Recognizing Distinct Types of Insurgency - "Know the type of conflict you are in."

[Bob's World]

Reorganization is what military leaders do when they know things aren't as good as they could be, but have no real idea what the problem is or how to fix it.

A couple of "simple" fixes:

1. We must change how we think. We are currently attempting to implement a national strategy that is essentially to sustain a status quo of a US dominated global system through a policy of attempting to convince others to think and believe and value more as we do. We do this in an era of accelerated power-shifting within, among and between systems of governance, when people everywhere are much more focused on attempting to be more like themselves, not more like us. The result: Massive strategic friction and associated US strategic frustration. It makes the world appear to be full of "threats."

So, the US must first gain a greater awareness of how the world actually is, and a greater empathy for the perspectives of others. We must then seek to avoid the empire-killing inclination of "Imperial overreach" and focus our interest more narrowly so as to better posture ourselves to hold onto what is truly important as hegemony naturally transitions to more multi-polar, regional systems of influence.

We must think in terms of interests, and problems; not in terms of problematic threats that become to us an "interest" simply because they exist and challenge our world-view.

2. Shift from reactive applications of SOF to proactive applications. Counterterrorism, Counter insurgency, FID focused on building partner CT and COIN capacity; etc. We are in the react mode and chasing threats. We never catch up, and our strategic goals, are mirage-like, in that no matter how hard we work, we never reach them. This is the problem of defining problems in tactical terms of named threats, and applying a reactive "strategy of tactics" to defeat and disrupt said threats. It is a treadmill we can't seem to get off.

A more proactive approach recognizes that the US is a nation at peace in a dangerous and evolving world. It is also a world full of pockets of revolutionary energy. This is a target rich environment for unconventional warfare-based approaches that rely on leveraging the insurgent energy within populations governed by others in order to advance one's own interests.

To implement such a proactive approach one would need a program of persistent, benign, transparent activity that placed special operators among the populations living in the places most critical to our truly vital interests. Not in some Embassy. Not in some military base teaching soldiers for the 20th time how to zero their rifle or clear a room. Not in some ninja squirrel clandestine operation. Just in plain sight, and focused on developing our own understanding, influence and relationships. This will gives us timely warning when some other independent (AQ, ISIS, etc) actor or state (Russia, etc) actor shows up to conduct their own UW; and also posture us to conduct whatever mission might someday come down the pipe from civilian authorities.

To do this requires gaining control over the SOF personnel system, so that SOF can protect, reward and promote those who do what is vital for SOF, but bizarre and unvalued by the services. It also requires SOF to turn the cart around from our current reactive, threat-centric mindset.

I do not hold high hopes for either to happen in time to avoid the cliff we are currently racing toward.

[Compost]

Say again Bob and more simply. No nation is ever actually at peace. Michael Howard recently and the Greeks millenia back had it correct. We just have to be a more more adroit and adaptive.

[davidbfpo]

A short, on the record talk by Canada's senior SOF officer last week @ IISS London:

The Afghanistan campaign saw extensive use of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in a wide variety of roles, and spurred unprecedented technical and tactical developments. For Canadian SOF, this also included new command structures and considerable growth in size. While maintaining a clear, mandated role for domestic counter-terrorism, Canada’s SOF are developing important global roles, from delivering precision direct effects to building partner capacity. Amid much speculative media commentary, there is a need for a clear understanding amongst policymakers and the defence and security community of the capabilities and limitations of SOF, as well as their role in supporting conventional forces and other government agencies.

Interesting short bio for the speaker, with my emphasis:

Brigadier-General Michael Rouleau, Commander of Canadian Special Operations Forces Command (CANSOFCOM), will share his perspective on these issues. Enrolled in 1985 and later commissioned as a Field Artillery Officer, Brigadier-General Rouleau joined Canada's nascent SOF unit Joint Task Force 2 in 1994. Retiring to join the Ottawa Police in 1999, he re-enrolled following the 9/11 terrorist attacks. He returned to Joint Task Force 2, eventually serving as the Commanding Officer, followed by a number of strategic-level positions. He was promoted to his current rank and appointed Commander of CANSOFCOM in February 2014.

Link:http://www.iiss.org/en/events/events...ghanistan-8bb8


Might be appropriate here.

[Bob's World]

Nations are rarely at war, which is not the same as an absence of conflict. The US has not been at war since 1945 - but we often have troops engaged in various conflicts here or there. Heck, we lose a cop every other day domestically. The world is a violent place, but violence does not mean war in most cases. The military over defines conflict as war, and our laws for conflict encourages that inappropriate behavior.

