Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
RUS would be able to support two theatres for aprox. 6 months with max. 3 brigades each involved. https://twitter.com/liveuamap/status/643509382026784768 …
http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/09/1...aine-analysts/
Russia may concede on Syria for free hand in Ukraine — analysts
First Deputy Speaker of Verkhovna Rada Andriy Parubiy reports that Russia is building two military bases in the Belgorod Oblast and significantly expanding its military presence on the border with Ukraine in preparation for further aggression. The former Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council discussed these developments on the Inter TV channel, September 13
According to Parubiy, a new military base is being build near the town of Valuyki in the Belgorod region, 25 km from the Ukrainian border, and an old Soviet base in Boguchar is being restored.
“Aside from Valuyki, a base is being prepared –actually restored — in Boguchar, Belgorod Region, right next to the Ukrainian border. An entire army… is being transferred there from Nizhny Novgorod,” he said.
Parubiy said Russia’s actions are designed to frighten and pressure the Ukrainian government while preparing the groundwork for a possible full-scale invasion of Ukraine. He pointed out that the most combat-ready units of the Russian army have already been transferred to the Ukrainian border.
Furthermore, according to Parubiy, Russia intends to carry out extremely large military exercises, involving about 100,000 soldiers, in the Central district in late September-early October.
Paribiy predicted that relative calm would prevail in the ATO zone until the end of September, before Putin’s trip to New York on September 28-29 for the UN General Assembly meeting. He also discounted any notion that Russia is expanding its military presence near the Ukrainian border only to have a bargaining chip with the West. Putin will be willing to bargain with the West, he believes, but it will be only to offer some concessions on Syria in exchange for a free hand in Ukraine.
“I can confidently say that on September 28-29 in New York Putin will be bargaining with the West over Syria. He will offer some concessions if they close their eyes on what is happening in Donetsk, Luhansk and Crimea,” he said
As previously reported, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) has determined that there are 50,500 Russian troops and militants in the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts and that some 200 Russian military training camps for Russian soldiers and militants have been deployed to Rostov-on-Don, Russia, Crimea and the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts.
The pessimistic view of Russia’s intentions is seconded by Russian military expert Pavel Felgenhauer , who believes the huge Russian tank army that Putin has been supporting for more than two years indicates that Russia is preparing for war in Ukraine.
“Preparations for war are taking place on the border in Ukraine. Very large military forces have been concentrated there. Moreover they have been supported for more than two years. In Donbas alone there is an entire tank army consisting of Russian troops and local militants and two companies. The number of Russian mercenaries is reaching 40,000 and there are about 60 tank units. And of course this is serious and for the long-term, since the crisis in Ukraine has not been resolved and it is not clear if it will be resolved at all,” he said.
Felgenhauer also thinks any assumptions that Russia will now concentrate on Syria are mistaken since Ukraine is many times more important than Syria for the Russian Federation.
RUS would be able to support two theatres for aprox. 6 months with max. 3 brigades each involved. https://twitter.com/liveuamap/status/643509382026784768 …
So... a new tarmac, one short taxiway, and two parking spots for helicopters in Lattakia...
...few photos of Syrian MiG-29s (flying CAS already since October 2013, so absolutely nothing new there), one faked photo of a Su-27 operated by Ruskiy Vityazy... and few Russian-made UAVs (replacing Iranian-made examples)...
...and everybody is in panic over 'Russian military intervention in Syria'...?
...although nobody knows why or even if there is such an intervention...?
...sigh...
How good there was no internet back at the times of the good ol' Cold War...
RE: Arrival of Dmitry Donskoi
I gather that the Russian SSBN deployed off Syria is their only active Typhoon-class. This is telling, as: (1) the boat has little practical purpose other than sabre-rattling as it has no conventional land-attack capability; and (2) the boat will be retired relatively soon. I suppose the Russians don't want to expose their Yasen or Borei boats to American surveillance in the Mediterranean...
It is not the above that is uninteresting and means nothing it is the seven T90s, and the elements of three brigades of elite units marines, airborne and Spetsnaz that are Ukraine veterans that is the interesting point--there was rumors of the M31s being sent but initially it was written off as propaganda.So... a new tarmac, one short taxiway, and two parking spots for helicopters in Lattakia...
