The US & others working with Pakistan

[SWJED]

20 May NY Times - U.S. Pays Pakistan to Fight Terror, but Patrols Ebb by David Sanger and David Rhode.

The United States is continuing to make large payments of roughly $1 billion a year to Pakistan for what it calls reimbursements to the country’s military for conducting counterterrorism efforts along the border with Afghanistan, even though Pakistan’s president decided eight months ago to slash patrols through the area where Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters are most active.

The monthly payments, called coalition support funds, are not widely advertised. Buried in public budget numbers, the payments are intended to reimburse Pakistan’s military for the cost of the operations. So far, Pakistan has received more than $5.6 billion under the program over five years, more than half of the total aid the United States has sent to the country since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, not counting covert funds.

Some American military officials in the region have recommended that the money be tied to Pakistan’s performance in pursuing Al Qaeda and keeping the Taliban from gaining a haven from which to attack the government of Afghanistan. American officials have been surprised by the speed at which both organizations have gained strength in the past year...

[Pragmatic Thinker]

My frustration and subsequent sarcasm in my writing has to do with what I believe is a real lack of knowledge regarding the playing field we find ourselves fighting the Global War on Terrorism. Especially, when we start to talk about the Afghanistan-Pakistan side of the world. I am often amazed that people act like this is our first jaunt into that region militarily, plus I can't seem to wrap my arms around our support for Musharraf. I am not convinced that Pakistan does everything it can for us in our fight against Al Qaeda, however, we continue to dump aid ($$) into his military and economy without any kind of expectation of a return on our investment.

I will point out two items from Clapper's testimony that I am finding misleading in their logic.

1) "The NIE highlights one such way in which the enemy has adapted: in response to its loss of Afghanistan: it has reconstituted some of its command and support network in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border."

Is this really an enemy adaptation? They have always traveled in and out of Waziristan. The Durand Line isn't recognized by the Pashtun nor their foreign guests who continually travel in and out of Afghanistan attacking US and coalition forces, so how does this equate to adaptation by the enemy when this capability has always been there? They exploit our unwillingness to pursue them into Pakistan is a more accurate statement then giving them (Al Qaeda) credit for discovering some sort of technique or tactic. Maybe word smithing but I find the language a little too one sided.

2) "At the same time, there are signs of a reaction against the extremists. On April 17, 2007, a convention attended by over 2,000 Pakistani religious figures in Peshawar, the capital of Pakistan's ethnically Pashtun North-West Frontier Province (which includes the FATA), proclaimed that suicide bombings were against Islam and condemned the forcible implementation and enforcement of Shari’a (Islamic Law). Also, internal disputes in Pakistan's tribal agency of South Waziristan recently erupted into conflict between Taliban-allied local tribes and al Qaeda-allied Central Asian groups, mostly Uzbeks. Uzbek forces offended local Pashtun groups by their criminal activity and insensitivity to local tribal customs, resulting in open warfare between locals and Central Asian fighters."

I think he takes a huge leap here implying that a limited reaction by some locals against a particular group equates to a consensus among the people of North Waziristan that there is an exploitable fissure between the Pashtu and the Taliban/AQ and their foreign guests. He couldn't be any further from the truth and this sounds a little like "cherry picking" reporting to paint the picture you want and not the picture that is actually there. There has been some limited (and I want to underscore limited) success by the Pakistani security forces in punishing tribes that allow foreigners among their midsts, but this hasn't taken hold long term and in the end most tribals see the Peshawar based Punjab military and political leaders as U.S. puppets. I would recommend the writers of this testimony spend some time along the border region talking to locals and getting the "ground truth" and not relying on single source reporting from questionable sources to support your arguments.

Again, not taking anything away from the man personally but I didn't read anything in his testimony about the enemy that was too promising. We can beat these guys and we can win this fight, but real issues need to be addressed and the first one is defining who really is our enemy? If Usama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are the leaders of the enemy organization we wish to defeat then why do we allow them sanctuary in Pakistan? Why do we ally ourselves with Musharraf after he publically states, 1) he believes Al Qaeda's top leaders are in his country but he claims he is supposedly powerless to do anything about it, and 2) he would rather see anyone else BUT the United States be the ones that capture/kill Usama Bin Laden within Pakistan should he be found.... Also, we say the enemy has "adapted" to using Waziristan as a sanctuary, but it only remains a sanctuary if we don't go after them...