[Compost]

To implement such a proactive approach one would need a program of persistent, benign, transparent activity that placed special operators among the populations living in the places most critical to our truly vital interests. Not in some Embassy. Not in some military base teaching soldiers for the 20th time how to zero their rifle or clear a room. Not in some ninja squirrel clandestine operation. Just in plain sight, and focused on developing our own understanding, influence and relationships. This will gives us timely warning when some other independent (AQ, ISIS, etc) actor or state (Russia, etc) actor shows up to conduct their own UW; and also posture us to conduct whatever mission might someday come down the pipe from civilian authorities.

Say again again. What do you suppose is being attempted - not always well - when actors show up every day for a tryout/tryon or whatever ?

Getting back to the purpose of special forces, started on a list of personnel and skills needed for FMA style military assistance complementary and supplementary to Embassy work and assistance from other parts of government.

Sorted them out in alphapetic order and was surprised at what came out.
Biometricians and police liaison;
Economists, forensic accountants and business/industry liaison;
Ethnographers, historians and college/university liaison;
Hygienists and waterworks engineers and liaison to civil/rural organizations;
Intelligence analysts and military liaison;
Journalists, speech writers and media liaison;
Linguists and humint;
Medicos, surgeons and hospital liaison;
Military analysts (especially psych warfare) and liaison coordinated with that provided by military separately posted as Embassy staff.

Realise that several other skill sets have been neglected. For example wanted to include operational research, systems analysts, computer programmers and industry liaison with feet on the ground but decided some such might be sent as fly-in teams. Eventually got to military, tactics and weapons to supplement US marines usually assigned roles such as embassy protection. Believe that SWAT team could also handle guerilla liaison.

And yes am aware that a low form of organisation can be to try and squeeze many functions into one place but the results can with common sense planning prove useful. Just keep some things elite and highly valued but small.

[davidbfpo]

Compost,

I like the list. Missing are prison staff trainers, if not adequate prisons - construction staff maybe available, designers and the like maybe not. And cartographers, little can be done without maps even in this so called digital age.

I have assumed pre-trial detention and imprisonment are the route being taken, not "catch, kill or release".

A key factor is understanding how country actually 'X' works and the extent of non-national / local access such as the IMF, banks, airlines, media and NGOs. Will they talk to you? Is there an overseas community? Sometimes the answers are closer than you think.

[Compost]

David,

Agree on custodial staff but that’s one of the rotten tasks for which well-trained MPs are intended. Almost outside my experience but was once apprehended speeding inside a Bien Hoa base and literally only weeks after briefly visiting a POW stockade run by the ARVN. Agree combination of undeclared and non-uniformed conflict warrants trial in civil courts.

Totally forgot cartographers. That’s another good reason for unscripted exercises where the loading schedules are not pre-planned. In many but not all instances arms-length commercial/civil arrangements can get some resident services on side. Intend to play tennis tomorrow and planning not to be back for a while.

[Bob's World]

We need aptitude far more than skills. The role of Special Forces is not to fix broken governance, but rather to understand and leverage the energy that broken governance generates within the populations it affects.

Sure, we can reverse engineer those skills to help some partner with their COIN (FID for us), but too often this is to prop up some government we have either created, or simply protect and enable to avoid making the changes necessary to reduce the negative energy their governance creates.

Insurgency is simple. Understanding and leveraging its energy is art - but thinking one can mechanically"fix" it with technical skills is folly rooted in the arrogance of the past several hundred years of Western imposition on the governance of others for Western interests.

[Dayuhan]

Late to the table, but a few points...

I agree with Slap's earlier point on "religious insurgency". This is an actual thing. Probably the most obvious act of religious insurgency in Western history would be Martin Luther nailing his theses to the church door in Wittenburg, challenging the Catholic hierarchy and accelerating a struggle for leadership of the Christian faith. That struggle of course spilled over into the political sphere and caused a great deal of violence and bloodshed. ISIL is a religious insurgency because it is setting itself up as a contender for leadership of the Islamic religion, directly challenging all other contenders for that title. The declaration of a Caliphate was more an act of religious insurgency than it was an act of political insurgency: by declaring a Caliphate ISIL demanded the fealty of Muslims around the world. We tend to see ISIL as a political challenge to the West because we see everything relative to the West, but it is fundamentally a challenge for leadership within Islam.

