt and Saudi Arabia would like most of the radical Islamist to go away I just question whether they would be willing to alienate their supports who are more sympathetic to groups like the Muslim Brothers. Also I would wonder how effective they would be if they tried to move against the fundamentalist.

I agree completely about taking a "reasonable man" approach with Iran, but I don’t see it happening anytime soon.