I am no genius (militarily or otherwise) but there lacks basic logic in our policies and actions that I find too easily dismissed by the people who are supposedly "great leaders" and "no nonsense types"....

PT

[wm]

[R]eal issues need to be addressed and the first one is defining who really is our enemy? If Usama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are the leaders of the enemy organization we wish to defeat then why do we allow them sanctuary in Pakistan?

For the US to cross into Pakistan unilaterally would be perceived (rightly, I think) as an overt act of aggression and would lose us even more of the little international public support we have for our anti-AQ efforts. It would also undercut the internal support Musharraf has in his own country. Do we really want a nuclear-armed Pakistan to lose his rule? His replacement may be far worse.

Why do we ally ourselves with Musharraf after he publically states, 1) he believes Al Qaeda's top leaders are in his country but he claims he is supposedly powerless to do anything about it, and 2) he would rather see anyone else BUT the United States be the ones that capture/kill Usama Bin Laden within Pakistan should he be found....

Musharraf (or his handlers) is pretty astute IMHO. Regarding your question 1), see my point above--he at least provides some stability in the government of a predominantly Islamic nation state member of the "nuclear club."
Regarding 2), I submit that having any nation other than the "Great Satan US" capture/kill UBL would lessen UBL's future "Martyr" status. Were the forces of a Moslem nation to effect the kill/capture, I believe that could be used to send a strong message to show that the efforts of the terrorists are wrong in the eyes of Allah and the Prophet.

I am no genius (militarily or otherwise) but there lacks basic logic in our policies and actions that I find too easily dismissed by the people who are supposedly "great leaders" and "no nonsense types"....

Logic has very little real play in the world of international diplomatic affairs. If you want to discuss whether we need more consistency in our policies and actions, that might very well be a topic worth exploring more fully.

[Pragmatic Thinker]

For the US to cross into Pakistan unilaterally would be perceived (rightly, I think) as an overt act of aggression and would lose us even more of the little international public support we have for our anti-AQ efforts. It would also undercut the internal support Musharraf has in his own country. Do we really want a nuclear-armed Pakistan to lose his rule? His replacement may be far worse.

Musharraf (or his handlers) is pretty astute IMHO. Regarding your question 1), see my point above--he at least provides some stability in the government of a predominantly Islamic nation state member of the "nuclear club."
Regarding 2), I submit that having any nation other than the "Great Satan US" capture/kill UBL would lessen UBL's future "Martyr" status. Were the forces of a Moslem nation to effect the kill/capture, I believe that could be used to send a strong message to show that the efforts of the terrorists are wrong in the eyes of Allah and the Prophet.



Logic has very little real play in the world of international diplomatic affairs. If you want to discuss whether we need more consistency in our policies and actions, that might very well be a topic worth exploring more fully.

I have heard the nuclear argument before that we must proceed cautiously for should Musharraf fall the nukes will fall into the hands of madmen. I think there is some merit to this, however, we went through this same supposed scare when Musharraf stole the reigns in '99 and now look at him, he is the toast of Washington when he comes into town. So much so that during his last visit he was plugging his autobiography on the Daily Show. So I am not convinced that some Islamic loon would get his hands on the keys and launch codes. In my dealings with Pakistan there is one thing that remains consistent there and that is a strong military who doesn't seem opposed to stepping on the toes (or pushing them aside for that matter) of their civilian leaders when they feel the country is in "trouble", so again I am not discounting the argument but I am not taking that fear-ladened approach either.

As for Musharraf's support at home, I would again say that he has it among his Punjabs in places like Peshawar and Islamabad, but you wander out to Waziristan and it is a whole other world out there. We're talking about a Pashtu populace that has attacked its own military and police, so this is nothing less than a "restive" place in my opinion and no greater place for our enemies to find sanctuary.

