The US & others working with Pakistan

[Jedburgh]

Moderator's Note: an old thread 'US and Pakistan Military Cooperation?' has been merged into this thread.

The Washington Quarterly, Spring 07:

When $10 Billion is Not Enough: Rethinking US Strategy Toward Pakistan

...For all the talk of the United States’ global dominance and despite considerable U.S. support to the Pakistani military, Washington finds itself with relatively little leverage to influence events in Pakistan. During the past five years, the United States has given Pakistan more than $10 billion in assistance, channeled primarily through the Pakistani military. What Pakistan gives in return may be only enough to keep the money coming.

After the September 11 attacks, many U.S. policymakers believed that Pakistan was one place where they were justified in saying, “You are either with us or against us.” Nevertheless, despite the billions of dollars spent, the United States has not made the necessary commitment to solidify the relationship for the long term. This is not merely a function of the scale of assistance, but of its type. U.S. engagement with Pakistan is highly militarized and centralized, with very little reaching the vast majority of Pakistanis. More problematic still, U.S. assistance does not so much reflect a coherent strategy as it does a legacy of the initial, transactional quid pro quo established in the immediate aftermath of the September 11 attacks and a familiar menu of what the United States was already organized to provide. U.S. soft power in Pakistan, the ability to influence by attraction and persuasion, is far lower than it could be, considering the historic, economic, and personal bonds that unite the two countries....

[goesh]

Soft power often entails the transfer of money with good itentions and plans on the part of the donor and recipient but with no quality control over the element of corruption and misappropriation that invariably creeps in. If you want an extension of good will and constructive effort on the part of the US and the Pakistani goverment extended to and into the frontier region, send in an all Muslim Peace Corps with a sole focus on agricultural, educational and health care development. Said components are totally compatible with fundamentalist Islam, which prevails in the frontier region.
I think the cultural barriers are so high in 3rd world countries that the usual soft approaches can't readily be employed. I'm a veteran of both the Marine Corps and the Peace Corps and I recall a time in our training village in Africa when some of the Jola people came to the Peace Corps school where we were doing cross cultural and language training. The Jolas were preparing to go out in the bush for a puberty ceremony. Their shamans were with them carrying traditonal weapons and everyone was fully decked out with their cultural accouterments. We were all outside under a shade of a tree getting a lecture at the time when they approached, singing, drumming, dancing, etc. Everyone except me and one interpretor went running inside the school house like so many frightened school kids. So much for reaching out and cultural interaction and sharing and all that good stuff. The Jolas came to share and show off and were insulted instead. This occured in about the 4th-5th week of some pretty intensive training given to some pretty intelligent, dedicated people. This was predominately a Muslim area and even though the people were good people, very peaceful and quite pro-West, the successful integration into the bush villages was dismal at best. The soft approach is simply going to have to involve American Muslims. I remember a number of the old men who would very politely and respectfully ask some of the male volunteers to accompany them to their masjid, but none would ever go. Commonality cannot always be acquired, sometimes it has to be a given.
I think traditonal soft approaches can be adjusted ,reinvented and reinterpreted and need to be. There was a reforestation project in which all kinds of sapplings were obtained and this one village got fired up and hundreds and hundreds of trees were planted. Kids and women and volunteers were hauling water to beat the band, waiting for the arrival of the chickenwire to fence the sapplings to keep the goats out. It never arrived - it ended up being sold out of a store in Banjul. Had the wire been simply shipped to Peace Corps headquarters instead of the government, it would have gotten to the village and saved the trees. By the end of the 3rd day, goats had eaten all the bark off all the sapplings. This was a traditional soft approach failure that not only killed trees but pretty much killed the faith of the people of that village in their government and the Peace Corps.

[Ray]

It is in the interest of the US to maintain and foster a lasting partnership with Pakistan. However, there are conflicting requirements that makes the task difficult.

Pakistan in the US sphere of influence would allow the US the following benefits:

1. It would keep the Islamic fundamentalist under surveillance and check, even if unable to root it out. The point to note is that Pakistan is the womb of international Islamic terrorism since all actions of the Islamists somehow have its root from Pakistan.

