Better than M4, but you can’t have it

[Tom Odom]

I am currently out at the Marine Corps' OIF train-up at Exercise Mojave Viper, and I'm not impressed by the current state of affairs with weapons-handling among the masses (which I am about to return to shortly).

I guess the advent of optics for every Marine's rifle now means that you can wear the rifle like a purse on the end of some $5 jacked up PX sling, with little or no regard to how the weapon dangles and bangs around your body. Heaven forbid that we should all pretend to care for our new PEQ-15 aiming devices too.

And don't get me started on the employment of clearing barrels in front of the chow hall, exchange, gym, etc. I have not observed one NCO, SNCO, or officer doing their job, which should be enforcing proper supervision of two-man clearing procedures. It's almost an afterthought by most troops to dip the barrel in, pull back the charging handle, and peek inside the chamber. For some of these cats, they haven't been around ammunition for days, so the practical task of dropping a magazine, extracting a round, etc., is totally lost. It's no wonder that negligent discharges still take lives overseas, because we are not doing the basics very well...and not many people seem to be keying in on the failure. Don't get me wrong though, folks know who's not wearing their glo-belt when not in full unifrom or PT gear. And heaven forbid you should be caught without a water source.

Ken, you'd probably have blown a blood vessel by now. The basics aren't happening right now, and I've come close myself.

We did a pretty good study of NDs here over the course of a year. Interesting and in some cases surpsing results. You can find it in the CTC Bulletins on the CALL web site. Look in 2007 editions.

Tom

[Norfolk]

Having been the "victim" of an AD I kind of get pissed around sloppy weapons handling. Maybe why I avoid it like the plague. In my case the person involved stuck the barrel haphazardly into the and can and pulled the trigger before clearing it. The round went around the can, came out in pieces, came across the range in a spray, and took a bite of my right cheek (as in below my eye ball). Another officer got the very tip of his nose hit. Pulling the fragment out of their had to hurt like a ..... Mine fell out.

I'm kind of sensitive about weapons handling ever since.

How do you get them to understand without shooting them all in the foot?

There was a day when soldiers feared - and I mean to use that very word - what would happen to them if they mishandled their weapon, let alone the consequences of having an AD/ND. This isn't just about training basics, or the lack thereof, it's about discipline too, of course.

Part of that has to do with being in an essentially peace-time force, even though it spends up to half its time in a nominal war-zone - part of the difference between fighting a counter-insurgency on the one hand, or a full-fledged conventional war on the other, perhaps. A counterinsurgency war is just "low-intensity" enough for most troops to avoid major combat operations day-in and day-out and so to kind of cut corners, but 'high-intensity" enough to require those very high standards of training and discipline when MCOs do take place. Can encourage spottiness in-theatre, and just plain sloughing-off once back home for a stretch.

It doesn't help any that quite a few NCOs are fairly young, still less when junior officers are by definition usually fairly young themselves. A degree of self-discipline and maturity - and of course experience - tends to be lacking as a result. It is not impossible for a Corporal to still be in his teens, or a Sergeant to be in his early twenties. In a major concentional war, that isn't as much of a problem after the first little while, because those who are left often turn into training and discipline fanatics in order to survive. In an unconventional war, the same sort of "cull" doesn't quite take place the same and is rather more limited, so bad habits are not as likely to meet with their ultimate sanction, unless of course one finds oneself in extended MCOs such as in the Battles of Fallujah and other places in the Sunni Triangle. Those who make it through those battles and campaigns have a lot less tolerance than many of their peers who do not endure such experiences in the same theatre of operations.

NCOs in Commonwealth Armies normally have a fair bit of experience, and are significantly older too, during peacetime or LIC, and it helps, plus officers tend to be as well. Majors command Companies, and specialist Platoons (Recce, Pioneer, AT, Mortar, Machine-Gun, etc.) are commanded by Captains. A Corporal (or in Canada, a Master-Corporal, the rank of Corporal nowadays being just the old rank of Lance-Corporal, which was formally abolished in the late 1960's) normally has 6 years or more of service before receiving rank, and is at least 22 or 23, though more usually in his mid-twenties. A Sergeant normally has at least 9 years' service before reaching his rank (there are few regular Sergeants who are not at least in their late 20's), and most Sergeants are in their thirties. In peacetime or LIC, that can make a big difference in the ability to enforce discipline. In major conventional war it doesn't make as much of a difference, since most of those experienced NCO's (and officers) are amongst the first to die anyway, and you're left with the more motivated junior survivors to handle things.