My argument isn't against Musharraf the man, but our policies in that region... I have studied the history of our foreign policy in South Asia and it sucks with inconsistencies. There isn't a Pakistani who doesn't believe that as soon as UBL, other AQ senior leaders, and to some extent the Taliban are no longer deemed a threat to the U.S. that we will once again "abandon" Pakistan and continue our economic dealings with their arch-enemies the Hinuds of India. I get that piece and fully understand the underlying political constraints, BUT from a strictly tactical sense if you want to take away your enemy's ability to reconstitute, re-arm, and re-fit from within his sanctuary then you need to take his sanctuary from him. The fact that many of these Taliban and foreign fighters are living mere kilometers across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border yet they seem almost invicible is absurd. I would take one thing from the Soviet playbook of the Soviet-Afghan War and that is not to leave places like Quetta and Miram Shah in the of the bad guys without a price. How many American, British, Canadian, and other coalition soldiers will have to die before someone realizes that this sanctuary only exists because we allow it to? I will not buy into the premise that Musharraf's government will collapse if we were to lead offensive operations into the FATA. I am not convinced whatsoever. We have asked, cajoled, threatened, and requested that the Pakistanis do it themselves and they are incapable of long term sustainment in that region. I don't want to argue why they can't do it themselves but rather lets address the real problem -- our enemy finds sanctuary inside the borders of a supposed ally on the Global War on Terrorism.

[tequila]

I will not buy into the premise that Musharraf's government will collapse if we were to lead offensive operations into the FATA. I am not convinced whatsoever. We have asked, cajoled, threatened, and requested that the Pakistanis do it themselves and they are incapable of long term sustainment in that region. I don't want to argue why they can't do it themselves but rather lets address the real problem -- our enemy finds sanctuary inside the borders of a supposed ally on the Global War on Terrorism.

What sort of offensive operations are you talking about? Are we talking about the 82nd Airborne or I MEF setting up shop independently in North Waziristan and basically occupying the area?

If so, I think you'd be hard-pressed to find any Pakistani government that could survive under such circumstances.

[Pragmatic Thinker]

What sort of offensive operations are you talking about? Are we talking about the 82nd Airborne or I MEF setting up shop independently in North Waziristan and basically occupying the area?

If so, I think you'd be hard-pressed to find any Pakistani government that could survive under such circumstances.

I am talking about any kind of continuous operation that denies the enemy freedom of movement to enter Afghanistan to kill coalition forces along their (bad guys) preferred LOCs. I have heard the argument that Musharraf would be pressured internally, but why not allow limited joint U.S.-Pakistani forces to conduct operations inside Pakistan? Much like we do in the Philippines? Is he not truly concerned about ridding Al Qaeda and Taliban influences from within his country? Is he truly committed to the fight to defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban which is the major destabilizing force inside Afghanistan? If he is then why refuse U.S. forces who are admittedly better capable some sort of limited ability to strike targets within his borders or complain when they do?

Anyway, this is turning into a discussion about South Asian politics and not about the Intelligence Estimate released earlier this month and the testimony from Gen. Clapper, so I will disengage from it. We can agree to disagree and my tactical perspective will remain the same -- a sanctuary is only a sanctuary if you allow it to remain as one. I get that Pakistani soldiers are dying in these operations inside Waziristan, but remember this a conscript Army and not to say their loss of soldiers is not as great at the personal level, but I do NOT want to use the metric of dead bodies as a measurment of resolve and/or dedication to a fight...it is illogical and one I see bantied around Washington by the pro-Musharraf crowd. If you're interested, read how many soldiers they (PAK MIL) lose annually fighting Baluch insurgents in the south and their occassional forays in Kashmir against the Indians.

PT

[tequila]

PT - Don't misunderstand me, I am hardly a Musharraf apologist. I think the best result for all would actually be if he resigned and left the country and open elections were held - unfortunately he appears to believe that he is Ataturk come again, sans French-style laicite, judging from my quick skim of his autobiography.

I do think, however, that a unilateral American intervention in the FATA would be seen by almost all the varied Pakistani publics as an American invasion.

I agree that it would certainly be to the good of both America and Pakistan if joint ops could be run - though I do think that the U.S. footprint in any such should be small and avoid any appearance of occupation. A Filipino- or Colombian-style advisor/trainer program would be best, with a discreet American air presence as well.

