Part 2

Capacity Building: The JSOTF-P set out to improve the capacity of the AFP to conduct both kinetic and non-kinetic operations.
Preparing the AFP units on Sulu for Operation Ultimatum presented the JSOTF-P with some significant challenges. In late 2005, before the JSOTF-P had arrived on Sulu and Special Forces detachments had not begun exchange training with the AFP, the AFP launched Operation Shadow, an offensive on Sulu to destroy the ASG. The offensive involved artillery and aerial bombardment of areas on Sulu believed to be ASG safe havens and caused significant damage to property as well as the population’s approval of the government. The AFP operation also experienced significant logistical challenges and after just 12 days, unable to resupply combat units, the AFP returned to their bases and ended the offensive.
Once you compare that outcome with the performance of the AFP during Operation Ultimatum you begin to get a sense of just how much progress the JSOTF-P had made in increasing the capacity of the AFP to conduct combat operations. Op Ultimatum lasted 8 months during which time the AFP remained largely in the field in pursuit of the ASG. On D-Day, of Op Ultimatum, the AFP conducted two simultaneous, nighttime, beach landing assaults and over land movement to 5 separate ASG targets, hitting them simultaneously. The AFP sustained themselves in the field while receiving some transportation support from the JSOTF-P. The JSOTF-P also assisted in the development of a partnership between MIG9 (the AFP intelligence unit organic to WESMINCOM) and the LRC which resulted in several highly successful raids.
The AFP also demonstrated dramatic improvements in conducting Joint Operations including air and maritime assets. Initially hesitant to employ OV-10s in conducting close air support, the JSOTF-P worked with pilots, improving their bombing accuracy. The improved accuracy of these strikes led the AFP ground forces, especially JSOG units, to employ these assets more frequently. The JSOTF-P also assisted the AFP in developing basic NVG capabilities which greatly enhanced the AFP's ability to conduct nighttime infil and Medevac operations.
The Bottom line is that the AFP was able to keep the ASG under tremendous pressure which in turn significantly disrupted their operations, movement and ability to conduct attacks on Sulu or in other parts of the Philippines.
Civil Military Operations:
As planning began for Op Ultimatum, the AFP was concerned with the MNLF on Sulu becoming involved in the fighting. The AFP had fought a major war against the MNLF in the 1970’s and tensions were still high. Through negotiations with MNLF leaders the AFP was able avoid a confrontation with the MNLF. This achievement is significant because it kept the thousands of MNLF members out of the fight and allowed the AFP to pursue the ASG. A similar agreement with the MILF in Mindanao called for the MILF Central Committee to denounce the ASG and JI as bandits and outlaws, clearing the way for the AFP to conduct operations in MNLF and MILF areas against ASG and JI targets. I would argue that the ongoing peace negotiations between the GRP and the MNLF and MILF contributed significantly to the success of these agreements to not interfere with AFP operations. The MNLF/MILF desire to resolve their claims for independence and continue to participate in the peace process forced them to become more moderate, or at least publicly. This meant that they had to distance themselves from more extreme members of their groups. While the MNLF likely still provided some support to the ASG/JI on Sulu during Op Ultimatum, they avoided any implication of major support which allowed AFP to more effectively pursue and target them. The situation with Commander Kato and Bravo is similar in that the MILF Central Committee publically distanced themselves from the “Rogue Commanders” which effectively split the MILF and allowed the AFP to target them.
After the successful operations on Basilan, the AFP, who in the past had sometimes employed a more heavy handed approach, embraced the effectiveness of the Indirect Approach. Although they admit in after action reports that they underfunded CMO initiatives during Op Ultimatum, they are working hard to correct this shortcoming. In September 2007, the AFP established the AFP National Development Support Command (NDSC). This command was established to centralize government, non-government, and military efforts to conduct civil-military operations. The establishment of the NDSC institutionalized the valuable lessons learned during the Basilan, Bohol, and Sulu. The NDSC is a unified command and has become the Philippine government proponent for CMO, development, and disaster response. The
NDSC also has operational control of all AFP engineer units as well as the authority to establish task forces to operate in support of regional unified commanders. This command will also coordinate the efforts of all Civil Affairs, SOT, and SALAAM teams in the specific region to maximize synchronization of effort. The NDSC mission “is to undertake development projects in support of national development programs to establish a physically and psychologically secure environment conducive to socio-economic growth.”

The success of the CMO approach had not gone unnoticed by the MILF
who had begun to conduct their own MEDCAPS and CMO projects in Central Mindanao.
The effectiveness of the JSOTF-P’s indirect strategy is illustrated by the quote from the Deputy Chairman of the MILF Committee on Information, Khaled Musa, who stated in an article posted on the Central Committee website April 2007, that the AFP/U.S. Indirect Approach
was “more lethal than brute force.”

*Continued in next blog*