...few photos of Syrian MiG-29s (flying CAS already since October 2013, so absolutely nothing new there), one faked photo of a Su-27 operated by Ruskiy Vityazy... and few Russian-made UAVs (replacing Iranian-made examples)...
...and everybody is in panic over 'Russian military intervention in Syria'...?
...although nobody knows why or even if there is such an intervention...?
...sigh...
How good there was no internet back at the times of the good ol' Cold War...
That also does not include their latest ATM that has been seen in large numbers AND it does not include the reported hundreds of IRGC that are being flow in from Iran almost daily now--that is what is interesting.
It is interesting that this is the largest Russian overseas engagement since even the Soviet Cold War days--that is a given.
Rumours, rumours and more rumours.
There is no indication for something like 'massive presence of Russian troops' in Syria. Not even for something like 'significant shipment of armament for Assad regime'.
All that can be seen are some reinforcements for four (in digits: 4) troops usually present at the depot in Tartous, scant APCs, ARVs and UAVs, and a slight expansion of the Bassil Assad IAP.
Especially the latter is long overdue alone because remaining air bases under regime control are already since long over-stuffed with all the aircraft and helicopters evacuated from air bases besieged or overrun by insurgents and/or Daesh (as should be clear to anybody watching photos of Hamah AB, just for example).
Compared to undergoing Saudi-led invasion of Yemen (where there is meanwhile an entire mechanized brigade of the Emirati Army, including about 30 AMX-56 LeClerc MBTs, BMP-3s and G-6 SPA; about a dozen of AH-64 Apache attack helicopters and UH-60s, at least one each of PAC-2 and SA-22 SAM-sites), that's peanuts.
Indeed, it's peanuts even in comparison to 'aid' provided by 'trusted allies' of Qatar and Turkey to quasi-Islamists of the Libyan Dawn in Libya (which included spares and armament for stored Mirage F.1 fighter-bombers, funding for overhauls of MiG-23 and - Mach-3-capable - MiG-25s etc, not to talk about all sorts of other armament, plus training and advice).
The IRGC has deployed the personnel of two of its brigades (one armoured and one mechanized) already back in October 2013. Plus several 'brigades' of combatants recruited in Iraq, Afghanistan and Azerbaijan. Nobody was upset about this then, so why now - especially since in April-May this year all the IRGC-QF troops have been withdrawn into Damascus area...?That also does not include their latest ATM that has been seen in large numbers AND it does not include the reported hundreds of IRGC that are being flow in from Iran almost daily now--that is what is interesting.
'Largest Russian overseas engagement'...?It is interesting that this is the largest Russian overseas engagement since even the Soviet Cold War days--that is a given.
It certainly looks like that - for all those who forgot the South Ossetia War of 2008, or prefer to ignore Russian de-facto invasion of eastern Ukraine, underway since 2014.
Of course, neither South Ossetia nor Ukraine are exactly 'overseas' but then: well, it's not as if Russia (i.e. Soviet Union) would have as 'rich history' of military interventions abroad as certain other nations around...
Overall, unless Russian transport aircraft start landing at Bassil Assad IAP at least at a tempo of '1 per hour' (like during their air-bridge to Ethiopia, back in November 1977) - and that's extremely unlikely to happen - there is not the least reason to get upset over this affair.
Last edited by CrowBat; 09-15-2015 at 07:04 AM.
Crowbat,
Thank you for providing the last post, placing the latest Russian deployments to Syria in context and with a comparison to their Ethiopian air bridge long ago (the Ogaden War IIRC).
davidbfpo
Syria Ambassador to #Russia "No Russian troops in Syria. They're on holiday shopping for discount tanks in Damascus" pic.twitter.com/41tNnWNvwC
Russia'n trolls switch gears from #Ukraine to #Syria
pic.twitter.com/lnc8FDTaYB
Putin doubles down on support for Syria's armed forces at CSTO summit. Urges Assad to negotiate with "reasonable" opposition
What is interesting about this particulare weaponized information “leak” is that at first glance it looks like Putin was pushing a valid offer and ot was the mean West that was far sighted and did not engage—BUT then the second comment reflect social media who had done battle with Russian propaganda for over a year now and can fully read between the Russian lines.
