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Thread: A Modest Proposal - National Guard as the heavy force

  1. #21
    Council Member 120mm's Avatar
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    I've trained NG/RC battalions at JRTC and JMRC. I've been in NG/RC battalions. I have yet to see a single one that can C2 their Battalions (and higher) effectively. Their staff officers tend to be complete duds. Their commanders are too busy trying to "play soldier" in order to actually "suck the egg."

    You indirectly mentioned one of the problems with the National Guard, overall. There are places in this country (usually the ones with the most federal funding, obtw) where the NG is seen as a welfare program. Some of the Southern and Northeastern states come to mind. Some of the soldiers I've met from there tend to be semi- to un-trained, and some admitted to getting paid without actually drilling. (800th MPs, anyone?)

    I don't understand what you are trying to say with the General Honore comment. The Iowa Guard, where I come from, doesn't have a problem sending Infantry and CAV units to disaster relief. What kind of training do you think it takes at the unit level to respond to disasters? There is the 4 hour mandatory "stomp and drag" training that we did (or pencil-whipped) each year.

    Your comment on maintenance is nonsense. Each state has full-time maintenance facilities for "maintaining thermal imaging/targeting systems" and other similarly complex systems. All it takes to maintain heavy armor is decent Company-level leadership that stresses PMCS.

  2. #22
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    I am confused about the General Honore comment myself, especially since the Tornado that hit Enterprise,Al. High school last week. That is about 60 miles south of where I live. At least 3 helicopter medi-vacs were sent from Ft.Rucker (civilians were to chicken to fly) and 100 Alabma National Guardsmen were on the secene within hours doing some of everything that needed to be done. They saved lives and provided a much needed since of security.

  3. #23
    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by 120mm View Post
    I've trained NG/RC battalions at JRTC and JMRC. I've been in NG/RC battalions. I have yet to see a single one that can C2 their Battalions (and higher) effectively. Their staff officers tend to be complete duds. Their commanders are too busy trying to "play soldier" in order to actually "suck the egg."

    You indirectly mentioned one of the problems with the National Guard, overall. There are places in this country (usually the ones with the most federal funding, obtw) where the NG is seen as a welfare program. Some of the Southern and Northeastern states come to mind. Some of the soldiers I've met from there tend to be semi- to un-trained, and some admitted to getting paid without actually drilling. (800th MPs, anyone?)

    I don't understand what you are trying to say with the General Honore comment. The Iowa Guard, where I come from, doesn't have a problem sending Infantry and CAV units to disaster relief. What kind of training do you think it takes at the unit level to respond to disasters? There is the 4 hour mandatory "stomp and drag" training that we did (or pencil-whipped) each year.

    Your comment on maintenance is nonsense. Each state has full-time maintenance facilities for "maintaining thermal imaging/targeting systems" and other similarly complex systems. All it takes to maintain heavy armor is decent Company-level leadership that stresses PMCS.
    Seems like we are doomed from the start. The anecdotal evidence presented in this thread would indicate that today's "Old" Guard couldn't possibly do what we might ask a new Guard organization to try to do.
    I will just stop banging my head against the stone wall here.

  4. #24
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    I did Ac/Rc duty as embedd trainer in a NG battalion. What I learned is that even in the enhanced brigades, which get bettter money, the problem of state versus federal requirements is too great to overcome short of mobilizing the unit (the current model we utilize). The federal reserve dosen't really have the ground combat arms since we got rid of the seperate brigades in the early 1990's. The federal reserve tends to suffer from being underfunded, and the ability to change MOS's too readily. The ARNG suffers from having to be state troops first and foremost. I served in a TSD so I saw what the federal reserve has as far as issues (a lot of old men). I dealt with IT division guys in Iraq (even older men/folks with no MTOE experience), that was not a positive note. I worked with the Arkansas, Louisiana, New York, and Texas Army National Guard during their mobilization train-ups. 120mm hit the nail on the head of the dilemma that the guard has to face. The most successful guard battalions that I saw were commanded by LTC's who really didn't have aspirations of higher command within their states. They were willing to make hard decisions as it came down to answering their state or federal master.

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    I've always thought the reverse argument made more sense from a training and readiness standpoint; the Guard would make better light infantry than anything else, since it's a lot easier for part time soldiers to train light infantry battle drills and common tasks than to concern themselves with vehicle manintenance and mech/armor tactics. It's also historically in line with what a minute man was and might complement disaster relief, homeland security, and constabulary missions better.

    That may not be what's most needed but it seems to make sense just from the perspectives of training and readiness.

    Is there anything in the Marine Corps reserve system worth emulating?

  6. #26
    Council Member Mondor's Avatar
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    I have always wondered why the NG does not have a larger percentage of its resources trained and equipped as military police. During civil disturbances, disasters, natural and otherwise, it seems that an awful lot of the MP skill set would come in handy. I know that when my hometown was hit by a tornado and the NG came in they served in that function. I would imagine that a battalion of MPs would be more useful than a battalion of heavy armor in most civil disturbance scenarios as well.

