Yemen 2016 onwards: an intractable war?

[CrowBat]

Simply funny to monitor the PRBS-battle around this war.

While some people are still falling for Houthi nonsense of this kind - Yemen’s Houthis control 100 miles of Saudi Arabia’s territory (if that would be truth, there would be no end of corresponding reports by the Houthis) - and while the IRGC's PR-machinery is still declaring S-24s for 'ballistic missiles', others do better, even though things are still quite PR-coloured: Legitimate Army Advances in Saada, Considers Taiz a Priority.

Namely, the Houthis have meanwhile been kicked completely out of Ta'iz.

The issue is now to kick them outside the artillery range to that city. Thus, while the Houthi PR-machinery is claiming BS of the kind US-Saudi air strikes are killing civilians in Ta'iz, the Saudi-led coalition does not need bombing the city. On the contrary, it's actually the Houthi artillery that's shelling the city and causing dozens of civilian casualties, every single day, and already since more than one year...

...in similar fashion, while all the possible media has forwarded reports like Houthi capture strategic Marcusa mount in Nata district, Bayda - everybody is ignoring the fact they've lost it to a YNA counterattack before being able to shot more than 2-3 photos.

Proof? Hard to get in English; and, certainly enough, Houthi-fans are not going to report it. But, other Yemenis do so, though in Arabic only:
https://mobile.twitter.com/amerAlham...02866917380096
https://mobile.twitter.com/amerAlham...96627135123456
https://mobile.twitter.com/amerAlham...01175497121793

[CrowBat]

Some commentary on what's going on in Yemen - and especially in Aden - of the last few days...

The official Saudi aim of the military intervention in Yemen is 'halting Iranian expansionism' and 'bringing leaders of the Houthi/Saleh coalition to the negotiating table'. For this purpose, the Saudi-led coalition insists on 'supporting the legitimate government' - that of president/former president Hadi.

Indirect aim of related efforts is the re-establishment of the Saudi position of influence in Sana'a.

Now, what caused the ongoing civil war in Yemen are major rifts that emerged within the Yemeni military, and thus the entire Yemeni state, in the wake of reforms introduced by Hadi in period 2012-2014. He dissolved the Republican Guards (always loyal to Saleh, only) and purged the military of Saleh's relatives and allies, thus they opposed him. But, he also tried to purge the military of those affiliated with the Islah Party - the de-facto Yemeni version of the Moslem Brotherhood - like Major-General Ali Mohsen. Thus, they opposed him too, and so on.

Over the time, multiple power blocks crystalised, with 50-60% of the military siding with Saleh and thus with the Houthis, 4-5 brigades with Hadi, up to 15 with Ahmar and thus the Islah etc. The rest of the military either declared neutrality, or sided with the Southern Separatists (i.e. Hirak and the Hadramawt Confederation) or was overrun by the AQAP.

However, Hadi has no wider political support inside Yemen. He's actually supported only by a small number of allied generals and a few (4-5 at most) of Yemen National Army's brigades.

Thus, the Saudis and Hadi were increasingly dependable on the support of the Islah Party - which is de-facto the Yemeni version of the Moslem Brotherhood (MB).

However, back in 2014, Saudi Arabia declared the MBs for terrorists and stopped supporting them. Thus, this party lost badly. Indeed, it could be said that this enabled the Houthis to take over in Sana'a.

But then... well, when the Saudis and allies invaded southern Yemen, in July-August 2015, they advanced so rapidly, a true power vacuum developed in their backs. This was so because the Houthi/Saleh alliance completely destroyed the governmental system, police, and the military in all parts of southern Yemen they've held until then. The AQAP jumped in and brought much of the country under its control.

This was something nobody could tolerate.

Thus, the Saudis and allies had to de-facto stop their advance on Sana'a (in turn offering Houthis/Saleh plenty of time to heavily mine all the ways into northern Yemen), and start building-up new government and new security forces.

In the course of that process, Saudi and Emirati ways of pursuing the re-establishment of the government went each their own way. Since Hadi still has no political support in the country, he and Saudis were left with little choice but to ally with the Islah Party. Unsurprisingly, Riyadh removed the MBs from the list of terrorist organisations, and Ali Ahmar was appointed Hadi's new Minister of Defence. This secured Hadi (and Saudis) the support of everybody affiliated with the Islah.

However, in the meantime the Emiratis have pursued their own politics. They are not only anti-AQAP, but also anti-MBs. And, they are primarily cooperating with the Hirak (Southern Separatists) and the Hadramawt Confederation. They also work with Quietists (Yemeni Salafists fighting against the AQAP and the Houthis). The Emiratis spent most of the Year 2017 securing the Aden area, constructing another forward base (including an airfield) at Perim (or Mayun) Island, and running COIN operations against the AQAP in the Mukalla area. Their alliances with the Hirak, the Hadramawt Confederation, the Quietists, and establishment of the Security Belt Forces resulted in creation of powerful proxies that are controlling de-facto all of southern Yemen. There's next to no place there - except the area few quarters of Aden and most of the area around the Bab al-Mandeb - where the Islah still has the say.

With other words, it's the Emiratis who are now in de-facto control over those parts of Yemen 'liberated' from the Houthis, not the Saudis. Unsurprisingly, the Emirati-supported National Transitional Council now wants to destroy whatever was left of the Hadi's government.