The idea of "good governance" is something we need to approach with caution, because all too often we assume that our idea of good governance is universal, which it is not. We tend to think that good governance can be achieved with a structural solution that provides all groups with input into the political process and protects the rights and interests of all groups. When the groups in question define good governance as "we rule and they die", the result is a fairly fatal degree of dissonance.

A discussion of what's been lacking in recent American military excursions abroad would necessarily be long and wide-ranging, but to me one critical and often overlooked deficiency is clarity of purpose. We never seem entirely clear on what we are trying to achieve, or why, or for whom. Our goals change in midstream, and we often seem to get tied up in believing our own rhetoric. Nations use force to achieve political goals, and victory is won when the goals are achieved. If the goals are uncertain, ephemeral, or aspirational, victory is unlikely from the start.

[Compost]

Here’s a cartoon that could almost have been devised for your views. Two specfor troopers walking toward a sign ‘Practise Village’. One is saying “There’s too many of us and the walls don’t seem to be moved much”. Close by two USMC are jogging toward a sign ‘Sneaker Range’ with sweat or tears dripping from their eyes.

That just about says it all. Even at a stretch your pushing FID as polemical rather than military liaison between a large and a small country that have some interests in common. Naturally agree with Dayuhan that evangelism often - and possibly always - is a dangerous excess.

[Bill Moore]

Late to the table, but a few points...

The idea of "good governance" is something we need to approach with caution, because all too often we assume that our idea of good governance is universal, which it is not. We tend to think that good governance can be achieved with a structural solution that provides all groups with input into the political process and protects the rights and interests of all groups. When the groups in question define good governance as "we rule and they die", the result is a fairly fatal degree of dissonance.

A discussion of what's been lacking in recent American military excursions abroad would necessarily be long and wide-ranging, but to me one critical and often overlooked deficiency is clarity of purpose. We never seem entirely clear on what we are trying to achieve, or why, or for whom. Our goals change in midstream, and we often seem to get tied up in believing our own rhetoric. Nations use force to achieve political goals, and victory is won when the goals are achieved. If the goals are uncertain, ephemeral, or aspirational, victory is unlikely from the start.

Regarding the part I bolded, I think the underlying issue is failure to treat our excursions like the wars that they are. Some assert that the military is treating these excursions as war and using Clausewitz as a guide for strategy. The reality seems quite different, instead our military treats these excursions as a form of social engineering with vague ideas of self-determination, democracy, human rights (now includes gay rights), free market systems, and so forth. We get so caught in up in nave discussions about legitimacy (for whom?) that we forget the original purpose that we employed military force to achieve in the first place. What U.S. interest were we protecting or pursuing? What was the role of the military in achieving those objectives?

I do agree that no all conflicts are wars, but our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan were certainly wars, as was Vietnam and Korea (despite labeling them as police actions for political purposes). With the exception of DESERT STORM where we had a limited objective, we didn't fight to win. In fact, it appears we no longer seek to defeat an adversary, instead we now throw money and ideology at our adversaries hoping to defeat them by co-opting them into our way of life. We have senior officers stating that if we just give the adversaries jobs they'll quit fighting (proven to be a false assumption repeatedly), or we simply have to win the battle of the narrative (even if true, we have demonstrated no ability to do this), or if we just install a democratic form of governance the people will pursue their objectives through a legal process. That wasn't true in the U.S., and we have one of the most advanced democracies in the world. We had a Civil War, and numerous terrorist groups in the 60s and 70s active in the U.S.. Why would that be true in countries that have a longer history of ethnic hatred and a high percentage of illiteracy?

Today we rarely hear or see any real effort to defeat the adversary using force. We promote the false belief that force doesn't work. Apparently the idea of using force isn't clever enough for those who see themselves as self-styled strategists who have a special understanding of the world that others can't grasp (also known as insanity). President Obama claimed we can't defeat ISIL with force, instead we have to promote better ideas. Listening to the radio I heard a counter argument to this view, which was that Nazism was only defeated by force. They weren't going to be defeated by better ideas. Why do assume that those who oppose us can't be true believers in their cause?

Our non-war approach results in years of ineffective operations at great cost to no discernible end. Instead of protecting or furthering our interests we simply deplete our human and financial resources, not to mention our reputation globally. The eating soup with a knife fans will mindlessly argue we just need to keep doing the same thing for another decade or two, and we'll win, but win what? Whether war would work or not regarding our current threats is debatable, but the way we're conducting operations now clearly is not working.