Suicide Attacks: weapon of the future?

[MikeF]

Anecdotal evidence is powerful, because it is illustrative and evocative. However, it is rarely generalizable, and it is difficult to extrapolate. I would point you towards Lindsey O'Rourke's Op-Ed, which is actually a summary of a piece that should be coming out soon in Security Studies.

Good points and great link. It appears Ms. O'Rouke is going to study the issue. You are correct. It is difficult to generalize off of anecdotes; however inductive studies should not be ignored. My belief is empirical evidence supported by inductive studies often produces the strongest arguments.

This area is personal for me as I know many of the people involved. One common current that I've observed out of the DRV is a lack of hope. There was a time when those same young girls dreamed of going to university and studying to be doctors, teachers, and lawyers. In some ways, it is just sad to see their dreams fade b/c their parents continue to fight amoungst each other.

Additionally, I imagine their will be strong debate within the Islamic community over the use of women as martyrs. They debate just as strongly as we do here at SWJ.

v/r

Mike

[Abu Suleyman]

You are correct. It is difficult to generalize off of anecdotes; however inductive studies should not be ignored. My belief is empirical evidence supported by inductive studies often produces the strongest arguments.

I agree. I suppose that my primary complaint with anecdotes is that they are so powerful that they can overcome actual evidence. Witness the effect of the anecdotes that returned from Tet versus the actual "net" reality on the battlefield. Humans are natural story tellers, and stories can captivate, and by themselves mislead.

This area is personal for me as I know many of the people involved. One common current that I've observed out of the DRV is a lack of hope. There was a time when those same young girls dreamed of going to university and studying to be doctors, teachers, and lawyers. In some ways, it is just sad to see their dreams fade b/c their parents continue to fight amoungst each other.

That is an interesting problem. I know that Dr. Pape argues that suicide bombing comes about because of occupation, although, I am unconvinced of his arguments completely. There have been some statistical critiques of his study, and I know that Lindsey follows in his footsteps a lot.

However, to me the bigger question is why some individuals become suicide bombers and others do not. I spent most of my time across the river from Diyala, so am not intimately familiar but not a stranger to the issues. Indeed, the despair you talk about is common. However, the overwhelming majority of both men and women do not become suicide bombers. What then, drives the few that do?

[davidbfpo]

Team,

There are several threads on suicide bombing on SWC and this one lasted awhile. I only post this as a reminder: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...bombers&page=7

Post 124 links to an Israeli academic who has interviewed failed Palestinian women suicide bombers.

davidbfpo

[gh_uk]

One of the best overviews of this subject (in my view at least) comes from Martha Crenshaw who, in this article, does a fairly good job of knocking down both Robert Pape (Occupation theory) and Mia Bloom (Outbidding other groups theory).

http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/2194..._Terrorism.pdf

There has been a lot of other work in this area since Pape and Bloom published in 2005. One of the better authors for explaining the motivation/ pyschological side is Anne Speckhard who comes at it from a clinical side and has done some good work on female (notable Chechen) attackers.

(This happens to be my phd area, but I'm more focused on the organisational side than the personal motivation/radicalisation debate).

[MikeF]

However, to me the bigger question is why some individuals become suicide bombers and others do not. I spent most of my time across the river from Diyala, so am not intimately familiar but not a stranger to the issues. Indeed, the despair you talk about is common. However, the overwhelming majority of both men and women do not become suicide bombers. What then, drives the few that do?

That's the $10,000 question. Let me know if you figure it out.

David is right. Suicide Bombers are discussed on another thread, but I'll leave this one with one last thought. The female suicide bombers started AFTER we dismantled the ISI government, military infrastructure, training camps, and beheadings and near-genocide of the local Shia. Maybe it was b/c the AQ leadership was desperate. I dunno.

v/r

Mike

[Scott Shaw]

I, like Mike F, am tied heavily to this particular AO. I was Lieutenant Colonel Khalid al Ameri's advisor for a year from the time he was the Bn XO through the removal of two battalion commanders and a huge AO switch from Muqdadiyah to the DRV. We cleared the ground around Abu Sayda, Mukisa, Qubbah, and Zaganiyah from April-June 08 after the brave troopers of 5-73 Cav (Thanks, Mike, Phil K, and COL P) and were starting to hold it when my team left in late June.

Mike is right about the ground. It is a Sunni area sandwiched between two large Shia areas (the Abu Sayda area and the Khalis area north-east of Baquoba). They greatly feared the Shia, the IA, and the IPs and the attacks targeted the ISF. As the ISI moved from Baghdad to Baqouba and was cleared from there, it moved into the DRV with its thick palm groves and thicker hatred of the occupiers and Shia lacky ISF. This area was one that ISI could refit in and conduct attacks to the south into Baqoubah and Khalis and to the north into Abu Sayda and Muqdadiyah. These attacks provoked the kind of sectarian violence that we saw in late 2006 and early 2007. It was so violent there that driving the MSR was an assured contact. The SCO in my squadron when asked where al Qaeda was by a visiting VIP said “Drive down that route, they’ll find you.”

It took two full Stryker infantry companies with the battalion recon platoon and Bn HQ and an entire Iraqi Army battalion with augmentation from the brigade HQ that settled into five COPs over a 25 square kilometer area (there was more, but it was really not settled or Shia) to calm the place – not pacify it and definitely not clear it, simply prevent chaos. The IA established COPs using routes that we could control and then we launched attacks to clear the routes. We started in the south and worked north toward the river – oil-spot style. The final hold-outs were Qubbah and Mukisa. Both as Mike points out were Saddam and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi support zones. They were so deep in the palms, so far from civilization that those who would do the people of Iraq and our Soldiers harm could hide nearly indefinitely. Zarqawi nearly did. They hid because the local insurgents who supported ISI were the sons of the villagers. It was a home-grown cadre of insurgents and when they were killed during CF and IA operations, it became a blood feud. No amount of projects or assistance except in the form of security was going to solve this problem in the short run (and more than likely in the 5-10 year run).

The manuals show a nice clean “10% over there that hate you, 80% in the middle, and 10% who are in your corner” and it was not the case there. The ratio was more like 50-40-10. It’s what created people like Rayna and Baida. It’s what enabled the insurgents hiding in the palm groves to survive – their parents bringing them food even though they knew what might happen.

The question is what do you do then? Is it an area that you just write off? How long can you allow the enemy a support zone in which he is not disruptable? Those palm groves won’t allow for Hellfire shots, so I guess GEN Krulak’s method is out. How do you combat hatred that is near Hatfield-McCoy with the truism that “all counterinsurgencies have a half-life?”

I know that many of these are un-answerable, but this article was a good read for me to understand what makes someone into a suicide (or homicide) bomber. There are some others (like the work of Dr Hafez – and he has video too if you don’t want to read it), but this was a good quick read.

Scott

And I spoke on the phone with LTC Khalid two days ago. The area is much quieter that it used to be - nearly nothing. I didn't have an interpreter and could only carry about four minutes of Arabic before my conversational skills ran out (and so did his English). Mike, I'll PM you with an update.