I, like Mike F, am tied heavily to this particular AO. I was Lieutenant Colonel Khalid al Ameri's advisor for a year from the time he was the Bn XO through the removal of two battalion commanders and a huge AO switch from Muqdadiyah to the DRV. We cleared the ground around Abu Sayda, Mukisa, Qubbah, and Zaganiyah from April-June 08 after the brave troopers of 5-73 Cav (Thanks, Mike, Phil K, and COL P) and were starting to hold it when my team left in late June.

Mike is right about the ground. It is a Sunni area sandwiched between two large Shia areas (the Abu Sayda area and the Khalis area north-east of Baquoba). They greatly feared the Shia, the IA, and the IPs and the attacks targeted the ISF. As the ISI moved from Baghdad to Baqouba and was cleared from there, it moved into the DRV with its thick palm groves and thicker hatred of the occupiers and Shia lacky ISF. This area was one that ISI could refit in and conduct attacks to the south into Baqoubah and Khalis and to the north into Abu Sayda and Muqdadiyah. These attacks provoked the kind of sectarian violence that we saw in late 2006 and early 2007. It was so violent there that driving the MSR was an assured contact. The SCO in my squadron when asked where al Qaeda was by a visiting VIP said “Drive down that route, they’ll find you.”

It took two full Stryker infantry companies with the battalion recon platoon and Bn HQ and an entire Iraqi Army battalion with augmentation from the brigade HQ that settled into five COPs over a 25 square kilometer area (there was more, but it was really not settled or Shia) to calm the place – not pacify it and definitely not clear it, simply prevent chaos. The IA established COPs using routes that we could control and then we launched attacks to clear the routes. We started in the south and worked north toward the river – oil-spot style. The final hold-outs were Qubbah and Mukisa. Both as Mike points out were Saddam and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi support zones. They were so deep in the palms, so far from civilization that those who would do the people of Iraq and our Soldiers harm could hide nearly indefinitely. Zarqawi nearly did. They hid because the local insurgents who supported ISI were the sons of the villagers. It was a home-grown cadre of insurgents and when they were killed during CF and IA operations, it became a blood feud. No amount of projects or assistance except in the form of security was going to solve this problem in the short run (and more than likely in the 5-10 year run).

The manuals show a nice clean “10% over there that hate you, 80% in the middle, and 10% who are in your corner” and it was not the case there. The ratio was more like 50-40-10. It’s what created people like Rayna and Baida. It’s what enabled the insurgents hiding in the palm groves to survive – their parents bringing them food even though they knew what might happen.

The question is what do you do then? Is it an area that you just write off? How long can you allow the enemy a support zone in which he is not disruptable? Those palm groves won’t allow for Hellfire shots, so I guess GEN Krulak’s method is out. How do you combat hatred that is near Hatfield-McCoy with the truism that “all counterinsurgencies have a half-life?”

I know that many of these are un-answerable, but this article was a good read for me to understand what makes someone into a suicide (or homicide) bomber. There are some others (like the work of Dr Hafez – and he has video too if you don’t want to read it), but this was a good quick read.

Scott

And I spoke on the phone with LTC Khalid two days ago. The area is much quieter that it used to be - nearly nothing. I didn't have an interpreter and could only carry about four minutes of Arabic before my conversational skills ran out (and so did his English). Mike, I'll PM you with an update.