The US & others working with Pakistan

[wm]

[R]eal issues need to be addressed and the first one is defining who really is our enemy? If Usama Bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri are the leaders of the enemy organization we wish to defeat then why do we allow them sanctuary in Pakistan?

For the US to cross into Pakistan unilaterally would be perceived (rightly, I think) as an overt act of aggression and would lose us even more of the little international public support we have for our anti-AQ efforts. It would also undercut the internal support Musharraf has in his own country. Do we really want a nuclear-armed Pakistan to lose his rule? His replacement may be far worse.

Why do we ally ourselves with Musharraf after he publically states, 1) he believes Al Qaeda's top leaders are in his country but he claims he is supposedly powerless to do anything about it, and 2) he would rather see anyone else BUT the United States be the ones that capture/kill Usama Bin Laden within Pakistan should he be found....

Musharraf (or his handlers) is pretty astute IMHO. Regarding your question 1), see my point above--he at least provides some stability in the government of a predominantly Islamic nation state member of the "nuclear club."
Regarding 2), I submit that having any nation other than the "Great Satan US" capture/kill UBL would lessen UBL's future "Martyr" status. Were the forces of a Moslem nation to effect the kill/capture, I believe that could be used to send a strong message to show that the efforts of the terrorists are wrong in the eyes of Allah and the Prophet.

I am no genius (militarily or otherwise) but there lacks basic logic in our policies and actions that I find too easily dismissed by the people who are supposedly "great leaders" and "no nonsense types"....

Logic has very little real play in the world of international diplomatic affairs. If you want to discuss whether we need more consistency in our policies and actions, that might very well be a topic worth exploring more fully.

[Pragmatic Thinker]

For the US to cross into Pakistan unilaterally would be perceived (rightly, I think) as an overt act of aggression and would lose us even more of the little international public support we have for our anti-AQ efforts. It would also undercut the internal support Musharraf has in his own country. Do we really want a nuclear-armed Pakistan to lose his rule? His replacement may be far worse.

Musharraf (or his handlers) is pretty astute IMHO. Regarding your question 1), see my point above--he at least provides some stability in the government of a predominantly Islamic nation state member of the "nuclear club."
Regarding 2), I submit that having any nation other than the "Great Satan US" capture/kill UBL would lessen UBL's future "Martyr" status. Were the forces of a Moslem nation to effect the kill/capture, I believe that could be used to send a strong message to show that the efforts of the terrorists are wrong in the eyes of Allah and the Prophet.



Logic has very little real play in the world of international diplomatic affairs. If you want to discuss whether we need more consistency in our policies and actions, that might very well be a topic worth exploring more fully.

I have heard the nuclear argument before that we must proceed cautiously for should Musharraf fall the nukes will fall into the hands of madmen. I think there is some merit to this, however, we went through this same supposed scare when Musharraf stole the reigns in '99 and now look at him, he is the toast of Washington when he comes into town. So much so that during his last visit he was plugging his autobiography on the Daily Show. So I am not convinced that some Islamic loon would get his hands on the keys and launch codes. In my dealings with Pakistan there is one thing that remains consistent there and that is a strong military who doesn't seem opposed to stepping on the toes (or pushing them aside for that matter) of their civilian leaders when they feel the country is in "trouble", so again I am not discounting the argument but I am not taking that fear-ladened approach either.

As for Musharraf's support at home, I would again say that he has it among his Punjabs in places like Peshawar and Islamabad, but you wander out to Waziristan and it is a whole other world out there. We're talking about a Pashtu populace that has attacked its own military and police, so this is nothing less than a "restive" place in my opinion and no greater place for our enemies to find sanctuary.

