A Modest Proposal - National Guard as the heavy force

[Granite_State]

Saw this letter in the latest issue of ARMOR magazine, thought it was very interesting. Can't get a link, so figured I'd post it here in three parts:

Future Force Structure Completely Wrong

Dear ARMOR,

The fundamental force structure of the U.S. Army in the Active, National Guard, and Reserve Components is completely wrong for the 40-year war against non-state terrorism. And nothing in the current brigade-based transformation process will fix it.

At their heart U.S. Army ground forces are still designed to defeat large, mechanized enemy elements through the use of maneuver, shock, and firepower. They are not fundamentally designed to defeat an insurgency and win the hearts and minds of a terrorized local populace. Further, the operational tempo of this Global War on Terror (GWOT) is rapidly deteriorating the entire U.S. Army's force structure skills and recruitment focus. We are not structured or training for the current fight and no longer offer the soldier any real choice among components.

Bottom-line: the U.S. Army Active Component should be rebuilt, from the ground up, as a generally light force based around the M1114 and the Stryker family of vehicles, and trained to conduct primarily anti-insurgency operations while continually deployed. The Army National Guard should be reconfigured as the primary heavy force, based on Abrams tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and field artillery platforms, and trained to break nations and destroy mass enemy forces as the national strategic fist. The Army Reserve should be reset as the support component, trained to rebuild places deemed worthy of rebuilding, and for low-density skills heavily required for occasional operations.

We are engaged in a GWOT that will boil and cool (much like the Cold War) over the next 30 to 40 years, toppling a dictator here, blowing up some infrastructure there, and covertly whacking key bad guys hither and yon. Sometimes it may require heavily mechanized forces to totally break a country. Other times, it will be a few bombs or individual bullets. The number of young Americans desiring to be forward-deployed warriors on this long-term basis is finite, certainly not enough to sustain the current mobilization tempo of all three components.

The current war in Iraq notwithstanding, the GWOT will not typically require mass formations of M1s, M2s, and cannons. The Active Duty warrior should reflect this with training and skills as a street-walking, door-knocking, language-talking anti-insurgency soldier. The Active Duty soldier should expect a career that sees him off to land on foreign shores again and again throughout his career; sometimes for a few days and sometimes for more than a year at a time. This soldier should enlist with the understanding that the Army of the 1980s and 1990s, and its normal civilian lifestyle, except with guns and gear, is a thing of the past, and he will be out the door and all over the world as a light, expeditionary ground-pounder, with his M1114 and Stryker to move him around and provide firepower. This Active Army will more reflect the expeditionary forces of the British Empire of the late 1800s, forward based around the world, and ready to move, shoot, and communicate at a moment’s notice.

[Granite_State]

Continued:

Entire careers will be spent overseas. It will not be a married Army with families – that will have to wait for 20 years and retirement. Critically, this force will specifically recruit young men and women who desire an active, busy, and aggressively mobile lifestyle with hopes of engaging America’s enemies wherever they are, whenever they can.

National Guard recruitment will focus on young men and women who seek to serve their country at critical times, while maintaining a civilian lifestyle and career. Until the GWOT, this has always been the role of the National Guard. It is only the past five years that the National Guard has been totally mobilized, repeatedly, and it is showing wear and tear. Most people do not join the Guard with dreams of heading out the door every few years for 18 months at a time. They join in support of the Minuteman heritage with the desire to be there at the strategic moments in defense of the Nation.

As Guard units demobilize now for the second time since 9/11, anticipate tremendous declines in retention and recruiting. Why should anyone join or stay in the Guard when they will not have the chance to maintain a civilian lifestyle? The current operating tempo (OPTEMPO) puts the Active and Guard components head-to-head or recruiting young soldiers. If one is going to be deployed constantly, then one will just join the Active Army in the first place. The current OPTEMPO also cuts into prior service recruiting for the Guard. Soldiers will simply remain in the Active Component until their enlistment expires and then they will be done, not risking a series of deployments during their Guard or Reserve tours. Critically, this force will specifically recruit the young men and women who are willing to fight total war, most likely only once or twice in their careers, enabling them to build and maintain a civilian life.

Army Reserve service would be an intermediate position, attracting people willing to deploy more often than the Guard, but less than the Active Army. Their skill sets would be most useful in support of the Active Army on longer missions, but could be sent out for a few months at a time. Civil affairs, psychological operations, public affairs, transportation, engineering, and medical services are among the skills most appropriate for limited, but recurring, deployments. They would most likely use these same skills in their civilian careers and be trained to proficiency to reduce mobilization-site training.

Critically, this force will recruit specialists generally willing to deploy more often, but for shorter periods, not unlike the Air Force Guard and Reserve model.

[Granite_State]

Continued:

No one would suggest emasculating Active Duty forces by stripping every heavy weapons system. Certainly tanks, Bradleys, and cannons are required in limited numbers at the right time to prevent a Blackhawk Down from recurring. Every light brigade should have an element of heavy support. It simply turns the paradigm upside down to say those skills become low density in the Active Army, while beefing up the Guard to be prepared to fight the total war. It may be wise to maintain several brigades of heavy combat punch in the Active Component as a rapid response force for high-risk operations, where heavier defensive response could be anticipated, but not more than can be floated to an appropriate beach within two or three weeks. If additional heavy equipment is required, then most likely, we will have time for a truly national response, summoning the National Guard to fight the big war.

Some will argue the National Guard will not be as proficient in heavy mechanized combat as the Active Army. That may be true, but it is also irrelevant. No force in the history of the world has ever been as proficient as our current full-time Army. The U.S. National Guard is currently second-best, and with the enemies we are going to face in the GWOT, a heavy National Guard with one or two months of heavy training after mobilization will perform superbly. If the time comes for the United States to face another industrialized and heavily mechanized and armored foe, then the Nation will invariably have additional time to prepare and train to an even higher standard.

Soldiers will remain in components longer, as they will be doing exactly what they choose. If they desire to serve shifts, there are two other distinct components as option: Guard and Reserve soldiers can rely on a stable civilian life until the time comes for strategic action, rather than just throwing bodies into the breech to the load off of the Active Army.

Fundamental remissioning of the Active Duty, National Guard, and Army Reserve will provide real choices for volunteer soldiers, place the appropriate firepower in the appropriate component, and improve strength throughout the services by eliminating recruiting conflict between the elements. It will best position the United States of America to fight the GWOT, while both building the greatest expeditionary force and maintaining the best, most effective heavy, armored, mechanized force in the world.

Roger T. Aeschliman
MAJ, U.S. Army, KSARNG

[120mm]

Bra-Vo.

Nice article/nice find. Not bad for your first three posts!

I've believed in this since about 1983.

[TROUFION]

This sounds great. What are the downsides?

[LawVol]

Intriguing, but I see at least two issues. The proposal for the Active Army sounds suspiciously like the Marine Corps. They are traditionally the ones that are expeditionary in nature and deploy more frequently. With their history for continually fighting off suggestions of folding them into the Army, they are not likely to go along with this.

If you think it's a problem getting the USAF to focus on airlift and other capabilities rather than strategic bombing and the like, try getting the Active duty Army to transfer all of its heavy stuff to the Guard! The Army likes their toys as much as we do. Besides, the Army's mission is to fight the big war and break nations.

Would there be issues transitioning from one mission to another? We've seen the downside of transitioning from preparing for the bug war to fighting in a COIN environment. If the bulk of our Army is geared toward COIN, does it hurt us when the next peer attacks? The author's purpose and argument is valid, but would it make more sense to expand the Marine Corps and have them geared solely to this and used the Army as heavy backup?