West 'ignored Russian offer to have Syria's Assad step aside' says Ahtisaari to @julianborger http://www.theguardian.com/world/201...sad-step-aside … fascinating if true
Just to be clear: Russians offer was 4 Assad 2 "lead transition" (God knows 4how long) & leave honorably on his term. http://www.theguardian.com/world/201...rld_b-gdnworld …
So in reality it really never was a true offer-was just designed as Russian CYA so Russia could stand back and say --we are the adults here not the West........BUT WAIT was not this offer actually all about regime change as even defined in Russian propaganda.
THEN today from the Russian UK Ambassador--one of their leading info warriors---he flips the 2012 article--typical Russian Orwellian doublespeak.
Alexander Yakovenko Verified account
@Amb_Yakovenko Rumours of Rus-US-Saudi “secret talks on ousting Assad” groundless. Moscow is not in regime change business.
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 09-15-2015 at 12:06 PM.
Al Jazeera English ✔ @AJEnglish
" Twelve million Syrians have been forced from their homes, that's more than half of Syria's population"
http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/09/14/...ampaign=buffer
This Satellite Image Leaves No Doubt That Russia Is Throwing Troops and Aircraft Into Syria
It also shows just how screwed America’s Syria policy is
Over the past year, evidence has steadily emerged of a growing Russian military presence in Syria. As Bashar al-Assad’s armies have failed him in the field, he has increasingly relied on outside help. Initially, that help came from Hezbollah and Iran, but now it appears to be Moscow’s turn. And Washington may finally be waking up to what looks like a substantial Russian intervention in Syria.
New satellite images, obtained by Foreign Policy, of construction at an air base near Latakia leave little doubt that U.S. policy toward ending the conflict in Syria, such as it is, is now in total disarray. As they say, seeing is believing.
Admittedly, there has long been a Russian military presence in Syria. When opposition forces overran a Syrian listening post in October last year, the images revealed that it was staffed by the Russian military. More recently, analysts have noted pictures and videos that seem to confirm the presence of Russian combat forces fighting in Syria. Russian military vehicles have been sighted, while Russian soldiers have posted images and comments on Russian social media sites like VKontakte and the California-based LiveJournal, detailing their service in the war-torn country. (Some of the best open-source analysis has been on Bellingcat’s website.)
It is very strange world we live in, one marked both by the “little green men” of Russia’s “hybrid” warfare who Moscow can disavow and by data ubiquity that allows analysts to mock those disavowals.
Still, there has always been a question about how extensive Russia’s support for the Syrian regime has been the past four years. Are those even Russians inside the Moscow-supplied combat vehicles? Open-source analysts have been quite enterprising in suggesting the answer is yes, hearing snippets of Russian in between bursts from the vehicle’s gun. But the Russians claim any Slavic accents are merely those of a very small number of trainers or advisors. Nothing to see here; please move along.
That is now very hard to believe. On Sept. 4, the New York Times published an article suggesting that Russia had shipped prefabricated housing and a transportable air traffic control station to an airfield near Latakia. It was a great scoop, but I was pretty baffled that the New York Times didn’t bother to purchase a satellite image of the facility. Had they done so, they would have realized that they buried the lede.
The satellite image shows far more than prefabricated housing and an air traffic control station. It shows extensive construction of what appears to be a military canton at Bassel al-Assad International Airport (named for Bashar’s elder brother, who died in a car accident in 1994). This canton appears designed to support Russian combat air operations from the base and may serve as a logistical hub for Russian combat forces.
In recent days, using aircraft tracking sites, a number of analysts have begun to document the near-daily arrival of Russian transport planes to the base. The Russians are also sending ships to Syria, though the ships often declare for a nearby non-Syrian port, like Port Said in Egypt, and then take a wrong turn at Albuquerque, so to speak.
Rogin reports that U.S. officials believe Russia will base combat aircraft at the site. That is easy to confirm from the satellite image. In recent weeks, construction crews have completed a taxiway that connects the runway to the construction area. That means aircraft shelters for Russian aircraft.
