What is and or has become extremely dangerous in the recent and continuing Russian nuclear statements is simply the unspoken Russian concept that many in the West seem to not want to notice--Putin has effectively eliminated MAD.Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
Putin will use the tactical first strike if he deems it necessary and he will use a second strike to "deescalate"--THAT is not MAD.
All former Soviet rulers lived and died by defending MAD--Putin on the other hand seems to think a small tactical "deescalation strike" will be so interpreted by the West--hate to admit it--it would lead to an immediate counter strike by the US as the US could interpret it to be the series of a first strike not a "deescalation" signal.
Why is that his thinking???--appears even the Russian General Staff feels they would openly lose in a conventional fight with NATO even if NATO has greatly disarmed over the last ten or so years.
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 07-04-2015 at 09:04 AM.
BTW--from 2300 until the 0400 timeframe heavy shellings and four major ground attacks occurred---total numbers not yet in.
NSDC of Ukraine ✔ @NSDC_ua
Map. Situation in eastern #Ukraine, July 4, 00:00 EET pic.twitter.com/YRlktZrEDP
Z. Brzezinski: "If #Putin goes into the #Baltics by invasion, #NATO would go into war. That's the point of NATO." http://m.spiegel.de/international/wo....facebook.com/ …
http://euromaidanpress.com/2015/07/0...shmelyev-says/
Post-Soviet states entered second anti-communist revolutionary period, Shmelyev says
2015/07/02 • Analysis & Opinion, Politics
The post-Soviet world is entering its own version of 1968, Aleksandr Shmelyev says, “and everything taking place in Armenia, Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Russia and so on can be conceived as a wave of ‘secondary anti-communist revolutions,’ as attempts to put the authorities under the control of society.”
In 1968, 23 years after the end of World War II, “a new generation of Europeans who were not satisfied with the post-war level of civil rights and freedoms appeared,” the Moscow commentator says. Now, 24 years after the end of the USSR, a new generation has appeared with the same anger and the same goal.
“Despite 24 years of a divided history and anything but simple relations among the post-Soviet states, Shmelyev says, civil society encounters in them approximately one and the same set of problems.” Among these are “weakly developed democratic institutions, an appalling level of corruption, unjust laws, the absence of an independent judicial system, insane income differentiation, the treatment of the political opposition as ‘enemies,’ intolerance to minorities, and torture in the police and penal system.”
At the same time, however, he continues, over this almost quarter of a century, “under conditions of relative freedom and inclusion in the globalized world have appeared a sufficient number of citizens who disagree with such arrangements but do not have the opportunity to change them by political means.”
According to Shmelyev, “the Internet is allowing those protesting from Mensk, Kyiv, Moscow, Yerevan and so on to be in constant contact with each other, to share experiences and to support one another.” In the post-Soviet space, this is facilitated by the fact that there is as yet no real language barrier: most of these communications are in Russian.
“If one can speak about ‘a Russian spring’ in the social-political sense, then only in this context as a series of mass protests against post-communist authoritarian hybrid systems. Then analogies with ‘the Arab spring’ appear completely logical.”
Consequently, “if one can speak about ‘a Russian spring’ in the social-political sense, then only in this context as a series of mass protests against post-communist authoritarian hybrid systems. Then, analogies with ‘the Arab spring’ appear completely logical,” the Moscow commentator says.
“No one knows,” he says, how the current round of events in Yerevan will end. “In Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Ukraine, street protests grew into revolutions; in Thailand and Belarus, they were harshly suppressed… in Turkey and Russia, the brakes were applied and a reaction followed; and in Syria, things descended into a long civil war.”
But if one considers these phenomena from a global perspective and not from a conspiratorial geopolitical one, “it is almost obvious that the future of each of the post-Soviet republics lies with those who are now protesting in the streets.” They have the advantage over those in power generationally and in terms of education.
“It is almost obvious that the future of each of the post-Soviet republics lies with those who are now protesting in the streets.” They have the advantage over those in power generationally and in terms of education.
