Future Conflict

[Reid Bessenger]

The events of the last several years have been attended by a shift in an American definition of required capability to engage in conflict. On one level, the balance between a capability to engage in military conflicts of fire and maneuver, and engaging in COIN. On another level, a renewed and more pervasive focus on improving a capacity to engage in conflict with a whole government team has emerged. On yet another, some see the redefinition of total warfare as a fourth generation of warfare.

The value of these efforts of course differ, but the process of engaging in the thought and discussion of their merit is beneficial. The capablity to be successful in operations like those that are currently underway brings a special sense of urgency that can, if allowed, cloud a longer term perspective.

What might the future geopolitical environment look like? What challenges might it include or suggest? What capabilites might most probably be needed by a nation state in that future environment? What are the implications for getting from today to that future with those capabilites?

[TROUFION]

The discussion of what Strategic-Operational-Tactical capabilities will be needed to fight the next war(s) is one based on perspective. Just what is meant by the 'the next war' and 'future war(s)' is not something easliy grasped.

Are we talking about peer (or near peer) conflict for hegemonic or hemispheric domination?

Or is it peer vs peer (peer refering to nation state) regional dominance, a conflict based on political and resource controls in a limited area capable of being confined to a particular region?

Or is it a conflict against a rouge state of moderate but inferior means such as Iran or Pakistan in relation to the U.S.?

Or is it a humanitarian conflict based on stabilizing and reconstructing a failed, failing state or region, such as seen in West Africa?

Or is it a conflict fought against transnational terrorist?

Does the future of conflict involve bits of all these?

Most Dangerous COA: it would seem obvious that a HIC involving peer to peer fighting such as China vs U.S. would be the most devestating, but perhaps the simpler of conflicts. It is doubtful that an invasion by large ground forces in order to conquer then stabilize and reconstruct would be involved. The target of this type of war would be to destroy the others capacity to wage offensive war and it would span many spectrums from electronic to economic as well as space and sea. Basically all other conflicts would pale in comparison. This type of conflict would change history for better or worse.

Most Likely COA: a LIC that revloves around stabilizing and reconstructiing a failed or failing state or region. The reason for intervention could be to prevent the growth of a transnational terrorist base, the need for stability to maintian the flow of precious natural resources (oil, bauxite etc) or a combination of both. This conflict requires a more nuanced approach as it is very likely to be done on the cheap, with limited resources across the board and with a coalition of various often competing international partners. Further direct combat operations would need to be kept to a minimum in a more 'hearts and minds' operation.

The two conflicts are vastly different and require different means. It reminds me of an arguement we used to have at AWS: what do you train for HIC with the intent that you can always ramp down to fight LIC or vice versa? Whixh is harder? What skills are the same and which are different. For one you don't have to seal off a battlefield to collect evidence in HIC.

-T

[zenpundit]

The future geopolitical environment is a crucial consideration and quite a bit has been written by theorists, historians and analysts of globalization, not to mention by IR types at Foreign affairs and CFR.

The future of conflict hypothesized by William Lind, John Robb, Martin van Creveld, Thomas X. Hammes, John Arquilla, Chet Richards is far darker and more decentralized than what is suggested by Thomas Barnett or (further afield) Thomas Friedman. The NIC 2020 -Mapping the Global Future papers make an interesting read, as does the older "Unrestricted Warfare" paper by two PLA colonels. Many, perhaps most, SWC members have already read some or all of these.

What would I look for in trying to game out trends ?

Platforms - what broad based, IT or other tech currently under development or entering the market today is going to have the largest global systemic effects ? Here you will find the capacity for superempowerment of individuals or small cells.

Demographics - It isn't destiny but it counts. China is huge but is going to age more rapidly than any just about any other great power. Russia is well below replacement numbers. The level of AIDS infection in subsaharan Africa is pandemic.

Economic flows - At a certain magnitude of economic interrelationship is a weight against escalation of overt conflict. A market specialist I know who teaches at DePaul U. referred to the current state of Sino-American trade as "golden handcuffs" for both parties.

Nation-state Devolution/Evolution - As a class of actors, are nation-states devolving power in a controlled fashion to loyal networks (privatization, subnational autonomy, loyalist paramilitaries, PMC's), uncontrolled fashion (failed state) or integrating upward (transnationalism). Are we due for a counterrevolution in favor of the nation-state that will take everyone by surprise ?

Multidimensionality of Power - the traditional, realpolitik, understanding of geopolitics is inadequate for understanding the actual state of geopolitics. The more interconnected the global system, the greater the incentives will be to act indirectly in order to avoid the consequences that open conflict will bring in terms of "blowback"

[Bill Moore]

I think the first thing we need to do is narrow the focus to what our national interests are (or will be) that may require the employment of our military.

