The US & others working with Pakistan

[Dayuhan]

I mean they cannot just be fooled....

Why not? Wouldn't be the first time...

[Rex Brynen]

Why not? Wouldn't be the first time...

It also wouldn't be the first time a public research report overstated a far more complex and nuanced situation.

[davidbfpo]

A new RAND report, the full title is 'Failed Strategy to Halt Pakistan-Based Militant Groups Has Helped Lead to Rising Number of U.S. Terror Plots' and a short summary on:http://www.rand.org/news/press/2010/...istan_military

A second AEI report on the situation in the Punjab 'Could the Taliban Take Over Pakistan's Punjab Province?' Link:http://www.aei.org/outlook/100967

Something to read one day when I have more time.

[davidbfpo]

I always commend Londonistani's postings on Pakistan on AbuM and the latest was:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam...-pakistan.html

Today FP's daily briefing has a good short article 'Pakistan's Suspicious Public' which starts with:

Caught between a vicious Islamist insurgency and CIA drone strikes, Pakistanis are growing increasingly disenchanted with the Taliban. But they still hate the United States, too.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...picious_public

Yes, I do acknowledge that traditionally decisions on national security in Pakistan rest with the Army, but as other posts refer public support was required for confronting the "internal enemy".

[davidbfpo]

A thoughtful comment article, which could fit a number of threads, so it is here and on the Londonistani thread too. Hat tip to Abu M and the comment is on Afpak Channel:http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts...erate_majority

His penultimate paragraph:

For decades internal and external actors have been exploiting religious fervor in Pakistan for political gain. That feeling has morphed, evolved, and developed a life of its own. The future of Pakistan will be decided by the outlook adopted by its people. And as of yet, that outlook is still being formed. Right now, despite the best efforts of extremists, the majority of Pakistanis see the core principles of their faith revolving around peaceful coexistence, social justice and community service. If the public sees Barelvis and Deobandi leaders marching their communities to war, the groups will threaten their own legitimacy. On the other hand, if extremists succeed in redefining what is considered "Islamic" and convincing ordinary Pakistanis that differing views of religion are worth fighting and killing over, the consequences will be devastating for Pakistan, and disastrous for the world.

He adds this on what the West can do:

A few months ago, I read Hilary Synnott's International Institute for Strategic Studies report Transforming Pakistan. I thought at the time that Sir Hilary's suggestion that the international community basically take it on itself to transform Pakistan was unrealistic and an even bigger disaster waiting to happen. However, I'm beginning to think that a major game change is needed and the only question remains who the real domestic partners should be. The best option, and the most willing potential allies, are the general public. The question is how to approach them and how to tool the options avaiable to the international community so that they actually work effectively.

The aboev comment comes from the article and there is a poor discussion on:http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawam...-pakistan.html

[huskerguy7]

It's been no secret that aspects of Pakistan's ISI (their spy agency) have aided the insurgency in Afghanistan. The recent leak of 92,000 classified military documents fuels these allegations even more.

First off, where are the ISI networks receiving their orders? This question is still unanswerable. In my opinion, it seems that these actions are committed by lower level agents. Essentially, I do not thank that Islamabad is secretly encouraging the ISI to aid the insurgency. The effects don't make sense (unstable borders, tense relations with a superpower, minimal economical growth, allying with a poor partner, etc). Yes, if done properly, Pakistan can turn Afghanistan into a puppet. However, it doesn't seem like it's worth it.

That is why I believe that the ISI's actions are coming from the lower levels. The actual structure of the ISI appears to be composed of different networks that are loosely connected with each other (if anybody knows of any papers off hand that describe this, mention them). Many intelligence agencies embrace this kind of structure because it allows them plausible deniability, requires less resources, and can yet be quite effective. However, I think that the ISI is suffering from the negatives from this structure. Lower networks are using their assets to support their interests in Afghanistan. Their interests may be friends in the Taliban, financial gains, religious beliefs, opposition to Indian influence, etc. Different motives are persuading ISI agents to act against ISAF with their government resources. That is my opinion, so I may be wrong. Islamabad may be behind this whole thing...

