Page 2 of 2 FirstFirst 12
Results 21 to 38 of 38

Thread: Iranís Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps

  1. #21
    Council Member tequila's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2006
    Location
    New York, NY
    Posts
    1,665

    Default Iran's Guard Builds a Fiscal Empire

    Iran's Guard Builds a Fiscal Empire - LATIMES, 26 Aug.

    Iran's Revolutionary Guard has quietly become one of the most significant political and economic powers in the Islamic Republic, with ties to more than 100 companies, which by some estimates control more than $12 billion in business and construction, economists and Iranian political analysts say.

    The Guard was created in 1979 as a military and intelligence force to protect the ideals of Iran's Islamic Revolution. But the 125,000-strong force has used the massive military engineering capability it developed rebuilding the country after the 1980-88 war with Iraq to take over the strategic highlands of the Iranian economy.

    The legendary people's army now has its hand in a broad and diverse variety of activities, such as dentistry and travel, and has become the dominant player in public construction projects across the country, say businessmen and economists in Tehran and analysts abroad.

    Under the leadership of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a former Revolutionary Guard commander, the force also has extended its reach in the Cabinet: 14 of 21 members are former Guard commanders. Former officers also hold 80 of the 290 seats in the parliament and a host of local mayorships and local council seats. Iran's chief nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, is a former Guardsman.

    The Revolutionary Guard's growing economic clout helps explain why the Bush administration is reportedly contemplating designating it a terrorist organization: More important than the label itself, the move would allow the U.S. to block its assets and disrupt operations by firms that associate with it, which with the Guard's large financial footprint would affect supplies, credit and investment to a broad swath of the Iranian economy ...

  2. #22
    Small Wars Journal SWJED's Avatar
    Join Date
    Sep 2005
    Location
    Largo, Florida
    Posts
    3,989

    Default Are We Prematurely Designating Iranís Revolutionary Guards as Criminal-Soldiers?

    SWJ Blog - Are We Prematurely Designating Iranís Revolutionary Guards as Criminal-Soldiers? By Robert J. Bunker and Hakim Hazim.

    The recent U.S. consideration to designate the 125,000 person strong Revolutionary Guard of Iran as a ďspecially designated global terroristĒ (per Executive Order 13224) has quite a few international security implications. (1) On the most basic level, it highlights growing U.S. and Iranian tensions over Iranís nuclear weapons program and Iranian involvementóvia its Quds Force belonging to the Revolutionary Guardóin both fermenting and supporting terrorist and insurgent activities in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

    What may be far more significant, however, is the U.S. designating the military branch of a sovereign state as a terrorist organization. In the past, such designations have applied only to non-state entities. (2) While the intent of such a designation would be to target the Revolutionary Guardís multi-billion dollar business network with ties to over 100 companies, (3) broader implications concerning state sovereignty, political legitimacy, and, ultimately, non-state-on-state conflict readily emerge. Before these issues are discussed, a short overview of Iranís Revolutionary Guard or IRG should be provided with a focus on the Quds Force...

  3. #23
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Posts
    10

    Default Not premature, but simply wrong.

    We - as a nation - have not settled on a single definition of terrorism and/or terrorist groups, let alone the rest of the world. But one item is nearly universal, and that is that an attack on a state by a non-state actor is terrorism, and an attack on a state by a state actor is an act of war. In some instances, the emotional dynamic of civilian targets or casualties is not even a factor. (Consider, if you will, Dresden.)

    I must not have stated the case in a fluid and convincing enough manner, as it netted the sound of crickets in response, but I attempted to make this case a few weeks ago with IRGC Designation and the Law of Unintended Consequences

    Designating the IRGC a terrorist organization will likely have precisely the desired economic effect. But can this purely psychological impact (beyond our borders, definitions and laws) not be achieved under the existing ďstate sponsor of terrorismĒ umbrella? If not, why not?

    Ask precisely how Iran sponsors international terrorism, and it must be concluded that it is almost exclusively through their IRGC and Quds Force. So why separate the IRGC from its commanding regime?

    Do we really need to specifically designate Iranís most elite military branch as a terrorist entity to justify such defense against those who are killing our troops in Iraq, both directly and via sponsorship and arms support?