My argument isn't against Musharraf the man, but our policies in that region... I have studied the history of our foreign policy in South Asia and it sucks with inconsistencies. There isn't a Pakistani who doesn't believe that as soon as UBL, other AQ senior leaders, and to some extent the Taliban are no longer deemed a threat to the U.S. that we will once again "abandon" Pakistan and continue our economic dealings with their arch-enemies the Hinuds of India. I get that piece and fully understand the underlying political constraints, BUT from a strictly tactical sense if you want to take away your enemy's ability to reconstitute, re-arm, and re-fit from within his sanctuary then you need to take his sanctuary from him. The fact that many of these Taliban and foreign fighters are living mere kilometers across the Afghanistan-Pakistan border yet they seem almost invicible is absurd. I would take one thing from the Soviet playbook of the Soviet-Afghan War and that is not to leave places like Quetta and Miram Shah in the of the bad guys without a price. How many American, British, Canadian, and other coalition soldiers will have to die before someone realizes that this sanctuary only exists because we allow it to? I will not buy into the premise that Musharraf's government will collapse if we were to lead offensive operations into the FATA. I am not convinced whatsoever. We have asked, cajoled, threatened, and requested that the Pakistanis do it themselves and they are incapable of long term sustainment in that region. I don't want to argue why they can't do it themselves but rather lets address the real problem -- our enemy finds sanctuary inside the borders of a supposed ally on the Global War on Terrorism.

[tequila]

CSIS - A Perilous Course: U.S. Strategy and Assistance to Pakistan (pdf)
Over $10 billion in aid to Pakistan since 9/11, and what to show for it?

Recommendations include shifting aid from a purely short-term military counterterror strategy focused on the western border to more state-building and internal stability for Pakistan itself. Sounds good on paper, and I can see the temptation, but how to avoid watching funds disappear into what is essentially a massive development project?

[Jedburgh]

10 Oct 07 HASC testimony testimony on security challenges involving Pakistan and policy implications for the Department of Defense:

Teresita C. Schaffer, Director South Asia Program, CSIS

Marvin G. Weinbaum, Middle East Institute

Husain Haqqani, Director, Center for International Relations, Boston University

Lisa Curtis, The Heritage Foundation

[SteveMetz]

I'm beginning to wonder whether the strategic and ethical costs of the U.S. relationship with Pakistan have surpassed the benefits. Personally, I see little sign that nation is serious about transcending its benighted condition.

From Times Online
June 18, 2007
Pakistan says Rushdie knighthood justifies suicide bombings
Jenny Booth, Joanna Sugden and Stewart Tendler

Britain's decision to award Salman Rushdie a knighthood set off a storm of protest in the Islamic world today, with a Pakistani government minister giving warning that it could provide justification for suicide bomb attacks.

Rushdie was awarded the title in the Queen's Birthday Honours on Saturday. He has lived under police protection since the late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini of Iran pronounced a fatwa (a religious ruling) calling for his death over alleged blasphemies against Islam in his 1988 novel The Satanic Verses.

Today, Pakistan's religious affairs minister suggested that the knighthood was so grave an offence that any Muslim anywhere in the world would be justified in taking violent action.

"If somebody has to attack by strapping bombs to his body to protect the honour of the Prophet then it is justified," Mr ul-Haq told the National Assembly.

The minister, the son of Zia ul-Haq, the military dictator who died in a plane crash in 1988, later retracted his statement in parliament, then told the AFP news agency that he meant to say that knighting Rushdie would foster extremism.

"If someone blows himself up he will consider himself justified. How can we fight terrorism when those who commit blasphemy are rewarded by the West?" he said.

He said Pakistan should sever diplomatic ties with Britain if it did not withdraw the award, adding:"We demand an apology by the British government. Their action has hurt the sentiments of 1.5 billion Muslims...

[SteveMetz]

It's the age old question: Why do bad typos happen to good people?

[Tom Odom]

It's the age old question: Why do bad typos happen to good people?

Done and done

[SteveMetz]

Done and done

Wow, the force is with you! Can you lift heavy objects with your mind as well?

[SWJED]

26 July Washington Post - Strike by U.S. in Pakistan Is an Option, Officials Say by Walter Pincus and Joby Warrick.

Top Pentagon and State Department officials said yesterday that U.S. Special Forces would enter Pakistan if they had specific intelligence about an impending terrorist strike against the United States, despite warnings from the Pakistani government that it would not accept U.S. troops operating independently inside its borders.

The statements were the clearest assertion yet of the Bush administration's willingness to act unilaterally inside tribal areas in northwestern Pakistan where al-Qaeda's top commanders are believed to have taken refuge. But the officials also voiced strong support for President Pervez Musharraf, who they said has repeatedly backed U.S. anti-terrorism efforts in the region at great political cost...

[Fuchs]

Pakistan has a population of about 167 million, growing by about 1.8% annually.
It has a GNP of about USD 144 billion, growing by about 6.4% annually (this surprised me).

