I found this ICG report "The Philippines: Counter-insurgency vs. Counter-Terrorism in Mindinao" to be very good (http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/d...n_mindanao.pdf). I will say off the bat that while I have been tracking the Philippine situation from a perch in Okinawa, I am in no way am qualified to say how accurate the ICG report is. My experience from Iraq is that their stuff is good, if somewhat dated and is skewed by whoever they were able to actually interview.
What I found interesting, however, is the distinction they draw between counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism. They assert that counterinsurgency seeks to split the insurgents from the people while counter-terrorism seeks to split the extremist terrorists from the more moderate insurgents. I'm not sold on the whole prospect, but I like the consideration of the complexity of the situation. It rang familiar to Iraq where there are multiple groups and the approaches that work with one, may actually make the situation worse by empowering (or threatening) another. In the case of the Philippines, the ICG asserts that the US success in Basilan and Jolo is driving the terrorists closer to Mindinao and may upset the balance between the government and insurgents (MILF, MNLF) there.
Actually, its much more complicated than that, but my point isn't whether the ICG is exactly correct in this instance, but their approach is a worthwhile call to always be aware of second and third order effects (a dirty word) from both "successes" and "failures" in counterinsurgency--to be wary of anything called a "model," which to unthinking minds gets applied where it shouldn't.