A 'Digger' writes The Rise and Fall of Western COIN

[Bob's World]

Successful COIN demands first and foremost that the population/populations where the revolutionary energy is the strongest, perceive themselves to have a viable political alternative to that which they feel compelled to revolve against - and trusted, certain, and legal ways to pursue that alternative that make sense in the context of their respective cultures.

The US always skips this step. We fixate on what we think is best for us, and then create or adopt some government who we believe most likely to act as we think is fit, wrap this fundamentally illegitimate entity in the nomenclature and trappings of "democracy" - and then task the military to build partner military capacity to protect this abomination from large elements of its own population. As this begins to fail of its own weight, we then apply more and more direct US energy (security, development, etc) in efforts to prop the whole thing up - but ultimately this has always failed.

When our overarching strategy was to prevail in a Cold War bi-polar contest, a tie in Korea and a loss in Vietnam could both contribute to a larger win. But that does not mean by any stretch that either of those conflicts were necessary, or even particularly helpful, in attaining that "win." They did not however cause a strategic "fail."

But what is the US larger end now?? What can a loss in Afghanistan and/or Iraq possibly contribute toward? What can they cause? They cannot contribute to a larger win because we have not defined a larger win. They can only contribute to a larger fail.

We have a grand strategy post-Cold War that is essentially to play not to lose. We are in a spread defense, we cannot score, and we see any who seek to score against us in anyway as a new "threat" to add to our ever expanding list. The surest way to lose is to play not to lose. The US needs a new grand strategic focus and a game defined in terms we can play to win if we hope to get off the current odyssey of bleeding off strategic altitude in exchange for tactical airspeed. As General Zinni commented to my war college class 9 years ago, "we don't know where we are going, but we are making good time."

[Bill Moore]

Successful COIN demands first and foremost that the population/populations where the revolutionary energy is the strongest, perceive themselves to have a viable political alternative to that which they feel compelled to revolve against - and trusted, certain, and legal ways to pursue that alternative that make sense in the context of their respective cultures.

From a Western perspective true, but this assumption ignores history. Insurgencies historically have been defeated more through the use of force than political maneuvering. Obviously we don't fight that way, but then again our approach to COIN is still looking for a victory somewhere.

The US always skips this step. We fixate on what we think is best for us, and then create or adopt some government who we believe most likely to act as we think is fit, wrap this fundamentally illegitimate entity in the nomenclature and trappings of "democracy" - and then task the military to build partner military capacity to protect this abomination from large elements of its own population. As this begins to fail of its own weight, we then apply more and more direct US energy (security, development, etc) in efforts to prop the whole thing up - but ultimately this has always failed.

Agree, and even when we can see it coming we don't change course. Operational design promotes reframing when the situation changes, but I think most people are psychologically wired to resist change, so while they may agree with reframing conceptually, doing it is another thing altogether.

When our overarching strategy was to prevail in a Cold War bi-polar contest, a tie in Korea and a loss in Vietnam could both contribute to a larger win. But that does not mean by any stretch that either of those conflicts were necessary, or even particularly helpful, in attaining that "win." They did not however cause a strategic "fail."

Of course any arguments of what would have happened if we didn't intervene are counterfactual. Still worth entertaining, but there is no way we can honestly know what would have happened. The fact that we did fight with an international coalition may have demonstrated to the communists that the West and its allies were willing to stand up to communist aggression. It "may" have served as a form of strategic deterrence that in the end prevented a nuclear holocaust. Who knows?

But what is the US larger end now?? What can a loss in Afghanistan and/or Iraq possibly contribute toward? What can they cause? They cannot contribute to a larger win because we have not defined a larger win. They can only contribute to a larger fail.

Not defined well, but I think we have defined the larger win, and that is an international order that protects our interests (clearly not black and white), and sustaining U.S. leadership (though President Obama seems to be backing away from this).

We have a grand strategy post-Cold War that is essentially to play not to lose.

Where is this articulated?

The US needs a new grand strategic focus and a game defined in terms we can play to win if we hope to get off the current odyssey of bleeding off strategic altitude in exchange for tactical airspeed. As General Zinni commented to my war college class 9 years ago, "we don't know where we are going, but we are making good time."

I don't disagree with this aspiration, but the world is changing fundamentally and frankly I don't think we know what we want the new order to look like. We have some idea of what we don't want it to look like, but that perspective results in reacting instead of proactive strategic shaping. I also think we're too divided politically to reach a consensus of where we want to go. There is little consensus on Cuba, ISIL, Iran, and Russia to name a few. If we had desired strategic goal then we could frame these issues in a larger context and make smart choices. That doesn't seem to be happening at the moment.