The range of threats, and social collapse scenarios, that may require a military response are too numerous to list, and many are probably unforeseen such as social collapse due to disease, or global warming (global warming has already caused mass migrations in Bangladesh, and it will get worse, which has alarmed India and led to some border skirmishes).

The U.S. can only afford to put boots on the grounds in limited locations, and always maintain enough reserve to ensure the defense of other emerging threats, so not only do we need a wide range of capabilities, perhaps more importantly we need a wide range of friends with capabilities to share the work load. Rarely are there going to be situations that are restricted to one country's interests, so coalitions will be key.

[Jones_RE]

War's essential character has not changed and will not change. The specific techniques required for close combat will probably remain stable. Firepower has continued to advance at the expense of protection - missiles are smarter, cheaper and more destructive than ever. Avoidance, concealment, cover and suppression remain the only means to stay alive in the face of a hostile enemy equipped with modern weapons.

I believe that the United States will require a great deal more infantry - especially light infantry. Infantry can be quickly and cheaply deployed almost anywhere. Light infantry should train to win the support of the local population by protecting them and treating them according to a strict code of conduct.

We'll probably be well served by fielding a few regiments cross trained as constabulary - not pure military police but with enough training to be "good enough for government work." With a law enforcement mindset, but military weapons and manpower, they'll probably pay for themselves in peacekeeping deployments.

Against high intensity foes, I can only recommend training (In a free play, force on force environment that simulates battle as closely as possible). Suppression, concealment and use of terrain, as well as cooperation by all arms, will be necessary to combat widespread ATGM and smarter indirect fires. I believe Israel's heavy losses in southern Lebannon were a direct result of poor suppression, reconaissance and use of terrain by the IDF - as well as excellent uses of concealment and guts by Hezbollah.

Smart weapons will become cheaper and more widely available. While non-state actors will have a hard time getting them in quantity, if a few of them are sufficiently well handled we can expect a seriously rough time.

Submarines. The same hydrogen, fuel cell and hybrid technology that's exciting everyone about cars would be just dandy for powering a submarine fleet - and quieter than our nuke boast. Combine that with widespread availability for cruise missiles and the next war with a major power may well be fought right alongside our coasts.

In short, I foresee a world in which firepower is increasingly democratized. War will remain primarily a mental and moral affair, with the actual tools and techniques used mattering a hell of a lot less than the people using them.

[Reid Bessenger]

Zenpundit - thanks for the link to the NIC 2020 piece. I'm still going through it, and it is intriguing. Of the scenarios featured in the piece, I think that today, two years after the production of the document, the Pax Americana scenario seems less plausible even though it attractively suggests some degree of stability that the others lack in varying degrees.

The chart of Relative Certainties and Key Uncertainties on page 8 is provocative alone. There are some underlying assumptions not specifically broken out in the chart that seem to suggest oversimplification. An example is the last Relative Certainty listed: "US will remain single most powerful actor economically, technologically, militarily." I think that once a region is selected as a vehicle to examine the ideas put forth, this becomes ambiguous. The context of the document when I read it today is different from the time of publication, and that may account for much of the complexity I see confronting some of these points.

Again, thanks for the input. Still reading...

[Bill Moore]

War's essential character has not changed and will not change. The specific techniques required for close combat will probably remain stable. Jones

I have to challenge you on this one, or at least ask for clarification. The nature of war has changed considerably, and will continue to do so. I'm not sure what you mean by the character of war though?

Some changes:

1. As you mentioned, strategic reach, we can launch nuclear weapons anywhere in the world with relative ease. Unfortunately we see the emergence of undesired peer competitors in this area. This gives a nation (or perhaps some day a non-state actor) the ability to launch a strategic attack in a matter of minutes, without mobilizing and deploying an Army. No change from say Napolean's time?

2. Globalization, global migration, global communications etc. have created what some call a Flat World, but the security implications are serious, because global communications gives an actor the ability (within reason) the ability to mobilize an amorphous army in any country, say radicalize a segment of the Muslim population in France, then pass information on how to disrupt the French economy. 9/11 was transmitted world wide within minutes, and so are our efforts in GWOT. We have to respond to several different audiences near real time to maintain acceptable relationships in globalized economy, which means our response options are very limited. No longer can we pass out small pox infected blankets to weaken our adversaries, but they can do it to us.

3. There are ways to fight wars now without conventional armies, or where conventional armies only play a supporting role (see unrestricted warfare).