2. It would allow surveillance and intelligence on the AQ activities since ObL and the leading AQ think tank members are holed up in Pakistan or along the borders with Afghanistan.

3. It would reduce the influence that China has on Pakistan.

4. It would allow surveillance to Pakistan's north and into the Uighur insurrection in China's Xinjiang area, as also allow the US to 'influence' the Uighur rebellion to China's discomfort. It will be recalled that the US is already undertaking promotion of better relations with Kyrghyzstan to the West of the Xinjiang area and has a air base there.

5. With Pakistan in the US sphere of influence, the fructifying of the oil and gas pipeline the Central Asian Republics through Afghanistan to Gwadar port in Pakistan's Baluchistan province would become all the more easier, once the situation in Afghanistan stabilises.

There is, however, the issue of India and the historical animosity including four wars! India, apparently is of major interest to the US because of her vast markets as also as a counter balance to China.

It would require delicate balancing so that both India and Pakistan are kept on the US bandwagon.

It is true that the US has not been able to influence Pakistan adequately to prevent the Taliban from using NWFP and Waziristan as its safe havens for action against the US and NATO forces operating in Afghanistan. Nor has the western nations adequate forces to "guard" Afghanistan's frontiers to minimise infiltration nor troops to "sanitise" the areas within a la India in Kashmir.

In fact, it is not possible for any Pakistani leader to toe the US line, owing to the "awakening" Islam and pan Islamic jihad movement has experienced of late thanks to ObL.

So long as Islam fundamentalism continues along with the accompanying mayhem, no strategy change will wean away Pakistan from the madness unleashed by ObL.

At best, a compromise has to be accepted.

[SWJED]

20 May NY Times - U.S. Pays Pakistan to Fight Terror, but Patrols Ebb by David Sanger and David Rhode.

The United States is continuing to make large payments of roughly $1 billion a year to Pakistan for what it calls reimbursements to the country’s military for conducting counterterrorism efforts along the border with Afghanistan, even though Pakistan’s president decided eight months ago to slash patrols through the area where Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters are most active.

The monthly payments, called coalition support funds, are not widely advertised. Buried in public budget numbers, the payments are intended to reimburse Pakistan’s military for the cost of the operations. So far, Pakistan has received more than $5.6 billion under the program over five years, more than half of the total aid the United States has sent to the country since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks, not counting covert funds.

Some American military officials in the region have recommended that the money be tied to Pakistan’s performance in pursuing Al Qaeda and keeping the Taliban from gaining a haven from which to attack the government of Afghanistan. American officials have been surprised by the speed at which both organizations have gained strength in the past year...

[Pragmatic Thinker]

My frustration and subsequent sarcasm in my writing has to do with what I believe is a real lack of knowledge regarding the playing field we find ourselves fighting the Global War on Terrorism. Especially, when we start to talk about the Afghanistan-Pakistan side of the world. I am often amazed that people act like this is our first jaunt into that region militarily, plus I can't seem to wrap my arms around our support for Musharraf. I am not convinced that Pakistan does everything it can for us in our fight against Al Qaeda, however, we continue to dump aid ($$) into his military and economy without any kind of expectation of a return on our investment.

I will point out two items from Clapper's testimony that I am finding misleading in their logic.

1) "The NIE highlights one such way in which the enemy has adapted: in response to its loss of Afghanistan: it has reconstituted some of its command and support network in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border."

Is this really an enemy adaptation? They have always traveled in and out of Waziristan. The Durand Line isn't recognized by the Pashtun nor their foreign guests who continually travel in and out of Afghanistan attacking US and coalition forces, so how does this equate to adaptation by the enemy when this capability has always been there? They exploit our unwillingness to pursue them into Pakistan is a more accurate statement then giving them (Al Qaeda) credit for discovering some sort of technique or tactic. Maybe word smithing but I find the language a little too one sided.

