Palestine and British COIN (catch all)

[Bill Moore]

One thing seems to be clear, for an terrorist action or insurgency to work it has to have two components: the first is the fighters who are willing to kill military and innocents alike in order to undermine whatever authority is currently in power, and a "legitimate" component that is works within the accepted political framework to offer a "solution" to the problems.

Wouldn't that depend upon their goal? A criminal organization may conduct terrorism to effect state capture (yes that is a political objective) to facilitate their criminal/economic activity. They don't require a legitimate framework to achieve their goals, they simply need to coerce the government and population. IS on the other hand used terrorism to establish territorial control and establish control of the population. If we really stretch our imagination we could call their government structure legitimate, but I'll pass on that.

One also needs to describe effective in a temporal context. I recall similar voices that Assad's government would fail years ago, that ISIS would collapse upon itself, etc. That may all prove to be true, but for now their versions of terrorism has worked to achieve their goals. The USSR used terrorism to control their population, it took over 50 years for their political system to collapse.

We Americans tend to have a nave view of the world based on how we perceive our history, and our so called natural and universal laws. The real world can be quite rough, and rough works when you're the roughest. It may or may not result in an enduring solution, but history speaks for itself if we would only listen. Fortunately we have a system in place that at least currently prevents control of the populace and government through terrorist tactics, but that truth doesn't apply everywhere in the world.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Bill,

I don't subscribe to the idea that criminal organizations engage in political terrorism. There motivation is usually monetary gain, not forming or reforming a political entity. If they do engage in acts that involve terror, like extortion, their motivation is not political.

I did not believe that Asad would fall easily, but I must admit that ISIS was unexpected and I totally misjudged them.

While I normally would agree with you on our Western bias, here is the one time that the Western bias matters. I have written elsewhere that there are three levels of legitimacy. The first level is the legitimacy of the individual leader - did he gain power through the appropriate channels and is he ruling according to the dictates of society. The second is the legitimacy of the system - does the system follow the expectations of the population. The third level is legitimacy between states - does the international community see the government as legitimate. ISIS may be the defacto government of a swath of northern Iraq and western Syria, but unless the Western world accepts them as a real, legitimate government. That requires another element, some organization that can give ISIS, or any other group, legitimacy amongst it's peers - other States. That is just a fact.

[Mike in Hilo]

No question these groups undermined the Mandate and likely heightened the Labor Government's resolve to disengage...But the pertinent question, I think, is would such terrorist tactics have worked had Palestine not been ruled by a liberal democracy; and moreover, one which was broke and beholden to a US not reluctant to exert pro-Jewish pressure--a US in which the Truman Administration and congressional Democrats were slipping into an increasingly pro-Zionist stance. Notably, substantial numbers of Palestine Police transferred to Malaya, where they were less constrained (and more successful) in countering terrorism...

Cheers,
Mike.

[Bill Moore]

I don't subscribe to the idea that criminal organizations engage in political terrorism. There motivation is usually monetary gain, not forming or reforming a political entity.

This has probably always been a false assumption, but it is certainly a false assumption today. Political power is political power regardless of the reason one seeks it. It is a false dichotomy to claim terrorists are political and criminals are profit motivated. That line only exists in our academic world, it is a line drawn to support bureaucratic rice bowls (who owns the problem and who gets the funding to deal with it). If terrorism is directed against the citizens and/or the government it is political. Political motivation can be quite varied, thus the character of the terrorism can vary significantly, but at the end of the day they often both have political aims. We have an outdated lexicon from the Cold War that no longer accurately describes the world we live in today (if it ever did).

Mike,

would such terrorist tactics have worked had Palestine not been ruled by a liberal democracy; and moreover, one which was broke and beholden to a US not reluctant to exert pro-Jewish pressure--a US in which the Truman Administration and congressional Democrats were slipping into an increasingly pro-Zionist stance. Notably, substantial numbers of Palestine Police transferred to Malaya, where they were less constrained (and more successful) in countering terrorism...

I'm not as familiar with this history as I should be. Are you arguing that liberal democracies are more vulnerable to terrorism than other forms of government? Regarding your point about Malaya, it seems you're arguing that countries willing to implement rather severe population control measures are more successful than countries that won't. That seems logical, but the West defeated a wide range of left leaning terrorist groups in Europe and the U.S. without implementing severe population control measures, so it seems there are more variables involved than this.

[Bob's World]

It is not about what the illegal actor wants that is important, it is WHY they want it. That is what determines both the nature of the problem and the nature of the cure. We tend to be far too symptomatic in our analysis. If something looks like problem A, apply solution A. The reality is that several types of problem might look like our symptomatic type A, each demanding a unique solution. This is the principle flaw in the AQAA construct and why the logic behind it has driven our strategic failure to date in dealing with illegal challenges to governance and stability

For example three broad categories of motivation for posing an illegal challenge to governance with very distinct natures demanding equally distinct solutions are:

1. Revolutionary insurgency to coerce change or illegally overthrow a domestic system of governance coming from an internal base of popular support. Largely a form of civil emergency, demanding a lead effort on the part of governance

2. Resistance insurgency to defeat or expel a foreign occupation (either physical or by manipulative policies). Typically a continuation of warfare demanding a lead effort on the part of military to defeat this segment of the population as one has likely already done with the government and security forces.

