The US & others working with Pakistan

[Pragmatic Thinker]

What sort of offensive operations are you talking about? Are we talking about the 82nd Airborne or I MEF setting up shop independently in North Waziristan and basically occupying the area?

If so, I think you'd be hard-pressed to find any Pakistani government that could survive under such circumstances.

I am talking about any kind of continuous operation that denies the enemy freedom of movement to enter Afghanistan to kill coalition forces along their (bad guys) preferred LOCs. I have heard the argument that Musharraf would be pressured internally, but why not allow limited joint U.S.-Pakistani forces to conduct operations inside Pakistan? Much like we do in the Philippines? Is he not truly concerned about ridding Al Qaeda and Taliban influences from within his country? Is he truly committed to the fight to defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban which is the major destabilizing force inside Afghanistan? If he is then why refuse U.S. forces who are admittedly better capable some sort of limited ability to strike targets within his borders or complain when they do?

Anyway, this is turning into a discussion about South Asian politics and not about the Intelligence Estimate released earlier this month and the testimony from Gen. Clapper, so I will disengage from it. We can agree to disagree and my tactical perspective will remain the same -- a sanctuary is only a sanctuary if you allow it to remain as one. I get that Pakistani soldiers are dying in these operations inside Waziristan, but remember this a conscript Army and not to say their loss of soldiers is not as great at the personal level, but I do NOT want to use the metric of dead bodies as a measurment of resolve and/or dedication to a fight...it is illogical and one I see bantied around Washington by the pro-Musharraf crowd. If you're interested, read how many soldiers they (PAK MIL) lose annually fighting Baluch insurgents in the south and their occassional forays in Kashmir against the Indians.

PT

[tequila]

PT - Don't misunderstand me, I am hardly a Musharraf apologist. I think the best result for all would actually be if he resigned and left the country and open elections were held - unfortunately he appears to believe that he is Ataturk come again, sans French-style laicite, judging from my quick skim of his autobiography.

I do think, however, that a unilateral American intervention in the FATA would be seen by almost all the varied Pakistani publics as an American invasion.

I agree that it would certainly be to the good of both America and Pakistan if joint ops could be run - though I do think that the U.S. footprint in any such should be small and avoid any appearance of occupation. A Filipino- or Colombian-style advisor/trainer program would be best, with a discreet American air presence as well.

An important thing to remember, however, is the large Pashtun constituency in the Army --- I think they are upwards of 25% of the officer corps. In intra-Army politics, while they do not constitute a single faction, the feelings of Pashtun officers, who often have clan or family affiliations in FATA, cannot be ignored as is the case in Baluchistan. This is another case where a democratic civilian leader would be less amenable to Army pressure than a general like Musharraf.

[Pragmatic Thinker]

An important thing to remember, however, is the large Pashtun constituency in the Army --- I think they are upwards of 25% of the officer corps. In intra-Army politics, while they do not constitute a single faction, the feelings of Pashtun officers, who often have clan or family affiliations in FATA, cannot be ignored as is the case in Baluchistan. This is another case where a democratic civilian leader would be less amenable to Army pressure than a general like Musharraf.

I agree that sympathies within the ranks is a problem and that factionalism is something of a problem too...Pashtu, Baluch, or Punjab...especially when you consider the company level leadership (where the rubber meets the road and policy is executed) mirrors the ethnic make-up of the civilian populace. I have seen where local border commanders are sympathetic if not complicit in allowing armed personnel to cross the border into Afghanistan. It isn't so much they're anti-American but they don't "see" the battlefield the same way we do. If their cousins go up on a hill and fire off rockets because the local imam paid them x-amount of rupees to do it, they don't see that as dishonorable but merely a way to make a living and feed their families, and in the end who gets killed? Some Afghans and Americans? Oh well, as long as they didn't bring dishonor to their tribal faction then they're good to go. I fully understand the internal problems but lose patience easily. I am, however, glad to see the latest round of Pakistani actions in regards to the Red Mosque and the FATA. I only hope this lasts longer than the remainder of the summer and we see a long term commitment to the fight against these religious extremists and fighters.

PT

[wm]

The appeal to operations like the Phillippines is problematic. Local perceptions of US involvement during the Phillippine Insurrection at the beginning of the last century painted us as supporting the Catholic Filipino minority in certain Moro areas. We were, therefore, largely viewed by the Islamic Moros as "handmaidens" of the Filipino oppressors, which I suspect caused the insurrection to last much longer than it m,ight have otherwise. I fear a similar type of reaction by the Pashto tribes, where we would be perceived as supporting the Punjabis to suppress them should we engage in in a joint intervention/AQ-Taleban hunt in the tribal areas. I suspect that we are caught in a similar kind of perception trap in Iraq right now, vis-a-vis Sunnis and Shias.

In matters of the kind under discussion here, perception (no matter how distorted) is reality for most of those involved.