That's about 4-5 % annual GNP/capita growth. Make that 10-15 % for ten years with a Marshall plan (concentrated on the politically decisive lowlands).
The costs would probably be about 1/5th of the overall effect at most, that's about 2% of their GNP = USD 3 billion in the first year and less than USD 12 billion at the end of the period.

Wouldn't that be surprisingly cheap in comparison to 'classical' national security / great power games policy? Even the military aid is expensive and equals just consumption, not investment.

The result would be that the youth migrates from the backwardish tribal areas into the cities. The population in the cities would be busy with business/jobs and with the exploitation of their new wealth.
Pakistani parents would more often than ever before consider (free!) secular schools as important for their youth instead of religious schools.

Poverty isn't the reason for terrorism, but it sure helps to recruit jihadists and it helps populists of all political wings.


A major problem of such a project would be the relationship to India, though.
India is a bit large and difficult to influence. Well, unless you look at it from the perspective of U.S. national security spending...

[Ken White]

rather it was due in part to the fact that such an initiative would require getting a fractious Congress to agree to put up the money and most of us would deem that a highly unlikely prospect for several reasons. Those reasons, ranging from simple bias in a few cases to the long term impact on US spending in the view of most are compounded by the India - Pakistan relationship conundrum.

I supposed it would be surprisingly cheap in comparison to military actions & sanctions.

Arguable at best but a part of the problem is the US Congress view of spending money -- it is generally predicated on very short term efforts that will realize a benefit for the incumbents. Long range thought is, very regrettably, not in the makeup of too many in Congress.

The members of this forum/board are so proud about their "non-kinetic" approaches...

Most also are in favor of other approaches that will work and are not prone to favor those that come equipped with obvious difficulties that may not be overcome; to wit (from your original post)

...Even the military aid is expensive and equals just consumption, not investment.

True, however, you're asking us for an investment and like most investors, we'd prefer that there be a guarantee of no harm and a good expectation of some small profit. Lacking that, the desire to invest is reduced. Another factor leading to non-response is, I think, that in dealing with other Nations since 1945, we've discovered that spending massive amounts of money will not buy love and indeed can often be counterproductive. You may have noted that our net government to government foreign aid has declined considerably over the years -- lack of return for the investments involved is a significant contributor to that.

The result would be that the youth migrates from the backwardish tribal areas into the cities. The population in the cities would be busy with business/jobs and with the exploitation of their new wealth.

In an ideal world -- indications lead me (and, I suspect, most observers) to believe that the Imams would fight that tooth and nail and it would not happen. That too is, IMO, a reason for the lack of response.

Pakistani parents would more often than ever before consider (free!) secular schools as important for their youth instead of religious schools.

Possible but also highly improbable in the near term -- which, as sadly stated above, is Congress' focus.

Poverty isn't the reason for terrorism, but it sure helps to recruit jihadists and it helps populists of all political wings.

True -- but so is this;

A major problem of such a project would be the relationship to India, though.
India is a bit large and difficult to influence. Well, unless you look at it from the perspective of U.S. national security spending...

Now, back to your most recent post:

As I said, it represents a mainstream reply from European peace & conflict studies, a whole academic field.

It would also represent the thoughts of many in this country; mostly those that lean a little to the left and who oppose conflict on principle. Fortunately or unfortunately, viewpoint dependent, the fact is that the majority of people in the US do not lean that way, they're pretty well centric in their views -- and they're very pragmatic. Moderate centrists far outnumber both left and right leaning persons in the US; those folks tend to be pretty thoughtful and realistic (they also tend to be quiet; that old 'silent majority'). Your suggestion would be nice in an ideal world and it would have great merit were it proposed for a nation with a western orientation. Pakistan is not such a nation -- and most Americans are well aware of the subtle differences therein involved. Yet another factor in no responses, perhaps.

Another pair of very minor factors are your noted "European peace & conflict studies, a whole academic field." Rightly or wrongly, that mass of moderate American is suspicious of anything emanating from Europe and anything from the vales of Academe. Neither font of knowledge and rectitude has proven to really have all the answers. Au contraire...

Are we so hard-wired to consider force (even "non-kinetic" one) as answer to international security concerns?

No, I don't think so. History since 1945 and most particularly in the last 30 years seems to point away from that. Recall that we would not be in Afghanistan or Iraq lacking the attacks on the World trade Center and the Pentagon.