3. Profit motivated criminal activities designed to exploit some illicit market space with significant popular demand. This demands a blend of law enforcement and law reform to find the mix best for sustainable stability.

All three forms of motivation may be in the same place, the same organizations, and the same individual; and a smart governmental response appreciates the blend and creates an appropriately blended response as well.

[TheCurmudgeon]

It is not about what the illegal actor wants that is important, it is WHY they want it. That is what determines both the nature of the problem and the nature of the cure.

I agree wholeheartedly. I only wish that more people would examine these conflicts from the point of view of the motives of the actors.

It gets even stickier when the motive of the leaders is revolution or resistance, and the motivations of the average fighter is personal self-esteem or revenge.

[Mike in Hilo]

Tequila: Concur. Atlee's gov't was resolved to disengage from the area, for sure. I suggest Stern atrocities reenforced this (and perhaps accelerated the timetable).

While the empire wasn't run democratically, Jewish citizens back home in the UK did have recourse to the processes of democratic government to exert influence....although, arguably, US pressure was more effective in tipping the scales....The difference is striking between the ham-fisted punishment of civilians who abetted the (unsuccessful) Arab Palestine insurgency 1936-39 and the far gentler tactics employed vis-a-vis the Yishuv...

Bill Moore: My argument is indeed as you say...But my generic argument implies "ceteris paribus".....Each case has its variables, and they certainly make a difference.

Cheers,
Mike.

[Bill Moore]

I agree wholeheartedly. I only wish that more people would examine these conflicts from the point of view of the motives of the actors.

It gets even stickier when the motive of the leaders is revolution or resistance, and the motivations of the average fighter is personal self-esteem or revenge.

I think you would be hard pressed to make a case that we don't study these conflicts from the view point of the actors. What our liberal views tend to promote are that America is always wrong and inept, and we simply dismiss the nature of war which is a contest between two or more opponents where each attempts to "impose" their will upon the other. Furthermore, the result is never final, so the argument that we need to address underlying issues to get to a final solution can and is often overstated. We have objectives as a country that we have chose to use war to pursue, which means we recognize that our opponent's objectives are at odds with ours and we will have to use force to achieve them. It does not mean we don't understand their ends, in fact it is quite the opposite. If you disagree with why we went to war that is a different manner, but quite different from what you wrote.

This view of war is what has led to the myth that if we just give people jobs they'll quit fighting. PRTs became the main effort and the use of force to impose our will became a secondary manner. We created a condition where both approaches would fail. LTG McMasters is right that we have separated war from its nature, so understandably we seldom accomplish our objectives regardless of its duration and the amount of money we spend. I disagree with Bob that insurgency and COIN, and even CT are not war. They clearly are, but their character is very different than interstate war where the principle objective is to defeat that state's military forces, so we can impose our will upon them. War is inhumane and it shouldn't be our first choice to achieve our objectives. When we chose to use it as a tool, then we need use it correctly. While cruel, it is less cruel than dragging conflicts out forever with no end in sight. This multigenerational approach destroys societies.

[tequila]

No question these groups undermined the Mandate and likely heightened the Labor Government's resolve to disengage...But the pertinent question, I think, is would such terrorist tactics have worked had Palestine not been ruled by a liberal democracy; and moreover, one which was broke and beholden to a US not reluctant to exert pro-Jewish pressure--a US in which the Truman Administration and congressional Democrats were slipping into an increasingly pro-Zionist stance. Notably, substantial numbers of Palestine Police transferred to Malaya, where they were less constrained (and more successful) in countering terrorism...

Cheers,
Mike.

I think the question of motivation works here more so than the question of liberal democracy. The British were certainly not liberal democrats in the Empire, and Arabs and Jews were subjects, not citizens.

More important than that - the post WWII priorities of Britain were quite different from those of pre-WWII. The Empire was becoming a political and economic burden to an exhausted and bankrupt country. The motivation to "keep" Palestine, which contributed nothing but the threadbare prestige of Jerusalem, was lower than low. The Brits were on the way out even in India - Palestine was the sideshow of sideshows, and the British were glad to be shed of it.

[davidbfpo]

Bruce Hoffman has a short, recent article, partly based on his book:http://www.chroniclecareers.com/arti...-Works/190353/

Max Abrahms wrote this journal article in 2012 'The Political Effectiveness of Terrorism Revisited':https://www.academia.edu/1595455/_Th...es_March_2012_