    The short answer is ďNo.Ē The long answer is more colorful and spoken by soldiers and Marines in the field losing their brothers at Iranian hands. Specially designed Iranian-supplied EFPís claim the bulk of US casualties incurred by roadside blasts. During the last quarter of 2006, ďEFP attacks accounted for 18 percent of combat deaths of Americans and allied troops in Iraq.Ē And the level of EFP shipments is increasing, not decreasing.

    After stating the Quds Force Karbala operation from January - whose involvement was swept aside by many as simply the actions of 'rogue elements' rather than the disciplined actions of a state military unit, I tried to further make the case that Quds Force and the IRGC are in fact state arms, regardless of their tactics and which non-state groups they support.

    ĎRoguesí within a state Ė as some have tried to characterize lethal IRGC/Quds Force actions in Iraq - do not build entire mock-ups, coordinate and train foreign actors, and supply vast amounts of precision-milled shaped copper EFPís without the acknowledgment of their state apparatus.

    Unless the Bush Administration dismisses a definition of terrorism which in essence includes ďan unlawful threat or act of violence committed for a political purpose by a non-state actor,Ē then the action of designating the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Quds Force as terrorists by definition sets them apart from the Iranian regime and state. How wise is this?

    Ralph Peters says, ďOur policy is that we reserve the right to whack terrorists anywhere in the world. Now we have newly designated terrorists.Ē Heís quite right. But do we not also equally reserve the right to defend ourselves against state actors who kill and/or facilitate killing our troops in the field?

    Does it matter at the end of the day whether that state actor trains, arms and deploys terrorists or sends their own men to do the job? It shouldnít.

    On one hand, it is reassuring to see the administration pro-actively confronting (or, at this point, talking about confronting) the Iranian regime without the (contemporary) historical pre-requisites of UN inclusion and nuclear program ties.

    On the other hand, it also demonstrates a timidity to call Iran's war on us what it is. Iran possesses no such timidity. They do, however, successfully engage proxies to avoid the full consequences of their actions.

    The Iranian regime makes no bones about their intent. However, they quite skillfully leave their specific actions just ambiguous enough for us to reliably debate ourselves into inaction.

    I understand the reluctance for the White House to call Iranian acts of war precisely that publicly. The demand will likely be one of reciprocity and decisive reaction. And, well, we're kind of busy at the moment. But, on the other hand, classifying the units currently waging war as terrorists does not change the actions, no matter what we call it.

    I conclude here precisely as I concluded in the August commentary: We cannot simply re-classify or redefine the actions of those who kill us and openly seek to destroy us. When a stateís military conducts regular attacks upon another, it is by definition an act of war. We may not like it. We may even try to redefine it. And we may ultimately decide that such provocation does not warrant an in-kind response. But it is what it is, regardless. We need not conflate the ďnon-stateĒ or ďsub-nationalĒ definition of a terrorist group in order to justify targeting Ė militarily or financially - any state or group that kills or seeks to kill our civilians or soldiers.

    Forgive the length of the reply and the excessive quoting, please.

    Thoughts?

  4. #24
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Jul 2007
    Posts
    204

    Default

    Re: The recent U.S. consideration to designate the 125,000 person strong Revolutionary Guard of Iran as a ďspecially designated global terroristĒ.

    Yes, the Law of Unintended Consequences does indeed apply. But here's a short summary of the Law of Unintended Consequences:
    Unintended consequences can be classed into roughly three types:

    1) a positive unexpected benefit, usually referred to as serendipity or a windfall
    2) a potential source of problems, according to Murphy's law used in Systems engineering
    3) a negative or a perverse effect, which is the opposite result of what is intended
    Link is http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unintended_consequence

    Now, let's look at why this designation of the IRGC is happening in the first place. The IRGC started to "acquire" existing business contracts which were previously held by Iranian non-IRGC business interest (looks like starting in earnest in 2003). Many of these existing contracts were in partnership with other, non-Iranian firms, and were located in the Engineering, Construction, and PetroChem sectors of the Iranian economy. The outside partners (usually non-Iranian) were given little, if any choice in the selection of their new partners.

