Recognizing Distinct Types of Insurgency - "Know the type of conflict you are in."

[TheCurmudgeon]

So assistance without thought should be avoided. How long does it take for an advisory mission to really know the context?

Supplying copious amounts of CS gas for riot control is often an option before the level of insurgent / civil violence escalates.

Can diplomacy and NGO action get people on all sides to talk? Should an external actor open dialogue with all?

There is clearly a potential for any external actor to be identified as supporting the regime / nation-state. Is that clearly a plus?

I agree with being cautious, learning what is going on, not saying "you are either with us or against us," and taking your time in deciding how best to proceed. It may be that anything an external party does will simply exasperate the problem. Even an NGO that provides medical and food aid may simply be setting the conditions for the conflict to continue.

The identification of a third party outsider with one side or the other is a big problem. I am not sure there is anyone anymore who is truly neutral. I don’t even know if the UN can do it anymore.

[Bob's World]

What American leaders, policy and doctrine struggle to recognize, is that those affected by our actions care little for our good intentions.

We can appreciate why a Russian invasion of Afghanistan sparked a resistance insurgency against the Russian invaders and a revolutionary insurgency against the puppet regime they put in power; but we cannot fathom why the US invasion and installation of a puppet regime would create the exact same effect.

There will be matters of degree based on the character of one's actions, but the primary effect is rooted in human nature and driven by the nature of the action.

We must have an assumption that any occupation - be it a small unit doing a training event to build partner capacity, or a full blown regime change invasion - will spark some degree of resistance in some portion of the affected population. This is natural.

Likewise, we must have an assumption that any government we help to rise to power or to merely stay in power will spark some degree of revolutionary energy against them by some portion of the population. The greater the perceived popular illegitimacy of the government based on our actions, the greater the revolutionary energy and the broader it will be across the affected population. Again, this is natural.

Bottom line, is that American fecal matter is just as odiferous as anyone else's. Truth.

[Bill Moore]

We can appreciate why a Russian invasion of Afghanistan sparked a resistance insurgency against the Russian invaders and a revolutionary insurgency against the puppet regime they put in power; but we cannot fathom why the US invasion and installation of a puppet regime would create the exact same effect.

No truer words ever spoken, but if it is in our national interest (agree or disagree, it is the policy we have been given) to promote and protect the clown we put in charge, what's a girl to do?

[Bob's World]

Bill,

This gets to what I think "Whole of Government" really needs to mean: Not that we all pull together to try to sustain the unsustainable, or to fix the unfixable.

Rather, what it needs to mean is that we need to design feasible operations from the start at the policy level; and then work through all phases of execution to minimize the negative characteristics that will naturally occur due to the nature of our actions.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Bill Rather, what it needs to mean is that we need to design feasible operations from the start at the policy level; and then work through all phases of execution to minimize the negative characteristics that will naturally occur due to the nature of our actions.

So, how do we influence policy. I have been at the DA level for a couple of years now, and it seems like, if it is not a budget issue, it does not matter.

I guess I am asking - do you have any suggestions on how we influence the civilian side of the military-civilian relationship?

[Bob's World]

Who is the "honest broker"? That is a good question. I don't know. How does one be an honest broker when working within an organization that is by its very nature biased due to an overarching mission of advocating for a particular aspect of our total system?

That is like the proverbial camel making it through the eye of the needle. (the small gate in walled cites that could be opened at night after the main gate was closed).

The army is much more purely a war fighting service than any of the others. Particularly for maritime nations with no neighboring ground threat to have to respond rapidly to. So the army is on a quest for relevance that creates a tremendous bias. They seek to expand the definition of war. They seek to expand the perceived necessity for military engagement overseas in times of peace. They seek to sell a "land power" solution as to key to virtually every security problem.

It is little wonder our doctrine on conflict and war is so confused, when all of the cooks are working off of a different idea of what the proper solution looks like, and works mightily to craft the problem into the context of their respective solutions. Who is it that works to understand and frame problems for what they actually are?