And consequently, Shmelyev says, “sooner or later, Lukashenka, Nazarbayev, Putin, Sargsyan, Aliyev, and Karimov will pass into history together with the systems they have created. The question involves only when and at what cost in victims.”
Shmelyev’s optimism comes placing events in the post-Soviet states within a broader context (there have been mass civic protests in almost 80 countries since the beginning of the global crisis in 2008) and from three characteristics the post-Soviet cases share with the others.
First of all, he says, “contemporary protests do not need leaders and organizers.” Consequently, parties and trade unions play very little role in them and “cannot take them under control.” Horizontal ties are more important for the protesters, and they are suspicious of any vertical organization.
Indeed, he continues, “the agora of modern times does not need representation; its strength is in the absence of leaders whom the powers that be can so easily intimidate, deceive, buy off or isolate.”
Second, those protesting are not supporters of any particular ideology. They may “advance some specific demands,” but “at a deeper level they are typically moved by a global dissatisfaction with the authorities whom they view as backward and out of date.”
And third, Shmelyev says, this means that “the occasion for mass civic protests in our time can be almost anything,” including what many might think are minor or marginal issues. That makes these protests “practically impossible” either to predict or prevent, and it also means there will continue to be more of them.
As an American in Berlin--wish all the US SWJ readers a great 4th of July BUT remember that are a large number of civil societies striving today around the world to achieve what we seem to sometimes take so for granted--rule of law, good governance and a transparent government.
And regardless of Russian propaganda we are not driving that agenda--their own civil societies are.
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 07-04-2015 at 10:00 AM.
Is @BBC aware it is accomplice to Kremlin propaganda by characterizing Russia's invasion of Ukraine as a civil war? pic.twitter.com/cDSOuOPefE
Russian Col-Gen A. Lentsov (JCCC) wanted a DMZ east of #Mariupol to free up his forces north of the city. He got it. https://twitter.com/24todayneteng/st...59174179774464 …
Key point is: this is NOT a Russian retreat. It IS either a Russian deception tactic or beneficial control tactic.
Yes that is predictable, they will try to attack Shyrokyne sooner or later from the Northeast
Mariupol: "Left by militants positions are seeded with mines and being raked with fire" @0629ComUa https://twitter.com/0629ComUa/status/617262511423778816 …
Russian-backed militants continue firing on Ukrainian positions
http://uatoday.tv/politics/russian-b...ns-450285.html … pic.twitter.com/FTzXyi3AFs
Putin's “Conservative Values Project” and his 2014 invasion of #Ukraine - products of Kremlin political technology: http://www.aspeninstitute.cz/en/arti...still-virtual/ …
Navy Commander of Russia Admiral Chirkov confirmed that Russian companies can not build engines for Russian warships. http://www.blackseanews.net/read/101845
One of many "tractor operators & miners" fighting in E.Ukraine,this one from Russian Far East https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=TH5cGFaWEyc … pic.twitter.com/unoNaPfSrm
Why Russia calls a limited nuclear strike "de-escalation" - Nikolai Sokov http://thebulletin.org/why-russia-ca...-de-escalation … via @BulletinAtomic 13 Mar 2014
Duma speaker says it would be in neither Moscow's nor Europe's interests for Russia to leave the Council of Europe.
Why because a number of Russian politicians get assigned there each year and the benefits of being in a foreign country other than Russia and the benefits of being paid in Euros.
Heavy smoke over Donetsk http://liveuamap.com/en/2015/4-july-...e-over-donetsk … pic.twitter.com/ytpnJbcqCw via @666_mancer https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c0QC2v3Dqa4 …
Andriy Lysenko: Ukrainian troops fought off militant subversive attack by Shchastya, Luhansk region
http://uacrisis.org/27910-andrij-lysenko …
Russian Spetsnaz at work again--they had been on a break for a few days--must have been a troop rotation issue.
BOOK recommendation:
Angstrom, J. & Widen, J.J. (2015) Contemporary Military Theory: The Dynamics of War. Routledge
http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415643047/ …
Or just google > us army "area control" < We also recomm: Wylie (1967) Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 07-04-2015 at 12:02 PM.
