Future Conflict

[zenpundit]

The future geopolitical environment is a crucial consideration and quite a bit has been written by theorists, historians and analysts of globalization, not to mention by IR types at Foreign affairs and CFR.

The future of conflict hypothesized by William Lind, John Robb, Martin van Creveld, Thomas X. Hammes, John Arquilla, Chet Richards is far darker and more decentralized than what is suggested by Thomas Barnett or (further afield) Thomas Friedman. The NIC 2020 -Mapping the Global Future papers make an interesting read, as does the older "Unrestricted Warfare" paper by two PLA colonels. Many, perhaps most, SWC members have already read some or all of these.

What would I look for in trying to game out trends ?

Platforms - what broad based, IT or other tech currently under development or entering the market today is going to have the largest global systemic effects ? Here you will find the capacity for superempowerment of individuals or small cells.

Demographics - It isn't destiny but it counts. China is huge but is going to age more rapidly than any just about any other great power. Russia is well below replacement numbers. The level of AIDS infection in subsaharan Africa is pandemic.

Economic flows - At a certain magnitude of economic interrelationship is a weight against escalation of overt conflict. A market specialist I know who teaches at DePaul U. referred to the current state of Sino-American trade as "golden handcuffs" for both parties.

Nation-state Devolution/Evolution - As a class of actors, are nation-states devolving power in a controlled fashion to loyal networks (privatization, subnational autonomy, loyalist paramilitaries, PMC's), uncontrolled fashion (failed state) or integrating upward (transnationalism). Are we due for a counterrevolution in favor of the nation-state that will take everyone by surprise ?

Multidimensionality of Power - the traditional, realpolitik, understanding of geopolitics is inadequate for understanding the actual state of geopolitics. The more interconnected the global system, the greater the incentives will be to act indirectly in order to avoid the consequences that open conflict will bring in terms of "blowback"

[Bill Moore]

I think the first thing we need to do is narrow the focus to what our national interests are (or will be) that may require the employment of our military.

The range of threats, and social collapse scenarios, that may require a military response are too numerous to list, and many are probably unforeseen such as social collapse due to disease, or global warming (global warming has already caused mass migrations in Bangladesh, and it will get worse, which has alarmed India and led to some border skirmishes).

The U.S. can only afford to put boots on the grounds in limited locations, and always maintain enough reserve to ensure the defense of other emerging threats, so not only do we need a wide range of capabilities, perhaps more importantly we need a wide range of friends with capabilities to share the work load. Rarely are there going to be situations that are restricted to one country's interests, so coalitions will be key.

[Jones_RE]

War's essential character has not changed and will not change. The specific techniques required for close combat will probably remain stable. Firepower has continued to advance at the expense of protection - missiles are smarter, cheaper and more destructive than ever. Avoidance, concealment, cover and suppression remain the only means to stay alive in the face of a hostile enemy equipped with modern weapons.

I believe that the United States will require a great deal more infantry - especially light infantry. Infantry can be quickly and cheaply deployed almost anywhere. Light infantry should train to win the support of the local population by protecting them and treating them according to a strict code of conduct.

We'll probably be well served by fielding a few regiments cross trained as constabulary - not pure military police but with enough training to be "good enough for government work." With a law enforcement mindset, but military weapons and manpower, they'll probably pay for themselves in peacekeeping deployments.

Against high intensity foes, I can only recommend training (In a free play, force on force environment that simulates battle as closely as possible). Suppression, concealment and use of terrain, as well as cooperation by all arms, will be necessary to combat widespread ATGM and smarter indirect fires. I believe Israel's heavy losses in southern Lebannon were a direct result of poor suppression, reconaissance and use of terrain by the IDF - as well as excellent uses of concealment and guts by Hezbollah.

Smart weapons will become cheaper and more widely available. While non-state actors will have a hard time getting them in quantity, if a few of them are sufficiently well handled we can expect a seriously rough time.

