The US & others working with Pakistan

[tequila]

I will not buy into the premise that Musharraf's government will collapse if we were to lead offensive operations into the FATA. I am not convinced whatsoever. We have asked, cajoled, threatened, and requested that the Pakistanis do it themselves and they are incapable of long term sustainment in that region. I don't want to argue why they can't do it themselves but rather lets address the real problem -- our enemy finds sanctuary inside the borders of a supposed ally on the Global War on Terrorism.

What sort of offensive operations are you talking about? Are we talking about the 82nd Airborne or I MEF setting up shop independently in North Waziristan and basically occupying the area?

If so, I think you'd be hard-pressed to find any Pakistani government that could survive under such circumstances.

[Pragmatic Thinker]

What sort of offensive operations are you talking about? Are we talking about the 82nd Airborne or I MEF setting up shop independently in North Waziristan and basically occupying the area?

If so, I think you'd be hard-pressed to find any Pakistani government that could survive under such circumstances.

I am talking about any kind of continuous operation that denies the enemy freedom of movement to enter Afghanistan to kill coalition forces along their (bad guys) preferred LOCs. I have heard the argument that Musharraf would be pressured internally, but why not allow limited joint U.S.-Pakistani forces to conduct operations inside Pakistan? Much like we do in the Philippines? Is he not truly concerned about ridding Al Qaeda and Taliban influences from within his country? Is he truly committed to the fight to defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban which is the major destabilizing force inside Afghanistan? If he is then why refuse U.S. forces who are admittedly better capable some sort of limited ability to strike targets within his borders or complain when they do?

Anyway, this is turning into a discussion about South Asian politics and not about the Intelligence Estimate released earlier this month and the testimony from Gen. Clapper, so I will disengage from it. We can agree to disagree and my tactical perspective will remain the same -- a sanctuary is only a sanctuary if you allow it to remain as one. I get that Pakistani soldiers are dying in these operations inside Waziristan, but remember this a conscript Army and not to say their loss of soldiers is not as great at the personal level, but I do NOT want to use the metric of dead bodies as a measurment of resolve and/or dedication to a fight...it is illogical and one I see bantied around Washington by the pro-Musharraf crowd. If you're interested, read how many soldiers they (PAK MIL) lose annually fighting Baluch insurgents in the south and their occassional forays in Kashmir against the Indians.

PT

[tequila]

PT - Don't misunderstand me, I am hardly a Musharraf apologist. I think the best result for all would actually be if he resigned and left the country and open elections were held - unfortunately he appears to believe that he is Ataturk come again, sans French-style laicite, judging from my quick skim of his autobiography.

I do think, however, that a unilateral American intervention in the FATA would be seen by almost all the varied Pakistani publics as an American invasion.

I agree that it would certainly be to the good of both America and Pakistan if joint ops could be run - though I do think that the U.S. footprint in any such should be small and avoid any appearance of occupation. A Filipino- or Colombian-style advisor/trainer program would be best, with a discreet American air presence as well.

An important thing to remember, however, is the large Pashtun constituency in the Army --- I think they are upwards of 25% of the officer corps. In intra-Army politics, while they do not constitute a single faction, the feelings of Pashtun officers, who often have clan or family affiliations in FATA, cannot be ignored as is the case in Baluchistan. This is another case where a democratic civilian leader would be less amenable to Army pressure than a general like Musharraf.

[Pragmatic Thinker]

An important thing to remember, however, is the large Pashtun constituency in the Army --- I think they are upwards of 25% of the officer corps. In intra-Army politics, while they do not constitute a single faction, the feelings of Pashtun officers, who often have clan or family affiliations in FATA, cannot be ignored as is the case in Baluchistan. This is another case where a democratic civilian leader would be less amenable to Army pressure than a general like Musharraf.

I agree that sympathies within the ranks is a problem and that factionalism is something of a problem too...Pashtu, Baluch, or Punjab...especially when you consider the company level leadership (where the rubber meets the road and policy is executed) mirrors the ethnic make-up of the civilian populace. I have seen where local border commanders are sympathetic if not complicit in allowing armed personnel to cross the border into Afghanistan. It isn't so much they're anti-American but they don't "see" the battlefield the same way we do. If their cousins go up on a hill and fire off rockets because the local imam paid them x-amount of rupees to do it, they don't see that as dishonorable but merely a way to make a living and feed their families, and in the end who gets killed? Some Afghans and Americans? Oh well, as long as they didn't bring dishonor to their tribal faction then they're good to go. I fully understand the internal problems but lose patience easily. I am, however, glad to see the latest round of Pakistani actions in regards to the Red Mosque and the FATA. I only hope this lasts longer than the remainder of the summer and we see a long term commitment to the fight against these religious extremists and fighters.

PT

[wm]

The appeal to operations like the Phillippines is problematic. Local perceptions of US involvement during the Phillippine Insurrection at the beginning of the last century painted us as supporting the Catholic Filipino minority in certain Moro areas. We were, therefore, largely viewed by the Islamic Moros as "handmaidens" of the Filipino oppressors, which I suspect caused the insurrection to last much longer than it m,ight have otherwise. I fear a similar type of reaction by the Pashto tribes, where we would be perceived as supporting the Punjabis to suppress them should we engage in in a joint intervention/AQ-Taleban hunt in the tribal areas. I suspect that we are caught in a similar kind of perception trap in Iraq right now, vis-a-vis Sunnis and Shias.