Really worth reading........
http://www.rand.org/blog/2014/12/yes...ggressive.html
Yes, Russia's Military Is Getting More Aggressive
by James T. Quinlivan
On Dec. 12, a Russian military jet came dangerously close to a Scandinavian Airlines passenger plane in international airspace near southern Sweden. Reportedly, the Russian aircraft was flying without its transponder active when the Swedish military detected it. The Swedes notified civilian air traffic control, which then diverted the civilian jet. A collision was avoided.
Immediately after the December incident, the Russians denied that their aircraft was anywhere near the passenger jet. But the near miss in the skies over Scandinavia was only the latest incident in a consistent pattern of Russian provocations and “who-me?” denials. In March 2014, a Russian reconnaissance aircraft came close enough to an SAS airliner departing from Copenhagen to require the airliner—carrying more than 100 passengers—to maneuver to avoid a collision.
For years, Russian aircraft have been doing fly-bys of European neighbors, largely without much public notice. But as Russia's relations with the United States and Europe have deteriorated in recent months following Moscow's annexation of Crimea and support for the rebels in eastern Ukraine, these incidents in the skies seem to have taken on a new urgency—they may even herald a revival of Cold War-era tactics.
Moscow's aggressive behavior is intended as an intimidating display of the Kremlin's strength, and perhaps even a reminder of Russian nuclear capability. But overreaction is the wrong response: These are annoying provocations, not serious dangers to Western Europe. As such, they should remind the United States and Europe that Russia's credible nuclear threats still spring from relative weakness—not strength. A new military doctrine issued by the Kremlin last week may look aggressive toward NATO and the West, but Putin is still more bark than bite.
After a hiatus that began in 1991, Russian aircraft returned to long-distance operations in 2007 with venerable Tupolev Tu-95 “Bear” bombers flying long-distance legs toward the United States coastline, near island bases in the Pacific, even intercepting American carrier task forces at sea. Over the last year, tactical aircraft have gradually been integrated into these flights, progressing in the last few months to short-range provocations of Russia's neighbors with fighter jets and intelligence aircraft.
Over the last year, tactical aircraft have gradually been integrated into these flights, progressing in the last few months to short-range provocations of Russia's neighbors with fighter jets and intelligence aircraft.
The recent spate of incidents with Russian aircraft over the Baltic have made headlines and prompted comments from Western officials. A recent report (PDF) by the European Leadership Network documented almost 40 incidents involving Russian aircraft or ships between March and November 2014 and pointed out that they were both more frequent and involved more risk than in previous years.
These provocations show no sign of abating. In November, Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that Russia would send bombers to the Gulf of Mexico and the Caribbean. This sounds dramatic, but it merely extends the practice of sending Bear bombers on long-range flights toward Canada and the United States. In June, for example, Russian bombers with tanker and fighter escorts appeared off Alaska, where Canadian and American fighters intercepted and escorted them. The bombers continued as far south as northern California and produced a few “nuclear-capable bombers buzz California” stories in the media. During the September NATO summit in Wales, two Bear bombers ostentatiously flew up past Iceland to Greenland toward points from which Russia would have launched cruise missiles against American targets if the Cold War ever turned hot.
That some of Russia's most provocative flights came during the NATO summit might not be a coincidence. NATO's own use of airpower demonstrated its utility as a threat and helped put Moscow on the policy course it is pursuing today. Now largely forgotten in the West, the Kosovo War in 1999, when the United States and its NATO allies bombed Serbian targets to protect ethnic Kosovars, is remembered in Russia for two things, both of which are directly relevant to understanding why Moscow is provoking its neighbors.
First, after President Boris Yeltsin warned the West not to push Russia, the United States and NATO never sought permission from the United Nations to begin bombing. The NATO campaign humiliated Moscow and contributed to Yeltsin's resignation at the end of 1999. Second, U.S. and NATO airpower waged what the Russians subsequently described as a “contactless war” in which airpower savaged Serbian military, paramilitary, and regime targets with opposing ground troops never coming into contact.