Submarines. The same hydrogen, fuel cell and hybrid technology that's exciting everyone about cars would be just dandy for powering a submarine fleet - and quieter than our nuke boast. Combine that with widespread availability for cruise missiles and the next war with a major power may well be fought right alongside our coasts.

In short, I foresee a world in which firepower is increasingly democratized. War will remain primarily a mental and moral affair, with the actual tools and techniques used mattering a hell of a lot less than the people using them.

[Reid Bessenger]

Zenpundit - thanks for the link to the NIC 2020 piece. I'm still going through it, and it is intriguing. Of the scenarios featured in the piece, I think that today, two years after the production of the document, the Pax Americana scenario seems less plausible even though it attractively suggests some degree of stability that the others lack in varying degrees.

The chart of Relative Certainties and Key Uncertainties on page 8 is provocative alone. There are some underlying assumptions not specifically broken out in the chart that seem to suggest oversimplification. An example is the last Relative Certainty listed: "US will remain single most powerful actor economically, technologically, militarily." I think that once a region is selected as a vehicle to examine the ideas put forth, this becomes ambiguous. The context of the document when I read it today is different from the time of publication, and that may account for much of the complexity I see confronting some of these points.

Again, thanks for the input. Still reading...

[Bill Moore]

War's essential character has not changed and will not change. The specific techniques required for close combat will probably remain stable. Jones

I have to challenge you on this one, or at least ask for clarification. The nature of war has changed considerably, and will continue to do so. I'm not sure what you mean by the character of war though?

Some changes:

1. As you mentioned, strategic reach, we can launch nuclear weapons anywhere in the world with relative ease. Unfortunately we see the emergence of undesired peer competitors in this area. This gives a nation (or perhaps some day a non-state actor) the ability to launch a strategic attack in a matter of minutes, without mobilizing and deploying an Army. No change from say Napolean's time?

2. Globalization, global migration, global communications etc. have created what some call a Flat World, but the security implications are serious, because global communications gives an actor the ability (within reason) the ability to mobilize an amorphous army in any country, say radicalize a segment of the Muslim population in France, then pass information on how to disrupt the French economy. 9/11 was transmitted world wide within minutes, and so are our efforts in GWOT. We have to respond to several different audiences near real time to maintain acceptable relationships in globalized economy, which means our response options are very limited. No longer can we pass out small pox infected blankets to weaken our adversaries, but they can do it to us.

3. There are ways to fight wars now without conventional armies, or where conventional armies only play a supporting role (see unrestricted warfare).

4. I'll challenge your close combat statement also, because close combat normally was defined (in conventional terms, which are too limited) as armed foes fighting one another within rifle range, where fire and maneuver tactics were essential. Now close combat is suicide bombers attacking unarmed civilians, or insurgents hiding behind civilians while executing an attack knowing that our forces must limit collateral damage, and they fire back and kill a women and child it will have a near immediate strategic impact on the nightly news (or the 24/7 news shows now). No change? There was time when we didn't worry about collateral damage.

All that said, much will remain the same, so we can't throw the baby out with the bath water. However, instead of us developing an ever bigger Army (light infantry or not, it is expensive), I think we need to pursue stronger relations with our allies. I don't like coalitions of the willing, because as we're seeing that isn't binding, but we need something along the lines of NATO, but more globalized (not regionally focused), and a new list of threats (beyond Warsaw) that are agreed to, if we ever hope to generate enough forces to mitigate the emerging threats during this period of massive economic and social change, which I think is a transition period, much like the Middle Ages, but we still have to maintain an acceptable level of security during this period.

[120mm]

I have to challenge you on this one, or at least ask for clarification. The nature of war has changed considerably, and will continue to do so. I'm not sure what you mean by the character of war though?

Some changes:

1. As you mentioned, strategic reach, we can launch nuclear weapons anywhere in the world with relative ease. Unfortunately we see the emergence of undesired peer competitors in this area. This gives a nation (or perhaps some day a non-state actor) the ability to launch a strategic attack in a matter of minutes, without mobilizing and deploying an Army. No change from say Napolean's time?