In matters of the kind under discussion here, perception (no matter how distorted) is reality for most of those involved.

[Tacitus]

What sort of offensive operations are you talking about? Are we talking about the 82nd Airborne or I MEF setting up shop independently in North Waziristan and basically occupying the area?

If so, I think you'd be hard-pressed to find any Pakistani government that could survive under such circumstances.

Okay, so we decide to launch some kind of Pakistan "incursion", reminiscent of Cambodia. I haven't looked on a map lately, but these tribal areas seem to cover a pretty fair amount of real estate. Here's some questions for the Council.

Are we supposed to then occupy this area, to prevent it from becoming a sanctuary after we leave? This could start sounding like the problems we have right now in Iraq, where U.S. forces can't withdraw until the state can regain control of the area.

How many men is this going to require? Are they there? Are they available from elsewhere?

Or is this envisioned as just some kind of punitive expedition to go across the border and kill/capture some people. Do we think we have the kind of intelligence to know who is who in this part of the world?

Last, but not least, does anybody think there is support in Congress for this sort of thing? I do believe most people view the war in Afghanistan quite differently from our democracy project in Mesopotamia. But I guarantee that any administration that did this would face questions like "Okay, do you have a plan once you get there? Show me. I want details, not promises, after what we've seen in Iraq. Who's in charge? What are the political goals? At what point, would you consider this mission accomplished? How will you know when you have achieved it? etc." I think Congress is going to demand more than a "Trust me, I know what I'm doing" statement from the military and the executive on this.

[Pragmatic Thinker]

Okay, so we decide to launch some kind of Pakistan "incursion", reminiscent of Cambodia. I haven't looked on a map lately, but these tribal areas seem to cover a pretty fair amount of real estate. Here's some questions for the Council.

Are we supposed to then occupy this area, to prevent it from becoming a sanctuary after we leave? This could start sounding like the problems we have right now in Iraq, where U.S. forces can't withdraw until the state can regain control of the area.

How many men is this going to require? Are they there? Are they available from elsewhere?

Or is this envisioned as just some kind of punitive expedition to go across the border and kill/capture some people. Do we think we have the kind of intelligence to know who is who in this part of the world?

Last, but not least, does anybody think there is support in Congress for this sort of thing? I do believe most people view the war in Afghanistan quite differently from our democracy project in Mesopotamia. But I guarantee that any administration that did this would face questions like "Okay, do you have a plan once you get there? Show me. I want details, not promises, after what we've seen in Iraq. Who's in charge? What are the political goals? At what point, would you consider this mission accomplished? How will you know when you have achieved it? etc." I think Congress is going to demand more than a "Trust me, I know what I'm doing" statement from the military and the executive on this.

Tequila -

I won't begin to speculate about numbers of personnel needed but suffice it to say that we would need to be a lot more than we have in country right now. I am against any unilateral actions on our part, but instead would like to see the U.S. government attach more expectations to the economic and military aid we provide the Pakistanis. For example, if they (PAK MIL) claim it is too difficult for them to do it on their own in the FATA then why not demand they allow us to support them overtly (mobility, planning, ISR, joint patrols, etc..). We are either allies with a unified vision of the enemy situation and have an agreed upon end state or we aren't allies and we don't agree upon the enemy situation and if that is the case then we cease all money until we see tangible long term results and we do it ourselves. Let us stop giving away millions of dollars to a government that is incapable or unwilling to attack this problem or refuses to comply with the conditions in which we hand over our money.

I am not calling for occupation, but I am saying that it is absurd for our forces to continually be wounded and killed by an enemy force that sits mere kilometers inside a border that only we recognize. A piece of terroritory that the sovereign of Pakistan himself states "he cannot control" yet he snubs any assistance from the U.S. that would put our forces on the ground with his. These same terrorists/fanatics/ACM/whatever your flavor we would be going after are the same people who fund, recruit, and support the fighters that kill our soldiers in Afghanistan. They are the same people who plan large scale attacks against us and our allies at home. I think most people who really follow these attacks and their post-mortems know the fanatics who carried them out had gone into the the FATA region of Pakistan to recieve their indoctrination and guidance from Al Qaeda affiliated personnel. Since we invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, they have planned and carried out numerous attacks against us (the west) from this area. The 7/7/05 London attack, the 3/11/04 Madrid bombing, and last year's thwarted U.K. airline attack were all hatched within Pakistan's FATA region.