    Both the WSJ and the FT among others have been profiling these types of occurrences, going all the way back well into 2006. This trend of IRGC business contract "takeovers" actually can be traced back all the way into 2003.

    These IRGC business contract "takeovers" also usually preceded several events that resulted in attempts/actions by Iranian representatives to unilaterally take control of project assets and equipment, unilateral renegotiation of agreements to provide for IRGC control, and even termination of agreements which they did not find to be favorable to their interests.

    In both 2006, and now 2007, the IRGC has "acquired" control of some very large pre-existing business agreements where the IRGC has some very potentially lucrative, yet highly complex agreements. With some of these "takeovers", other powerful Iranian, non-IRGC business interests were pushed aside in favor of the IRGC. There appears to be at least some covert dissension among the losing parties over their rather abrupt removal from the business agreements (understandably not too happy).

    US Treasury obviously feels that this is a move to escape sanctions, and they see that the IRGC has made a rather substantial number of financial commitments, which from Treasury's viewpoint, are an international financial pressure point that can be exploited, and can be extremely effective.

    Look at this from Treasury's viewpoint: IRGC has made themselves into a very large player, and consequently a target. The types of business agreements the IRGC has taken over require external financing equipment above and beyond what is available within Iran, and designation as a ďspecially designated global terroristĒ makes acquiring either, much less both extraordinarily difficult.

    Plus (to be blunt about it), this really sticks it to the IRGC, certainly has the potential to make them look like unreliable business partners, and creates potential allies among the non-IRGC business partners who were strong-armed out of these business agreements.

    From Treasury's standpoint, it's hard to see a down side. Plus, don't discount the effect of doing this in the political marketplace. The reality is that if you don't do something like this, the pressure is just going to build to take actions against Iran in other venues. And these actions would probably tend to be of a more "direct nature".

    Truth of the matter is that the IRGC has made themselves out to be a very lucrative target for such economic controls. A pressure point to be taken advantage of.

    As to the law of unintended consequences, I can see (1) happening in the sense that there could easily be elements within Iran that won't be at all unhappy to see these impacts upon the IRGC. Such actions by Treasury also gives unwilling non-Iranian partners a reason to avoid dealing with the IRGC.

    I can see (2) happening just because those effects are going to happen regardless of these actions occurring, or not occurring.

    Am hard pressed to see how (3) can occur.

    My .02

  5. #25
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Posts
    10

    Default More than $.02, But Whose Criminal Soldiers?

    Appreciate the reasoned logic shared.

    Like I said, I don't one bit doubt that designating the IRGC will bring about the desired economic consequences, which you detail accurately in my view. And each of those consequences are good developments without question.

    Forgive as I struggle with economy of words, please.

    The question for me remains - Why can these economic consequences not be brought about under the proper umbrella of "State Sponsor of Terrorism"? If it does not provide for such international economic leverage as perceived under a designation as a "terrorist group," then why not? The perception among potential international entities that would do business with the IRGC under its new no-bid contract authority is one that is purely of our own making. Both designations - and the consequences delineated - are our own, by our own legal definitions.

    So rather than pretend that an entire branch of one nation's armed forces are non-state terrorists, why not amend our terms and consequences for dealing with state sponsors of terrorism and dole them as required? ...Regardless of how far Quds Force "holy warriors are incompatible with our perceptions of political legitimacy." Quds Force carries out the will of the still-revolutionary theocratic regime, which, hate it or love it, is recognized as a state in every corner I have peeked.

    The authors write, "The Quds, viewed from this perspective (holy warriors of the clerics) and coupled with the fact of their direct involvement in terrorist activities, are more of a non-state entity than a component of a national military force such as the IRG." In this, they argue that treating them as an arm of the state gives undue "political legitimacy" to the clerics and, thus, the Iranian regime which is by constitutional design constituted at its most powerful levels from the clerics' ranks. The Supreme Leader, the Assembly of Experts, the Guardian Council... We in fact often are required to point out how little true constitutional executive power Mahmoud Ahmadinejad holds as mere president.

