Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps

[Watcher In The Middle]

Why can these economic consequences not be brought about under the proper umbrella of "State Sponsor of Terrorism"? If it does not provide for such international economic leverage as perceived under a designation as a "terrorist group," then why not?

Don't think that's their goal. I tend to believe that the US government (through these financial measures) wants to target specifically the IRGC and their related entities.

Let's look at this "politically" (I know, really, really BAD WORD!). Back in the day, the Administration decided to name Iran as a sponsor of terrorism, and that didn't go so well. Arguing over the past in this specific case is irrelevant, but if the goal was to better relationships between Iran and the US, well, pretty obvious that that approach failed miserably.

Simple Analysis: They tried to use a double barreled sawed-off as a sniper rifle. Didn't work, at least not well.

Designating Iran as a "State Sponsor of Terrorism" just will not get them where they want to go. That would just come across as a replay of their previous failed attempt at "communicating" with Iran. "Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results." Albert Einstein. They do learn - eventually.

But now we have a different issue with Iran. The IRGC is being developed into a major economic development player within Iran, and now externally on large Iranian development projects, with non-Iranian business partners. No reason (or need) to target the entire nation-state of Iran with such a designation, when a specific quasi "business entity" will do.

Honestly, this approach is very similar to what the US government has done with any number of quasi business firms within the PRC (China). The Chinese government squawks about such designations, and then business continues forward as usual (except for the designated firms, they are now officially in a world of hurt). But the Chinese government realizes that this is just one of those costs of doing business. And "doing business" wins.

Understand, my outlook tends to be tempered by dealing with other pol's. They tend to want and require the "short version" of everything, and in many cases, it's all about framing issues, and honestly, "who's going to be driving the bus". The points you raise in your posts would be lost upon them, because those points would be extremely difficult to "frame" regarding any discussion regarding Iran.

Would I be at all surprised if the points and issues you raise were considered? I would expect they were considered, and seriously. I just think that other factors were more important, such as the need for taking a strong action designed to alleviate the need for imminent military action.

I tend to be convinced that this action designating the IRGC has a substantive political equation to it, along with the obvious primary goal of disrupting the financial operations of the IRGC. But there's also no reason to make other additional enemies by disrupting other parts of the Iranian economy that are not directly/indirectly aligned with the IRGC. We'll leave that up to the Iranian government to do on their own. They appear to be much more capable of accomplishing that goal than we are.

[Jedburgh]

JFQ, 2nd Qtr 08: Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps: An Open Source Analysis

....By analyzing only open source material, it is evident that the key center of gravity in Iran is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), or Sepah-e Pasdaran (Pasdaran). The IRGC’s conventional military strength, uncompromising execution of its conceptual and constitutional mandates, political and economic influence, and direct as well as indirect control of the country’s WMD programs combine to make the Pasdaran the source of the clerical regime’s power both domestically and internationally......

[Jedburgh]

RAND, 20 Jan 09:

The Rise of the Pasdaran: Assessing the Domestic Roles of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps

This monograph assesses the extent of the IRGC’s penetration into Iran’s society, economy, and politics. We begin by situating the IRGC within the context of Iran’s factional landscape and security bureaucracy, highlighting the origins and early development of its domestic roles. Next, we cover the IRGC’s role in popular paramilitary training, higher education, the indoctrination of youth, and its influence over Iran’s domestic media. This extensive apparatus serves both the regime’s interests—mobilizing the population into a “10 million–man army” for the defense of the homeland and countering reform activism, particularly on university campuses—and the more parochial goal of blunting any criticism of Pasdaran nepotism and economic corruption. We then discuss the IRGC’s economic role. We survey its broad-ranging business interests in numerous Iranian market sectors, as well as its role in public works, highlighting how these activities lend the institution a multidimensional quality. Finally, we conclude with an assessment of the IRGC as a political actor, paying special attention to emerging factionalism within its ranks and highlighting instances in which these fissures have surfaced in the past.

Complete 153-page study at the link.