While a rogue state may be able to launch a missile(s), these weapons are not a realistic option for a member of the civilized world. Symbols only

2. Globalization, global migration, global communications etc. have created what some call a Flat World, but the security implications are serious, because global communications gives an actor the ability (within reason) the ability to mobilize an amorphous army in any country, say radicalize a segment of the Muslim population in France, then pass information on how to disrupt the French economy. 9/11 was transmitted world wide within minutes, and so are our efforts in GWOT. We have to respond to several different audiences near real time to maintain acceptable relationships in globalized economy, which means our response options are very limited. No longer can we pass out small pox infected blankets to weaken our adversaries, but they can do it to us.

3. There are ways to fight wars now without conventional armies, or where conventional armies only play a supporting role (see unrestricted warfare).

4. I'll challenge your close combat statement also, because close combat normally was defined (in conventional terms, which are too limited) as armed foes fighting one another within rifle range, where fire and maneuver tactics were essential. Now close combat is suicide bombers attacking unarmed civilians, or insurgents hiding behind civilians while executing an attack knowing that our forces must limit collateral damage, and they fire back and kill a women and child it will have a near immediate strategic impact on the nightly news (or the 24/7 news shows now). No change? There was time when we didn't worry about collateral damage.

Light infantry is the ONLY truly precision guided weapons system. Our main defense against any of the threats listed is aggressive patrolling, combined with the right "touch" when going door to door. I think we do need more light infantry, we just need it to more closely resemble a heavily armed police force than a "2nd Mech".
All that said, much will remain the same, so we can't throw the baby out with the bath water. However, instead of us developing an ever bigger Army (light infantry or not, it is expensive), I think we need to pursue stronger relations with our allies. I don't like coalitions of the willing, because as we're seeing that isn't binding, but we need something along the lines of NATO, but more globalized (not regionally focused), and a new list of threats (beyond Warsaw) that are agreed to, if we ever hope to generate enough forces to mitigate the emerging threats during this period of massive economic and social change, which I think is a transition period, much like the Middle Ages, but we still have to maintain an acceptable level of security during this period.

Good luck. Sooner or later, we would need to eat some things we wouldn't care for, politically, with this approach. I'm not saying we shouldn't, I'm just saying that we need to be prepared to to take this approach

Excellent topic and discussion!

[Tc2642]

War's essential character has not changed and will not change. The specific techniques required for close combat will probably remain stable. Jones

I have to challenge you on this one, or at least ask for clarification. The nature of war has changed considerably, and will continue to do so. I'm not sure what you mean by the character of war though?

I think there may be some confusion over how we define terms here.

I for one, think the nature of war has not changed but that it's characteristics have, the nature of war is always political, although how it is fought and the methods used to fight it, the characteristics, the features of war have changed over time. Although character and nature can be mentioned in the same breath, for the sake of clarity that's how I define them.

[Reid Bessenger]

Perhaps we can benefit from a definition of terms. I regard "nature" as applied in "the nature of conflict" to refer to those enduring characteristics that identify a thing in regard to how it is composed, how it functions, and how it relates to other things. The specific inclusion of those enduring characteristics is critical to the nature, because the value of knowledge of a thing's nature is realized through that immutability. This may seem pedantic, but I think it's central to our discussion of future conflict. Armed with the enduring characteristics of conflict, we can assess the trends that shape the specific form conflict may take, and from that identify capabilities required to engage from a position of advantage.

The Nature of Conflict.

Conflict of ideas or violence or both. (LTC D. A. Fastabend, USA, in "A General Theory of Conflict" submitted 1 May 1996)

"War is a violent clash of interests between or among organized groups characterized by the use of military force."
"The essence of war is a violent struggle between two hostile, independent, and irreconcilable wills, each trying to impose itself on the other." (United States Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1, 1997)

These provide a sound starting point. I think in factional conflict there may be more than two parties. Interested in your comments.