    With all due respect, I approach it from the compete opposite. I view Bunker and Hazim's argument as giving undue legitimacy to the religious duty Quds Force carries out at the behest of the clerics they serve - clerics both in and out of official government office. The regime is one of clerics. The regime has never chosen to delineate the religious from the political - quite the opposite, of course - so why should we now attempt to do so?

    The Iranian regime accepts and leverages membership in the United Nations, not the United Pre-Nation-State Prospective Imamates. If we hypothetically attempted to remove them, they would in fact outright demand to be recognized as such.

    The argument of avoiding giving undue "political legitimacy" to Quds, the clerics and thus (because they cannot be separated by their own definition) the regime would perhaps be an argument I would entertain if we were actively supporting a dissident alternative(s) within Iran that could form a "politically legitimate" government in place of the existing theocratic regime, one which is unquestionably seeking to establish a greater imamate through regional insurgency. But we are not. So, if we follow this logic to its end point and remove political legitimacy, then what?

    All boils down to the well written (and informative) analytical commentary deciding to identify with the religious Pre-Nation-State Prospective Imamate aspect of Quds Force in order to justify calling them a terrorist organization - due to their actions, as the authors accurately conveyed. In order to do this, one must consciously choose to then dismiss Quds Force's role as an arm of the state.

    I ask, then, do the Qom imams take up special collections at Friday prayers for Quds Force expenses, or is there a ministerial payroll generated out of Tehran's governmental offices to dispense compensation, benefits and operating expenses for the IRGC arm?

    And therein lies my fundamental disagreement.

    For at the end of the day, we are toying around quite unnecessarily with our own definition of a terrorist entity. Smack in the infancy of a war against terrorists who all one day want to grow up and become insurgents so that they can then mature fully into their version of a state - even if one in the form of a caliphate and/or imamate that is in ways "incompatible with our perceptions of political legitimacy."

    In so doing, we seek to declare either the IRGC, Quds Force or both as a whole as terrorist organizations. An entire branch of a nation's military.

    We fight the uphill battle of perception from the outset in a long war with a massive public information component with the 'One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter' meme fueled by our (neccessary) support for the mujahideen against the Soviet Union. Now, we toy with (or ignore) our own definition of a terrorist group and fuel the now-amplified message that "One nation's terrorist group is another nation's military branch."

    All because we find it more expedient to deal with an enemy as declared officially a terrorist group - with its ready-made economic consequences - rather than as the state sponsor it is and adjusting those economic consequences to suit the need and urgency.

    In effect, we therefore adjust the very definition of a terrorist group that can be seen as based upon their actions (in part, supporting and/or participating in the deaths of civilians) in the infant stages of what we have chosen to characterize as a 'War on Terrorism.'

    And now that that definition includes a nation's entire branch of the military. A state actor defined as a terrorist group.

    I recall not long ago an American civilian administration that was not much opposed to slipping the United States Military directly under the jurisdiction of an International Criminal Court, where American warfighters would find themselves prosecuted for war crimes as defined and charged by myriad international actors with potentially spurious motives. In fact, there were international demands that America do just that and give the ICC access to direct charge and prosecution. Lucky are we that it was not established until 2002.

    We may not be far from a very like-minded American civilian administration. Do we really want to go down that road?

    And thus, the unintended consequence.

    Sometimes we're just too damned smart for our own good, so brilliant are we.

    Re-write the economic penalties for doing business with a State Sponsor of Terrorism, not the definition of a Terrorist Entity. We wrote the damned things in the first place.

  6. #26
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Jul 2007
    Posts
    204

    Default

    Why can these economic consequences not be brought about under the proper umbrella of "State Sponsor of Terrorism"? If it does not provide for such international economic leverage as perceived under a designation as a "terrorist group," then why not?
    Don't think that's their goal. I tend to believe that the US government (through these financial measures) wants to target specifically the IRGC and their related entities.

    Let's look at this "politically" (I know, really, really BAD WORD!). Back in the day, the Administration decided to name Iran as a sponsor of terrorism, and that didn't go so well. Arguing over the past in this specific case is irrelevant, but if the goal was to better relationships between Iran and the US, well, pretty obvious that that approach failed miserably.

