A 'Digger' writes The Rise and Fall of Western COIN

[Bill Moore]

John Nagl's "Eating Soup with a Knife," revived the Western concept of COIN, a concept based on myths perpetuated by John's inaccurate portrayal of the Vietnam War embraced by so many in liberal academia and now the military. Fortunately, it is being called into question. While anti-COINdista, who I describe as those who argue COIN is the only form of war in the future, and all we have to do is win the people's hearts and minds to achieve our goals, I do think there are gems within our COIN doctrine worth preserving. However, lets not forget it is an armed conflict, and each situation is different, but the skillful use of force will generally prove to be the most effective means to defeat an insurgency. Winning hearts and minds is essential for consolidating those wins unless you envision a nation that lives under perpetual martial law. We have never found the balance, and tend to give insurgents too freedom of action with our current approach.

The North Vietnamese under Ho were not seen as legitimate by many, in fact Ho ruthlessly killed those in North Vietnam opposed to him. The outcome of the war was not predetermined, North Vietnam simply employed the coercive use of conventional power more effectively. His insurgency in the south was largely suppressed. The fact that the South Vietnamese fought so bravery when the North conducted their final conventional invasion would indicated that despite their internal troubles they didn't want to fall under communist rule. Nor did countries in the region, there was no one with greater knowledge of the region that the former PM of Singapore, Lee Kuan Yew. He stated the war in Vietnam gave other countries time to build their defenses against communist aggression, so in his view from that aspect it was a win. It was not a war between simply North and South Vietnam, the communists succeeded in taking Laos and Cambodia, and sponsored an insurgency in Thailand. The domino theory actually had merit. Since we can't discuss the Vietnam War honestly, we need to focus on other examples in my view, and there plenty to study.

I look forward to reading Prof Evan's paper, but based on short excerpt above it does seem we spend too much staring in a mirror when studying COIN. There are numerous non-Western COIN doctrines that do not conform to our current version of COIN. Communists countries around the world, supported by the USSR had their own doctrine for COIN. Iran clearly has its own doctrine. Of course, so did the Nazis (in many respects they paralleled modern day western COIN in words, but not in practice). They may all have parallels with the West, but they were unique to their form of governance.

[Bob's World]

Bill, I too have significant problem's with the perspective on COIN captured and propagated into US COIN doctrine by John Nagl - however my primary concerns are nearly a mirror image of your own.

IMO the US borrowed much of the tactical approach of the Brits in Malaya, but with none of the strategy. What John and most miss about Malaya, IMO, are the strategic lessons, choosing to focus on what the military did in support of the WOG COIN, as actually being the COIN.

The Brits returned to Malaya bent on restoring the colony, but quickly (compared to the US in Vietnam, Afghanistan or Iraq) came to realize that goal was impossible, and therefore any COIN approach in support of the same would be infeasible. So they gave up on restoring illegitimate government under British governance, and instead shifted to facilitating the growth of legitimate local governance. This demanded the Brits to give up their control; and also to facilitate full participation and opportunity across the entire population. The military merely created the time and space for this to occur.

The Brits "won" by losing. Their dream of colony dashed by reality, the helped a sovereign commonwealth partner to emerge instead.

The US, on the other hand, fearful of the spread of communism, sought to quash the legitimacy of Vietnamese independence won over the French by the people of Vietnam. Now, did all Vietnamese want to be communist? Of course not, but a much greater percentage did not want to be French, or under the control of any other external power, such as the US.

It is a moot point, IMO, to debate the legitimacy of Ho's government with those who saw their interests served best by governance protected by a Western power like France or the US; the essential debate is legitimacy of the governments created/protected by the US in the South. Neither had universal legitimacy, but at least Ho's legitimacy was domestic.

