Another new book recently published (should be available in the USA too, meanwhile), is
Arab MiGs, Volume 6: October War 1973 (Part 2)
This volume is a kind of 'culmination' of nearly 10 years of intensive work on 'Arab MiGs' - a project that evolved into a history of Arab air forces at wars with Israel (and elsewhere), in period 1955-1973.
Published back in October 2014, Volume 5 offered an in-depth insight into preparations of these air forces for the October 1973 War, i.e. their build-up, training and combat operations in period 1971-1973, and then the first three days of the October 1973 War. Volume 6 covers operations of Arab air forces during the rest of that conflict, and until the cease-fire between Israel and Syria, signed only in May 1974.
As usually, the volume starts with an Addenda/Errata to earlier books from this series, offering additional information that became available in the meantime (often in reaction to publications of earlier volumes).
The first two chapters of Volume 6 describe combat operations on Egyptian and Syrian 'fronts' from 9 until 13 October 1973. AFAIK, this is the first time ever that this air war is described to such detail and within its general context, explaining the story not only in relation to ground warfare, but also explaining inter-relations between specific aerial operations. For example, the Israeli strike on the Syrian Army HQ in Damascus is not described from the point of view of few involved Israeli pilots, but starting with the Israeli attack on Lebanese radar station at Jebel Barouch, early on 9 October. The rest of the story is primarily based on Syrian sources, and revealing plenty of new details about how the Israelis managed to reach Damascus after all, and how they took Syrian air defences by surprise. Thanks to cooperation from several Syrian sources, there are plenty of details about the actual outcome of this operation too.
Another example would be descriptions of 'other air bridges' run by different air forces during this war. Namely, the US-run air bridge to Israel is well known; at least some general details about the Soviet-run air bridge were available so far too. But, never before has anybody published anything about Algerian and Iraqi air bridges to Egypt and Syria, for example. Of course, these were no 'massive' nor 'flashy' operations of C-5s and similar aircraft - but they are still worth mentioning.
We've added lots of 'boxes' to this volume, and used them to explain additional related affairs. One is providing details on the Israeli 'nuclear blackmail' in Washington, and whatever information we were able to collect about availabilty, numbers, and even shapes of Israeli nuclear weapons of the early 1970s. Another is detailing the backgrounds to appearance of Dassault MD.620 Yericho surface-to-surface missiles in Israeli arsenal, and SS-1c Scud-B missiles in Egyptian arsenal.
Namely, one thing that might surprise many is that both of these affairs de-facto dictated much of what was going on in the air over Egypt in October 1973. This was so because Israelis were so concerned about Soviets arming Egyptian Scuds with nukes, that they did their utmost to destroy Egyptian air defences in Port Said area - the only part of Egypt west of the Suez Canal from which Scuds could reach central Israel. Therefore, the IDF/AF flew thousands of air strikes against targets in that area, and the EAF responded with SAMs and interceptors, resulting in days-long air-to-air and air-to-ground battles.
Related to these affairs was also the story of 14 October 1973. This day is most famous for the supposed 'all out offensive' of the Egyptian Army aimed to lessen Israeli pressure upon Syria. Well... cross-examination of publications and documentation from both sides has revealed that there was no 'all out offensive' at all, and certainly no 'biggest armour battle since Kursk'. Actually, the Egyptians launched only a minor show-operation - but both sides were then more than happy to exaggerate the scope of this out of any proportions (each for their own purpose, of course). In turn, and expanding their 'area denial' operations in Port Said area, Israelis then launched their famous raids on el-Mansourah and Tanta air bases in Nile Delta - prompting Egyptians to claim up to 17 Phantoms shot down, and subsequently declare this date for their Day of Air Force...
Next chapter is detailing the Syrian 'burnout' during the second and thrid week of the war (they've really 'spent' most of their military early during that conflict); Israeli Operation Dominique (little known 'strategic' campaign against Syrian economy and communications network); and the final Battle for Jebel Sheikh. Another chapter is describing final days of the war on Egyptian front, including EAF's 'mass' air strikes on Israeli bridgeheads over the Suez Canal. One thing that surprised me a lot while we were finalizing our work on this volume was the high number of very authoritative accounts about air battles between Egyptian, Iraqi and Syrian MiG-17s - yes: MiG-17s - with Israeli Mirages and F-4s we've collected over times. Most of these are far more detailed, and better supported than majority of Arab accounts about air combats involving MiG-21s. Without revealing too much, let me also observe that not only MiG-17s, but also MiG-21s proved much more survivable to combat damage than usually assumed.
Final chapter is dedicated to 'post-war' combat operations, particularly so on the Syrian front. The volume is rounded up by a total of four Appendices, including one providing scans of log-books of EAF pilots; one with additional details on training of Iraqi pilots in former Czechoslovakia; and - for example - a big one detailing authentic camouflage colours and markings of dozens of Arab aircraft deployed during this war...
Overall, this really became a sort of 'what I ever wanted to read about air warfare in October 1973, but never found anywhere else' - volume. Call me biased (and I certainly am), but I'm very happy with its final content and look.
It's also the last (planned) book from Arab MiGs series: I'll not say 'never again', but subsequent story of Arab air forces is neither that of '-MiGs', nor as coherent as during the period 1955-1973 (plus, the entire team of involved authors needs some rest after all of these years of often exhausting and intensive work on this project).
***********
PS For those who wonder: yes, the colour profile on the cover is showing an Iraqi MiG-21MF with a 'kill marking' for a claim (remains unconfirmed) against an Israeli Mirage, over Jebel Sheikh/Mount Hermon, on 22 October 1973. BTW, the same MiG went on to serve during the Iran-Iraq War too, and was later decorated by a 'kill marking' for an Iranian F-4 too...
Bookmarks