The CPA, Bremer and Year One in Iraq

[Bill Meara]

The Guardian is publishing excerpts:

http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0,,2016127,00.html

[John T. Fishel]

A most interesting article, but one that fails to get some basic facts right. Paul Bremer did, almost always wear coat and tie, but his most common "uniform" was a blue blazer and slacks (often khaki), not a blue suit. Nor did he wear combat boots, but rather - as he specifically points out in his memoir - Timberland boots, a gift from his kids.
The point I would make is that if the author of the article is willing to ignore minor but easily checkable facts, how far is he willing to go to distort important ones? This guy was a Washington Post correspondent in Baghdad, not from the Podunk news!
A good friend and former colleague at the National Defense University worked for Bremer and was certainly able to convince me that the man deserves somewhat better reviews than he has been getting. As his memoir points out, he was clearly right about Moqtada al Sadr - even if he was totally wrong about disbanding the Iraqi armed forces.
Finally, one of my students at American University was one of the "20 somethings" who staffed the CPA. It is a sad reflection on the USG at the time that we were not seeking significantly better qualified folks to run the legally required occupation government. (This is not to take anything away from my student who was among the more qualified of the 20 somethings but few, if any, had the experience to do that demanding job.)

[MountainRunner]

Unlike the Guardian article, I wrote brief reviews of Imperial Life and My Life in Iraq, which I found to be interesting side-by-side reading. While I'd like to edit and shorten the original (to paraphrase Twain, I wrote a long review because I didn't have time to write a short time), I've posted the beginning of the review posted on my site to save you the trouble.

I find it sadly interesting that many, outside the SWJ community of course, don't see the connection between the CPA, missed opportunties, and what became of the situation. Or is it just me?

Rajiv Chandraskaran's Imperial Life in the Emerald City: Inside Iraq's Green Zone is, among other things, instructive on how to create an insurgency through occupation. Yes, you read that right. Chandraskaran shows how reconstruction efforts were short-circuited and really pissed off the population frequently and unerringly. Chandraskaran's portrayal of a period that roughly overlaps the existence of the Coalition Provisional Authority is one of myopic and ignorant staffing, priorities, and execution.

How might insurgencies develop? Read this book to see how the people in the middle ground had their options removed and how extremists and criminals had recruiting opportunities handed to them on silver platters, not to mention plenty of time to refine their own operations as neon warning signs were ignored and dismissed.

Because of their similarity and at the same time contrast, my book review here comments on both Chandraskaran's book and Ambassador L. Paul Bremer's My Year in Iraq: The Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. Nearly identical in scopy, they are diametrically opposed in their perceptions of reality.

Starting with Imperial Life, Chandraskaran digs into the details like a forensic historian, tearing at the paper castles Bremer and the Administration created for themselves and the American public. He delves into the politics of who was allowed to participate, what information was not shared, and how "loyalists" without appropriate, or in many cases, any experience were placed. Michael Goldfarb, in his New York Times review of the book, hits some of the highlights of Imperial Life, including comparisons between people like the extremely qualified Frederick M. Burkle Jr and who was replaced by the extremely unqualified James K. Haveman Jr for the job of rebuilding Iraq's healthcare (if the importance of healthcare isn't obvious, see the RAND report on the importance of healthcare in 'nation-building').

The difference between these two books is astounding, quite honestly. Bremer, as Goldfarb writes, has apparently "read one C.E.O. memoir too many". An accurate states considering the frequent platitudes Bremer heaps upon himself.

Bremer likes to finish a section on a positive reflection while Chandraskaran finishes with reality, a bit of bad reality. For example, on the disbanding of the Iraqi army, CPA Order No. 2, Bremer concludes with Kurdish leader Jalal Talabini telling him that the "decision to formally 'disband' the old army was the best decision the Coalition made during the our fourteen months in Iraq."

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