Understanding Indian Insurgencies

[davidbfpo]

The headline for a BBC News report:

Senior politicians in the Indian state of Jharkand say they are living in fear and hardly dare venture from their own homes.In recent weeks Maoist rebels have begun issuing death threats against local Congress Party leaders - demanding they oppose the government's latest military offensive against the guerrillas. These are not empty threats. Earlier this month the Maoists gunned down Congress leader Govardhan Mahli in the East Singhbhum district of the state.

Beyond the headlines and some strange phrases - governance and governors under threat.

Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8639621.stm and this link to a map of where this province is:http://www.mapsofindia.com/maps/jhar...ndlocation.htm

An earlier BBC report on the Maoist motivation:http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/8659501.stm

[Kevin23]

In my own observations of the Indian government's dilemma in fighting the Naxalite insurgency, I've come away with some thoughts about this insurrection both from my readings and from this site. Most of them will appear obvious, however some of them are connections to one another and movements in the wider realm of insurgency.


. Even though very different in terms of ideology, history, as well as goals. The Naxalites and Middle Eastern insurgencies like the one in Iraq, share the common thread of focusing on the population of the areas they operate through exploiting the frustration with a situation to direct a population in the direction of an insurgency. As well as using oppression,indoctrination, and intimidation as ways to further solidly their control from the insurgent point of view.

.Like in Iraq in the case of Al-Qaeda and the foreign fighter elements in relation to the population, the Naxalites in the 22 Indian states that they operate in appear to have differing goals from those of the populations they fight among. As the population at least in the case of the tribals, seem to have grievances about both government and private exploitation. While some Naxalite commanders have other goals in mind, both in terms of ideological and material gain.

.The Indian armed and security forces seem to be making the same mistake of trying to crush the Naxalites head on while having little strategy of how to ply away the tribals from the Naxalites other then "through building development projects along with the counterinsurgency campaign or after the Naxalites have been defeated". The Indian government's strategy is also further plagued by the lack of direction, coordination, and discipline among many elements of the Indian forces involved in the counterinsurgency, which in the process seems to be driving some groups to the Naxalites not previously attracted to the insurgency.

. Overall another observation that could be made, is that the Naxalites and any success they have had is due to India's great level's of inequality and history of such. That has allowed groups like the Naxalites to exist and have some success. Which from this, the Indian government can take some comfort in showing that in many ways the Naxalite insurgency isn't a unique phenomenon. However, it also highlights the type of unrest in India that exists, and how more of it could be breed.

[Bob's World]

Well, if one were to apply The Jones Insurgency Model (shameless plug acknowledged) to the Governance / Populace dynamics of India, as well as China; that in the long run the U.S. has little to worry about either of these emerging economic powerhouses achieving their full potential.

They are quite likely doomed to devolve into debilitating insurgencies as the gap widens between the haves and have nots; exacerbating the four causal factors of Poor Governance.

[Kevin23]

Well, if one were to apply The Jones Insurgency Model (shameless plug acknowledged) to the Governance / Populace dynamics of India, as well as China; that in the long run the U.S. has little to worry about either of these emerging economic powerhouses achieving their full potential.

They are quite likely doomed to devolve into debilitating insurgencies as the gap widens between the haves and have nots; exacerbating the four causal factors of Poor Governance.

I wouldn't go as far as to say that both the PRC and India will succumb as governments to internal disturbances or insurgencies, because even under the Jones model both governments are attempting to at least play to the interests of all groups in their respective countries.. Despite the fact that all factors of poor governance exist in China and India. For example, India is democracy in which groups across the political, economic, and social spectrum have representation in which the interests and grievances of all groups are played to. In the case of China, the government in Beijing is also beginning to address some of the issues and problems under the Jones Model in the various provinces of China, with one instance of this being the rural-urban divide which has also translated into a economic/class divide as well.

On the last notes to this point, industrializing nations within the Western World also exhibited many of the symptoms under the Jones Model but managed to evolve into successful industrialized countries. Also in the cases of both China and India, both nations have a history of varying degrees of internal disorder, so at least in the case of India what makes such disturbances unusual?

However then again in world history, the issue of two nations with populations of a billion plus people and the conflicting interests and grievances that such a population brings.

[tequila]

An article in The Deccan Chronicle from a former IPS officer, contrasting how Andra Pradesh tackled Naxalism in the 1990s with the current special police/local militia offensive being undertaken in Chhattisgarh:

Make the war public

* A ban was imposed on the Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) and its front organisations like Radical Students’ Union and Progressive Democratic Students’ Union to check activities like bandhs and to stop fresh recruitment.

* A new legislation, Public Security Act, cut off the nexus between Naxals and their sympathisers in the affected villages.

* Intensive development of interior areas, particularly of roads and communications, was undertaken.

