I'm another ARNG officer with a background in force structure, and dealt with HQDA directly for 5 years so I think I can add some additional insight to Mike's comments. Also was a M1A1 company commander in the Guard so I know the strengths and shortcomings of the heavy force in the Guard.

1. TAA is limited in its scope. TAA does not determine the number of BCT's or Divisions, that is left to Congress believe it or not. It's known as the "directed force." Everything other unit is up for grabs - if the Army, throught the Center for Army Analysis at Belvoir, determines that they need X transportation units or Y Combat Support MP units, the three components (AC, ARNG and USAR) sit down for weeks during TAA and try to divvy up the requirements for these units. It's contentious as one might imagine. As Mike said, HQDA always gets the first choice.

2. The USAR gave up the vast majority of their combat force structure in the early 90's stemming from the Quicksilver decision. It basically took all the combat structure out of the USAR and shifted it into the ARNG while the ARNG shifted a lot of CS and CSS into the USAR.

3. As Mike said, resources come from the Title 10 Federal Budget. There are specific Congressional adds (I've worked a few) and they are nowhere as common as you'd think. The ARNG has always been short on modern equipment, which was fine for a force designed to be a strategic reserve. The lack of overall money for procurement played a role, as each piece of equipment has something known as the Army Acquistion Objective (AAO) which determines how many widgets are bought. More often than not, ARNG units wouldn't be placed on the AAO because there wasn't enough cash.

3. Training - training at battalion and BCT level has been difficult, but it's also made more difficult by the lack of CTC rotations (one ARNG BCT per year per CTC...before modularity an Enhanced Brigade went once every 7 years) and a lack of Warfighter/STAFFEX exercises at the BN and above level. It's all about funding - the Army simply isn't diverting the resources to these programs for the ARNG.

4. Poor training is a problem across the board. No one with a straight face can tell me an AC BCT is well trained when it has less than a years dwell time at home station. Again, resourcing and time driven.

5. The overall problem with force structure is that the structure that was designed with Modularity does not match the force structure requirements in the CENTCOM AOR. We've created massive new force structure and equipment requirements in both Afghanistan and Iraq. PRT's, ETT/MiTT's, and the lovely 1/3 heavy, 2/3rds motorized mix have basically caused us to form new armies in both locations.

6. The big issue with the Guard is time, followed by resources. I think's it's very possible to have fully trained platoons in the Guard, and then use post-mob training time to ramp up to company level proficiency with a solid BN and BCT staff. It would help if we could get more STAFFEX's but you have to do the best with what you have.