The CPA, Bremer and Year One in Iraq

[WVO]

I do not think the comparions of Sadam's Iraq to Hitler's Germany is a very good one. Working with the Germans and Japanese after WWII (where they were soundly beaten after a long extreme fight) was a major reason for the lack of chaos. In Japan the head was kept and in Germany they cut off the head and kept the body. In Hungry many Arrow Cross members joined the Communists in '45. The US could have had many people join their side at the beginning. Bremer and Rumsfeld fumbled the ball and others are paying for it now.

I agree he sounds like he is trying to justify a bad policy. I wonder how much Bremer had studied his own country's occupation of Germany and Japan?

Hear, hear!

There's a pretty good book called What We Owe Iraq by a guy called Noah Feldman, a law professor who worked at CPA in 2003. He recounts that while flying to Iraq, many of the CPA civilians were reading books on the Marshall Plan and US post-war occupation in Germany and Japan rather than reading about the Shiites or any other Iraq-related material. What did the occupation authorities read when they got assigned to the military governments in Japan and Germany? What prepared them to do as well as they did? I think the answer is that they well understood the cultures of Japan and Germany - think of MacArthur keeping the Emperor around.

The fact that we focus so much on our own experience (which is obviously better than not focusing on any experience) rather than than the culture in which we will operate is critical. Furthermore, to maximize success we need this knowledge before undertaking an operation, not during or after.

By the way, the book does a good job of spelling out the moral imperative for the US to stay in Iraq until stability is restored. It carries out the kind of discussion we should be having Nationally, rather then the simplified "in or out" pissing match that seems to be going on in Washington these days.

[Mike in Hilo]

Strikes me that since guys of Bremer's age who had attained Ambassadorial/Career Minister rank in State and who also served in CORDS during their junior years were quite numerous, "they" might have looked to that pool to provide the CPA head (if they were determined that it be a civilian, which may have been a mistake). Given the status to which these guys rose, at least some must have also been appropriately politically connected...

Cheers,
Mike
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[John T. Fishel]

Mike--

You raise a fascinating point when you question the need for a civilian to have headed the CPA. Should it have been a civilian? Is a retired General (Jay Garner, for example) not a civilian? Would an active soldier (like Macarthur or Lucius Clay) have been a better choice? Should ownership of the occupation have remained in DOD or moved to State?

My answers (humble opinion or not) are: 1. Not only should it have remained in DOD but the responsibility fell on the Combattant Commander (COMCENT) or a sub-unified commander as has been created (de facto) in Iraq first under George Casey and now Dave Petraeus. The individual specifically responsible for PRC should have been in command of all military and civilian elements assigned to that mission and reported directly to the #1 soldier in Iraq. Whether he was military, civilian, or some combination (retired, reservist, etc) is, I think, immaterial. 2. To my mind, a retired officer and a reservist, NOT on active status, is a civilian - but one with a very useful military background. 3. The critical organizational issue, IMO, was one of not dividing command of the occupation as was, in fact, done. Finally, although not one of my semi-rhetorical questions, a friend who served on Bremer's staff pointed out to me that Bremer was ill supported by OSD - only a little of which comes out in Bremer's book.

I do like your idea that a good civilian choice would have been one of those guys who cut their teeth on CORDS. It waould have been useful background.

Cheers

JohnT

[Mike in Hilo]

I couldn't agree more, John. You've put it better than I could have....Mike.

[Jedburgh]

RAND, 12 May 09: Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional Authority

The American engagement in Iraq has been looked at from many perspectives, including the flawed intelligence that provided the war’s rationale, the failed effort to secure an international mandate, the rapid success of the invasion, and the long ensuing counterinsurgency campaign. This book focuses on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its administrator, L. Paul Bremer, who governed Iraq from his arrival on May 12, 2003, to his departure on June 28 of the following year. It is an account of that occupation, seen largely from American eyes—mostly from Americans working in Baghdad for the CPA. It is based on interviews with many of those in Baghdad and Washington responsible for setting and implementing occupation policy, on the memoirs of American and Iraqi officials who have since left office, on journalists’ accounts of the period, and on nearly 100,000 internal CPA documents to which the authors were allowed access.

This book recounts and evaluates the efforts of the United States and its coalition partners to restore public services; reform the judicial and penal systems; fight corruption; reduce inflation; expand the economy; and create the basis for a democratic constitution, free elections, and representative government. It also addresses the occupation’s most striking failure: the inability of the United States and its coalition partners to protect the Iraqi people from the criminals and extremists in their midst.....