* A solution was sought to the various issues raised by extremists through a special cell functioning in the chief minister’s office.

* Employment was promoted in a big way. There was, in fact, a special focus on employing tribals in good numbers in all government departments, particularly the police, to give them a greater sense of participation in governance.

* Procurement of forest produce was taken away from forest contractors and entrusted with government corporations, thereby cutting off the flow of funds to extremists.

* A rehabilitation policy for those extremists wanting to leave the movement was put into action.

* Perception management, or counter-propaganda, through well-trained cultural troupes was undertaken.

A major issue in India is the drive to nationalize/federalize the Naxalite insurgency by bringing in the Army. Historically, most Indian insurgencies (excepting Kashmir) were tackled and resolved by the police at the state level.

[Jedburgh]

A series of articles from IPCS in New Delhi, published 14-21 June 2010:

Countering the Naxal Threat I: An Analysis of Earlier Efforts

Countering the Naxal Threat II: A Case for Specialized Units

Countering the Naxal Threat III: Use the CRPF and Avoid the Army

Countering the Naxal Threat IV: Military as an Option?

[Kevin23]

Here is an interesting article from Foreign Policy, about how the mining situation in the Naxalite infected region is both fueling their cause and providing funding and support to their operations.

http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...re_in_the_hole

[blueblood]

Well, if one were to apply The Jones Insurgency Model (shameless plug acknowledged) to the Governance / Populace dynamics of India, as well as China; that in the long run the U.S. has little to worry about either of these emerging economic powerhouses achieving their full potential.

They are quite likely doomed to devolve into debilitating insurgencies as the gap widens between the haves and have nots; exacerbating the four causal factors of Poor Governance.

If you compare present day India with US in the 1850-60s we are doing way much better if we consider the time when 60 years have passed since they got their independence.

[Ray]

If I may give another perspective to Insurgencies in India.

Contrary to the popular belief, democracy has been not been introduced to India by the West nor was or is alien to India. It has been functioning in the ancient times (Ram Rajya). Ram Rajya aimed at transparency in public affairs, sanctity of contract and accountability to people; in short, the dharma of good governance.


That apart, owing to the tribal/ insular community structure, the activities of governance emanated from the village level (panchayati raj). This practice is still followed, but in the present environment, is enmeshed in politics and village rivalries.

Historically, owing to various conquest, this Ram Rajya faded at the highest level of governance since governance was at the whims of the Conqueror, it nevertheless continued to flourish at the village level. Even, the Zamindari system pf British India was village or district oriented, even if not the ideal form of Ram Rajya or Panchayati Raj.

Therefore, notwithstanding the conquests and the governance pattern of the rulers. the importance of the village, their tribal/ community loyalties/ the writ of their leaders remained an important aspect of Indian governance matrix and its role in shaping the destiny of the area.

Rewinding to the present, in the tribal and remote areas, the writ of the State government or the Union (Federal) government is evident more in default than in practice. Therefore, the village heads, more or less, decides the fate of the villages.

Left to their means without cognizable government presence and activities, the people of the tribal/ remote areas, felt alienated and could perceive the neglect. In this void, vested interests (be they political or religious) played their part. They not only assisted in solving the individual's or the communities problems but also contributed to the development, even if marginal, of these tribal/ remote areas. The Caste system worked in the favour of both the religious and the political organisers since they broke down this barrier and gave the people an equality that they had never believed existed! This was 'powerful medicine'!!

These vested interests, because of their yeoman activities, including giving the tribal or neglected people, a meaning to life and ambition, endeared themselves to the people of the villages and the area. The official government, for good reasons, became non existent as far as these people were concerned. It mattered little to the rare petty official of the Government, who may have been stationed there, or who came a visiting as a part of his duty.

Having become a force to reckon with, these vested interests pursued their agenda, Having proved the lack of interest mainstream India had for the neglected people of the area, were able to indoctrinate them with a new 'identity' (at places based on religion and separate ethnic root, and at place, based on a social and political root).

These 'separatisms' starting as small movements. It caught the imagination of many like bushfire by those who felt that they were deprived and it finally such movements rode rough into large movements culminating in insurgencies.

The above is but a very broad template. Notwithstanding, each insurgency has its own chemistry within this broad framework.

[davidbfpo]

An Indian article reflecting on the long identified threat from Maoist insurgency and what has not been done:http://www.sunday-guardian.com/analy...-maoist-menace

Not that these factors do not exist elsewhere.

Ends with:

Government conferences or National Security Advisory Board deliberations will not work since they do not have grassroots knowledge.

Which is a reminder that SWC has a part to play, assuming those way above read here.

[davidbfpo]

A SWJ article 'Countering Insurgency In South Asia: Three Approaches', which is wide-ranging and worth a read, if not study:http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art...ree-approaches