2) "At the same time, there are signs of a reaction against the extremists. On April 17, 2007, a convention attended by over 2,000 Pakistani religious figures in Peshawar, the capital of Pakistan's ethnically Pashtun North-West Frontier Province (which includes the FATA), proclaimed that suicide bombings were against Islam and condemned the forcible implementation and enforcement of Shari’a (Islamic Law). Also, internal disputes in Pakistan's tribal agency of South Waziristan recently erupted into conflict between Taliban-allied local tribes and al Qaeda-allied Central Asian groups, mostly Uzbeks. Uzbek forces offended local Pashtun groups by their criminal activity and insensitivity to local tribal customs, resulting in open warfare between locals and Central Asian fighters."

I think he takes a huge leap here implying that a limited reaction by some locals against a particular group equates to a consensus among the people of North Waziristan that there is an exploitable fissure between the Pashtu and the Taliban/AQ and their foreign guests. He couldn't be any further from the truth and this sounds a little like "cherry picking" reporting to paint the picture you want and not the picture that is actually there. There has been some limited (and I want to underscore limited) success by the Pakistani security forces in punishing tribes that allow foreigners among their midsts, but this hasn't taken hold long term and in the end most tribals see the Peshawar based Punjab military and political leaders as U.S. puppets. I would recommend the writers of this testimony spend some time along the border region talking to locals and getting the "ground truth" and not relying on single source reporting from questionable sources to support your arguments.

Again, not taking anything away from the man personally but I didn't read anything in his testimony about the enemy that was too promising. We can beat these guys and we can win this fight, but real issues need to be addressed and the first one is defining who really is our enemy? If Usama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are the leaders of the enemy organization we wish to defeat then why do we allow them sanctuary in Pakistan? Why do we ally ourselves with Musharraf after he publically states, 1) he believes Al Qaeda's top leaders are in his country but he claims he is supposedly powerless to do anything about it, and 2) he would rather see anyone else BUT the United States be the ones that capture/kill Usama Bin Laden within Pakistan should he be found.... Also, we say the enemy has "adapted" to using Waziristan as a sanctuary, but it only remains a sanctuary if we don't go after them...

I am no genius (militarily or otherwise) but there lacks basic logic in our policies and actions that I find too easily dismissed by the people who are supposedly "great leaders" and "no nonsense types"....

PT

[wm]

[R]eal issues need to be addressed and the first one is defining who really is our enemy? If Usama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are the leaders of the enemy organization we wish to defeat then why do we allow them sanctuary in Pakistan?

For the US to cross into Pakistan unilaterally would be perceived (rightly, I think) as an overt act of aggression and would lose us even more of the little international public support we have for our anti-AQ efforts. It would also undercut the internal support Musharraf has in his own country. Do we really want a nuclear-armed Pakistan to lose his rule? His replacement may be far worse.

Why do we ally ourselves with Musharraf after he publically states, 1) he believes Al Qaeda's top leaders are in his country but he claims he is supposedly powerless to do anything about it, and 2) he would rather see anyone else BUT the United States be the ones that capture/kill Usama Bin Laden within Pakistan should he be found....

Musharraf (or his handlers) is pretty astute IMHO. Regarding your question 1), see my point above--he at least provides some stability in the government of a predominantly Islamic nation state member of the "nuclear club."
Regarding 2), I submit that having any nation other than the "Great Satan US" capture/kill UBL would lessen UBL's future "Martyr" status. Were the forces of a Moslem nation to effect the kill/capture, I believe that could be used to send a strong message to show that the efforts of the terrorists are wrong in the eyes of Allah and the Prophet.

I am no genius (militarily or otherwise) but there lacks basic logic in our policies and actions that I find too easily dismissed by the people who are supposedly "great leaders" and "no nonsense types"....

Logic has very little real play in the world of international diplomatic affairs. If you want to discuss whether we need more consistency in our policies and actions, that might very well be a topic worth exploring more fully.