The ramifications of the Kosovo War are still being felt. When Yeltsin resigned in December 1999, he turned over power to his prime minister, Vladimir Putin. And Putin, who is famous for holding grudges, remembers both the pain and the possibilities shown in the Kosovo War as he has attempted to rebuild Russian power and its sphere of influence.
Putin, who is famous for holding grudges, remembers both the pain and the possibilities shown in the Kosovo War as he has attempted to rebuild Russian power and its sphere of influence.
In the wake of the Kosovo War, the Russian military viewed NATO as aggressive and believed the alliance could intervene in another regional conflict and wage “contactless war” against a weakened Russian military. Under the catchphrase “de-escalation of military action,” Russian military theorists developed the concept of using nuclear weapons to bring a stop to conventional fighting before complete defeat. A series of large exercises beginning with Zapad-99 in 1999 were designed around scenarios of NATO intervening with advanced military forces into local conflicts in Russia's “near abroad,” such as Belarus and Kaliningrad, the Russian enclave between Lithuania and Poland. In the exercises, the conflicts escalated into major regional wars with Russian conventional forces losing to mass air attacks with precision weapons, as had the Serbs in Kosovo.
These exercises involved long-range aircraft including the Tupolev Tu-22 “Backfire” theater-range system and the Bear simulating attacks at depth—as well as concurrent launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles, which flew to the Kamchatka test range. At the time of the Zapad-99 exercise, then-Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev stated that the exercise involved nuclear weapons when conventional weapons had failed. These exercises demonstrated to the West that “de-escalation of military action” by nuclear use was more than a theoretical concept.
By 2000, nuclear weapons took a greater prominence in Russia's formal military doctrine, which stated (PDF) nuclear weapons could be used in situations “critical to the national security of the Russian Federation.” New doctrine also opened the possibility of nuclear first-use. Most outside observers agreed that the many weaknesses of Russia's military, the West's conventional ability and U.S. willingness to execute “contactless war,” and the Russian regime's fragility all gave credibility to the Kremlin's threat of a nuclear response in the case of a conventional defeat.
Russia's 2008 border war with Georgia demonstrated two important new considerations for Moscow. First, reorganized Russian ground forces built around contract soldiers rather than conscripts demonstrated greater skills and overall military capability than the forces that had failed in Chechnya in the late 1990s. These units are manned at higher levels as “permanently ready forces” than the rest of Russia's military and do not depend on the mobilization of reservists or additional conscripts to deploy to operations. The experience of defeating the Georgians gave the Russian military greater confidence that they could fight and win a local war. Second, NATO showed no interest in involving itself in the Georgian war as it had in Kosovo, which signaled to the Russians that the West is not always itching for a fight.
Russia issued a new military doctrine (PDF) in 2010 that seemed to reduce the role for nuclear weapons. The doctrine retained the possibility of nuclear first-use but said Russia would consider nuclear use only in situations in which “the very existence of the state” is under threat—a higher bar than “critical for national security,” the language used in the 2000 doctrine. Nuclear deterrence only works when both sides have a clear understanding of what is being deterred. The formal change in Russia's doctrine communicated that Moscow recognized less need for rapid recourse to nuclear measures.
The new military doctrine that President Putin signed on Dec. 26 is based on a four-month effort that began in September to revise the 2010 military doctrine. The tone of the latest document is much more defensive than the previous doctrine, with a heightened concern about NATO buildups on territories contiguous to Russia, as well as evolving forms of warfare such as information warfare and ballistic missile defenses.
CONTINUED......................................... ..............
James T. Quinlivan is a senior operations research analyst at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.
Russia loses second MiG-29, fourth aircraft overall in past month to accident. Are they flying too hard? http://tinyurl.com/o4z2v5d .
Two Russian Tu-22M3 strategic bombers east of Gotland - Swedish fighter aircraft QRA intercept 4 July https://translate.google.ie/translat...%2F&edit-text= … via @rlgrpch
Two Russian TU-22 spotted near Swedish Island Gotland during Almedalen political festival.