I am not a policy expert and I am not a security expert, but I am a low-level neanderthal military type. A couple of things my military mind are certain of -- 1) there are violent religious fanatics just inside Pakistan who continually plan and execute attacks against us inside Afghanistan; 2) these same religious fanatics just inside Pakistan are planning to attack us and our western allies at home. They have been successful in the past (read examples above) and if we don't radically change our approach they will be successful again. If you're comfortable letting Pervez Musharraf lead the fight against these people then rest easy, but if you're like me you might want to see a more aggressive approach taken to eradicate this threat. They won't stop planning and attacking, and we're not about to stop involving ourselves in matters of economy and state with Muslim "apostate" countries. Our courses have collided the west and its global economic/political interests have collided head-on with their desire to return to the Caliphate and Sharia law. I have obviously over-simplified the issues but in my mind this what I see, and from a tactical perspective we fight the fight on their terms. If they don't recognize the border, then neither do we...if we know Quetta and Miram Shah are staging areas (just as in the Soviet-Afghan War) then we deny them this terrain. If that means bombings, cross-border raids, joint U.S.-PAK ground operations along the border regions, or whatever the guys wearing stars come up with it then that is what happens, but we tactically take the fight to them and stop waiting for them to come across the border before we kill them.

My fear is that most Americans know only the Iraq fight and don't realize that the right hook that is going to knock us on our ass (9-11 style) will most likely originate in the FATA. I would hate to see another large-scale attack happen before our leaders and citizens take action and to realize we allow our enemy sanctuary to plan his attacks through our inaction.

Sorry for the lenghty replies and ramblings.... PT

[Pragmatic Thinker]

My apologies for addressing my last reply to Tequila when it should read Tacitus... PT

[davidbfpo]

The continued use of the FATA by AQ is an issue the British government (HMG) wishes to push out of the headlines, let alone pay attention to. The steady trickle of deaths, let alone injuries, in Helmand Province to British forces will keep the issue in HMG's "too difficult" policy box.

Yes, some U.K. terror plots are reported as having their roots in FATA and Pakistan generally. Just as many I would suggest have their roots closer to home, or as many allude to the web at home.

Any overt or covert Allied incursuion into the FATA, disregarding the immense practicalities, is political madness.

Pakistan is an ally, which has its own difficulties, for example the secular parties may have a more nuanced stand on AQ and terrorism that Musharraf. An incursion before the Pakistani election is hardly pragmatic.

What would HMG do if the logistic support Pakistan gives now was stopped or restricted? I refer to the reported use of Karachi docks and the overland movement of heavy supplies to Hlemand and Afghanistan.

I am sure somewhere there is an author who has analysed and written on the lessons HMG learnt from the North West Frontier (up till 1947).

It is odd sixty years later British national security is so bound up - again - by the NW Frontier and this time the BRitish military are on the other side of the Durand Line in Afghanistan.

In our struggle against AQ terrorism in this region history can teach us much, we too found it frustrating and bloody for a very long time. Brute force is not the answer on this "playing field".

davidbfpo
(sitting in an armchair in the UK)

[Pragmatic Thinker]

The continued use of the FATA by AQ is an issue the British government (HMG) wishes to push out of the headlines, let alone pay attention to. The steady trickle of deaths, let alone injuries, in Helmand Province to British forces will keep the issue in HMG's "too difficult" policy box.

Yes, some U.K. terror plots are reported as having their roots in FATA and Pakistan generally. Just as many I would suggest have their roots closer to home, or as many allude to the web at home.

Any overt or covert Allied incursuion into the FATA, disregarding the immense practicalities, is political madness.

Pakistan is an ally, which has its own difficulties, for example the secular parties may have a more nuanced stand on AQ and terrorism that Musharraf. An incursion before the Pakistani election is hardly pragmatic.

What would HMG do if the logistic support Pakistan gives now was stopped or restricted? I refer to the reported use of Karachi docks and the overland movement of heavy supplies to Hlemand and Afghanistan.

I am sure somewhere there is an author who has analysed and written on the lessons HMG learnt from the North West Frontier (up till 1947).

It is odd sixty years later British national security is so bound up - again - by the NW Frontier and this time the BRitish military are on the other side of the Durand Line in Afghanistan.

In our struggle against AQ terrorism in this region history can teach us much, we too found it frustrating and bloody for a very long time. Brute force is not the answer on this "playing field".

davidbfpo
(sitting in an armchair in the UK)

I concur with brute force not being the ONLY solution, however, we can't let ourselves be hamstrung. I understand Karachi's importance as a POE for supplies for the troops going over land into Afghanistan, which in my opinion remains a serious wekaness in our military strategy. I can't speak for the RAF but I know the USAF is over burdened as it is trying to keep supplies flowing into Iraq and Afghanistan, so relying soley on aerial resupply is out... My point remains a tactical dilemma which is why allow your enemy sanctuary? I keep getting political problems as reasons why we can't have a tactical solution to this and I am not quite buying it. I don't see Pakistan imploding if we decided to conduct precision bombing of key Taliban and Al Qaeda targets in the FATA, and I am not talking about the onsies and twosies we do now but an all out bombing campaign followed by ground incursions. If nothing else it would show our resolve to take the fight to them. I know the Pashtu understand and respect violence, and again I am not advocating a wholesale bombing campaign but a precise campaign of continuous strikes and raids. We haven't tried it yet, so I am not convinced we can sit here and predict the outcome accurately.

PT