Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps

[Watcher In The Middle]

Why can these economic consequences not be brought about under the proper umbrella of "State Sponsor of Terrorism"? If it does not provide for such international economic leverage as perceived under a designation as a "terrorist group," then why not?

Don't think that's their goal. I tend to believe that the US government (through these financial measures) wants to target specifically the IRGC and their related entities.

Let's look at this "politically" (I know, really, really BAD WORD!). Back in the day, the Administration decided to name Iran as a sponsor of terrorism, and that didn't go so well. Arguing over the past in this specific case is irrelevant, but if the goal was to better relationships between Iran and the US, well, pretty obvious that that approach failed miserably.

Simple Analysis: They tried to use a double barreled sawed-off as a sniper rifle. Didn't work, at least not well.

Designating Iran as a "State Sponsor of Terrorism" just will not get them where they want to go. That would just come across as a replay of their previous failed attempt at "communicating" with Iran. "Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results." Albert Einstein. They do learn - eventually.

But now we have a different issue with Iran. The IRGC is being developed into a major economic development player within Iran, and now externally on large Iranian development projects, with non-Iranian business partners. No reason (or need) to target the entire nation-state of Iran with such a designation, when a specific quasi "business entity" will do.

Honestly, this approach is very similar to what the US government has done with any number of quasi business firms within the PRC (China). The Chinese government squawks about such designations, and then business continues forward as usual (except for the designated firms, they are now officially in a world of hurt). But the Chinese government realizes that this is just one of those costs of doing business. And "doing business" wins.

Understand, my outlook tends to be tempered by dealing with other pol's. They tend to want and require the "short version" of everything, and in many cases, it's all about framing issues, and honestly, "who's going to be driving the bus". The points you raise in your posts would be lost upon them, because those points would be extremely difficult to "frame" regarding any discussion regarding Iran.

Would I be at all surprised if the points and issues you raise were considered? I would expect they were considered, and seriously. I just think that other factors were more important, such as the need for taking a strong action designed to alleviate the need for imminent military action.

I tend to be convinced that this action designating the IRGC has a substantive political equation to it, along with the obvious primary goal of disrupting the financial operations of the IRGC. But there's also no reason to make other additional enemies by disrupting other parts of the Iranian economy that are not directly/indirectly aligned with the IRGC. We'll leave that up to the Iranian government to do on their own. They appear to be much more capable of accomplishing that goal than we are.

[tequila]

Very interesting article by Dr. Ali Ansari about the IRGC and its increasing prominence in the Iranian economy.

Increasingly we can no longer talk about the mullahs being in charge --- rather we can speak of a sort of state that looks more like Russia, where ideological fervor comes in second place to a rentier state controlled by the factions within the security services allied with the Supreme Leader.

Indeed, the onset of additional sanctions cannot necessarily be seen as a negative by members of the regime like the Guard, which benefits enormously from the sanctions already in place. Indeed, more sanctions will act to further enrich the power players.

SOME YEARS back on a research trip to Iran, I met a young man who had been conscripted into the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Commenting on his obviously secular upbringing, I was both intrigued and sympathetic. Yet contrary to all expectations, I found him not only sanguine but also somewhat relieved. He explained that the Guards were not what he had expected. For all their very public piety, they were by far the most relaxed and laid back of the military organizations in the Islamic Republic. The Guards had even implemented a form of flexible work hours. God forbid, had he gone into the regular military he might have been expected to adhere to a strict work regimen. It was all highly unorthodox and reassuringly Iranian. The IRGC wasn’t a disciplined military organization in the Western sense of the term; it was a network, a brotherhood, in which personalities and connections mattered far more than structures. This did not make it necessarily less effective or indeed less dangerous as an instrument of coercion—the lack of transparent rules might, in fact, make it more so—but it was certainly a different type of beast.

Though the IRGC started its life as a defender of the revolution, over time the organization has become increasingly involved in commercial interests. Divisions within the Revolutionary Guard, particularly between its veterans and their heirs, have deepened. Now in bed with an increasingly radicalized elite in Iran, the IRGC seems to be less about protecting the people of the country and more about protecting its own material interests. Iran is rapidly becoming a security state.

[Surferbeetle]

Who is Dr. Ali Ansari?

Ali M. Ansari, PhD, is one of the world's leading experts on Iran and its history. Having obtained his BA and PhD from the University of London's School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS),[1] he is currently Professor in Modern History with reference to the Middle East at St. Andrews University in Scotland, where he is also the founding director of the Institute for Iranian Studies.

In addition to his dual role at St. Andrews, he is also an Associate Fellow at Chatham House and sits on the Governing Council of the British Institute of Persian Studies (BIPS). He is a regular speaker at conferences and events regarding Iran, including "Iran's New Parliament" at the New America Foundation[2]. He has also written for The Guardian,[3] The Independent,[4] and the New Statesman,[5] among others.

What is the National Interest?

The National Interest (NI) is a prominent conservative American bi-monthly international affairs magazine published by the Nixon Center. It was founded in 1985 by Irving Kristol and until 2001 was edited by Anglo-Australian Owen Harries. The National Interest is not restricted in content to “foreign policy” in the narrow, technical sense but attempts to pay attention to broad ideas and the way in which cultural and social differences, technological innovations, history, and religion impact the behavior of states.

The National Interest is often critical of positions taken by a rival magazine, Foreign Affairs.

NI has an international readership, and excerpts from its articles have been published in the New York Times, Financial Times, The Australian, International Herald Tribune, Shin Dong-A, The Spectator, and Austria's Europäische Rundschau, as well as on online sites such as the Russian Inosmi.ru.

[omarali50]

I think you have hit the nail on the head. The revolution is now like post-stalinist Russia, but its less secure because the purges were less thorough and Iran was never a total dictatorship like Stalinist Russia was. Until a year ago, the islamic republic had reasonable internal legitimacy and some degree of real democracy. From that position, its not going to be easy to impose a watertight soviet style repression. But given the vast economic interests of the revolutionary guards, they are certainly going to make an effort. If they lose control, they also lose real money....

[Firn]

From what I have seen, heard and read it will now be far more difficult to sustain the concept of an Iranian Islamic Republic than one year ago. The bloody trumoil must have hardened the lines of conflict.

Firn