Latitude 67N SIGINT @uascan
Who else besides south baltic sea got TU22 visits today? Active units at least:
13303
74502
74703
74708
77661
77664
77665
MORE from RAND............
Will Putin Gamble All on a Broader Ukraine Invasion? http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/05/wil...-invasion.html … via @RANDCorporation 26 May 2015
Russia's New Military Doctrine: Same as the Old Doctrine, Mostly http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/01/rus...-doctrine.html … via @RANDCorporation 15 Jan 2015
Russian GRU is not noted for making massive sudden changes to TTPs-------
Priyom.org @priyom_org
Something that never happened before today: GRU's 11:00/10/20Z 200Bd/1000Hz FSK sked turned into 11:00/12:00Z English voice (E06) sked
Liar Putin insists there are no RUS troops in UKR. Just half a dozen RUS generals and a nine thousand "vacationers". https://twitter.com/GorseFires/statu...86795194146816 …
Militants have consolidated their positions 2 km from Shyrokyne, the settlement likely mined - ATO spox
http://112.ua/ato/boeviki-zakrepili-...ak-242312.html …
Markov: people who raise the Ukrainian flag don't really support Ukraine, they are only against Russia and the Russian soul.
http://www.rand.org/blog/2015/04/put...wide-shut.html
Putin: Eyes Wide Shut
by F. Stephen Larrabee
The United States is entering a period of growing competition and tension in relations with Russia. The Russia that the United States faces today is more assertive and more unpredictable—and thus, in many ways, more dangerous—than the Russia that the United States confronted during the latter part of the Cold War.
The Russian leadership after Khrushchev's ouster in 1964 was essentially cautious and conservative. They were primarily interested in maintaining the political and territorial status quo in Eastern Europe, not promoting world revolution. In areas outside Europe, especially the Third World, Moscow relied on proxies such as Cuba to advance its interests. While rhetorically Moscow continued to pay lip service to world revolution, in practice the aging apparatchiks in the Kremlin were more interested in finding ways to enhance “strategic stability” and reduce the risks of nuclear war.
The Russia that the United States faces today is quite different. Under Putin, Russia has become a revisionist state. Putin believes that the European security system that emerged at the end of the Cold War is oriented against Russia and does not adequately reflect Russian interests and political ambitions. Putin believes Russia got the short end of the stick because it was weak and he is determined to undermine the post-Cold War security system in Europe and reshape it in ways that enhance Russian interests and influence.
Putin's speech at the Munich security conference in 2007 was intended to put the West on notice that Russia had its own national interests and was no longer willing to abide by the old rules of the Western game. Henceforth Russia would decide for itself which rules it would obey.
Brezhnev and company were risk-adverse. Putin is the opposite—a risk-taker. When challenged, his inclination is not to seek compromise but to double down and raise the ante, as he did in the wake of the shooting down of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 last July.
Instead of backing down, he increased the firepower and sophistication of the weapons he was supplying to the separatists in eastern Ukraine and sent several thousand well-armed and well-trained Russian regular army soldiers clandestinely into Ukraine. This bold move caught the Ukrainian government—and the West—by surprise, enabling Putin to deal a stunning blow to the Ukrainian forces, which up until that moment had been winning the war, and reverse the tide of the conflict.
The annexation of Crimea showed the same combination of boldness and readiness to take big risks. Confronted by Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych's sudden ouster and the prospect that Ukraine might move swiftly and irreversibly into the Western camp, Putin annexed Crimea. The annexation caught Western leaders by surprise, leaving them flatfooted and unable to organize an effective response other than mild economic sanctions.
Indeed, Putin appears to have been surprised at the ease with which the annexation was realized. The Ukrainians put up no military resistance (they reportedly had been advised not to resist). At home the annexation was enthusiastically welcomed by the overwhelming majority of Russian citizens and resulted in a major boost in Putin's approval rating, which soared to over 85 percent.
What do these examples suggest about Putin's character and future behavior?
First, as noted, Putin is a risk-taker. He continually does the unexpected. That keeps his opponents off balance and allows Putin to control the state of play. The West, by contrast, is largely reactive, responding to moves Putin has made rather than taking the initiative and putting Putin on the defensive.