The services like leaders and action officers who are grinders and who adhere strictly to the party line. Innovation is only wanted in the context of those two things. If you opt to be a thinker, then you will not be grinding as hard as your peers, and your thoughts will likely take you outside of the party lines. At that point you become a heretic and a pain in the neck, or even a threat, to those dedicated to head down grinding.

Know your boss, know your environment. Good bosses like good ideas and will know what they can and can't advance. It is a game of inches when all around you are running 100 miles per hour.

[Compost]

The Journal has a new item and slant on a recurring topic: ‘Reorganization is Imperative to Fixing Special Forces’ Bent Unconventional Culture’:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...tional-culture

The author focuses on language and linguistics as an important factor in the overall problem. That seems valid because although a political cartoon may convey a lot without words few people can succeed in doing the same. However the Pentagon has certainly managed to do just that.

(This item was intended for Doctrine and TTPS but threads such as Counter – Unconventional Warfare, Thrashing about is not a strategy, The Joint Planning Process were all closed. Active threads were preoccupied with COIN. This thread has the first appropriate title but have not read all its items.)

It’s now easy to distinguish the special trooper. “ Yes he’s the one wearing the big helmet and mosquito net with half a pair of opera glasses and the single ear headset for road safety, multi-colour sunscreen, big wristwatch and sweat bands and mittens, modish scarf over the blotchy but stylishly slit Jean Paul G stretch combo, the cowboy’s holster on the belt with the big knife and hatchet, handcuffs and baton and large bunch of coloured cable ties, with soft lunch bag and drink flasks. Then over the waistcoat with the rifle magazines, energy drink and fruit pouches there’s the cute shortie over-and-under shotgun between the speckled binoculars and the computer phone with a screen, the big rifle on one shoulder with a can on the end to keep out the rain and the vacuum cleaner squeegie thingie on the other shoulder together with the bent antenna. The coloured patches are to show who is the boss of each group and for all skills other than spoken and written American English and math. “

The Pentagon chiefs and their political chiefs - and similarly the chiefs of other ABCA nations - have apparently forgotten how to task organise, exercise and commit joint force units. One result has been the growth of Special Forces harvesting vitality and particularly extracting rather than extricating it from single service special units. If that continues SpecFor will become larger than the USMC leading each next set of chiefs to dream up a special SpecForCom.

Possibly the long-term task organisation of SpecForCom - as distinct from strike-oriented single and joint force units - should consist of at the largest 100-person SpecFor teams each specialised in one language/ethno area with integral mobility using ag-bikes up to at most 3-tonne GP vehicles – some with discrete armour but without an electric generator for high capacity comms. Then as indicated or if needed promptly add for later subtraction sub-units from single forces as needed, exercise and deploy with no higher than a major in local command. Possibly a LTCOL with 6 staff in country and almost always at the embassy or consulate keeping tabs on several separate teams, but limited to 20 hours per week in the field. If not enough then more area-specialised teams and at most a Colonel with 10 staff at the embassy, again with at most 20 hours per week in the field. If still more commitment is warranted then send in a USMC force up to the size of a MAGTF.

The Pentagon knows that special forces have to be engaged in difficult business and that small can be useful. But it commonly scores B for effort and E for brain. SpecForCom has been enthusiastically and energetically glamourised and made popular with the electorate. And the Pentagon is now almost duty bound to continue feeding an overlarge gorilla when smooth and cut-down guerillas are needed. The way many politically contentious decisions seem to be made indicates that rectification is likely to be delayed until some administration after the current one has gone. Some pragmatists like Jean Larteguy might understand but many long-dead and some recently dead senior executives would be seriously displeased and for the long term.

So how might a SpecForCom be made effective or more effective without damaging the rest of a national security infrastructure ? Use skill in languages to determine suitability for what precisely or approximately ? Is that the right type of straight line for a reorganization and just how many straight lines are needed ?