[Wagram]

Has shown by this picture

http://raids.histoireetcollections.c...llet-2008.html

the french army SF DA unit (1er RPIMa) has received its first HK 416; HK 417 should soon follow. They will replace FAMAS and limited standard Colt 723/733 and SIG 551 used by this unit

[120mm]

It should be interesting to note that EOTech sights (as pictured on top of that Hk 416) are having all sorts of reliability/QC/standing up under hard use problems.

I know that the Polish troopers who come through JMRC are equipped, by and large with folding stock Tantal AKs and an EOTech over the gas tube. I haven't heard anything bad from them, btw.

But according to Pat Rogers, a rather learned man in the tactical rifle field, the premature failure rate of EOTech 55X series sights are approaching 100% in anything near to field use, according to his extensive and personal observation. (I'm looking for a link that isn't behind a sign-in on this)

The currently US-issued CCO, though, is as close to "bulletproof" as one can find in an electronic sight.

[120mm]

I think this might do the trick. The US gov't has had it with L3 EOTech's crap, evidently:

Decision

Matter of: L-3 Communications EOTech, Inc.

File: B-311453; B-311453.2

Date: July 14, 2008

<I snipped a bunch of people's names to make it fit>

DIGEST

Protester’s challenge to the exclusion of its proposal from the competitive range based on the failure of its bid sample during testing to satisfy an “essential criteria” is denied, where the solicitation advised offerors that the failure to satisfy an “essential criteria” would result in elimination of the proposal from the competition, the agency’s testing method was reasonable and consistent with the solicitation instructions, and the protester’s complaint about the test failure was related to its inadequately written proposal.

DECISION


L-3 Communications EOTech, Inc. protests the exclusion of its proposal from the competitive range under request for proposals (RFP) No. W15QKN-07-R-0428, issued by the U.S. Army Materiel Command for “Close Combat Optics” to be used with M16A2 rifles. L-3 asserts that the agency performed flawed testing on its proposed sight and mount and improperly rejected its proposal.


We deny the protest.


The RFP sought “Close Combat Optics,” that is, optical sights with mounts, to be used as fire control devices on M16A2 rifles, M16A4 rifles, and M4 carbines. RFP sect. C.2. These systems were to be procured through award of a fixed-price indefinite‑delivery/indefinite-quantity (ID/IQ) contract for a 5-year base period with two 1-year option periods. Id. sect. B. The RFP instructed each offeror to submit a written proposal, as well as a bid sample that would be tested against numerous criteria described in the solicitation.


The solicitation provided for award on a “best value” basis, considering the evaluation factors of bid sample, quality system, equipment/production, price, performance risk, and small disadvantaged business participation. With regard to the bid sample factor, which was the most important factor, offerors were advised that the bid samples first would be tested against 15 “essential criteria,” each of which would be rated on a “pass/fail” basis, and only samples that passed all of the “essential criteria” would be tested against 7 additional “rated criteria.” Id. sect. M para. B. In this regard, section M of the RFP stated in three places language essentially identical to the following:

A failure in any one or more of the essential criteria as stated shall be cause for elimination from further consideration for award and [the] offeror[’]s submission will not be further evaluated.
Id. sect. M paras. A, C.1.0, C.1.1.


At issue in this protest is the evaluation of optical sights for the M16A2 rifles. In response to the solicitation, seven proposals and bid samples from four offerors were submitted for the M16A2 rifles. With the bid samples, offerors were required to submit commercial off-the-shelf manuals, each of which included mounting instructions. RFP sect. L; Mounting Instructions. Six of the samples, including L-3’s, failed the “endurance-live fire” test, which was one of the “essential criteria.”[1] This test required that bid samples be mounted on the M16A2 rifle, withstand a 6,000 round endurance firing with no physical damage, and maintain a “zero within 1 Gunner’s mil upon completion of [the] endurance test.” Id. sect. M para. C.1.1.10. Based on this failure, the agency determined that L-3’s sample was unacceptable and eliminated L‑3’s proposal from the competition. This protest followed.