Second, Putin has likely been emboldened by the ease with which he has been able to achieve his objectives. This is likely to reinforce his belief that bold moves pay big dividends.
This suggests that rather than laying the groundwork for a negotiated settlement of the Ukrainian crisis, as many European leaders hope, the ceasefire agreed to in Minsk in February is likely to prove to be only a temporary respite before a new push on the part of the separatists, backed by Putin, to seize the port of Mariupol and establish a land bridge to Crimea that would enable Russia to more easily reinforce its forces in eastern Ukraine. This would be a bold and risky move, but Putin has shown time and again his willingness to take chances.
F. Stephen Larrabee holds the Distinguished Chair in European Security (Emeritus) at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation. He served on the National Security Council staff in the Carter Administration.
http://www.unian.info/economics/1096...to-donbas.html
Kobolev: Ukraine seeking to investigate gas supplies from Russia to Donbas
04.07.2015 | 16:16
NOTICE ---indicates that Russia has not raised the issue with the Swedes even after demanding the Ukraine pay for the gas they supplied the Russian mercenaries.Ukraine intends to carry out an international investigation into gas supplies from Russia to the occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions, national energy company Naftogaz of Ukraine CEO Andriy Kobolev told Ukrainian TV Channel 5 on Friday night, according to the Ukrainian online newspaper Ukrainska Pravda.
"Gazprom declares that it has been supplying gas to those areas. We cannot confirm this because there is no way to check gas metering units there due to ongoing hostilities. We expected that Gazprom would have raised the issue in the Stockholm arbitration court. But they didn't," Kobolev said being quoted by Ukrainska Pravda.
"If supplies of Russian gas to the [occupied] territory have started, I think, this situation will require careful examination and perhaps specific investigative actions," he said.
"Is it legal and correct to supply gas to the organizations manifesting signs of terrorism? I think this issue will be addressed soon. We are interested in this situation being examined at international level. We have nothing to hide," he added.
As UNIAN reported earlier, Kobolev previously announced Ukraine could dispense with Russian gas, as it did last summer. He also noted that Russian gas could not be competitive without Moscow's "special discounts."
We expected that Gazprom would have raised the issue in the Stockholm arbitration court. But they didn't," Kobolev said being quoted by Ukrainska Pravda.
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 07-04-2015 at 01:25 PM.
.@olliecarroll on East Ukraine:
"It is relatively calm but certainly not a ceasefire"
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kvQ3...4mhqHJfNDmvSvg … pic.twitter.com/2lxL6a6kcw
Y do Russian's love Putin? It's simple, State TV doesn't report domestic news. Full BBC report http://bbc.in/1GOQox2 pic.twitter.com/tmCsos0X8V
Russian 'hybrid' forces fire a Grad-P rocket launcher somewhere in occupied-Donbas. Video 4 Jul https://youtu.be/MMNZLKCzgD8
Terrorists violate Minsk agreements keep shelling Ukrainian positions with 120 mm mortars, 122 mm guns, small arms. https://twitter.com/molodyko/status/617335797033906176 …
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 07-04-2015 at 04:46 PM.
BreakingFootage
Far East #RussianArmy ("DPR Battalion #Khan") training near #Telmanove.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xsu9pcN2hgI … pic.twitter.com/GUQHG5fMvM
Dutch furious as Russia blocks MH17 investigation
http://uatoday.tv/politics/july-17-m...ne-447126.html …
VIDEO Village Berdianske (West of Mariupol) has been hit by Russian shelling.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2I6o9vNAYDg …
WARNING >>@mkj1951<< is a well known and long-time Russian Troll messing w my timeline regularly. Block &ignore her. @raging545 @ofehr_en
Reddit AMA by ukrainian officier, who was fighting near the Donetsk Airport for 96 days during winter-spring 2015. https://www.reddit.com/r/ukraina/com...hting/#csp3x85 …
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 07-04-2015 at 05:55 PM.
http://www.rferl.org/content/russian.../27108296.html
Who Are The Russian Generals That Ukraine Says Are Fighting In The Donbas?
