The US & others working with Pakistan

[SWJ Blog]

ISI "Directly" Funding Taliban?

Entry Excerpt:

Pakistan’s ISI Military Intelligence Accused of Directly Funding Taleban - Jeremy Page, The Times.

Pakistan’s military intelligence agency directly funds and trains the Afghan Taleban and is officially represented on its leadership council, according to a report by a British academic. The study, published by the London School of Economics, also alleges that Asif Ali Zardari, the Pakistani President, met Taleban leaders imprisoned in Pakistan and promised them early release and future support.

Pakistan dismissed the report by Matt Waldman, a Harvard fellow who interviewed current and former members of the Taleban, as “baseless” and “naive”. A spokesman for the Pakistani Army said that the state’s commitment to opposing the Taleban was demonstrated by the number of soldiers killed fighting on the Afghan border. Western officials and analysts have often accused elements within Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency of supporting the Afghan Taleban, even as its army combats the Pakistani Taleban on the northwestern frontier.

However, Mr Waldman’s report goes further, arguing that support for the Afghan Taleban is “official ISI policy” and is backed at the highest levels of Pakistan’s civilian administration. “Pakistan appears to be playing a double game of astonishing magnitude,” the report says. “There is thus a strong case that the ISI orchestrates, sustains and shapes the overall insurgent campaign,” it said. “Without a change in Pakistani behaviour it will be difficult if not impossible for international forces and the Afghan Government to make progress against the insurgency.” ...

More at The Times.

Link to report: http://www.crisisstates.com/download/dp/DP%2018.pdf

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[Jedburgh]

ISI "Directly" Funding Taliban?

CSRC, 11 June 2010: The Sun in the Sky: The Relationship Between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan Insurgents

Many accounts of the Afghan conflict misapprehend the nature of the relationship between Pakistan’s security services and the insurgency. The relationship, in fact, goes far beyond contact and coexistence, with some assistance provided by elements within, or linked to, Pakistan’s intelligence service (ISI) or military.

Although the Taliban has a strong endogenous impetus, according to Taliban commanders the ISI orchestrates, sustains and strongly influences the movement. They say it gives sanctuary to both Taliban and Haqqani groups, and provides huge support in terms of training, funding, munitions, and supplies. In their words, this is ‘as clear as the sun in the sky’.

Directly or indirectly the ISI appears to exert significant influence on the strategic decisionmaking and field operations of the Taliban; and has even greater sway over Haqqani insurgents. According to both Taliban and Haqqani commanders, it controls the most violent insurgent units, some of which appear to be based in Pakistan.

Insurgent commanders confirmed that the ISI are even represented, as participants or observers, on the Taliban supreme leadership council, known as the Quetta Shura, and the Haqqani command council. Indeed, the agency appears to have circumscribed the Taliban’s strategic autonomy, precluding steps towards talks with the Afghan government through recent arrests.....

[omarali50]

What I find unbelievable is the notion that this could all happen without the US knowing about it. Obviously the US and its allies know how much contact ISI does or does not have with the taliban. IF this report is true and yet the US and allies are paying Pakistan regularly then they must have some other plan in mind. I mean they cannot just be fooled....

[Dayuhan]

I mean they cannot just be fooled....

Why not? Wouldn't be the first time...

[davidbfpo]

A thoughtful comment article, which could fit a number of threads, so it is here and on the Londonistani thread too. Hat tip to Abu M and the comment is on Afpak Channel:http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts...erate_majority

His penultimate paragraph:

For decades internal and external actors have been exploiting religious fervor in Pakistan for political gain. That feeling has morphed, evolved, and developed a life of its own. The future of Pakistan will be decided by the outlook adopted by its people. And as of yet, that outlook is still being formed. Right now, despite the best efforts of extremists, the majority of Pakistanis see the core principles of their faith revolving around peaceful coexistence, social justice and community service. If the public sees Barelvis and Deobandi leaders marching their communities to war, the groups will threaten their own legitimacy. On the other hand, if extremists succeed in redefining what is considered "Islamic" and convincing ordinary Pakistanis that differing views of religion are worth fighting and killing over, the consequences will be devastating for Pakistan, and disastrous for the world.

He adds this on what the West can do:

A few months ago, I read Hilary Synnott's International Institute for Strategic Studies report Transforming Pakistan. I thought at the time that Sir Hilary's suggestion that the international community basically take it on itself to transform Pakistan was unrealistic and an even bigger disaster waiting to happen. However, I'm beginning to think that a major game change is needed and the only question remains who the real domestic partners should be. The best option, and the most willing potential allies, are the general public. The question is how to approach them and how to tool the options avaiable to the international community so that they actually work effectively.