L-3 contends that the agency’s endurance-live fire test was flawed. In this regard, the protester asserts that the only reason its optical sight sample failed the endurance-live fire test was because the agency failed to properly secure the locking nut that tightens the mount to the weapon. L-3 contends that the agency improperly hand‑tightened the nut when it should have used a tool, such as a hex key, to secure the locking nut before conducting the test. L-3 asserts that it should have been “obvious” to the agency that a tool was required from the locking nut’s design and that it is “common knowledge” in the industry that a tool is required for these types of locking nuts. Protest at 7-8.


Our Office will review an allegedly improper technical evaluation of product samples to determine whether the evaluation was fair, reasonable and consistent with the evaluation criteria. We will not make an independent determination of the merits of an offeror’s proposal; rather, we will review the evaluation record to ensure that the agency’s technical judgment has a rational basis and is consistent with the stated evaluation criteria. Optical Sys. Tech., Inc., B-296516.2, B-296516.3, Mar. 17, 2006, 2006 CPD para. 63 at 5; Sun Chem. Corp., B-288466 et al., Oct. 17, 2001, 2001 CPD para.185 at 7.


Here, the agency explains that the design of the locking nut (with “knurled” ridges) on the submitted bid sample suggested to it that hand-tightening was the appropriate tightening method,[2] and the agency further explains that its own experience has shown that over‑tightening the locking nut with a tool can damage the optic or optic mount.[3] The agency also notes that each of the other offerors submitted mounting instructions that identified when hand-tightening was appropriate, when tools were required, what tool was to be used, and how to use the tool to tighten the particular nut, screw, or bolt. For example, when tools were required, offerors included specific instructions for what component the tool should be used with and, where appropriate, described the number of turns or amount of force to be applied.[4] Agency Report at 9, 11-12; Mounting Instructions. However, with respect to the optical sight for the M16A2 rifle, L-3’s proposal failed to include any instruction that a tool was required; the proposal merely stated, “Secure the locking nut.” Id. at 7-8; Mounting Instructions at 25. Without such an instruction, the agency or user could reasonably conclude that hand-tightening L‑3’s knurled ridge locking nut was the appropriate method to secure the sight mount.[5]

As we have often stated, an offeror must submit an adequately written proposal or it runs the risk of having its proposal rejected as unacceptable. Dynamic Mktg. Servs., Inc., B-279697, July 13, 1998, 98-2 CPD para. 84 at 6. Here, the complaint raised by L-3 concerning the endurance-live fire test was the result of its failure to identify how its locking nut was to be tightened, and not because of agency error. Under these circumstances, we cannot find the agency’s testing approach unreasonable. [6]


L-3 nevertheless asserts that its test failure was not design related, but was the result only of a “minor informational deficiency” that could have been corrected easily by asking L-3 whether a tool was required to properly tighten the nut. L-3 contends that given this minor issue and the fact that this was the only one of the “essential criteria” that its sample failed to satisfy, the agency should allow L‑3 to correct the informational deficiency and repeat the pass/fail test, especially because the failure to do so resulted in the establishment of a competitive range of one. Supp. Protest and Comments at 9.


Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) permits an agency to limit the competitive range to only the “most highly rated proposals” and does not require that discussions be held with offerors that are not included in the competitive range.[7] FAR sections 15.306(c)(1), (d)(1). We have held that there is nothing inherently improper in a competitive range of one where the agency has a reasonable basis for its competitive range determination. M&M Investigations, Inc., B‑299369.2, B-299369.3, Oct. 24, 2007, 2007 CPD para. 200 at 3. As indicated above, this RFP clearly established the ground rules for testing the samples as well as the consequences--“elimination from further consideration for award”--for offerors whose proposed bid sample failed any one of the 15 “essential criteria.” Given these ground rules, we cannot find unreasonable the agency’s decision to exclude L-3’s proposal and bid sample from the competitive range where, as here, the proposal failed an “essential criteria” test and the only complaint about this failure is related to L-3’s inadequately drafted proposal, and not because of agency error or flawed testing.[8] See California Microwave, Inc., B-229489, Feb. 24, 1988, 88-1 CPD para. 189 at 6.


L-3 also asks us to consider that the optical sight of the only offeror in the competitive range (Aimpoint) experienced test failures, which require design changes that L‑3 asserts are more significant than the informational deficiency that caused L-3’s test failure. However, the test failures experienced by the Aimpoint bid sample occurred with the “rated criteria,” which, as defined by the RFP, were only evaluated after the bid sample passed all of the “essential criteria”; Aimpont’s bid sample passed all of the “essential criteria.” In contrast, L-3’s failure occurred under the “essential criteria” and required no further evaluation. The agency has persuasively explained why the Aimpoint test failures were easily correctible without a need to retest the optical sight under these “essential criteria,” and, since the RFP allowed for discussions to occur on “rated criteria” failures, we find no error in the agency’s actions here.