    Simple Analysis: They tried to use a double barreled sawed-off as a sniper rifle. Didn't work, at least not well.

    Designating Iran as a "State Sponsor of Terrorism" just will not get them where they want to go. That would just come across as a replay of their previous failed attempt at "communicating" with Iran. "Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results." Albert Einstein. They do learn - eventually.

    But now we have a different issue with Iran. The IRGC is being developed into a major economic development player within Iran, and now externally on large Iranian development projects, with non-Iranian business partners. No reason (or need) to target the entire nation-state of Iran with such a designation, when a specific quasi "business entity" will do.

    Honestly, this approach is very similar to what the US government has done with any number of quasi business firms within the PRC (China). The Chinese government squawks about such designations, and then business continues forward as usual (except for the designated firms, they are now officially in a world of hurt). But the Chinese government realizes that this is just one of those costs of doing business. And "doing business" wins.

    Understand, my outlook tends to be tempered by dealing with other pol's. They tend to want and require the "short version" of everything, and in many cases, it's all about framing issues, and honestly, "who's going to be driving the bus". The points you raise in your posts would be lost upon them, because those points would be extremely difficult to "frame" regarding any discussion regarding Iran.

    Would I be at all surprised if the points and issues you raise were considered? I would expect they were considered, and seriously. I just think that other factors were more important, such as the need for taking a strong action designed to alleviate the need for imminent military action.

    I tend to be convinced that this action designating the IRGC has a substantive political equation to it, along with the obvious primary goal of disrupting the financial operations of the IRGC. But there's also no reason to make other additional enemies by disrupting other parts of the Iranian economy that are not directly/indirectly aligned with the IRGC. We'll leave that up to the Iranian government to do on their own. They appear to be much more capable of accomplishing that goal than we are.
    Last edited by Watcher In The Middle; 09-07-2007 at 04:43 AM. Reason: Punctuation - The bane of my existance....

  7. #27
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Posts
    3,098

    Default

    JFQ, 2nd Qtr 08: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: An Open Source Analysis
    ....By analyzing only open source material, it is evident that the key center of gravity in Iran is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or Sepah-e Pasdaran (Pasdaran). The IRGC’s conventional military strength, uncompromising execution of its conceptual and constitutional mandates, political and economic influence, and direct as well as indirect control of the country’s WMD programs combine to make the Pasdaran the source of the clerical regime’s power both domestically and internationally......

  8. #28
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Oct 2005
    Posts
    3,098

    Default

    RAND, 20 Jan 09:

    The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps
    This monograph assesses the extent of the IRGC’s penetration into Iran’s society, economy, and politics. We begin by situating the IRGC within the context of Iran’s factional landscape and security bureaucracy, highlighting the origins and early development of its domestic roles. Next, we cover the IRGC’s role in popular paramilitary training, higher education, the indoctrination of youth, and its influence over Iran’s domestic media. This extensive apparatus serves both the regime’s interests—mobilizing the population into a “10 million–man army” for the defense of the homeland and countering reform activism, particularly on university campuses—and the more parochial goal of blunting any criticism of Pasdaran nepotism and economic corruption. We then discuss the IRGC’s economic role. We survey its broad-ranging business interests in numerous Iranian market sectors, as well as its role in public works, highlighting how these activities lend the institution a multidimensional quality. Finally, we conclude with an assessment of the IRGC as a political actor, paying special attention to emerging factionalism within its ranks and highlighting instances in which these fissures have surfaced in the past.
    Complete 153-page study at the link.

  9. #29
    Council Member tequila's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2006
    Location
    New York, NY
    Posts
    1,665

    Default Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps: The Revolution Will Be Mercantilized

    Very interesting article by Dr. Ali Ansari about the IRGC and its increasing prominence in the Iranian economy.

    Increasingly we can no longer talk about the mullahs being in charge --- rather we can speak of a sort of state that looks more like Russia, where ideological fervor comes in second place to a rentier state controlled by the factions within the security services allied with the Supreme Leader.

    Indeed, the onset of additional sanctions cannot necessarily be seen as a negative by members of the regime like the Guard, which benefits enormously from the sanctions already in place. Indeed, more sanctions will act to further enrich the power players.