The next question, how does the US respond to this? Do we continue providing substantial amounts of assistance to Pakistan? Or do we pursue assistance from India to counter their influence? I have yet to take a stance on this question. In my opinion, the current methods the US is pursuing to assist Pakistan are not affecting the whole population. However, if the US pursues more assistance from India, more enemies may be made. Possibly there are other solutions?

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to Abu M for pointing to this Newsweek article, with [quoteRead the whole thing. It's a rare bit of what reporting is supposed to be about.[/quote.

Link:http://www.newsweek.com/2010/07/31/w...ike-these.html

Opens with:

The Afghan Taliban logistics officer laughs about the news he’s been hearing on his radio this past week. The story is that a Web site known as WikiLeaks has obtained and posted thousands of classified field reports from U.S. troops in Afghanistan, and hundreds of those reports mention the Americans’ suspicions that Pakistan is secretly assisting the Taliban—a charge that Pakistan has repeatedly and vehemently denied. “At least we have something in common with America,” the logistics officer says. “The Pakistanis are playing a double game with us, too.”

And ends with:

The Pakistanis, for their part, continue to resist U.S. pressure for strikes against Taliban sanctuaries. “Their aim seems to be to prolong the war in Afghanistan by aiding both the Americans and us,” says the logistics officer. “That way Pakistan continues to receive billions from the U.S., remains a key regional player, and still maintains influence with [the Taliban].” And which side is Pakistan on? “That’s a foolish question,” says Anatol Lieven, a professor in the Department of War Studies at King’s College London. “Pakistan is on Pakistan’s side, just as America is on America’s.” Nobody knows that better than the Taliban.

No great surprises, but pulls it all together.

[omarali50]

Re the assassination of Sifwat Ghayoor, Commandant FC: my note is at

http://www.facebook.com/home.php?#!/...5724953&ref=mf

The problem remains the divided loyalties of the security establishment. And I am not talking about "divided between loyalty to the USA and loyalty to Pakistan". Of course, they should be loyal to Pakistan. I am referring to the division between those who support a pan-islamic anti-Indian agenda (which automatically necessitates saving the "good taliban" and the "good jihadis" for future use and containing or even killing off secular forces) and those liberals/pragmatists/rationalists who understand that the jihadi project may destroy Pakistan before it destroys India and conquers the world.

[davidbfpo]

An irregular, indirect contributor Hamid Hussain has written a historical article for the Pakistan Defence Journal on the 'United States, Pakistan and Reconnaissance during Cold War', which some may enjoy and I quote only the conclusion which is appropriate today:

Fifty years down the line and Pakistan and United States are again engaged in wide ranging defense and intelligence operations in the context of fight against extremism. One lesson that can be learned from the past such endeavourers is that each party should be realistic in its objectives as well as fully comprehend its own as well as other party's limitations. Exaggerated expectations will invariably result in huge disappointments on both sides. Every one understands that some intelligence operations need to be classified, however overall relations between the two countries and general defense relations should be discussed at different forums so that a more practical and somewhat transparent relation focusing on common interests is established. One simple fact which is missing in most discussions is that no policy can be pursued without minimum consensus from the population. Conducting all transactions in dark simply adds more suspicion and confusion and dividends are usually marginal in the long run.

For reasons I do not understand the article is not on the journal's website and was found elsewhere:http://drug-trafficking.blogspot.com...istan-and.html

[Backwards Observer]

I have lived some years among Pakistanis. I cannot claim to have done them much good. Instead, my preoccupations have been those which animate the game of nations. I have served a great power which hunts its enemies, pursues its interests, and tries to meet what it sees as its responsibilities in distant places, far from home. I make no apology for this; neither do I expect great credit.

But one cannot travel among the Pakistanis, as I have been privileged to do, without developing a great admiration for their decency and their dignity.