(Or is the English-speaking countries bias here so overwhelming and the understanding of rather foreign approaches to security concerns too small?)

Pragmatic versus dogmatic, I think.

[davidbfpo]

Not sure about the details, but the UK has recently announced a new aid package to Pakistan, with an emphasis on the FATA; see links below:

http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=122125
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7486948.stm

A respected Pakistani columnist commented on the issues a few weeks ago: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/7433349.stm

The UK has sound strategic reasons to be involved in Pakistan and the FATA. Considerable emphasis is given to the links to the UK, with 400k Pakistani origin UK citizens travelling there each year and an estimated 100k citizens being there at any one time. Note most of the UK's Pakistani population come from Kashmir and not the FATA.

This aid package started in 2006 and I do wonder if the announcement has been timed for when US policy is so un-decided.

I am wary of any aid to Pakistan, knowing that other civil irrigation projects, have been seriously weakened by corruption and the diversion of materials. That was a decade ago and how any external, let alone UK, aid can be delivered effectively in the FATA is a moot point.

davidbfpo

[Bill Moore]

Economic investment has merit, but has you stated Pakistan (and Bangladesh) are already in an upward trend economically. I think our bias isn't being military focused, but rather our bias is a few bombs go off in a country and there are some insurgents/terrorists in their midsts, so we assume the country is a basket case, and that is far from the reality. The majority of Pakis don't want anything to do with the extremists.

I think we already invest enough in Pakistan, and we encourage economic growth by providing technical expertise to assist them. The issue is diversifying the wealth distribution, but that needs to be tied to some sort of behavior change by the tribes in the FATA.

I think you hit the main issue and that is their relationship with India. If we could cool the flames between India and Pakistan (it may take a Christmas miracle), then both countries could direct more attention on their internal troubles. They're both allies, so like Egypt and Israel, we have to balance our aid to both to avoid the perception we're picking a side.

Economic incentives are not enough to quiet the radical voices of discontent. Saudi Ariabia is an example where radicals emerge from the middle class. Poverty may assist their propaganda campaign, but it isn't the reason that terrorists become radicals.

[reed11b]

The more I follow the complexities of the Pakistan and Indian involvement in A-stan, the more I fear we are trying to sit on the fence, with all the risk of serious groin injury that this entails. I think the time has come to seriously re-evaluate the sides we have chosen in this fight. In the following LINK, two passages stand out to me. One.

Wednesday's attack could have a negative impact on Indo-Pakistani ties, which--due to revelations of Pakistani intelligence involvement in the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul on July 7, 2008--were already strained.

Does anyone here have confirmation of this? To me this is big, if the Pak Intelligence community is still supporting terrorist activities in A-stan, my support for them would be gone.
Two.

The historical animosity between Pakistan and India has also begun to increasingly manifest itself in Afghanistan, where Pakistan fears it is losing influence to India. New Delhi has pledged over $1 billion in assistance to the Afghan government and increased its political and economic influence throughout the country over the last few years. Pakistan's ability to maintain influence in Afghanistan throughout the 1990s stemmed from its support to the Taliban, whose leadership is allied with al-Qaeda. Other than strengthening ties to Kabul through stronger economic and trade linkages, Pakistan now finds itself with few options to project influence in Afghanistan; any further dealings with the Taliban risk isolation from the international community.

My embarrassing random thought of supporting India as the key counter-terrorist agent in the region has begun to seem less whacko to me all the time. I understand the desire to appease everyone in the region, but my gut says that this is a bad idea, and we will lose ALL support and influence in the region if we keep it up.
Reed
Any thought on how peacekeepers from either Pak or India would be viewed by the Afghan populace compared to the US and NATO?

[reed11b]

Rand Paper Abstract
I would love to get the whole document but this abstract sums up the challenge and options fairly well.

[Entropy]

It's not known for sure, but it's likely ISI had some involvement in the attack. Whether this was limited to general support for the group or whether it provided direct assistance in support of this particular attack isn't known. There is a very important distinction there between general support and specific support for a particular attack.

Also, one thing you have to keep in mind about Pakistan is that it is a factional country that lacks the kind of centralized power and authority that we have here in the US. The civilian government, military and intelligence services all have a lot of independent power - indeed the civilian government serves at the pleasure of the Army - so there are many times when the right hand not only doesn't know what the left is doing, but the foot is doing something completely different and lying to both hands about it. And there are times when the government may want to do something and the military say's no. In those arguments, the military usually wins and gets its way.