[Pragmatic Thinker]

For the US to cross into Pakistan unilaterally would be perceived (rightly, I think) as an overt act of aggression and would lose us even more of the little international public support we have for our anti-AQ efforts. It would also undercut the internal support Musharraf has in his own country. Do we really want a nuclear-armed Pakistan to lose his rule? His replacement may be far worse.

Musharraf (or his handlers) is pretty astute IMHO. Regarding your question 1), see my point above--he at least provides some stability in the government of a predominantly Islamic nation state member of the "nuclear club."
Regarding 2), I submit that having any nation other than the "Great Satan US" capture/kill UBL would lessen UBL's future "Martyr" status. Were the forces of a Moslem nation to effect the kill/capture, I believe that could be used to send a strong message to show that the efforts of the terrorists are wrong in the eyes of Allah and the Prophet.



Logic has very little real play in the world of international diplomatic affairs. If you want to discuss whether we need more consistency in our policies and actions, that might very well be a topic worth exploring more fully.

I have heard the nuclear argument before that we must proceed cautiously for should Musharraf fall the nukes will fall into the hands of madmen. I think there is some merit to this, however, we went through this same supposed scare when Musharraf stole the reigns in '99 and now look at him, he is the toast of Washington when he comes into town. So much so that during his last visit he was plugging his autobiography on the Daily Show. So I am not convinced that some Islamic loon would get his hands on the keys and launch codes. In my dealings with Pakistan there is one thing that remains consistent there and that is a strong military who doesn't seem opposed to stepping on the toes (or pushing them aside for that matter) of their civilian leaders when they feel the country is in "trouble", so again I am not discounting the argument but I am not taking that fear-ladened approach either.

As for Musharraf's support at home, I would again say that he has it among his Punjabs in places like Peshawar and Islamabad, but you wander out to Waziristan and it is a whole other world out there. We're talking about a Pashtu populace that has attacked its own military and police, so this is nothing less than a "restive" place in my opinion and no greater place for our enemies to find sanctuary.

My argument isn't against Musharraf the man, but our policies in that region... I have studied the history of our foreign policy in South Asia and it sucks with inconsistencies. There isn't a Pakistani who doesn't believe that as soon as UBL, other AQ senior leaders, and to some extent the Taliban are no longer deemed a threat to the U.S. that we will once again "abandon" Pakistan and continue our economic dealings with their arch-enemies the Hinuds of India. I get that piece and fully understand the underlying political constraints, BUT from a strictly tactical sense if you want to take away your enemy's ability to reconstitute, re-arm, and re-fit from within his sanctuary then you need to take his sanctuary from him. The fact that many of these Taliban and foreign fighters are living mere kilometers across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border yet they seem almost invicible is absurd. I would take one thing from the Soviet playbook of the Soviet-Afghan War and that is not to leave places like Quetta and Miram Shah in the of the bad guys without a price. How many American, British, Canadian, and other coalition soldiers will have to die before someone realizes that this sanctuary only exists because we allow it to? I will not buy into the premise that Musharraf's government will collapse if we were to lead offensive operations into the FATA. I am not convinced whatsoever. We have asked, cajoled, threatened, and requested that the Pakistanis do it themselves and they are incapable of long term sustainment in that region. I don't want to argue why they can't do it themselves but rather lets address the real problem -- our enemy finds sanctuary inside the borders of a supposed ally on the Global War on Terrorism.

[tequila]

I will not buy into the premise that Musharraf's government will collapse if we were to lead offensive operations into the FATA. I am not convinced whatsoever. We have asked, cajoled, threatened, and requested that the Pakistanis do it themselves and they are incapable of long term sustainment in that region. I don't want to argue why they can't do it themselves but rather lets address the real problem -- our enemy finds sanctuary inside the borders of a supposed ally on the Global War on Terrorism.

What sort of offensive operations are you talking about? Are we talking about the 82nd Airborne or I MEF setting up shop independently in North Waziristan and basically occupying the area?

If so, I think you'd be hard-pressed to find any Pakistani government that could survive under such circumstances.