    I am not saying that all NG units should be MPs. I can see the utility of air and some light armor assets. I have a harder time seeing the need for a MBT rolling down the street. I know that we have a shortage of MP units in theater and that at least 25% of my reserve unit was law enforcement. It would seem to be a natural match.
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  7. #27
    i pwnd ur ooda loop selil's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Mondor View Post
    I have always wondered why the NG does not have a larger percentage of its resources trained and equipped as military police.
    I asked this question about 20 years ago and was told that it's because a vast percentage of the USANG are already law enforcement officers in civilian life. I remember Desert Storm 1 and the depletion in the Sheriffs Department I was working in as dozens of Reserve and Guard troops were deployed. When they came through snapping up IRR it was like a ghost town. Since I was medically discharged from the Marines I wasn't going to be called back, but I could do LOTS of over time as an LEO.
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  8. #28
    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    selil, that is very true the MP unit in Montgomery has already served 2 tours in Iraq and it puts a big dent in LE manpower on the street. MP units are very useful during disasters,riots,etc. so your question about why there are not more is one that should be looked at again. On the other hand during Katrina one of the most used assets down along the coast of Al. and Miss. was the USMC amphibious tractor units, helicopters were over taxed to say the least but the am-tracks could go anywhere. I thought this was strange because if my memory serves me correctly the am-track was originally designed to rescue Hurricane victims and the USMC modified for use in WW2 Ops. Seems like coastal area NG units would have more of this capability.

  9. #29
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    Just my 2 cents as a NG guy with a background in force structure...
    1. HQDA does Total Army Analysis (TAA) every 2 years, which, based on the inputs for what the Army requires, spits out the appropriately sized tactical force and the necessary general force required to execute National Strategy. Of course, this is limited by resource & end strength constraints. We haven't had much say in what DA loads in the front end of the Army Sausage Machine, so the resultant structure is based on what DA wants. When it's done, DA tells the USAR & NG how many of which types of units we get. Sure, we lobby back for future changes, but I haven't seen anything more than onesy-twosy shifts in the past 6 years.
    2. NG resources come from Congress, just like the AC's. Sometimes a Congressional delegation might work a Congressional Add to fund a specific piece of equipment for units in their State, but this is not too frequent & it only gets the equipment, not necessarity the training & maintenance funds to support continued operation. Prior the GWOT, some NG Divisions were resourced as low as 20% of what would be required to conduct full-spectrum operations. I repeat, our funds come from Congress, not the State.
    3. 800 MP Co was NOT a NG unit - they're USAR. Federal, not State. And poor training is not limited to USAR & NG: 507 Maintenance was an AC unit with poor land nav and PMCS training.
    4. The big delay in NG Soldiers responding to Katrina stemmed from the Governor of LA not requesting the support. That's how it works: we don't act until we're asked. Governors get testy if a neighboring State deems them in mortal peril and sends in the troops without an invitation. What sticks in my mind more than GEN honore yelling about weapons was the interview with the guy who complained the NG wasn't there. He said something about "all we see as the Red Cross helicopters." You know, the UH-60s with the red cross on them. AKA NG air ambulances. You'll no doubt recall MS also suffered in Katrina, but they prepositioned the NG & requested support from other States. Katrina was a failure of local & State government, not the NG.
    5. As for C2 capability of NG Battalions and Companies, now that we're being used as an operational reserve, I've noticed a big improvement is the quality of the Commanders & staffs. C2 is a perishable skill. We've deployed units with every OIF rotation since it started & the feedback our units (& Commanders) have received has been significantly on the positive side.
    6. I think the discussion would go much better if we focused on developing a doctrine & building a force structure to match, rather than trying to divvy up the force structure & crafting a Doctrine to match our tools.

    Regards,

    Mike Greene

  10. #30
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    I'm another ARNG officer with a background in force structure, and dealt with HQDA directly for 5 years so I think I can add some additional insight to Mike's comments. Also was a M1A1 company commander in the Guard so I know the strengths and shortcomings of the heavy force in the Guard.

    1. TAA is limited in its scope. TAA does not determine the number of BCT's or Divisions, that is left to Congress believe it or not. It's known as the "directed force." Everything other unit is up for grabs - if the Army, throught the Center for Army Analysis at Belvoir, determines that they need X transportation units or Y Combat Support MP units, the three components (AC, ARNG and USAR) sit down for weeks during TAA and try to divvy up the requirements for these units. It's contentious as one might imagine. As Mike said, HQDA always gets the first choice.

    2. The USAR gave up the vast majority of their combat force structure in the early 90's stemming from the Quicksilver decision. It basically took all the combat structure out of the USAR and shifted it into the ARNG while the ARNG shifted a lot of CS and CSS into the USAR.

    3. As Mike said, resources come from the Title 10 Federal Budget. There are specific Congressional adds (I've worked a few) and they are nowhere as common as you'd think. The ARNG has always been short on modern equipment, which was fine for a force designed to be a strategic reserve. The lack of overall money for procurement played a role, as each piece of equipment has something known as the Army Acquistion Objective (AAO) which determines how many widgets are bought. More often than not, ARNG units wouldn't be placed on the AAO because there wasn't enough cash.

    3. Training - training at battalion and BCT level has been difficult, but it's also made more difficult by the lack of CTC rotations (one ARNG BCT per year per CTC...before modularity an Enhanced Brigade went once every 7 years) and a lack of Warfighter/STAFFEX exercises at the BN and above level. It's all about funding - the Army simply isn't diverting the resources to these programs for the ARNG.

    4. Poor training is a problem across the board. No one with a straight face can tell me an AC BCT is well trained when it has less than a years dwell time at home station. Again, resourcing and time driven.

    5. The overall problem with force structure is that the structure that was designed with Modularity does not match the force structure requirements in the CENTCOM AOR. We've created massive new force structure and equipment requirements in both Afghanistan and Iraq. PRT's, ETT/MiTT's, and the lovely 1/3 heavy, 2/3rds motorized mix have basically caused us to form new armies in both locations.

    6. The big issue with the Guard is time, followed by resources. I think's it's very possible to have fully trained platoons in the Guard, and then use post-mob training time to ramp up to company level proficiency with a solid BN and BCT staff. It would help if we could get more STAFFEX's but you have to do the best with what you have.

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