The aboev comment comes from the article and there is a poor discussion on:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam...-pakistan.html

[huskerguy7]

It's been no secret that aspects of Pakistan's ISI (their spy agency) have aided the insurgency in Afghanistan. The recent leak of 92,000 classified military documents fuels these allegations even more.

First off, where are the ISI networks receiving their orders? This question is still unanswerable. In my opinion, it seems that these actions are committed by lower level agents. Essentially, I do not thank that Islamabad is secretly encouraging the ISI to aid the insurgency. The effects don't make sense (unstable borders, tense relations with a superpower, minimal economical growth, allying with a poor partner, etc). Yes, if done properly, Pakistan can turn Afghanistan into a puppet. However, it doesn't seem like it's worth it.

That is why I believe that the ISI's actions are coming from the lower levels. The actual structure of the ISI appears to be composed of different networks that are loosely connected with each other (if anybody knows of any papers off hand that describe this, mention them). Many intelligence agencies embrace this kind of structure because it allows them plausible deniability, requires less resources, and can yet be quite effective. However, I think that the ISI is suffering from the negatives from this structure. Lower networks are using their assets to support their interests in Afghanistan. Their interests may be friends in the Taliban, financial gains, religious beliefs, opposition to Indian influence, etc. Different motives are persuading ISI agents to act against ISAF with their government resources. That is my opinion, so I may be wrong. Islamabad may be behind this whole thing...

The next question, how does the US respond to this? Do we continue providing substantial amounts of assistance to Pakistan? Or do we pursue assistance from India to counter their influence? I have yet to take a stance on this question. In my opinion, the current methods the US is pursuing to assist Pakistan are not affecting the whole population. However, if the US pursues more assistance from India, more enemies may be made. Possibly there are other solutions?

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Abu M for pointing to this Newsweek article, with [quoteRead the whole thing. It's a rare bit of what reporting is supposed to be about.[/quote.

Link:http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/31/w...ike-these.html

Opens with:

The Afghan Taliban logistics officer laughs about the news he’s been hearing on his radio this past week. The story is that a Web site known as WikiLeaks has obtained and posted thousands of classified field reports from U.S. troops in Afghanistan, and hundreds of those reports mention the Americans’ suspicions that Pakistan is secretly assisting the Taliban—a charge that Pakistan has repeatedly and vehemently denied. “At least we have something in common with America,” the logistics officer says. “The Pakistanis are playing a double game with us, too.”

And ends with:

The Pakistanis, for their part, continue to resist U.S. pressure for strikes against Taliban sanctuaries. “Their aim seems to be to prolong the war in Afghanistan by aiding both the Americans and us,” says the logistics officer. “That way Pakistan continues to receive billions from the U.S., remains a key regional player, and still maintains influence with [the Taliban].” And which side is Pakistan on? “That’s a foolish question,” says Anatol Lieven, a professor in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. “Pakistan is on Pakistan’s side, just as America is on America’s.” Nobody knows that better than the Taliban.

No great surprises, but pulls it all together.

[omarali50]

Re the assassination of Sifwat Ghayoor, Commandant FC: my note is at

http://www.facebook.com/home.php?#!/...5724953&ref=mf

The problem remains the divided loyalties of the security establishment. And I am not talking about "divided between loyalty to the USA and loyalty to Pakistan". Of course, they should be loyal to Pakistan. I am referring to the division between those who support a pan-islamic anti-Indian agenda (which automatically necessitates saving the "good taliban" and the "good jihadis" for future use and containing or even killing off secular forces) and those liberals/pragmatists/rationalists who understand that the jihadi project may destroy Pakistan before it destroys India and conquers the world.

[davidbfpo]

An irregular, indirect contributor Hamid Hussain has written a historical article for the Pakistan Defence Journal on the 'United States, Pakistan and Reconnaissance during Cold War', which some may enjoy and I quote only the conclusion which is appropriate today:

Fifty years down the line and Pakistan and United States are again engaged in wide ranging defense and intelligence operations in the context of fight against extremism. One lesson that can be learned from the past such endeavourers is that each party should be realistic in its objectives as well as fully comprehend its own as well as other party's limitations. Exaggerated expectations will invariably result in huge disappointments on both sides. Every one understands that some intelligence operations need to be classified, however overall relations between the two countries and general defense relations should be discussed at different forums so that a more practical and somewhat transparent relation focusing on common interests is established. One simple fact which is missing in most discussions is that no policy can be pursued without minimum consensus from the population. Conducting all transactions in dark simply adds more suspicion and confusion and dividends are usually marginal in the long run.