[Bob's World]

From a Western perspective true, but this assumption ignores history. Insurgencies historically have been defeated more through the use of force than political maneuvering. Obviously we don't fight that way, but then again our approach to COIN is still looking for a victory somewhere.

Bill, I need one example. Sure, insurgencies have been suppressed for a decade or two quite often by a government that remains uncoerced and set on sustaining its oppressive ways, but those insurgencies always come roaring back. Perhaps with different leaders, different organizational names or ideologies - but the insurgent is only the tip of the iceberg of the insurgency. The insurgency is a condition of grievance residing deep within a population.

Insurgency is suppressed in the Philippines over and over - but never resolved. Those who hold power will never give it up willingly. A very common condition in those places colonized by Spain. Similar in Algeria and across Sunni Arab populations held under the Ottomans, then the Europeans, and then governments formed or sustained in unnatural stasis by the US for purposes of containment and economic interest. Groups come and go, but the insurgency smolders and flames off and on. But that is not successful COIN by any true measure (regardless of what RAND and their study says).

As to where the US states we have a strategy that is play not to lose? Nowhere. That is my assessment. But what else do you call a strategy that is largely to sustain the status quo and promote US perspectives in an era where so many seek change and to be more like themselves?? What is a win for us, other than preventing that from happening?

[Bill Moore]

Bill, I need one example. Sure, insurgencies have been suppressed for a decade or two quite often by a government that remains uncoerced and set on sustaining its oppressive ways, but those insurgencies always come roaring back. Perhaps with different leaders, different organizational names or ideologies - but the insurgent is only the tip of the iceberg of the insurgency. The insurgency is a condition of grievance residing deep within a population.

Too easy, I'll give you three. Sri Lanka's recent defeat of the LTTE, Saddam's defeat of the Kurds and Shia in 1991, and Assad's father defeated an Islamist insurgency in 1982.

For me legitimacy is a side issue that desired, but not always possible. Furthermore, winning has a legitimacy of its own, the side that can most effectively wield force. From a strategy perspective, I'm principally interested in achieving strategic objectives. There are few government leaders or governments willing to step aside because a segment of their constituency doesn't approve of them, and if they engage in armed conflict to replace that government they are now engaged in war. Both sides, or the multiple sides, have interests that they consider legitimate. Clearly it wasn't in Saddam's, Assad's, or the Government of Sri Lanka's interest to acquiesce to insurgent demands, all were seen as legitimate by segments of their population, so the legitimacy argument loses steam when we try to apply an U.S. melting pot onto other countries.

I'm not arguing whether it was morally right, or that peace would be sustained (is it ever?, we had a civil war after defeating the British), or anything other than the power that be achieved its objective and has legitimacy with a segment of its population. If you want to argue there is a better way, that may or may not be a valid argument. To dismiss that force works is simply wrong. To say it isn't the U.S. way of war (or COIN), is true (unless we need to suppress a separatist group like we did during the Civil War, where we used brutal force). The South didn't see the North as legitimate, instead they were coerced with force. A rough peace endured for decades after, and really the political objectives weren't achieved until well after the Civil Rights Movement, but the war (or insurgency) was won well before then.

Taking it a step further, outside actors like the U.S. have their interests, and they'll often intervene on the side that best represents their interests. This has been a historical truth that I don't see changing anytime soon.

[Bob's World]

Bill,

Your three examples make my point. In each of those cases the government defeated the insurgent, but in so doing only served to suppress the symptoms of insurgency for a short time, while at the same time making the conditions of insurgency within the populations those insurgent groups emerged from worse.


I realize we call that "COIN" but it really isn't. It is counterinsurgent, not counterinsurgency. We could more accurately call it "SOIN" - suppression of insurgency. There are times and places and situations where SOIN makes sense. If you are a colonial power whose primary concern is extraction of resources at lowest possible cost, and the population is resisting your presence, and in revolution against your client regime, then by all means, suppress the symptoms and get on with your colonial profit making.

This is not what the US's mission is these days, but yet the SOIN that so many think of as COIN is derived from the lessons learned from those type of operations.

How would the US benefit in the long term from helping some client regime suppress the symptoms of insurgency in their country?? This is what creates and thickens the vectors of transnational terrorism back to the US. This is what validates and enhances the UW operations of AQ and now ISIL as well.

We have to stop thinking about insurgency as if we were still a colonial power. Until we can do that we are doomed to fail. It is not the fault of our tactics, though bad tactics do not help. It is the fault of our poor strategic understanding of the problem and our poor strategy for approaching these problems in general.


Once one shifts to thinking about these types of conflicts in the proper framework it becomes clear why legitimacy is the central issue, not a side issue. A side issue for SOIN, but central for COIN. One cannot create legitimacy in some other government, and one cannot grant legitimacy to some other government. The more one interferes between a population and their government, the less legitimacy that government has. SOIN operations are typically a deathblow to legitimacy.