In SEAsia during the Seventies, most of the Americans we knew spoke in this manner, with a frankness that few other would-be power brokers could be bothered to muster. They also seemed to have an approach that defaulted to viewing people as fellow human beings, whether a snot-nosed local rapscallion or a local towkay; another trait that was unusual, although not non-existent, among the mat sallehs. 'Tis passing strange that with all the slings and arrows hurled at the American Empire that one would likewise feel privileged to have known such folks.


Flood of Misery (AlJazeera) - - Article by Robert Grenier, CIA Chief of Station, Islamabad, 1999-2002.

[omarali50]

My latest note on the current buzz in Pakistan:

http://www.facebook.com/note.php?sav...d=457300418766

[omarali50]

My article is now up on outlookindia.com

http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?266864

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to a Canadian DFA pointer. A report (as yet unread):

Prospects for the Conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan. In this paper from the Center for International Governance Innovation, Bruce Reidel, a former CIA officer and former advisor to several U.S. Presidents, describes the strategy that President Obama has implemented to combat al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan and discusses the al-Qaeda links behind recent terrorist plots.

Link:http://www.cigionline.org/sites/defa..._Paper_7_0.pdf

On a quick read he does not "pull his punches", like the loss of control at the Bagram detention facility.

I think the paper fits well here.

[carl]

I think the paper fits well here.

The paper is worth reading as look into the mind of an insider. He seems to be trying to paint the President as a great man of vision while at the same time hinting that thing are being done right. He makes no mention of the deadline but he also states "Rather, the end goal is to build stable countries in South and Central Asia. That’s the standard we should use to measure success. " referring to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

I often wonder about how the inside the beltway crowd continues to be flim-flammed by the Pak Army/ISI but after reading this paper I am getting an inkling. He says there Pakistan is complex and there is "ambiguity" and that we have to give the Pakistan Army what they need to fight with. To me, that sounds like talking points provided courtesy of the ISI.

I must read the appendix in McChrystal's report about Al-Qaeda and the Taliban running Bagram prison. I can understand us forgetting these lessons in decades between wars but we learned that running and controlling prisons in Iraq, just a little while ago! So now I read we don't control the prison in Bagram while we were learning we must control prisons? This is very discouraging.

[davidbfpo]

Professor Paul Rogers comments on several recent publications and comments on the AfPak scene:http://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-rogers/afghanistan%25E2%2580%2599s-decade-of-war-and-endgame?utm_source=feedblitz&utm_medium=FeedBlitzE mail&utm_content=201210&utm_campaign=Nightly_'2010-09-26%2005:30:00'

Taken from the concluding passages:

the Afghan war is now effectively lost. This makes inevitable a fundamental rethinking of strategy and tactics...When will it be undertaken? The imminence of the mid-term elections in the United States in November 2010 means that little will happen before then. A strategy review is due in December, though it is unclear how thorough it will be. It is probable in any event that reality finally impinges on politics during the coming Washington winter. If this is indeed the case, then there may well be some radical changes in policy by the next Afghan spring.

[davidbfpo]

An intriguing FP AfPak post 'Pakistan Goes Rogue: What the sole footnote in Bob Woodward's Obama's Wars tells us about Europe's growing fears of a terrorist attack'.

Yes written amidst the posturing over terror alerts and copious briefing. Plus a certain book being published.

How about this for the closing:

So Europe is on alert for terrorist attacks that would likely originate in Pakistan and be controlled from Pakistan -- the two distinguishing features of the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Until Woodward's book, observers might have assumed that, in the intervening two years, the United States might have succeeded in pressuring Pakistan to place the ISI under tighter control. We can no longer make that assumption.

Perhaps we should be asking: Why is General Pasha still head of the ISI? He was, after all, appointed a month before the Mumbai attacks that Woodward, in his footnote, linked firmly to the ISI.

Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...rogue?page=0,0

Try this sensible article on alerts: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn...pinion/columns

Which ends with:

In truth, the only people who can profit from such a warning are the officials who issue it. If something does happen, they are covered: They warned us, they told us in advance, they won't be criticized or forced to resign. And if nothing happens, then we'll all forget about it anyway.