The scale of the construction goes even further. A large area of ground has been cleared in many different parts of the air base. There are pallets and crates everywhere. Trucks are visible driving into the site. (We’ve annotated the image, but I highly recommend following @finriswolf on Twitter.) The image drives home the implication of all those flights and shipments heading to Syria: Russia is substantially expanding its involvement.
There is now little hope of establishing a no-fly zone over Syria, unless Washington wants to be in the business of shooting down Russian aircraft. From a broader perspective, U.S. efforts to arm the opposition to Assad mean fighting a proxy war with Moscow, either by trying to down the Russian planes or helping Syrian opposition forces kill Russian combat troops on the ground. That seems a much tougher task than fighting a proxy war with Iran and Hezbollah.
But beyond this narrow question of whether the United States wants to directly support combat operations against Russian forces in Syria, Moscow’s apparent commitment to Damascus raises fundamental questions about what U.S. strategy, if any, can succeed. I have long been opposed to collaborating with Assad. I don’t believe that he is committed to fighting the Islamic State; he only seems interested in attacking those opposition forces that threaten him directly. (In fact, by writing off parts of Syria to the Islamic State, he creates a second front for his opponents.) Nor do I believe he will ever command enough support to reestablish government control in Syria. If there is any hope of uniting Syrians, Assad must leave.
What Russia has done, however, is make it clear that it will not let Assad fall. He can’t win, but Russia won’t let him lose. That dooms Syria to what looks like endless war, as Assad fights to the last man. There are those who see Syria as a quagmire for Putin, a kind of matched pair to our own folly in Iraq; just as Washington collectively saw Afghanistan as payback for Vietnam. I am not so sanguine.
While Charlie Wilson’s war helped popularize the idea of bleeding Moscow, I don’t think that can be the basis of U.S. policy either. The moral cost is far too high. Aylan Kurdi, the 3-year-old boy whose corpse washed up on a Turkish beach, was fleeing Syria’s civil war, as are hundreds of thousands of the refugees now in Europe. More than half of Syria’s 17 million people have been displaced. Bleeding Moscow means bleeding these people. It may sound strategic in a Pentagon war room, but not when children’s bodies wash up on shore.
Columns are supposed to have a simple solution. An op-ed should have five paragraphs wrapped up in a neat little bow that explains how to fix the problem outlined in the first paragraph. One of my favorite professors (and FP colleague), Kori Schake, used to liken it to the answer in a beauty pageant. She was right, but for the life of me I can’t come up with one. It seems that, sometimes, the world’s pain can’t be solved in a few hundred words of sage advice.
So this column does not have a neat and tidy ending. And that is because I am not sure that it is now possible to save Syria. There is no path to resurrect a state that is failing, not so long as Putin has decided to do whatever it takes to preserve Assad’s awful regime and condemn Syria to endless conflict. We can, of course, make it difficult for Russia to resupply its forces in Syria. Already, some NATO allies, like Bulgaria and Turkey, have denied Russian aircraft over-flight rights. Iraq, too, appears to have turned back at least one aircraft.
And there is surely more we can do to shelter the millions of refugees now fleeing the conflict. Having helped create this mess with the invasion of Iraq and subsequent failure to stop the bloodshed in Syria, the United States and its European allies have an obligation to assist these people. This is especially true of those countries that were the loudest supporters of the invasion of Iraq. Coalition of the Still Willing, right? That includes you, Hungary.
But these measures won’t replace Bashar al-Assad with a figure who could rally moderate Syrians to restore a stable government, let alone stop the bloodshed. At best, they are only an expression of empathy and contrition. Putin has to be convinced to tell Assad it is time to go. Until then, and as long as Moscow is flooding Syria with military assistance, the country’s misery will continue.
BUT with a extra large B ----why do regime change when one can "share"--so Assad is in the view of Russia going to be there for a long time---but as the KSA has stated he must go as he is the problem.
Putin says Assad is ready to share power with Syria’s opposition https://meduza.io/en/news/2015/09/15...a-s-opposition … Why change regimes when you can "share" them?
BUT only share with "reasonable forces"--what the heck is "reasonable forces" among the current anti Assad forces?????