By Robert Coalson
July 03, 2015
The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) has prepared a dossier laying out evidence for what it calls "Russian aggression against Ukraine."
The report alleges there are some 9,000 Russian troops deployed in Ukraine, forming 15 battalion tactical groups. The force includes about 200 tanks, more than 500 armored fighting vehicles, and some 150 artillery systems, according to the dossier.
The SBU also identifies by name five Russian generals who it says are playing leading roles in commanding and coordinating the military forces of the separatists in eastern Ukraine.
Speaking to Bloomberg, New York University professor and specialist in Russian security services Mark Galeotti said that by "embedding their senior officers," the Russians are solidifying control over the separatist portions of Ukraine.
"Somewhere in Moscow they have made the decision this will be a long-term frozen conflict," Galeotti told Bloomberg.
Russia has consistently denied any military involvement in the conflict there.
RFE/RL takes a closer look at the six officers who have been implicated:
Major General Oleg Tsekov
Tsekov graduated from a military institute in Chelyabinsk in 1988. He then served in various parts of the Soviet Union and Mongolia.
He graduated from the Academy of the General Staff in 2011. The same year, he was appointed commander of the 200th motorized special-forces brigade of the Northern Fleet. In September 2014, the volunteer information service InformNapalm published evidence that the unit had been mobilized from Murmansk Oblast to Rostov Oblast, together with evidence that service personnel from the 200th had been identified in Ukraine.
Tsekov was promoted to major general (equivalent of a U.S. two-star general) on February 21, 2015.
The latest SBU dossier charges that Tsekov commands the so-called 2nd brigade of the separatist forces near Donetsk.
Major General Valery Solodchuk
Born in Astrakhan, Solodchuk graduated from the paratroops institute in Ryazan in 1992. In 2012, he was named commander of the 7th guards air-assault division based in Novorossiisk. A media reference in 2014 identified Solodchuk as deputy commander of the 5th Army in the Far East.
Digital-forensic investigators have drawn attention to a soldier of the 7th guards air-assault division named Stanislav Ramensky. He posted on social media several photographs that seem to have been taken in Crimea in March 2014, when Russia annexed the peninsula from Ukraine. He also published a photograph of the medal and certificate he was given on April 14, 2014, "for the return of Crimea," which was signed by Solodchuk.
In an interview with Rossiiskaya Gazeta in March, Solodchuk was asked if the 7th guards air-assault division is a designated rapid-reaction unit within the Russian military. He answered that there are no such units and that the entire military is in a state of constant combat readiness. Asked if that meant that his unit is prepared to be ordered into battle at any moment, Solodchuk answered, "Exactly."
The SBU dossier charges that Solodchuk is the commander of so-called 1st Army Corps of Novorossia in the Donetsk area.
Major General Sergei Kuzovlev
Sergei Kuzovlev was born in 1967 and graduated from the paratroops institute in Ryazan in 1990. He also studied at the Academy of the General Staff. He was promoted to major general in February 2014. Since 2014, he has been chief of staff of the 58th Army based in Vladikavkaz.
In January, the Ukrainian SBU released an audio recording that it alleged showed Kuzovlev organizing the military forces of the self-proclaimed "Luhansk People's Republic" in eastern Ukraine. The SBU says Kuzovlev goes by the pseudonyms "Tambov" and "Ignatov."
Major General Aleksei Zavizion
Aleskei Zavizion was born in Narva, Estonia, in 1965 and graduated from a military institute in Chelyabinsk in 1986. He served in the Far East, in Chechnya, and as commander of Russian forces in Tajikistan.
In 2009, he began studies at the Academy of the General Staff.
In March, Ukraine's SBU claimed Zavizion, using the nom de guerre Alagir, directed the shelling of Kramatorsk and Mariupol. Referring to Zavizion, SBU official Markiian Lubkivskyi wrote on Facebook that "a citizen of the Russian Federation...with the call sign Alagir is currently in Donetsk within the rotational assignment of running the Operational Headquarters since January 2015, coordinating military operations with the participation of representatives of illegal armed formations."
