A Modest Proposal - National Guard as the heavy force

[selil]

I have always wondered why the NG does not have a larger percentage of its resources trained and equipped as military police.

I asked this question about 20 years ago and was told that it's because a vast percentage of the USANG are already law enforcement officers in civilian life. I remember Desert Storm 1 and the depletion in the Sheriffs Department I was working in as dozens of Reserve and Guard troops were deployed. When they came through snapping up IRR it was like a ghost town. Since I was medically discharged from the Marines I wasn't going to be called back, but I could do LOTS of over time as an LEO.

[slapout9]

selil, that is very true the MP unit in Montgomery has already served 2 tours in Iraq and it puts a big dent in LE manpower on the street. MP units are very useful during disasters,riots,etc. so your question about why there are not more is one that should be looked at again. On the other hand during Katrina one of the most used assets down along the coast of Al. and Miss. was the USMC amphibious tractor units, helicopters were over taxed to say the least but the am-tracks could go anywhere. I thought this was strange because if my memory serves me correctly the am-track was originally designed to rescue Hurricane victims and the USMC modified for use in WW2 Ops. Seems like coastal area NG units would have more of this capability.

[MikeGreene]

Just my 2 cents as a NG guy with a background in force structure...
1. HQDA does Total Army Analysis (TAA) every 2 years, which, based on the inputs for what the Army requires, spits out the appropriately sized tactical force and the necessary general force required to execute National Strategy. Of course, this is limited by resource & end strength constraints. We haven't had much say in what DA loads in the front end of the Army Sausage Machine, so the resultant structure is based on what DA wants. When it's done, DA tells the USAR & NG how many of which types of units we get. Sure, we lobby back for future changes, but I haven't seen anything more than onesy-twosy shifts in the past 6 years.
2. NG resources come from Congress, just like the AC's. Sometimes a Congressional delegation might work a Congressional Add to fund a specific piece of equipment for units in their State, but this is not too frequent & it only gets the equipment, not necessarity the training & maintenance funds to support continued operation. Prior the GWOT, some NG Divisions were resourced as low as 20% of what would be required to conduct full-spectrum operations. I repeat, our funds come from Congress, not the State.
3. 800 MP Co was NOT a NG unit - they're USAR. Federal, not State. And poor training is not limited to USAR & NG: 507 Maintenance was an AC unit with poor land nav and PMCS training.
4. The big delay in NG Soldiers responding to Katrina stemmed from the Governor of LA not requesting the support. That's how it works: we don't act until we're asked. Governors get testy if a neighboring State deems them in mortal peril and sends in the troops without an invitation. What sticks in my mind more than GEN honore yelling about weapons was the interview with the guy who complained the NG wasn't there. He said something about "all we see as the Red Cross helicopters." You know, the UH-60s with the red cross on them. AKA NG air ambulances. You'll no doubt recall MS also suffered in Katrina, but they prepositioned the NG & requested support from other States. Katrina was a failure of local & State government, not the NG.
5. As for C2 capability of NG Battalions and Companies, now that we're being used as an operational reserve, I've noticed a big improvement is the quality of the Commanders & staffs. C2 is a perishable skill. We've deployed units with every OIF rotation since it started & the feedback our units (& Commanders) have received has been significantly on the positive side.
6. I think the discussion would go much better if we focused on developing a doctrine & building a force structure to match, rather than trying to divvy up the force structure & crafting a Doctrine to match our tools.

Regards,

Mike Greene

[Ski]

I'm another ARNG officer with a background in force structure, and dealt with HQDA directly for 5 years so I think I can add some additional insight to Mike's comments. Also was a M1A1 company commander in the Guard so I know the strengths and shortcomings of the heavy force in the Guard.

1. TAA is limited in its scope. TAA does not determine the number of BCT's or Divisions, that is left to Congress believe it or not. It's known as the "directed force." Everything other unit is up for grabs - if the Army, throught the Center for Army Analysis at Belvoir, determines that they need X transportation units or Y Combat Support MP units, the three components (AC, ARNG and USAR) sit down for weeks during TAA and try to divvy up the requirements for these units. It's contentious as one might imagine. As Mike said, HQDA always gets the first choice.

2. The USAR gave up the vast majority of their combat force structure in the early 90's stemming from the Quicksilver decision. It basically took all the combat structure out of the USAR and shifted it into the ARNG while the ARNG shifted a lot of CS and CSS into the USAR.

3. As Mike said, resources come from the Title 10 Federal Budget. There are specific Congressional adds (I've worked a few) and they are nowhere as common as you'd think. The ARNG has always been short on modern equipment, which was fine for a force designed to be a strategic reserve. The lack of overall money for procurement played a role, as each piece of equipment has something known as the Army Acquistion Objective (AAO) which determines how many widgets are bought. More often than not, ARNG units wouldn't be placed on the AAO because there wasn't enough cash.

3. Training - training at battalion and BCT level has been difficult, but it's also made more difficult by the lack of CTC rotations (one ARNG BCT per year per CTC...before modularity an Enhanced Brigade went once every 7 years) and a lack of Warfighter/STAFFEX exercises at the BN and above level. It's all about funding - the Army simply isn't diverting the resources to these programs for the ARNG.

4. Poor training is a problem across the board. No one with a straight face can tell me an AC BCT is well trained when it has less than a years dwell time at home station. Again, resourcing and time driven.

5. The overall problem with force structure is that the structure that was designed with Modularity does not match the force structure requirements in the CENTCOM AOR. We've created massive new force structure and equipment requirements in both Afghanistan and Iraq. PRT's, ETT/MiTT's, and the lovely 1/3 heavy, 2/3rds motorized mix have basically caused us to form new armies in both locations.

6. The big issue with the Guard is time, followed by resources. I think's it's very possible to have fully trained platoons in the Guard, and then use post-mob training time to ramp up to company level proficiency with a solid BN and BCT staff. It would help if we could get more STAFFEX's but you have to do the best with what you have.