An important thing to remember, however, is the large Pashtun constituency in the Army --- I think they are upwards of 25% of the officer corps. In intra-Army politics, while they do not constitute a single faction, the feelings of Pashtun officers, who often have clan or family affiliations in FATA, cannot be ignored as is the case in Baluchistan. This is another case where a democratic civilian leader would be less amenable to Army pressure than a general like Musharraf.

[Tacitus]

What sort of offensive operations are you talking about? Are we talking about the 82nd Airborne or I MEF setting up shop independently in North Waziristan and basically occupying the area?

If so, I think you'd be hard-pressed to find any Pakistani government that could survive under such circumstances.

Okay, so we decide to launch some kind of Pakistan "incursion", reminiscent of Cambodia. I haven't looked on a map lately, but these tribal areas seem to cover a pretty fair amount of real estate. Here's some questions for the Council.

Are we supposed to then occupy this area, to prevent it from becoming a sanctuary after we leave? This could start sounding like the problems we have right now in Iraq, where U.S. forces can't withdraw until the state can regain control of the area.

How many men is this going to require? Are they there? Are they available from elsewhere?

Or is this envisioned as just some kind of punitive expedition to go across the border and kill/capture some people. Do we think we have the kind of intelligence to know who is who in this part of the world?

Last, but not least, does anybody think there is support in Congress for this sort of thing? I do believe most people view the war in Afghanistan quite differently from our democracy project in Mesopotamia. But I guarantee that any administration that did this would face questions like "Okay, do you have a plan once you get there? Show me. I want details, not promises, after what we've seen in Iraq. Who's in charge? What are the political goals? At what point, would you consider this mission accomplished? How will you know when you have achieved it? etc." I think Congress is going to demand more than a "Trust me, I know what I'm doing" statement from the military and the executive on this.

[Pragmatic Thinker]

Okay, so we decide to launch some kind of Pakistan "incursion", reminiscent of Cambodia. I haven't looked on a map lately, but these tribal areas seem to cover a pretty fair amount of real estate. Here's some questions for the Council.

Are we supposed to then occupy this area, to prevent it from becoming a sanctuary after we leave? This could start sounding like the problems we have right now in Iraq, where U.S. forces can't withdraw until the state can regain control of the area.

How many men is this going to require? Are they there? Are they available from elsewhere?

Or is this envisioned as just some kind of punitive expedition to go across the border and kill/capture some people. Do we think we have the kind of intelligence to know who is who in this part of the world?

Last, but not least, does anybody think there is support in Congress for this sort of thing? I do believe most people view the war in Afghanistan quite differently from our democracy project in Mesopotamia. But I guarantee that any administration that did this would face questions like "Okay, do you have a plan once you get there? Show me. I want details, not promises, after what we've seen in Iraq. Who's in charge? What are the political goals? At what point, would you consider this mission accomplished? How will you know when you have achieved it? etc." I think Congress is going to demand more than a "Trust me, I know what I'm doing" statement from the military and the executive on this.

Tequila -

I won't begin to speculate about numbers of personnel needed but suffice it to say that we would need to be a lot more than we have in country right now. I am against any unilateral actions on our part, but instead would like to see the U.S. government attach more expectations to the economic and military aid we provide the Pakistanis. For example, if they (PAK MIL) claim it is too difficult for them to do it on their own in the FATA then why not demand they allow us to support them overtly (mobility, planning, ISR, joint patrols, etc..). We are either allies with a unified vision of the enemy situation and have an agreed upon end state or we aren't allies and we don't agree upon the enemy situation and if that is the case then we cease all money until we see tangible long term results and we do it ourselves. Let us stop giving away millions of dollars to a government that is incapable or unwilling to attack this problem or refuses to comply with the conditions in which we hand over our money.

I am not calling for occupation, but I am saying that it is absurd for our forces to continually be wounded and killed by an enemy force that sits mere kilometers inside a border that only we recognize. A piece of terroritory that the sovereign of Pakistan himself states "he cannot control" yet he snubs any assistance from the U.S. that would put our forces on the ground with his. These same terrorists/fanatics/ACM/whatever your flavor we would be going after are the same people who fund, recruit, and support the fighters that kill our soldiers in Afghanistan. They are the same people who plan large scale attacks against us and our allies at home. I think most people who really follow these attacks and their post-mortems know the fanatics who carried them out had gone into the the FATA region of Pakistan to recieve their indoctrination and guidance from Al Qaeda affiliated personnel. Since we invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, they have planned and carried out numerous attacks against us (the west) from this area. The 7/7/05 London attack, the 3/11/04 Madrid bombing, and last year's thwarted U.K. airline attack were all hatched within Pakistan's FATA region.