The latest map from ISW, also in PDF:http://www.understandingwar.org/back...tember-14-2015
Today cut & paste does not work.
davidbfpo
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/faysal...b_8097416.html
In Zabadani, Signs of a New and Worrying Iranian Strategy in Syria
09/13/2015 8:51 pm EDT
Bassam Barabandi, a former Syrian diplomat, is a co-author.
Amid promises from Iran of a peace plan for Syria, lets get one thing straight: The Islamic Republic is not negotiating over its key interests in Syria, but advancing them more directly, and possibly with less concern for Bashar al-Assad's fate. Furthermore, Assad's woes are not pressuring Iran to negotiate, but embedding it more deeply in Syria. Rather than bring peace, this will probably worsen the war's sectarian character, strengthen jihadist groups, and make a lasting settlement less likely than ever.
All this is on full display in the city of Zabadani.
Zabadani lies some 17 miles northwest of Damascus, astride a key Hezbollah supply line and near core Hezbollah territory in Lebanon. This makes the city critical for both the militia and Iran. In early July, Hezbollah and regime forces began an offensive to take Zabadani, besieging rebel forces there. Syrian rebels responded by encircling thousands of pro-regime and Hezbollah forces in Fu'a and Kefraya, northern Syria, using this as leverage to force a ceasefire in Zabadani. Sporadic fighting continues and the city's fate remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that Iran's handling of the Zabadani crisis indicates a shift in its Syria strategy, in which it either negotiates on behalf of or ignores Assad and his inner circle, securing its interests directly rather than by proxy.
Iran's negotiating terms are bad news for Syria. It reportedly offered to end the assault on Zabadani on two conditions: that its fighters be allowed to evacuate Fu'a and Kefraya, and that Zabadani's largely Sunni population leave the city. This would be the first deliberate, large-scale sectarian population transfer in the Syrian war. It is not clear whether that would benefit the regime, but displacing a hostile Sunni population from critical territory would clearly benefit Hezbollah and Iran, both Shia powers. That Iran is negotiating Syria's new sectarian geography indicates its war strategy has become less about reconquering insurgent territory, and more about shaping a new Syria to secure its interests.
Understanding Iran's approach requires distinguishing between Iranian and Syrian regime interests. Iran's efforts in Syria were never about saving Assad as such, but securing its own strategic position in the Levant. This means protecting Hezbollah supply lines in areas like Zabadani and preventing a hostile regime from emerging in Syria. Iran is not opposed to negotiation, but a lasting negotiated settlement to the war would be based roughly on the principles of the Geneva 2 agreement: consensus-based political transition. Whatever diplomatic initiatives it announces, the bitter truth is that as long as Iran believes it has other options, it cannot accept this outcome because it would endanger Hezbollah. A post-war order that enjoys the support of most of the insurgency and its domestic and foreign backers will not be as kind toward this Iranian proxy as Assad was.
The Iranian aspiration to transfer Zabadani's population and alter Syria's sectarian geography indicates it has little interest in serious negotiations at the moment. Indeed, it sets a terrible precedent for ethnic cleansing as a war strategy in a multi-sectarian country, in which the displacement of Sunnis (or other sects for that matter) would boost the sectarian narrative and recruitment prospects of jihadist groups like the Islamic State. An Iranian-led rather than Iranian-backed war on the insurgency would lead to an even more toxic and broken Syria.
This new dynamic threatens the US interests of defeating jihadist groups and facilitating an end to the war. As we argue in a new study for the Atlantic Council, however, local crises also present opportunities to protect US interests and preempt worst-case scenarios, including the ethnic cleansing of Zabadani and the catastrophes that would follow. Zabadani shows that Iran has a bold and coherent new strategy, while regional rivals active in Syria, including Turkey and the Gulf states, lack an effective answer. However the United States chooses to tackle this -- training and equipping new forces; working more closely with existing ones to push back on Iran's new sectarian strategy; directly negotiating in crises such as Zabadani; or helping cobble together a more effective regional coalition to increase negotiating leverage against Iran -- its policy should reflect Syria's new local realities, not a misreading of Iranian intentions.
