The US & others working with Pakistan

[davidbfpo]

Blueblood,

Thanks for the alert, as the BBC reports it raises the logistic issue again:

Within hours of the alleged attack it was reported Pakistan had closed the border crossing for supplies bound for Nato forces in Afghanistan - a move which has been used in the past as a protest.

The supply routes to Afghanistan thread is here:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=6386

[blueblood]

You're welcome David, but what happened to the Northern Distribution Network? It was supposed to carry out 80% of traffic from mid 2011.

Any conformation by NATO on this assault?

[davidbfpo]

Blueblood,

You asked:

what happened to the Northern Distribution Network?

There are some comments on the NDN on the other thread; the use of Pakistani facilities remains essential.

As for the border post attack no updates spotted yet. ISAF has issued a holding statement:http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isa...an-border.html

[davidbfpo]

Slowly comments are being made, although the ISAF investigation has yet to report (yes, I know it takes time) and this is the logistic issue:

About 49 per cent of Nato supplies reach Afghanistan through Pakistan.

Pakistani reaction includes:

asked the US to vacate the Shamsi air base, where the CIA is believed to base predator drones, within 15 days.

The Government will revisit and undertake a complete review of all programmes, activities and cooperative arrangements with US/Nato/Isaf, including diplomatic, political, military and intelligence

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-soldiers.html

[davidbfpo]

In the past I have remarked that Pakistani policy has been a series of 'stop, start' moves and this incident has added a 'review'. One begins to wonder what is going on when you read this (my emphasis):

The committee also said the United States would be asked to vacate, within 15 days, the Shamsi air base, which the US has used to launch drones.

However, our correspondent notes that Pakistan has made a similar demand before and the base may already be empty.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-15905777

Note a few days ago the British Home Secretary was in Pakistan saying:

..the UK and Pakistan share a "powerful interest" in fighting extremism and terrorism....the ties between the countries "feel stronger than ever" after meeting Pakistan's Interior Minister Rehman Malik during a visit to the country.

"Pakistan is on the front line and you have made tremendous sacrifices," Mrs May said.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-15868852

I would contend that this episode is a good illustration that Pakistani politics, notably popular antipathy to the US, quickly overwhelms such polite, diplomatic sound bites and international co-operation is oh so fragile. This last UK ministerial visit is I readily admit peripheral to Pakistani national security policy; I doubt if ISI and the Army met her.

We are still waiting for the ISAF investigation to report before a judgement can be made.

[Dayuhan]

... calls for a much less cooperative policy toward Pakistan. Nothing really revolutionary, but interesting because it appears in what is effectively the publication of record for the US foreign policy establishment. It will be interesting to see what response, if any, emerges.

The article is worth a read; it requires registration but not payment.

http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articl...gh-to-pakistan

Key excerpts:

The only way the United States can actually get what it wants out of Pakistan is to make credible threats to retaliate if Pakistan does not comply with U.S. demands and offer rewards only in return for cooperative actions taken. U.S. officials should tell their Pakistani counterparts in no uncertain terms that they must start playing ball or face malign neglect at best and, if necessary, active isolation. Malign neglect would mean ending all U.S. assistance, military and civilian; severing intelligence cooperation; continuing and possibly escalating U.S. drone strikes; initiating cross-border special operations raids; and strengthening U.S. ties with India. Active isolation would include, in addition, declaring Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism, imposing sanctions, and pressuring China and Saudi Arabia to cut off their support, as well.

Second, the United States must show that it can neutralize one of Pakistan's trump cards: its role in the war in Afghanistan. Washington must therefore develop a strategy for Afghanistan that works without Pakistan's help. That means a plan that does not require transporting personnel or materiel through Pakistan. Nearly 60 percent of the NATO supplies sent into Afghanistan are already routed through the north, through Russia and Central Asia. The U.S. military is hoping to increase that number to 75 percent. Without Pakistan, therefore, the coalition could still support a substantial force in Afghanistan, but not one as big as the current one of 131,000 troops. The basic objective of that force would necessarily be counterterrorism, not counterinsurgency. Counterterrorism is less personnel- and resource-intensive because it aims only to prevent the country from becoming a haven for Islamist extremists, not to transform it into a well-functioning democracy. Given the Obama administration's current plans to withdraw 24,000 U.S. troops by the summer of 2012, with many more to follow, such a strategy is already inescapable.

I have some doubts on some of this... for one thing, I'm not sure that "pressuring China and Saudi Arabia to cut off their support" would accomplish much, as these countries are not notoriously amenable to US direction. I also suspect that relying completely on transit of supplies through Russia and Central Asia may pose complications down the line: there will be a quid pro quo somewhere. Still, worthy of a look if only for what it might indicate in terms of shifting mainstream opinion.

[omarali50]

Newly appointed defence secretary Naeem Lodhi wrote two articles that may shed light on what the deep state is thinking: http://pakpotpourri2.wordpress.com/?...m+khalid+lodhi

I know many people will find these articles unexceptional, but keep in mind the rather deep connections between all the various categories of taliban and militants and you can see where the problem may lie...

btw, to speak of LET as a product of "poor governance" is rather interesting. I had not seen that coming.