I am not a policy expert and I am not a security expert, but I am a low-level neanderthal military type. A couple of things my military mind are certain of -- 1) there are violent religious fanatics just inside Pakistan who continually plan and execute attacks against us inside Afghanistan; 2) these same religious fanatics just inside Pakistan are planning to attack us and our western allies at home. They have been successful in the past (read examples above) and if we don't radically change our approach they will be successful again. If you're comfortable letting Pervez Musharraf lead the fight against these people then rest easy, but if you're like me you might want to see a more aggressive approach taken to eradicate this threat. They won't stop planning and attacking, and we're not about to stop involving ourselves in matters of economy and state with Muslim "apostate" countries. Our courses have collided the west and its global economic/political interests have collided head-on with their desire to return to the Caliphate and Sharia law. I have obviously over-simplified the issues but in my mind this what I see, and from a tactical perspective we fight the fight on their terms. If they don't recognize the border, then neither do we...if we know Quetta and Miram Shah are staging areas (just as in the Soviet-Afghan War) then we deny them this terrain. If that means bombings, cross-border raids, joint U.S.-PAK ground operations along the border regions, or whatever the guys wearing stars come up with it then that is what happens, but we tactically take the fight to them and stop waiting for them to come across the border before we kill them.

My fear is that most Americans know only the Iraq fight and don't realize that the right hook that is going to knock us on our ass (9-11 style) will most likely originate in the FATA. I would hate to see another large-scale attack happen before our leaders and citizens take action and to realize we allow our enemy sanctuary to plan his attacks through our inaction.

Sorry for the lenghty replies and ramblings.... PT

[tequila]

CSIS - A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan (pdf)
Over $10 billion in aid to Pakistan since 9/11, and what to show for it?

Recommendations include shifting aid from a purely short-term military counterterror strategy focused on the western border to more state-building and internal stability for Pakistan itself. Sounds good on paper, and I can see the temptation, but how to avoid watching funds disappear into what is essentially a massive development project?

[Jedburgh]

10 Oct 07 HASC testimony testimony on security challenges involving Pakistan and policy implications for the Department of Defense:

Teresita C. Schaffer, Director South Asia Program, CSIS

Marvin G. Weinbaum, Middle East Institute

Husain Haqqani, Director, Center for International Relations, Boston University

Lisa Curtis, The Heritage Foundation

[davidbfpo]

Thanks, read all four. The forthcoming Pakistani provincial and national assembly elections, probably in January 2008, will clear some of the "smoke" as to who is the elected government. I remain unconvinced Ms Bhutto will succeed.

Lots of wishful thinking on external support for civilian power, without considering how American support could harm those in power. Yes, the Pakistani Army has taken US military aid, can this be re-directed to enhancing COIN capability now?

Worth reading from this armchair.

davidbfpo

[Jedburgh]

CEIP, 28 Nov 07: Pakistan: Conflicted Ally in the War on Terror

Arguably the greatest reverse suffered by the United States in its war on terror has been the rejuvenation of al-Qaeda and the Taliban—a revival the intelligence community believes is owed to their ability to secure a sanctuary in Pakistan. Accordingly, many Americans blame the regime of Pervez Musharraf for not delivering on its commitment to root out terrorist operatives from its territory despite receiving massive U.S. aid for that purpose.

The reality, however, is more complex. Although Pakistani counterterrorism effectiveness has fallen short of what Americans expect, Islamabad’s failures in this regard are not simply due to a lack of motivation. Instead, the convulsive political deterioration in the North West Frontier Province in Pakistan, Islamabad’s military ineptitude in counterterrorism operations, and the political failures of the Karzai government in Afghanistan have all exacerbated the problem. The war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban will thus be a long one requiring considerable patience on the part of the United States.....