The reality for the US is that our interests are better served the less we interfere in these foreign revolutions. I was at a meeting with several successful business executives and a couple members of the state department. For state all corruption is bad. One exec commented that for many places, corruption is how taxation occurs where there is no effective legal taxation. The State reps had a fit. Likewise, insurgency is often how democracy occurs where there is no effective legal means to shape governance. That truth makes people have a fit as well. But still truth all the same.

[Bill Moore]

In general agreement, and why I and others think we need a strategic context that consists foremost of desired ends. Then we can assess if suppressing an insurgency is in our interests or not based on criteria that are bigger than the local conflict.

I'm specifically speaking of U.S. interests, but clearly most of our allies and partners share many common interests that will facilitate collaboration.

While you may be right about riding a dead horse in some cases (Karzai, Maliki, Marcos, etc.), there is strategic risk to simply pulling the rug out from their feet. Beyond local repercussions, over time it sends a message that the U.S. is a fickle friend and will weaken our alliances. Based on that aspect, and I'm sure there are others since it is a tangled web, I don't think dropping someone like Maliki is as easy as you make it seem.

This is not what the US's mission is these days, but yet the SOIN that so many think of as COIN is derived from the lessons learned from those type of operations.

What is the U.S. mission today? We understand the difference between FID and COIN, so sticking specifically to COIN, our mission in Iraq and Afghanistan was to protect/defend the fledging governments that we deemed legitimate. The war in Afghanistan was tied to fighting to the al-Qaeda network, so in my view the intent was legitimate, but in practice fighting al-Qaeda became a side show at best. We started calling every low level Taliban IED producer a high value target and instead of targeting the real networks that threatened us we almost completely transformed the fight. I'm not touching Iraq at the moment, I still can't talk or write about it without spitting venom.

How would the US benefit in the long term from helping some client regime suppress the symptoms of insurgency in their country?? This is what creates and thickens the vectors of transnational terrorism back to the US. This is what validates and enhances the UW operations of AQ and now ISIL as well.

It depends, if we allowed AQI to take over Iraq it certainly wouldn't have reduced terrorism? Allowing Maliki and the Shia to dominate basically made Iraq a proxy state to Iran, so in the end allowing AQI to win would have undermined our interest, and promoting mob rule by imposing democracy to facilitate a Shia take over did undermine our interests. Obvious, maybe in only hindsight, but I don't think so, we needed to develop different options. Let's not forget, AQ attacked several time before 9/11 and then of course the tragic attacks on 9/11 long before we invaded Iraq and Afghanistan. Our actions made have made the threat worse, the jury is still out on that, but the threat was there before hand.

We have to stop thinking about insurgency as if we were still a colonial power. Until we can do that we are doomed to fail. It is not the fault of our tactics, though bad tactics do not help. It is the fault of our poor strategic understanding of the problem and our poor strategy for approaching these problems in general.

What makes you think we view COIN as a colonial power?

Once one shifts to thinking about these types of conflicts in the proper framework it becomes clear why legitimacy is the central issue, not a side issue. A side issue for SOIN, but central for COIN. One cannot create legitimacy in some other government, and one cannot grant legitimacy to some other government. The more one interferes between a population and their government, the less legitimacy that government has. SOIN operations are typically a deathblow to legitimacy.

Legitimacy may or may not be the central issue depending upon our strategic goals. Furthermore, I think globalization and information technology has fundamentally undermined the folk wisdom that all politics are local. The overwhelming number of foreign actors, both state and non-state, in many of these conflicts (not all) requires we reframe them. Local issues may have provided the tinder that allowed the fire to start, but once it started it took on different characteristics, meaning addressing the original underlying issues won't solve the problem.

The reality for the US is that our interests are better served the less we interfere in these foreign revolutions. I was at a meeting with several successful business executives and a couple members of the state department. For state all corruption is bad. One exec commented that for many places, corruption is how taxation occurs where there is no effective legal taxation. The State reps had a fit. Likewise, insurgency is often how democracy occurs where there is no effective legal means to shape governance. That truth makes people have a fit as well. But still truth all the same.

Of course our business execs would say that, that is how they facilitate deals in many foreign countries. I don't disagree it is part of most cultures, but it is still one of the biggest drivers of conflict in many countries. A government that steals from its people is not legitimate. This is another myth, like all politics is local, that NPS COIN professors like to promote. It matters, and in many locations it matters enough to fight.

[OUTLAW 09]

Since we always seem to lack a strategy for even drinking coffee--interesting short read.

http://zenpundit.com/?p=44685

Is Strategy Dead?

[by Mark Safranski, a.k.a “zen“]