4. I'll challenge your close combat statement also, because close combat normally was defined (in conventional terms, which are too limited) as armed foes fighting one another within rifle range, where fire and maneuver tactics were essential. Now close combat is suicide bombers attacking unarmed civilians, or insurgents hiding behind civilians while executing an attack knowing that our forces must limit collateral damage, and they fire back and kill a women and child it will have a near immediate strategic impact on the nightly news (or the 24/7 news shows now). No change? There was time when we didn't worry about collateral damage.

All that said, much will remain the same, so we can't throw the baby out with the bath water. However, instead of us developing an ever bigger Army (light infantry or not, it is expensive), I think we need to pursue stronger relations with our allies. I don't like coalitions of the willing, because as we're seeing that isn't binding, but we need something along the lines of NATO, but more globalized (not regionally focused), and a new list of threats (beyond Warsaw) that are agreed to, if we ever hope to generate enough forces to mitigate the emerging threats during this period of massive economic and social change, which I think is a transition period, much like the Middle Ages, but we still have to maintain an acceptable level of security during this period.

[Reid Bessenger]

There is potential for globalization, demographic trends, regional tensions, energy appetites, and identity or religion politics to conspire to create a greater and more pervasive instability. International relief organizations may become overwhelmed. I think that this paints a picture that calls for dramtically enhanced interservice, interagency and international capacity to plan together as well as execute together in a variety of efforts from economic development to humanitarian assistance to support to governance to conflict engagement and resolution. This is a present problem. At a recent event including participation of an international and interdisciplinary collection of government and nongovernment professionals, the observation was offerred that one can get a Brit, an American and a Canadian to agree on a definition of a problem much more easily than on a process for planning. One issue, but instructive.

I think that as difficult as the effort associated with enhancing US service interoperability has been, it is simple compared to the same challenge applied to US efforts involving multiple agencies of the government. In turn I think that challenge may look tame when compared to the complexity of the challenge to improve the capability for international coordination of several teams, each representing a "whole government approach" for their respective nation, and all seeking to work together to accomplish a common goal.

Again, in the context of the future environment described, it appears that the capability to plan and execute efforts aimed at reducing the causes of conflict, mitigating the residual sources of insecurity and instability (economic, technological, etc.) and resolving conflicts that occur (including engaging directly in conflicts when necessary) will be very important.

[franksforum]

Below is the link to the full text of the NIC Report-Global Trends 2025: A World Transformed.

http://www.dni.gov/nic/PDF_2025/2025...nal_Report.pdf

By 2025, the accelerating pace of globalization and the emergence of new powers will produce a world order vastly different from the system in place for most of the post-World War II era, according to a projection by the federal government's top intelligence analysts.

The projection, prepared by the National Intelligence Council of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, was made public by the ODNI today.

The ODNI report, “Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World” projects a still-preeminent U.S. joined by fast developing powers, notably India and China, atop a multipolar international system. The world of the near future will be subject to an increased likelihood of conflict over scarce resources, including food and water, and will be haunted by the persistence of rogue states and terrorist groups with greater access to nuclear weapons, the report says. Widening gaps in birth rates and wealth-to-poverty ratios, and the uneven impact of climate change, could further exacerbate tensions, “Global Trends 2025” concludes.

The report extrapolates from current and projected trends. It is not a prediction, and the authors stress that “bad outcomes are not inevitable.”

“International leadership and cooperation will be necessary to solve the global challenges and to understand the complexities surrounding them,” the report concludes.

“By laying out some of the alternative possibilities we hope to help policymakers steer us toward more positive solutions.”

Other projections in “Global Trends 2025”: include:

• Russia's emergence as a world power is clouded by lagging investment in its energy sector and the persistence of crime and government corruption.

• Muslim states outside the Arab core – Turkey, Indonesia, even a post-clerical Iran – could take on expanded roles in the new international order.

• A government in Eastern or Central Europe could be effectively taken over and run by organized crime. In parts of Africa and South Asia, some states might wither away as governments fail to provide security and other basic needs.

• A worldwide shift to a new technology that replaces oil will be under way or accomplished by 2025.

• Multiple financial centers will serve as 'shock absorbers' in the world financial system. The U.S. dollar's role will shrink to 'first among equals' in a basket of key world currencies.

• The likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used will increase with expanded access to technology and a widening range of options for limited strikes.

• The impact of climate change will be uneven, with some Northern economies, notably Russia and Canada, profiting from longer growing seasons and improved access to resource reserves.

The Global Trends series examines geopolitical trends and analyzes their likely outcomes, in an attempt to prompt public discussion of possible responses. The projections have covered five-year intervals, beginning with Global Trends 2010 issued in November 1997.