Good COIN requires governance that seeks to be fully inclusive, that is reasonably controlled by the will of the people, and that is evolutionary in nature. This must be supported by security forces that protect this inclusive, evolutionary system of governance, and not some particular government. The branch that cannot bend, will surely break. When the majority perceive themselves to have effective legal mechanisms to shape governance in the context of their cultural expectations, the number who perceive they must act out illegally and violently will typically be rare and small. There is no fundamental problem with employing reasonable state power against these few, but again, it must be in support of an inclusive, evolutionary system, and not to simply defend a status quo that keeps some man or family in power, or that appears designed to support the fears and interests of some foreign power.

The US sucks at COIN because we think US control is so much better than what we replaced that people affected by it will not resist. That is beyond naïve.

The nature of governmental action will drive the nature of population response. But the character of governmental action will determine the degree or scope of that population response. Until the US military incorporates a presumption that resistance insurgency will follow invasion; and that revolutionary insurgency will follow any effort to create, shape or protect a foreign government, we will continue to suck at COIN.

[Bob's World]

Or, to paraphrase a Texas saying, when it comes to COIN, the US is "all hat and no cattle" (with hat being tactical programs, and cattle being a feasible strategic framework).

[Bill Moore]

Strategy exists at all levels, what you're discussing IMO is little strategy, the strategy of how to "win" a particular operation or smaller scale war. COIN is unique, I know you don't consider it war and I do, but regardless we both understand it has a unique strategic context at the local level. Using the diplomacy, information, military, and economic (DIME) model, despite its limitations, all of these elements can perform at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels. In my opinion you're arguing we failed to understand the operational environment and had an ineffective operational approach. Certainly that is true, but we probably disagree on several points on what we did wrong.

Transitioning to big strategy, you have to look at the war in a global context, and that has little to with so called legitimacy at the local level. It had a much larger Cold War context. At this point in time it had everything to with relative power vis--vis the communist and so called free world. From that perspective the war demonstrated, that the U.S. was willing to stand up against perceived communist aggression. It demonstrated the U.S. was willing to support it allies, and as Lee said it gave time for the still weak governments in SE Asia to strengthen their defenses against USSR sponsored insurgencies. Over time it was realized, although I doubt it was an objective going in, that this war, much like our support to the resistance in Afghanistan helped weaken the USSR, which contributed to its collapse and our subsequent post-Cold War era where we often appear to be strategically adrift.

I disagree with that view, strategy is simply more complex in a multipolar or non-polar world, so it can't be explained in a Cold War context. Local issues still have global implications, but the implications vary greatly, and need to be considered on their own merits. The last thing we need is a strategy today that parallels our Cold War strategy. It would limit our options and more often than not cause us to mischaracterize issues.

[Bob's World]

Ok, now we are diverging into a couple of distinct issues. Both important, but clearly distinct.

First, strategy for successful COIN. More accurately for the US, strategy for successful support to someone else's COIN. COIN is fundamentally a domestic operation, and if revolutionary rather resistance against an illegitimate foreign presence, really does not fall within the logic and fundamentals associated with war and warfare. The Government of Baltimore is currently conducting COIN. The US forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are providing support to foreign efforts to deal with their own revolutionary insurgency, while at the same time contributing to the parallel resistance insurgency generated by our very presence and actions. (more to follow)

[Bob's World]

Successful COIN demands first and foremost that the population/populations where the revolutionary energy is the strongest, perceive themselves to have a viable political alternative to that which they feel compelled to revolve against - and trusted, certain, and legal ways to pursue that alternative that make sense in the context of their respective cultures.

The US always skips this step. We fixate on what we think is best for us, and then create or adopt some government who we believe most likely to act as we think is fit, wrap this fundamentally illegitimate entity in the nomenclature and trappings of "democracy" - and then task the military to build partner military capacity to protect this abomination from large elements of its own population. As this begins to fail of its own weight, we then apply more and more direct US energy (security, development, etc) in efforts to prop the whole thing up - but ultimately this has always failed.

