Like Churchill and Ike

[Stratiotes]

The electrical generators story seems indicative of the Washington approach - we have money and resources to support more troops but not enough to provide needed services to improve Iraqi lives. A penny wise and a pound foolish as the old saying goes. We seem to have a habit of claiming a "hearts and minds" strategy but our actions seem to always fall back on the "coercion and enforcement" strategy. That is not a military malady, it is a political one.

[Steve Blair]

The electrical generators story seems indicative of the Washington approach - we have money and resources to support more troops but not enough to provide needed services to improve Iraqi lives. A penny wise and a pound foolish as the old saying goes. We seem to have a habit of claiming a "hearts and minds" strategy but our actions seem to always fall back on the "coercion and enforcement" strategy. That is not a military malady, it is a political one.

Amen! There has almost always been a disconnect in American military history between the "talking" and the "doing" when it comes to this sort of thing. As many of you know, I've got a bit of a "thing" for the Frontier Army, and it's difficult to keep track of the number of very promising peace initiatives that foundered because the government (read Congress) would not fund programs for the various tribes, to include treaties and other activities that might have helped avoid open conflict. Of course, back then Congress was also very interested in cutting the Army as well, seeing it as a cost savings. It would be interesting to compare the cost of the delayed and rejected peace programs with the eventual bill that came due through open warfare.

[Stratiotes]

Steve - you would probably like that book I recently reviewed: _Chasing Ghosts_ by Tierney...or, perhaps you have already read it. Anyhow, one of the "heroes" who seemed to get some things right in his approach to the Apaches was Gen. George Crook. _Chasing Ghosts_ gives a few examples of his approach and how it seems to have been lost to history. We forget all the successful counterinsurgency lessons and keep repeating the mistakes it seems.