For reasons I do not understand the article is not on the journal's website and was found elsewhere:http://drug-trafficking.blogspot.com...istan-and.html

[davidbfpo]

Copied to here 6th April 2011 from 'Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan' thread.

Hat tip to Circling the Lion's Den, a story I've not seen reported elsewhere, despite the prominence of the original attack, in March 2009:

Police in Lahore, Pakistan, have announced that another six members of the gang that attacked the Sri Lankan cricket team in March 2009 have been arrested following a tip-off.

Link:http://circlingthelionsden.blogspot....a-cricket.html

Note Circling is not persuaded those arrested are TTP, preferring LeT. There's also the reported arrest of a Bali bombs suspects (back in October 2002) in Pakistan and his likely transfer to Indonesia. Well-timed arrests due to the cricket match between India and Pakistan.

Now will we see those arrested appear in court charged?

[Ray]

The Double Mirror
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ar...071153,00.html

Why We're Stuck with Pakistan
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/ar...071131,00.html



There is a trust deficit.

How much is the 'trust' and how much is the 'deficit'?

There seems to be no 'escape' route or is there?

[omarali50]

Now with more pictures: http://www.3quarksdaily.com/3quarksd...-win.html#more

[davidbfpo]

A BBC story, based on a Pakistani MP talking about a briefing to the parliamentary defence committee:

Pakistan's army chief Ashfaq Kayani has warned the US that it will have to think "10 times" before taking any unilateral action in North Waziristan...

(Slightly edited) General Kayani is quoted saying "If someone convinced me that all problems will be solved by taking action in North Waziristan, I'd do it tomorrow...If we need to take action, we will do it on our schedule and according to our capacity."

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15364956

I fully accept this is Pakistani "spin" and may reflect more on Pakistani politics than any prospect of a US military incursion across the Durand Line.

[carl]

It just occurred to me reading Kayani's latest pronouncement, that Pakistan is Oceania from the novel 1984. They actually use Newspeak as the official language.

[jonSlack]

Asia Times Online - Taliban a step ahead of US assault

KARACHI - The ongoing three-day peace jirga (council) involving hundreds of tribal leaders from Pakistan and Afghanistan is aimed at identifying and rooting out Taliban and al-Qaeda militancy on both sides of the border.

This was to be followed up with military strikes at militant bases in Pakistan, either by the Pakistani armed forces in conjunction with the United States, or even by US forces alone.

The trouble is, the bases the US had meticulously identified no longer exist. The naive, rustic but battle-hardened Taliban still want a fight, but it will be fought on the Taliban's chosen battlegrounds.

Twenty-nine bases in the tribal areas of North Waziristan and South Waziristan on the border with Afghanistan that were used to train militants have simply fallen off the radar.

...

The death in May of Taliban commander Mullah Dadullah in Afghanistan during a coalition raid set in motion a major change within the Taliban's command structure.

The loss of the heroic commander was a huge blow for the Taliban in southwestern Afghanistan, as a major symbol of success had been killed - and there was no one of his stature to replace him, as another top Taliban commander, Mullah Akhtar Osmani, had earlier been killed in Helmand.

Amid the demoralization, the entire Taliban leadership left Helmand, Urzgan, Zabul and Kandahar and sat idle in Satellite Town in Quetta, Pakistan, for several weeks.

Finally, in June, Taliban leader Mullah Omar outlined new guidelines, which included:

No members of the central military command would work in southwestern Afghanistan.

Group commanders would be given control of specific districts and be allowed to develop their own strategy.

This strategy would be passed on only to the Taliban-appointed "governor" of the area, who in turn would relay it to the Taliban's central command council. From these various inputs, the council would develop a broader strategy for particular regions.

The Taliban would discourage personality cults like Dadullah's, as the death of a "hero" demoralized his followers.

Four spokesmen were appointed to decentralize the Taliban's media-information wing. Each spokesman would look after only a specific zone so that in case of his arrest, only information about that zone could be leaked. They also have all been given the same name, at present it is Qari Yousuf Ahmedi.