    SOME YEARS back on a research trip to Iran, I met a young man who had been conscripted into the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Commenting on his obviously secular upbringing, I was both intrigued and sympathetic. Yet contrary to all expectations, I found him not only sanguine but also somewhat relieved. He explained that the Guards were not what he had expected. For all their very public piety, they were by far the most relaxed and laid back of the military organizations in the Islamic Republic. The Guards had even implemented a form of flexible work hours. God forbid, had he gone into the regular military he might have been expected to adhere to a strict work regimen. It was all highly unorthodox and reassuringly Iranian. The IRGC wasn’t a disciplined military organization in the Western sense of the term; it was a network, a brotherhood, in which personalities and connections mattered far more than structures. This did not make it necessarily less effective or indeed less dangerous as an instrument of coercion—the lack of transparent rules might, in fact, make it more so—but it was certainly a different type of beast.

    Though the IRGC started its life as a defender of the revolution, over time the organization has become increasingly involved in commercial interests. Divisions within the Revolutionary Guard, particularly between its veterans and their heirs, have deepened. Now in bed with an increasingly radicalized elite in Iran, the IRGC seems to be less about protecting the people of the country and more about protecting its own material interests. Iran is rapidly becoming a security state.
    Last edited by tequila; 01-01-2010 at 06:22 PM.

  10. #30
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2007
    Posts
    1,111

    Default Background on our guides...

    Who is Dr. Ali Ansari?

    Ali M. Ansari, PhD, is one of the world's leading experts on Iran and its history. Having obtained his BA and PhD from the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS),[1] he is currently Professor in Modern History with reference to the Middle East at St. Andrews University in Scotland, where he is also the founding director of the Institute for Iranian Studies.

    In addition to his dual role at St. Andrews, he is also an Associate Fellow at Chatham House and sits on the Governing Council of the British Institute of Persian Studies (BIPS). He is a regular speaker at conferences and events regarding Iran, including "Iran's New Parliament" at the New America Foundation[2]. He has also written for The Guardian,[3] The Independent,[4] and the New Statesman,[5] among others.
    What is the National Interest?

    The National Interest (NI) is a prominent conservative American bi-monthly international affairs magazine published by the Nixon Center. It was founded in 1985 by Irving Kristol and until 2001 was edited by Anglo-Australian Owen Harries. The National Interest is not restricted in content to ďforeign policyĒ in the narrow, technical sense but attempts to pay attention to broad ideas and the way in which cultural and social differences, technological innovations, history, and religion impact the behavior of states.

    The National Interest is often critical of positions taken by a rival magazine, Foreign Affairs.
    NI has an international readership, and excerpts from its articles have been published in the New York Times, Financial Times, The Australian, International Herald Tribune, Shin Dong-A, The Spectator, and Austria's Europšische Rundschau, as well as on online sites such as the Russian Inosmi.ru.
    Sapere Aude

  11. #31
    Council Member
    Join Date
    Aug 2009
    Location
    USA
    Posts
    861

    Default

    I think you have hit the nail on the head. The revolution is now like post-stalinist Russia, but its less secure because the purges were less thorough and Iran was never a total dictatorship like Stalinist Russia was. Until a year ago, the islamic republic had reasonable internal legitimacy and some degree of real democracy. From that position, its not going to be easy to impose a watertight soviet style repression. But given the vast economic interests of the revolutionary guards, they are certainly going to make an effort. If they lose control, they also lose real money....

  12. #32
    Council Member Firn's Avatar
    Join Date
    Sep 2009
    Posts
    1,297

    Default

    From what I have seen, heard and read it will now be far more difficult to sustain the concept of an Iranian Islamic Republic than one year ago. The bloody trumoil must have hardened the lines of conflict.

    Firn

  13. #33
    Council Member AdamG's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Location
    Hiding from the Dreaded Burrito Gang
    Posts
    3,096

    Default

    Incompetency or sabotage?

    TEHRAN, Iran ó Iran on Wednesday said 18 members of the powerful Revolutionary Guard were killed in an explosion that struck the force's base in the country's west a day earlier.