"Alagir is the person in charge of the deployment of artillery, mobile rocket systems, and heavy equipment," Lubkivskyi continued. "Major bloody attacks on Ukrainian cities, particularly on Kramatorsk and Mariupol, were carried out under his direct command and coordination."
Lubkivskyi also wrote that Zavizion was scheduled to be replaced by Russian Major General Andrei Gurulyov.
Major General Roman Shadrin
Roman Shadrin was born in Rostov Oblast in 1967 and graduated from a military institute in Kazan. He served in the Soviet contingent in East Germany after graduating in 1988. In 1995, he was awarded the Hero of Russia medal for his service during the first war in Chechnya. After service in Armenia and the North Caucasus, Shadrin was named deputy commander of Interior Ministry troops in the Urals region. In 2008, he served during the conflict with Georgia in the breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia, after which he was promoted to major general.
In September 2013, he was elected to the Yekaterinburg City Duma from the ruling United Russia Party.
The SBU dossier says Shadrin is the so-called minister of state security for the self-proclaimed "Luhansk Peoples Republic" (LNR) in eastern Ukraine. According to a media report on July 3, Shadrin denies the allegation, saying he has only traveled to Ukraine's Donbas region "with a humanitarian mission."
The Yekaterinburg-based Novy Den news agency reported the same day that Shadrin has "repeatedly traveled to eastern Ukraine with humanitarian missions." It also noted that Shadrin resigned as chairman of the city legislature's security committee in January and quoted an unidentified source in the Yekaterinburg Duma as saying Shadrin "holds one of the top positions in the security service of the LNR."
The same source said it is not known when Shadrin will return to his duties in Yekaterinburg, but there have been no efforts to strip him of his mandate.
Last edited by OUTLAW 09; 07-04-2015 at 05:41 PM.
It lookslike the Russians just had a collective training day off yesterday. And war is back again. https://twitter.com/loogunda/status/617227679172063232 …
Shelling reports and a few ground attack reports have not come in yet--last reports were from the 0600 timeframe..
Reference the torture of Ukrainian POWs by Russian mercenaries----
Oh wow. This is actually ULTRA trolling. Because this man Sergei Zhuk or 'Moskva' tortured POWs himself:
https://twitter.com/RobPulseNews/sta...81039249104896 …
In this video Sergei Zhuk forced a POW to shoot his comrade if only there was a bullit in the pistol.
http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=d9b_1428359155 …
Russia Cmdr. Sergei Zhuk is so deranged he forced1 #Ukraine POW to almost shoot his comrade
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GPjvlrttKjE … pic.twitter.com/xZFNCQb1WF
VIDEO Some Russian 'selfie' presenter showing that Strelkov NOR Motorola are, but Yarosh IS on Interpol wanted list.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?t=230&v=Xx2eiX4szqo …
Going to be a long night tonight----
00:13 #Luhansk @East_lg "Again there?"
00:14 south @NataButikova Very close now, single [AA-gun] shot and some series after
23:56 #Luhansk @LUGANSKA_JUNTA AA-gun shots are heard
23:57 #Luhansk south @NataButikova Cannonade. "Did you hear? And what's it? Again hunting a UAV. Loud, close"
Maryinka @hyeva_maryinka [vk]
22:35 SA fire
23:20 Ttil now they were shooting in Sovkhoz & Novomaryinka dir'n. Now ceased
23:44 #Luhansk @LUGANSK_TODAY Explosion sounds in #Stanytsia_Luhanska direction are becoming [more intense/louder]
In Luhansk heard explosions from Stanitsa Luhanska http://liveuamap.com/en/2015/4-july-...nitsa-luhanska …
22:30 #Maryinka @666_mancer Rumble in #Novomaryinka as usually [after the sunset]
OSCE UAV recorded militant military hardware near Komsomolske. noting 9 MBTs, 4 armoured track vehicles, 28 APCs & 60 trucks
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