From the outset of the current crisis in Ukraine, Moscow’s policies have been driven primarily by geopolitical considerations, not by developments inside Ukraine itself. Despite its rhetoric, the Kremlin cares little if at all about the design of Ukrainian federalism, the rights of Russian speakers, or alleged “fascists” in Kyiv, except insofar as they affect Ukraine’s external orientation and Russia’s geopolitical interests. Ukraine was, and doubtless to a certain extent still is, a central element in the Kremlin’s ambitions to establish a Russian-dominated “Eurasian” pole in what it sees as an increasingly multi-polar world. But more importantly, it has been and remains critical to the Kremlin’s goal of keeping the United States, the European Union, and above all NATO from becoming politically, economically, and militarily preeminent in post-Soviet space.
Accordingly, anyone interested in forecasting the Kremlin’s next moves in Ukraine should keep his/her eye on the geopolitical ball. That in turn means assessing how Russian decision-makers are likely to see the evolving geopolitical context, as well as how they are likely to think Ukraine can, or cannot, be used to influence that context.
My take on this key question at the moment is as follows. The Kremlin has probably concluded that (1) the Ukraine crisis has made Russia’s already serious security problems with NATO much worse; (2) the repositioning of NATO hard power assets to the east, along with NATO’s growing military cooperation with Sweden, Finland, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, constitute an acute threat to Russian national security; (3) although Russia may emerge from its current recession by the end of the year, its economy will very likely grow slowly for at least several years, and as a result it is going to be increasingly difficult to fulfill the Kremlin’s ambitious military spending plans; (4) a long period of weak economic performance may lead to domestic unrest at some point, which the West will seek to exploit; (5) a “pivot to China,” greater cooperation with the other BRICS countries, or alliances with anti-Western governments around the globe may help Russia’s geopolitical position in the long run, but they won’t solve the immediate security challenge from NATO; and (6) the Kremlin is nevertheless duty bound to ensure that the balance of hard power along its western borders does not shift decisively in NATO’s favor.
To put the problem bluntly, Russia has what it considers an acute problem with NATO, not with Ukraine, and it is not going to solve that problem by improved relations with China or the other BRICS countries. Neither it is easy, for reasons elaborated below, to see how Russia can use Ukraine to solve the problem.
What strategies, then, are available to the Kremlin to meet this challenge, and in particular what role can Ukraine play in its response?
It strikes me that there are at least five possibilities, as follows (moving from more to less likely).
1. Hunker Down. This would entail focusing primarily on internal and external security, including additional constraints on internal dissent and a continued effort to build up Russia’s military capabilities. In addition to continued spending on new arms, it would mean increased reliance on tactical and strategic nuclear weapons; the repositioning of conventional forces within Russia to its western borders; and probably a build up of its military presence in Belarus. In addition, the Kremlin would continue its efforts (so far very successful) to convince the Russian public that the country faces a dire external threat from NATO, that the government needs to take whatever military steps it can to address that threat, and that living standards may well suffer as a result. It would probably also mean eschewing economic liberalization because liberalization would make high levels of military spending difficult, at least in the short to medium run.
2. Try to weaken and divide the West using primarily political and economic means. Were the Kremlin to make this the centerpiece of its strategy, it might conclude that it would be more effective in dividing the West if it backed off on brinkmanship and military pressure intended to increase Western fears of a military confrontation between Russian and NATO. It might also try to bring about a lasting ceasefire in the Donbas (although full implementation of Minsk II is not going to happen). In both cases, the reasoning would be that Moscow needed to empower pro-Russian forces in the West that would successfully resist further NATO/EU expansion and efforts to reinforce NATO’s eastern defenses. It might also conclude that its best prospects for improving economic performance was to liberalize economically at home, try to attract Western investment, and take whatever steps it could to support those forces in the West that would like to see an end to sanctions and a return to business as usual. The general goal would be to exploit as best as possible the acute divisions within Europe resulting from the Euro crisis and growing nativism in Europe, preferably to the point where the entire European project collapsed. The reasoning would be a decisive political victory for anti-EU forces in Europe would likewise mean a decisive victory for anti-U.S. and pro-Russian forces, and might even lead eventually to the collapse of NATO.
CONTINUED......................................... ..............
Originally Posted by OUTLAW 09
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