When our overarching strategy was to prevail in a Cold War bi-polar contest, a tie in Korea and a loss in Vietnam could both contribute to a larger win. But that does not mean by any stretch that either of those conflicts were necessary, or even particularly helpful, in attaining that "win." They did not however cause a strategic "fail."

But what is the US larger end now?? What can a loss in Afghanistan and/or Iraq possibly contribute toward? What can they cause? They cannot contribute to a larger win because we have not defined a larger win. They can only contribute to a larger fail.

We have a grand strategy post-Cold War that is essentially to play not to lose. We are in a spread defense, we cannot score, and we see any who seek to score against us in anyway as a new "threat" to add to our ever expanding list. The surest way to lose is to play not to lose. The US needs a new grand strategic focus and a game defined in terms we can play to win if we hope to get off the current odyssey of bleeding off strategic altitude in exchange for tactical airspeed. As General Zinni commented to my war college class 9 years ago, "we don't know where we are going, but we are making good time."

[Bill Moore]

Successful COIN demands first and foremost that the population/populations where the revolutionary energy is the strongest, perceive themselves to have a viable political alternative to that which they feel compelled to revolve against - and trusted, certain, and legal ways to pursue that alternative that make sense in the context of their respective cultures.

From a Western perspective true, but this assumption ignores history. Insurgencies historically have been defeated more through the use of force than political maneuvering. Obviously we don't fight that way, but then again our approach to COIN is still looking for a victory somewhere.

The US always skips this step. We fixate on what we think is best for us, and then create or adopt some government who we believe most likely to act as we think is fit, wrap this fundamentally illegitimate entity in the nomenclature and trappings of "democracy" - and then task the military to build partner military capacity to protect this abomination from large elements of its own population. As this begins to fail of its own weight, we then apply more and more direct US energy (security, development, etc) in efforts to prop the whole thing up - but ultimately this has always failed.

Agree, and even when we can see it coming we don't change course. Operational design promotes reframing when the situation changes, but I think most people are psychologically wired to resist change, so while they may agree with reframing conceptually, doing it is another thing altogether.

When our overarching strategy was to prevail in a Cold War bi-polar contest, a tie in Korea and a loss in Vietnam could both contribute to a larger win. But that does not mean by any stretch that either of those conflicts were necessary, or even particularly helpful, in attaining that "win." They did not however cause a strategic "fail."

Of course any arguments of what would have happened if we didn't intervene are counterfactual. Still worth entertaining, but there is no way we can honestly know what would have happened. The fact that we did fight with an international coalition may have demonstrated to the communists that the West and its allies were willing to stand up to communist aggression. It "may" have served as a form of strategic deterrence that in the end prevented a nuclear holocaust. Who knows?

But what is the US larger end now?? What can a loss in Afghanistan and/or Iraq possibly contribute toward? What can they cause? They cannot contribute to a larger win because we have not defined a larger win. They can only contribute to a larger fail.

Not defined well, but I think we have defined the larger win, and that is an international order that protects our interests (clearly not black and white), and sustaining U.S. leadership (though President Obama seems to be backing away from this).

We have a grand strategy post-Cold War that is essentially to play not to lose.

Where is this articulated?

The US needs a new grand strategic focus and a game defined in terms we can play to win if we hope to get off the current odyssey of bleeding off strategic altitude in exchange for tactical airspeed. As General Zinni commented to my war college class 9 years ago, "we don't know where we are going, but we are making good time."

I don't disagree with this aspiration, but the world is changing fundamentally and frankly I don't think we know what we want the new order to look like. We have some idea of what we don't want it to look like, but that perspective results in reacting instead of proactive strategic shaping. I also think we're too divided politically to reach a consensus of where we want to go. There is little consensus on Cuba, ISIL, Iran, and Russia to name a few. If we had desired strategic goal then we could frame these issues in a larger context and make smart choices. That doesn't seem to be happening at the moment.