[Pragmatic Thinker]

What sort of offensive operations are you talking about? Are we talking about the 82nd Airborne or I MEF setting up shop independently in North Waziristan and basically occupying the area?

If so, I think you'd be hard-pressed to find any Pakistani government that could survive under such circumstances.

I am talking about any kind of continuous operation that denies the enemy freedom of movement to enter Afghanistan to kill coalition forces along their (bad guys) preferred LOCs. I have heard the argument that Musharraf would be pressured internally, but why not allow limited joint U.S.-Pakistani forces to conduct operations inside Pakistan? Much like we do in the Philippines? Is he not truly concerned about ridding Al Qaeda and Taliban influences from within his country? Is he truly committed to the fight to defeat Al Qaeda and the Taliban which is the major destabilizing force inside Afghanistan? If he is then why refuse U.S. forces who are admittedly better capable some sort of limited ability to strike targets within his borders or complain when they do?

Anyway, this is turning into a discussion about South Asian politics and not about the Intelligence Estimate released earlier this month and the testimony from Gen. Clapper, so I will disengage from it. We can agree to disagree and my tactical perspective will remain the same -- a sanctuary is only a sanctuary if you allow it to remain as one. I get that Pakistani soldiers are dying in these operations inside Waziristan, but remember this a conscript Army and not to say their loss of soldiers is not as great at the personal level, but I do NOT want to use the metric of dead bodies as a measurment of resolve and/or dedication to a fight...it is illogical and one I see bantied around Washington by the pro-Musharraf crowd. If you're interested, read how many soldiers they (PAK MIL) lose annually fighting Baluch insurgents in the south and their occassional forays in Kashmir against the Indians.

PT

[Tacitus]

What sort of offensive operations are you talking about? Are we talking about the 82nd Airborne or I MEF setting up shop independently in North Waziristan and basically occupying the area?

If so, I think you'd be hard-pressed to find any Pakistani government that could survive under such circumstances.

Okay, so we decide to launch some kind of Pakistan "incursion", reminiscent of Cambodia. I haven't looked on a map lately, but these tribal areas seem to cover a pretty fair amount of real estate. Here's some questions for the Council.

Are we supposed to then occupy this area, to prevent it from becoming a sanctuary after we leave? This could start sounding like the problems we have right now in Iraq, where U.S. forces can't withdraw until the state can regain control of the area.

How many men is this going to require? Are they there? Are they available from elsewhere?

Or is this envisioned as just some kind of punitive expedition to go across the border and kill/capture some people. Do we think we have the kind of intelligence to know who is who in this part of the world?

Last, but not least, does anybody think there is support in Congress for this sort of thing? I do believe most people view the war in Afghanistan quite differently from our democracy project in Mesopotamia. But I guarantee that any administration that did this would face questions like "Okay, do you have a plan once you get there? Show me. I want details, not promises, after what we've seen in Iraq. Who's in charge? What are the political goals? At what point, would you consider this mission accomplished? How will you know when you have achieved it? etc." I think Congress is going to demand more than a "Trust me, I know what I'm doing" statement from the military and the executive on this.

[tequila]

CSIS - A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan (pdf)
Over $10 billion in aid to Pakistan since 9/11, and what to show for it?

Recommendations include shifting aid from a purely short-term military counterterror strategy focused on the western border to more state-building and internal stability for Pakistan itself. Sounds good on paper, and I can see the temptation, but how to avoid watching funds disappear into what is essentially a massive development project?

[Jedburgh]

10 Oct 07 HASC testimony testimony on security challenges involving Pakistan and policy implications for the Department of Defense:

Teresita C. Schaffer, Director South Asia Program, CSIS

Marvin G. Weinbaum, Middle East Institute

Husain Haqqani, Director, Center for International Relations, Boston University

Lisa Curtis, The Heritage Foundation

[davidbfpo]

Thanks, read all four. The forthcoming Pakistani provincial and national assembly elections, probably in January 2008, will clear some of the "smoke" as to who is the elected government. I remain unconvinced Ms Bhutto will succeed.