Except that we don't forget about it. Over time, these kinds of enigmatic warnings do al-Qaeda's work for it, scaring people without cause. Without so much as lifting a finger, Osama bin Laden disrupts our sense of security and well-being. At the same time, such warnings put the U.S. government in the position of the boy who cried wolf. The more often general warnings are issued, the less likely we are to heed them. We are perhaps unsettled or unnerved, but we don't know what to do. So we do nothing -- and wish that we'd been told nothing as well.

Makes one ponder the value of alerts.

[omarali50]

I think in this case the alert was used as a way to signal that the so-called "mumbai-style attack" threat was real. This probably became necessary because people were starting to think that the US had cooked up this threat posthoc after killing more people than usual in FATA and that the helicopter incursions were unjustified escalation...this was meant to put that escalation in context and make it look justified (rightly or wrongly).
Pakistan has not gone rogue, it has always been rogue, though it is LESS rogue now than it ever was in the last 20 years, so this headline is a bit ironic..
btw, have you seen Musharraf shooting his mouth off and offering juvenile justifications for the policy of arming and training jihadis against India? http://www.spiegel.de/international/...721110,00.html
Put that stupid interview together with Admiral Fasih Bokhari's article (http://www.allvoices.com/s/event-678...h0bWw/MjMxNjc4) and you can see that the overgrown adolescents who are America's great white hope in Pakistan are in fact far more dangerous and deluded than the ball-scratching, nose-dripping, illiterate and corrupt gangsters in the civilian political parties...but military men being military men, no pentagon general seems to be able to resist the sight of a man in a finely starched uniform, especially if he also likes whisky (the one sure sign of "enlightened moderation", if the diplomatic reports of the last 50 years are any guide)

[carl]

The Pak Army/ISI won't change. They will allow something like the attempted Times Square attack to happen again. If it succeeds, we know what we will do. They will do something like Mumbai again. I know nothing about Indian military capabilities and politics. So, what do you all think India will do? How will they do it? One thing I would guess they are not inclined to do is listen to us when we urge restraint.

[omarali50]

India is in a tough spot on this. They would much prefer that this situation just doesnt come up, since they are not ten thousand miles away, they are right next door. While their economy is bigger, the armed forces are not that much superior to Pakistan (qualitatively, several arms are inferior, especially in the light of American transfer of some advanced weaponry to Pakistan and Pakistan's distorted political system leads to the army being able to hog resources that the Indian army has to beg from civilian politicians). Another Mumbai style attack would be hard to ignore, but their options are limited unless they get significant help from NATO.....
The US is saying the next attack on Europe or the US will be met with a major response, but the jihadi faction in the ISI may actually welcome such an outcome. They think ahead....
I am still hoping that the moron faction will realize that their good life is over if this delicately balanced apple cart is upset. But with the morons, you never know. In any case, they may simply lose control. They have spent years inculcating anti-Americanism into the population. And being not too bright, may start believing their own propaganda. The problem is that the realization that is needed is rather subtle and complex and involves reorienting not just the overt jihadi policy but the very "ideology of Pakistan" that they live by. I suspect there is at least a 33 percent chance this will spiral out of control and end in disaster.
Of course, one still hopes the 44 percent probability that economic necessity and common sense are paramount will prevail and GHQ will realize that the "Bangladesh model" doesnt just mean knocking a few heads in the corrupt political class, but actually involves accepting that a viable future for Pakistan involves making peace with India without any change in borders and giving up the notion of "defeating India", whatever that means.....and that then the army will take decisive action against the jihadis and (even more important) rein in their out-of-control psyops arm...one hopes and prays.

[davidbfpo]

Carl asks:

what do you all think India will do? How will they do it?

Pre-Mumbai Two I'd expect India to increase it's "### for tat" armed diplomacy, notably increasing the oh so covert support for the Baluchi insurgents and the more overt support for the Afghan state. Add to that, support for the Northern Alliance, their original ally pre-9/11 - OK Massoud in the Panshir Valley, not all the warlords.