This makes choosing "sides" difficult when talking about India/Pakistan because when something like the India Embassy bombing occurs, and there are indications of Pakistani involvement, we don't know if that involvement was an official act of the Pakistani government, or just another in a long line of ISI going off the reservation and pursuing its own, independent agenda. It must be quite frustrating to the civilian government as well, who might find out that an instrument of its supposed national power has gone and done something from al Jezeera or when the US Ambassador calls.

This reality in Pakistan makes dealing with them very complex and frustrating, but they still remain an ally of necessity. Even if parts of the Pakistani government are working against us, we need those parts which are working for us if we want to continue operations at all in Astan.

I also strongly endorse Rex's comments. Pakistan has long sought to control Afghanistan to gain strategic depth against India. It's one of several reasons why Pakistan does not want to see a strong, independent government in Afghanistan. Indian "peacekeepers" in that context would be seen as an existential threat to Pakistani interests. In fact, the main reason India is playing in Afghanistan at all has little to do with Afghanistan and everything to do with causing problems for Pakistan.

[Ken White]

strongly disliked in order, Pakistanis, Brits and Russians. Guy I know with two tours and current contacts there tells me that's still true.

That suggests that any thought of Pakistani troops in Afghanistan would not be a good idea...

Entropy is of course correct on the problems that Pakistan possesses as a nation. There is no easy solution there or in Afghanistan and there was never going to be one. We did something that needed to be done, are still doing that as best we can and that's good. The bad thing is that it seems to me we have yet to determine what we can and will accept as an achievable end state. We really need to do that, be very clear and public about it and set out to achieve that goal.

[Jedburgh]

Rand Paper Abstract
I would love to get the whole document but this abstract sums up the challenge and options fairly well.

The entire document is here: The Counterterror Coalitions: Cooperation with Pakistan and India

[davidbfpo]

I accept "sitting on the fence" can be painful, but the campaign in Afghanistan does not face the dilemma of choosing between India and Pakistan.

Neither nation can really supply "boots on the ground", for a variety of reasons, although I'd be interested to learn how the small Indian para-military presence, guarding road builders, has gone down with the Afghans (sibject of a thread a long time ago).

IMHO India can only play a small part whilst without Pakistan's assistance we cannot campaign fully in Afghanistan; as discussed on the supply routes thread recently.

We do need to work on ensuring India and Pakistan do not return to their historical bickering etc. Reinforced by the Mumbai attacks and the attendant allegations of a Pakistani state role.

Alas neither nation is readily amenable to diplomacy and pressure. The two rival intelligence agencies are known to "play games" in Afghanistan, much to the annoyance of former Western government figures. The Indian Embassy attack has been widely leaked as being linked to ISI, sometimes in surprising detail in semi-public forums; whether there is any foundation to this remains elusive.

The real issue in Afghanistan is securing Afghan support, preferably in the fight; I exclude what our objective is (covered in another thread) and whether an Afghan nation state exists that can provide that support.

Reed - I hope this helps.

[Rex Brynen]

Any thought on how peacekeepers from either Pak or India would be viewed by the Afghan populace compared to the US and NATO?

The Indians would be regarded as just as foreign as NATO, and—given how Indian RoE work out when they are under threat—likely involve even more collateral damage against the civilian population as things got messy. More important, any Indian troop deployment would be considered by the Pakistani military-intelligence complex as confirmation that the Karzai government is a major strategic threat, and would lead them to throw their full-blown support behind the Taliban as a strategic counter. (While there is no doubt that elements in ISI currently provide some support to the Taliban now, it is very, very far from full fledged institutional support at present.)

Pakistani peacekeepers in Afghanistan? I wouldn't assume that they would be seen as much more "local"—the Pakistani army is seen as already "foreign" by many Pakistani Pashtuns in the FATA/NWFP/etc. It would also be resented by many local pro-Karzai Afghans as an extension of (malevolent) Pakistani influence. Finally, I have serious doubts about the PKO or combat efficiency of the Pakistani armed forces (their performance against radical Islamists within Pakistan, or on PKO missions such as Somalia, is far from stellar).