Lots of wishful thinking on external support for civilian power, without considering how American support could harm those in power. Yes, the Pakistani Army has taken US military aid, can this be re-directed to enhancing COIN capability now?

Worth reading from this armchair.

davidbfpo

[Jedburgh]

CEIP, 28 Nov 07: Pakistan: Conflicted Ally in the War on Terror

Arguably the greatest reverse suffered by the United States in its war on terror has been the rejuvenation of al-Qaeda and the Taliban—a revival the intelligence community believes is owed to their ability to secure a sanctuary in Pakistan. Accordingly, many Americans blame the regime of Pervez Musharraf for not delivering on its commitment to root out terrorist operatives from its territory despite receiving massive U.S. aid for that purpose.

The reality, however, is more complex. Although Pakistani counterterrorism effectiveness has fallen short of what Americans expect, Islamabad’s failures in this regard are not simply due to a lack of motivation. Instead, the convulsive political deterioration in the North West Frontier Province in Pakistan, Islamabad’s military ineptitude in counterterrorism operations, and the political failures of the Karzai government in Afghanistan have all exacerbated the problem. The war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban will thus be a long one requiring considerable patience on the part of the United States.....

[SteveMetz]

I'm beginning to wonder whether the strategic and ethical costs of the U.S. relationship with Pakistan have surpassed the benefits. Personally, I see little sign that nation is serious about transcending its benighted condition.

From Times Online
June 18, 2007
Pakistan says Rushdie knighthood justifies suicide bombings
Jenny Booth, Joanna Sugden and Stewart Tendler

Britain's decision to award Salman Rushdie a knighthood set off a storm of protest in the Islamic world today, with a Pakistani government minister giving warning that it could provide justification for suicide bomb attacks.

Rushdie was awarded the title in the Queen's Birthday Honours on Saturday. He has lived under police protection since the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran pronounced a fatwa (a religious ruling) calling for his death over alleged blasphemies against Islam in his 1988 novel The Satanic Verses.

Today, Pakistan's religious affairs minister suggested that the knighthood was so grave an offence that any Muslim anywhere in the world would be justified in taking violent action.

"If somebody has to attack by strapping bombs to his body to protect the honour of the Prophet then it is justified," Mr ul-Haq told the National Assembly.

The minister, the son of Zia ul-Haq, the military dictator who died in a plane crash in 1988, later retracted his statement in parliament, then told the AFP news agency that he meant to say that knighting Rushdie would foster extremism.

"If someone blows himself up he will consider himself justified. How can we fight terrorism when those who commit blasphemy are rewarded by the West?" he said.

He said Pakistan should sever diplomatic ties with Britain if it did not withdraw the award, adding:"We demand an apology by the British government. Their action has hurt the sentiments of 1.5 billion Muslims...

[SteveMetz]

It's the age old question: Why do bad typos happen to good people?

[Tom Odom]

It's the age old question: Why do bad typos happen to good people?

Done and done

[SteveMetz]

Done and done

Wow, the force is with you! Can you lift heavy objects with your mind as well?

[Tom Odom]

Wow, the force is with you! Can you lift heavy objects with your mind as well?

Yep ever time I get up

[MCMasterChef]

Can I ask, do you mean end our ties with Pakistan, or with the Musharaff regime?

In the light of the widespread public protests against his dismissal of the former Chief Justice Chaudry there, it's debatable how much longer he'll be able to cling to power; and while Musharaff finds the specter of Islamist takeover useful to rationalize his continued value to the States, I believe the Islamist parties last polled somewhere around 12%.

While Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif's parties have no shortage of blemishes in their past themselves, I think writers like Stephen Cohen (The Idea of Pakistan) and Hussain Haqqani (Pakistan Between Mosque and Military) make a good case that some of Pakistan's greatest problems can be traced to the military's regular usurpations of the democratic process, more than the demagogues like Zia Jr — while not something to be ignored, he and those like him are symptoms of a larger problem.