In sum, we find that L-3’s proposal was properly eliminated from the competitive range in accordance with the unambiguous ground rules of the RFP.


The protest is denied.


Gary L. Kepplinger
General Counsel

[SethB]

Pat on the EOTech.

1

2

[William F. Owen]

The currently US-issued CCO, though, is as close to "bulletproof" as one can find in an electronic sight.

You may want to look at the Elbit Falcon. It's on about 50% of the M-16 Carbines and Galils over here, and I've also seen it on the weapons carried by the current combat units. Most have been hammered and have all the blacking knocked off them, but they still work. Been around for more than 12 years, IRRC.

The Tavors all seem to have Meprolight sights on them - but not really played with them, so not sure how robust they are.

[SethB]

A quick search of the internet revealed that the Elbit Falcon is a ~20 year old design that is being phased out of service. Although it is in fact known for durability.

The Aimpoint T1 Micro is lighter, smaller and the battery life is 200 times longer.

Compact ACOGs are pretty nice for those who don't like batteries.

[gute]

With the talk of the soldier's load and the need for a more effective combat round then the 5.56 it seems obvious a new assault rifle or a modified M16/M4 is needed.

You all are probably familiar with the FN P90 and maybe the new Magpul PDR. How about blending the two - keeping the FN mag and feed & ejection system and the Magpul's pistol grip and modular lower receiver? The P90 fires 5.7x28 which is not an effective all purpose combat round, but how about cased 6.8 SPC? Add two inches to the barrel making it 12.4 an infantryman would have a compact, bigger caliber, light weight assault rifle - thoughts?

Now, I know there is no bayonet and no front and rear sights - I'm sure something could be figured out. From what I know about the FN 90 and what I have read about the cased ammunition by AAI and the LSAT program, I think 50 rds of cased 6.8 SPC would be about a pound or a little over. Put that in this rifle (or sub-gun) I think you have a weapon that can effectively engage out to 300+ and most definately do more damage in the CQB enviroment. I have never fired 6.8 SPC so I do not know if it would be controllable in such a small weapon, but I like my idea, which I'm sure someone else thought of.

We use Rock River AR's for entry work - I really like the weapon, but there is too much barrel (16 inch) for CQB. The Rock Rivers are really handy for outdoor marijuana grow enforcement operations, but I would like to have the P90 or Magpul PDR for the in house stuff.

[William F. Owen]

With the talk of the soldier's load and the need for a more effective combat round then the 5.56 it seems obvious a new assault rifle or a modified M16/M4 is needed.

It may seem obvious, but I don't see it. 5.56mm may have short-comings compared to other rounds, but so what? Unless infantry operations are actually impeded or less effective, because of the weapon they use, then this argument becomes academic.

Yes, you are exactly right better use needs to be made of the carried load, but that line of reasoning could actually point towards more FN P-90 and MP-7A1, than a better M4, with a bigger round.
I believe that the correct use and application of the MIL-STD-1913 rails system can have far greater effect than mucking about with new rounds.

[Ken White]

...I believe that the correct use and application of the MIL-STD-1913 rails system can have far greater effect than mucking about with new rounds.

I'd go the other way -- you can dispense with the rail and tech solutions and save money and training time by simply and cheaply getting a round with greater effective impact. Terminal ballistics count and the laws of physics (and physiology...) can't be beaten by better shot placement.

Shot lodgement is affected by too many variables outside the control of the shooter in anything less than ideal circumstances...

Sheesh: Now that's one where some hard data is needed.

You are NOT getting a date with me, hard or otherwise.

[William F. Owen]

I'd go the other way -- you can dispense with the rail and tech solutions and save money and training time by simply and cheaply getting a round with greater effective impact. Terminal ballistics count and the laws of physics (and physiology...) can't be beaten by better shot placement.

Well I merely going to suggest,

• Bi-pod plus optic sight or TI Sight.
• 40mm launcher, drop on, drop off.
• Laser pointer, to use with NVGs

Now all those would work just as good on a 7.62mm rifle as a 5.56mm rifle, but again, weight becomes an issue.