    The state IRNA news agency said 14 other Guard troops were wounded in Tuesday's blast in the city of Khoramabad, some 300 miles (500 kilometers) southwest of the capital, Tehran. The injured were taken to hospitals in Khoramabad.

    The report said the blast was caused by a fire that had reached the ammunition storage area, but there was no word on what had ignited the blaze. In their first reports of the blast late Tuesday, most Iranian media said the explosion was an accident.
    http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/...ocId=D9IQOHTO2
    A scrimmage in a Border Station
    A canter down some dark defile
    Two thousand pounds of education
    Drops to a ten-rupee jezail


    http://i.imgur.com/IPT1uLH.jpg

  14. #34
    Council Member AdamG's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Location
    Hiding from the Dreaded Burrito Gang
    Posts
    3,096

    Default

    Qu'elle surprise.
    An explosion that ripped through an Revolutionary Guards Corps. base last week in western Iran, killing 18 soldiers, has attracted international attention because the site is reportedly used to store medium-range Shihab-3 missiles.
    http://www.jpost.com/IranianThreat/N...aspx?id=191626
    A scrimmage in a Border Station
    A canter down some dark defile
    Two thousand pounds of education
    Drops to a ten-rupee jezail


    http://i.imgur.com/IPT1uLH.jpg

  15. #35
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    13,225

    Default Revolutionary Guards Speak Out Against Ahmadinejad

    Hat tip to Scott Lucas blogsite picking up a story in The National:
    The president of Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has come under harsh and unprecedented criticism from his usually close supporters, the Revolutionary Guards, in a move that suggests rifts among the Islamic Republic's power centres are widening.
    Link:http://www.enduringamerica.com/home/...-ahmadine.html
    davidbfpo

  16. #36
    Council Member AdamG's Avatar
    Join Date
    Dec 2005
    Location
    Hiding from the Dreaded Burrito Gang
    Posts
    3,096

    Default

    Must be the greasy kebabs.

    The Iranian State media just announced that another high ranking Revolutionary Guard commander, Ahmad Sodagar, has died of a heart attack.

    Sodagar, a major general, had served as the head of security and intelligence of the Guards’ Khatam-al-Anbia Base and was the chief commander of the Guards’ Prophet Mohammad Division. He had served in the Iran-Iraq war and, at the time of his death, was the head of the program “Defaeh Moghadas” or Holy Defense.

    This is the fifth Guard commander to die because of a heart attack or stroke in the past month.
    http://www.radicalislam.org/news/fifth-rev-guard-commander-dies-heart-attack20,446v t
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 07-26-2019 at 03:34 PM. Reason: 20,446v today when thread reopened
    A scrimmage in a Border Station
    A canter down some dark defile
    Two thousand pounds of education
    Drops to a ten-rupee jezail


    http://i.imgur.com/IPT1uLH.jpg

  17. #37
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    13,225

    Default Thread reopened for next post

    Manually id'd this thread for the next post to be added.
    davidbfpo

  18. #38
    Council Member davidbfpo's Avatar
    Join Date
    Mar 2006
    Location
    UK
    Posts
    13,225

    Default Shadow force: The secret history of the US intelligence community's battle with IRGC

    A 'Long Read' that provides an overview of the 'battle' and a number of new to me items.
    Link:https://news.yahoo.com/shadow-force-...090000959.html
    davidbfpo

Similar Threads

  1. Replies: 7
    Last Post: 02-04-2017, 12:09 PM
  2. Marine Corps Vision and Strategy 2025
    By SWJED in forum Futurists & Theorists
    Replies: 0
    Last Post: 07-01-2008, 05:12 PM
  3. Conway Becomes Marine Corps Commandant
    By SWJED in forum The Whole News
    Replies: 2
    Last Post: 12-08-2006, 02:35 AM
  4. Recognizing and Understanding Revolutionary Change in Warfare
    By SWJED in forum Futurists & Theorists
    Replies: 0
    Last Post: 03-01-2006, 09:59 PM

Bookmarks

Posting Permissions

  • You may not post new threads
  • You may not post replies
  • You may not post attachments
  • You may not edit your posts
  •