[Surferbeetle]

And from the Pakistani Paper The International News

The federal government has begun the process of negotiating a peace agreement with the Tehrik-e- Taliban (TeT) in South Waziristan. There are certain important reflections on this matter which need consideration.

Earlier this month, the NWFP government signed a peace agreement with the TNSM, which is a religious movement in Malakand division, where the TNSM is demanding the implementation of Shariat. In the agreement, the TNSM promised to abandon violence and to propagate its views peacefully. It also condemned the recent militant violence in Swat. Although, the agreement was signed by the TNSM, its fighting rank and file, led by Maulvi Fazlullah, has condemned it! There is a danger that this agreement will wither away without having accomplished much.

The NWFP government has thus opened itself to criticism for failing to include an enforcement clause based on indemnities, as well as the absence of any mechanism through which the agreement can be monitored and enforced.

On the other hand, the proposed agreement with TeT of Baitullah Masud is in a totally different category. Firstly, this agreement, though not yet finalised, is the responsibility of the federal government as it relates to tribal areas. Secondly, it is not understood how the government can sign an agreement with TeT, when it is not a tribe but an armed organisation. Thirdly, TeT is signing the agreement in South Waziristan. How will it, for example, be effective in Mohmand agency, which is different from South Waziristan? How will it be monitored by the federal government in the NWFP, where TeT is also active? If the government signs the agreement with the Mahsud tribe it will not be with the TeT, who could ignore it and continue to fight. There are thus so many technical bottlenecks in the signing of an agreement with TeT that it is unlikely to materialise.

[davidbfpo]

Found on the Kings of War blogsite, a Canadian journalist based in Kandahar reports on interviewing a Taliban prisoner who alleges being trained by the Pakistani Army: http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/War_Terr...996761-cp.html

davidbfpo

[Jedburgh]

NYT, 1 Aug 08: Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul, U.S. Officials Say

American intelligence agencies have concluded that members of Pakistan’s powerful spy service helped plan the deadly July 7 bombing of India’s embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, according to United States government officials.

The conclusion was based on intercepted communications between Pakistani intelligence officers and militants who carried out the attack, the officials said, providing the clearest evidence to date that Pakistani intelligence officers are actively undermining American efforts to combat militants in the region.

The American officials also said there was new information showing that members of the Pakistani intelligence service were increasingly providing militants with details about the American campaign against them, in some cases allowing militants to avoid American missile strikes in Pakistan’s tribal areas.....

[Jedburgh]

Pakistan Policy, 29 Sep 08: Ahmed Shuja Pasha, New ISI Chief

Lt. Gen. Ahmed Shuja Pasha has replaced Lt. Gen. Nadeem Taj as director general of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

The Australian reports that Washington had been pressing Islamabad/Rawalpindi hard to replace Taj as late as Sunday night. President Asif Zardari reportedly met with CIA Director Michael Hayden this weekend in New York. What they discussed specifically is unclear — but Hayden reportedly provided Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani will a proposal for “ISI reform” in July.

Taj, a Musharraf relative and appointee, is depicted as the face of the organization’s alleged double game vis-a-vis militants along the border with Afghanistan. He will now head Gujranwala’s XXX Corps.

Pasha, just promoted from major general, had been director general of military operations (DGMO). In this capacity, he headed the Pakistan Army’s operations in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), and so his appointment provides no indication of a change in the military establishment’s war on terror policy.....

[Jedburgh]

CSIS, 27 Jan 09 The Afghan-Pakistan War: The Rising Threat: 2002-2008

NATO/ISAF, the US government, and UN have provided some unclassified data on the rising intensity of the conflict, but coverage has often been limited and much of the data are contradictory. Other material has been leaked by the UN, or has been complied by private organizations like Senlis -- whose results are generally more negative than those of the US and NATO/ISAF.

This paper provides a graphic comparison of such data in graphic and map form. No one source can be said to be reliable and no one set of trends is definitive. The only way to track the the trends in the war is to look at different sources and metrics.

The reader should also be aware that there are particularly sharp differences in estimates of Taliban and other insurgent influence depending on whether that influence is measures in terms of clashes, poll, presence, or risk to NATO/ISAF, and UN/NGO personnel. This is clearly reflected in the maps in showing the rise of violence, high risk areas, and areas of Taliban influence.

The data are further limited by the fact that NATO/ISAF, the US and other sources do not cover the Pakistani side of the fighting. This ignores one of the most critical aspects of the conflict.