[Ken White]

but I also think they could be built in with little effort and some weight saving. A top rail for an optic that could be changed plus take an add-on NVG /TWS or such would be okay.

Sigh. Everything has to be a compromise...

[jcustis]

Well I merely going to suggest,

Bi-pod plus optic sight or TI Sight. I agree with the optic, not so much with the bipod
40mm launcher, drop on, drop off. we can barely train our tm ldrs to stadard due to a lack of ammunition, so this is most likely a non-player in the Marine Corps
Laser pointer, to use with NVGs Every M4/M16 with a rail (and that's all infantry for us) has a PEQ-15 already
Now all those would work just as good on a 7.62mm rifle as a 5.56mm rifle, but again, weight becomes an issue.

One thing I think we definitely need to take a long, harder look at, is the use of rifle grenades, if for just the mere fact that regardless of whether a bullet-trap or blank-fired design is used, making an inert trainer can't be all that difficult, and incredibly more cost-effective than training with 40mm HEDP or TP rounds.

If we want projected HE capability that any shooter can employ, while not burdening the TL or grenadier down with the sole responsibility, how awesome it would be to issue every rifleman an inert RG, then send them out to a hasty range with a few blanks, at least once a quarter. We conduct similar training with pnuematic mortar systems, and it can't be any harder retrieving the device than it is looking for golfballs...even easier in a cleared-out area.

Hmm, I'm starting to sound like Sparks.

[Schmedlap]

No need for a new weapon. Just feed it the existing weapon the right ammunition. When we started issuing the 5.56MM 77 Grain LR, the results were day and night. Instead of blood trails, we had dead bodies. Soldiers were confident in their weapons, more effective at killing people who needed to die, and tended to fire less because they knew that the round had one-shot stopping power. The only problem was that we simply didn't get enough of the ammo. It was designed (or at least intended) for the "squad designated marksmen." It should have been standard issue for everyone. Not sure how it would work if linked and fired from the SAW.

[jcustis]

Was that 77 grain the open-tipped round that I had a magazine (and only one magazine) of?

[Schmedlap]

Was that 77 grain the open-tipped round that I had a magazine (and only one magazine) of?

That's the one. I was only able to obtain about one magazine per rifleman at the team/squad level. Everyone else with an M4 (E-6 & up) got none. It was pretty scarce.

[jcustis]

That's interesting, because it for sure isn't A059, but that is all that we ever train with. If 55 gr. isn't the most efficient round to be had, I'm a little disappointed that the discussion of using 77 gr. isn't something I hear every small unit leader discussing when it comes to talk of combat marksmanship. I imagine it's because most of us don't know the bit of difference between the two.

Thanks for re-energizing me over that bit of info schmedlap.

[Schmedlap]

I submitted AARs on the use of the 77 grain round that went all the way to some CW5 in charge of ammo at some echelon above reality. That was in 2005. Apparently he put it in his "to do later" stack and then ETS'd. When I say that the AAR went "all the way to some CW5" I mean that my S-4 forwarded me the lengthy e-mail chain, showing that my AAR went from him, up the S-4/G-4 channels, into some puzzle palace abyss, and ultimately to some guy who had "Ammo Honcho" or something like that in his official title. Everytime that it was forwarded, the forwarder included a comment along the lines of "feedback from our boys downrange" or "good info regarding 77 grain," etc. It was encouraging, but ultimately accomplished nothing, apparently. I even did it in spiffy memo format IAW AR 25-50, to include the neato DoD logo in the upper left corner.

I did the same thing - and got similar results - with AARs on the use of M84 Stun Hand Grenades and 5.56mm 4x1 linked (4 armor piercing: 1 tracer). The consensus among the desk-bound people at every echelon seemed to be "great feedback!" but that was it. No action.

[Ken White]

and draws objection -- as Churchill said, we usually do the right thing but only after we've tried all other options...

Check the slide: LINK. Just go for Cartridge, Caliber 5.56mm Ball, Carbine, Barrier, MK 318 MOD 0 -- DODIC: AB49 NSN: 1305-01-573-2229 (If you can get past the SOCOM lock on it...)

Also see this LINK. That's part of the conflict about which round(s) to buy, how many and for who -- plus the bureaucracy chugs along on slow and keeps buying plain M855. Shouldn't be that hard but it always is.

They do pay attention to things from the field, just takes far longer than it should to get it done and the system isn't primed (as it should be) to come back down and tell you what happened to your idea...