Iran's diplomatic push on Syria is not about making serious compromises to end the Syrian war. It merely shows that Iran is more directly controlling its Syrian interests, reshaping its strategies and priorities accordingly. This may or may not involve sacrificing Assad, but if it does lead to regime change, it will look nothing like a Geneva 2-type compromise, and would certainly not involve meaningful Iranian sacrifices over its strategic position in Syria. More likely, this approach simply reflects Iran's calculation that the regime has become a burden -- an obstacle rather than a means to securing its core interests. As Zabadani makes clear, if Iran's new strategy goes unopposed, Syria will go from very bad to far worse.
You don't need a FOB to "train" SAA. Russian Moves in Syria Widen Role in Mideast
http://nyti.ms/1KmLZEy
BUT the key when dealing with and analyzing Russian military moves is not the numbers or their intentions but the weaponry that is being sent.
The key question I had immediately is why the T90 which is their most modern MBT and why when it is strictly Russian is it in the ME when only two have been seen at all in the Ukraine--the why might have been answered by a Finnish analyst.
THEN the airlift is now at two per AN-124s a day with Iranian airlift in between so 3-4 a day. Sea lift transport is now at five and increasing.
The question is not the numbers of Russian troops BUT the intent to create a far larger footprint using Iranians troops and Russian airpower with elite ground units for attacks to stem the anti Assad advances.
Sorry in Finnish----
Finnish article explains just why the T90 might have been sent to Syria—can it defeat the TOW????
Making the case for T-90s in Syria: Shtora-1 vs. TOW. @APulkki's article in Finnish. https://twitter.com/APulkki/status/643780556359135232 …
The TOW hunter killer teams in large numbers have tipped the fighting and the Russians fully understand that thus the T90 in country instead of the T72 variants. The TOW has become the Stinger of the ME.
AND the Syrian Express just keeps on rolling or in this case swimming---
NF's Polish built ropucha class LST Alexander Otrakovski 031 transits southbound Bosphorus en route to #Tartus #Syria pic.twitter.com/wgOvzvYc0c
Fifth freighter in less than one week----and they carry hundreds of tons of equipment per ship as well as troops.
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 09-15-2015 at 02:29 PM.
Video Intense gun fire in east #Saudi capital #Riyadh which is still going on..
Syria #Damascus #Assad- forces using a huge slingshot to shoot stones into Baseema village in Barada valley pic.twitter.com/LDFEsyu6tw
This is why I say one has to observe exactly what weapon systems and equipment are going into Syria----These two are prevelant in the Ukraine and are strictly Russian issued.
'Pantsir-S1' And 'Ural-43206' in Ukraine--BOTH have now been reported by social media as being in Syria.
NOW what is interesting is that the Pantsir-S1 is the most modern Russian AD system next to the S300s and S400s.
WHY does Russia need the Pantsir when the IS does not even have a flying carpet to speak of anywhere in the ME?
BUT with the Pantsir the Russians can actually establish with ease air space denial even over a large part of Isreal.
So one does not need a large amount of ground troops if one wants to intimadate the US in the air space over Syria.
BUT if in say support to Iranian ground troops and elite Russian units a Pantsir S1 is a perfect match.
Even NATO is now highly concerned about the Russian AD Systems.
We're going to have to develop TTPs [tactics, techniques & procedures] to address" Russia's "long-range SAM array" http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs...-general-warns …
Gen. Gorenc warned last year: "1/3 of Poland is under Russian IADS [integrated air defense system] coverage" http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs...-general-warns …
Russia's "modern long-range SAM systems...are being layered in a way that makes access [in Europe]...more difficult" http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs...-general-warns …
Alarming" that Russia can create "anti-access/area denied [zones] that are very well defended" by SAM batteries http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs...-general-warns …
Gen. Gorenc on #Russia air power: Invested in "a very large modernization" & have improved both "quality & quantity" http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs...-general-warns …
Again this thing with Russian weapons--part and parcel of Russian non linear warfare which many claim Russia is not conducting in Syria...
Remember Russian non linear warfare has eight phases--review them as it is interesting that many western pundits are saying it is not non linear warfare.
Gotta love putting T-90s into play in Syria. Never did that in Donbas: http://www.wsj.com/articles/russian-...als-1442259593 …
The one and or two caught by social media were actually invovled in combat to gain experince with the weapon system then they were pulled back into Russia and never seen since the first reportings.
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