Recognizing Distinct Types of Insurgency - "Know the type of conflict you are in."

[Bob's World]

For me one must apply the flagpole test.

Go the capital of the place you are at to deal with an insurgency, find the tallest flagpole and look to the top of that pole. If it is the flag of your nation, you are conducting COIN, but if is the flag of anyone else, you are not.

COIN is not unlike parenting. If you are at home dealing with your own children you are parenting. But if you go to a neighbor's home to help them with their children you are not parenting. To think you were parenting would lead to a disaster of undermining their role as parents and regardless of how good your intentions or actions, would probably not leave a functional family behind when you leave to go home.

We understand this intuitively in operations of the scale of a family - but for some reasons lose all common sense when we scale it to the national level, rationalize our actions with interests or threats, and label it "war."

But it is the same damn thing.

[Bob's World]

For the US, dealing with Ferguson effectively is COIN. Dealing with ISIL is not COIN for the US at all.

In fact, now that the Iraqi state has divided and a separate system of governance around ISIL has formed, it is not COIN for the state formerly known as Iraq either. It is truly, Civil War.

We love to use the term civil war as a measure of the scale of an insurgency, but that serves no purpose. When we use Civil War to identify when an insurgency has evolved so as to become a distinct system of governance, then it is helpful. What was once revolutionary non-war has become war. That in turn drives changes of strategy and tactics. The scale of operations, or the presence or absence of violence does not affect the nature of the problem. We focus on the wrong criteria.

Our current lexicon and distinctions have little strategic value or purpose.

[TheCurmudgeon]

We love to use the term civil war as a measure of the scale of an insurgency, but that serves no purpose. When we use Civil War to identify when an insurgency has evolved so as to become a distinct system of governance, then it is helpful. What was once revolutionary non-war has become war. That in turn drives changes of strategy and tactics. The scale of operations, or the presence or absence of violence does not affect the nature of the problem. We focus on the wrong criteria..

I agree - you cannot have a war without two clearly distinct entities; a clear "us" and "them". As long as we are all still "us," its not a war.

Our current lexicon and distinctions have little strategic value or purpose.

Yes, but the current lexicon has a larger budget attached to it.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Colonel,

How do you classify the post invasion phase? If it is Stability Operations, could some of the operational methods outlined in COIN adapted to a Stability Operation, assuming we are not planning on staying long enough to create a mini-merica.

[Bob's World]

Argh...not the "phase" word.

Better question, what is the natural human response to a foreign power invading their homeland and defeating their government and security forces? A blend of submission by some, collaboration by others, and resistance by the rest.

That means that those guys with the friendly faces welcoming you? They are high order traitors and opportunists in the eyes of most everyone else. The ones you'd actually respect are the ones who want to cut your throat. But we put the collaborators into power and then wonder why we are soon met with resistance insurgency against our foreign presence, and revolutionary insurgency against the de facto illegitimate regime we have put in power to serve our interests.

What do we call that phase? We delude ourselves that what we bring is so good, and that what we oppose is so evil, that there will be no resistance against us. We also believe that when we create a government that we think will be good for us and call it a democracy, there will be no revolution against it. But we are always wrong. Always.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Argh...not the "phase" word.

..

What do we call that phase? We delude ourselves that what we bring is so good, and that what we oppose is so evil, that there will be no resistance against us. We also believe that when we create a government that we think will be good for us and call it a democracy, there will be no revolution against it. But we are always wrong. Always.

Sir,

Don't think I am trying to inject COIN into other operations, but reality is that there will be something after the fight is done. I am a proponent of the WWII style Military Government until it can be turned over to civilian control. But I am not for the Bush/Rumsfeld "the locals can handle it" attitude that prevailed after we overthrew Saddam.

The Army is loath to accept this responsibility, even though it has been historically our job. "No, the Army fights and wins America's Wars, ... we do not enforce the peace!" Meanwhile, the Marine (the older and more mature fighting force) have been doing just this for years.

OK, now I am way off topic, but I think the concept needs to be a complete "soup to nuts" formula. No disrespect meant.

[Bill Moore]

Sir,

Don't think I am trying to inject COIN into other operations, but reality is that there will be something after the fight is done. I am a proponent of the WWII style Military Government until it can be turned over to civilian control. But I am not for the Bush/Rumsfeld "the locals can handle it" attitude that prevailed after we overthrew Saddam.

The Army is loath to accept this responsibility, even though it has been historically our job. "No, the Army fights and wins America's Wars, ... we do not enforce the peace!" Meanwhile, the Marine (the older and more mature fighting force) have been doing just this for years.

OK, now I am way off topic, but I think the concept needs to be a complete "soup to nuts" formula. No disrespect meant.

You can't blame the Army for the President's and SECDEF's decisions. If you recall the Army Chief of Staff proposed a much larger ground force for invading Iraq to stabilize it post conflict. He didn't suffer the Wolfowitz illusion that Iraqis would simply welcome us and embrace a western form of government. The Marines weren't stabilizing the Balkans or conducting any other significant stability operations within the past 50 years.

The Army's new doctrine addresses the stability requirement, now we'll if they task organize and train for it. Even if they do it will mean little if policy makers continue to shy away from military governance. This is an example of point where we fail to use sufficient force or other means to achieve OUR objectives. Instead we do just enough to make it worse, and continue to do enough to make it worse instead of getting completely out of the way and letting locals settle it (it won't be pretty), or using sufficient force to impose our will. The lessons we'll take from this war are consolidated in a highly deficient COIN doctrine based on unsound theories. One could argue they are even based on political correctness.

While no one can predict the future, I hope we don't get involved in another long COIN operation. Frankly we suck at it, and it isn't the soldier or marine on point, it is our system. We just end up getting a lot of our kids killed and maimed, and prolong the suffering of the locals who are also killed and maimed. What do we have to show it for it anywhere? Why not try a different approach? Why are we afraid of implementing military governance when it is the right and humane thing to do?