If I'm to ask, this was a great opportunity for the Saudis to get rid of Hadi. There's simply no point in continuing to support him, because political and military realities in Yemen of 2018 are entirely different than they used to be as of September 2014 (not to talk about March 2015). Question is, if they can afford doing so: after all, they all the time insisted that he's the only legitimate president of Yemen.

It appears they - and even the Emiratis - have concluded they can not send Hadi into retirement. Thus, the NTC/STC is already announcing it recognizes Hadi as legitimate president.

I.e. expect the things to get back to where they were before this coup. Only difference will be that Hadi-loyalists will now really have nothing to say.

...and then the net result will be something like Somaliland: an independent South Yemen not recognized by anybody from the outside.

(Note: an alternative would've been a split of the country into two, as originally demanded by the NTC. Something like Northern Yemen, say, ruled by somebody like Saleh's son Ahmed with support of the Islah and the Houthis; and Southern Yemen, ruled by the NTC.)

[CrowBat]

...all of that summarised - perhaps as a 'basic guide' for all the new-comers into related affairs - and by your very own:

A New State Is Emerging in Yemen

A new country is beginning to form in the chaos and confusion of Yemen’s civil war. A coup in Aden in late January 2018 has hastened the process.

The new Yemen has its roots in the period 1990 to 1994, when the Saudi-supported North Yemen and the Cuban/Soviet-supported South were forcibly united. The united Yemen was dominated by a clique surrounding North Yemen president Abdullah Saleh.

Although he eventually appointed a southerner – Soviet-trained Maj. Gen. Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi as his vice president, Saleh ruled the country like a family enterprise. He appointed his son, nephews and other members of his family and tribe to all important positions of the military and the state.

All the power, and most of development, were concentrated in Sana’a, and the Saleh clique had the final word in every single state affair.

Saleh and his clique tended to disparage the southerners as “Eritreans” and “Indians,” because Aden was predominantly populated by people who came the region as laborers during the British colonial period.

Saleh and his clique likewise discriminated against many northerners, describing those of Zaidi origin as “backward.”
...

[davidbfpo]

Tom,

Thank you for being so informative on the situation in the whole of the Yemen.

This sentence reminded me of a couple of factors:

On the contrary, the Emiratis intensified their cooperation with the southerners, foremost the separatists and the Hadramawt Confederation.

There is a "kith & kin" link between the Gulf states that dates back a long time, I understand it was based on commercial and trading links. This was reinforced in 1967 when the UK left Aden and "up country", many of the traditional leaders in the Hadramawt and elsewhere fled to the Gulf. At least one senior UAE official is from the Hadramawt.

I do wonder if these leaders ever returned, either when the Communist regime ended or later.

Dr Elisabeth Kendall @ Pembroke College, Oxford University is a regular visitor to the Yemen, including long term access to the Hadramawt. To see her publications dip into:https://oxford.academia.edu/ElisabethKendall and her slim bio:

In she wrote a 14 pgs. paper 'Iran’s Fingerprints in Yemen' in October 2017 for the Atlantic Council and concluded:

a conflict that began essentially as a politically and tribally motivated dispute over territory, resources and power may yet over time turn into a long-term cycle of bloody sectarian violence. In this respect, the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen is – to some extent – helping to exacerbate the very problem it claimed to be designed to solve.

Link:http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/image...n_web_1019.pdf

Would a semi-independent South Yemen, following the Somaliland model, really be that bad for the people? It might suit the diplomats and outsiders, but on reflection have they really helped the people that much for many years?

[CrowBat]

AFAIK, they never returned. They are still in the UAE.... which is why the UAE has it as easy to deal with them: there is lots of mutual sympathy.

Would a semi-independent South Yemen, following the Somaliland model, really be that bad for the people?

It would be a realistic solution, apparently conform to what most of the people living in that part of Yemen want - too.

But, well: try convincing governments of various countries that have 'problems with separatists' to accept a secession of South Yemen. That's also the reality, and why Somaliland is still not internationally recognized.

[davidbfpo]

A slightly long article and the sub-title gives a clue why:

The commonly held view that the conflicts in Yemen – and elsewhere in the region – are a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia must be revised.

Link:https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-...li-abdullah-s?

The more you read, the more Byzantine the Yemen seems. President Saleh was:

Despite also being a member of the Houthis’ Zaidi sect, he had little regard for sectarian loyalty; in the pursuit of power he allied with Sunni Salafists against Zaidi Houthis, and later with the Houthis against everyone else.

[davidbfpo]

A short paper (44 pgs) by a British academic who has spent years in the Yemen and published by a US think tank (POMED) on a fascinating aspect of the multiple conflicts in the Yemen.

A "taster" from the summary:

Some Western observers (along with many Yemeni government authorities) contend that a key reason for AQAP’s staying-power is that some tribes are aligned with the terrorist group and provide it with safe havens, fighters, and other support. To be sure, AQAP has a presence in some tribal areas, and some tribal members (along with other Yemenis, and some foreigners) have joined the group. But in doing so, they have acted independently, against the wishes of their tribes. Yemeni tribes as collective entities —as opposed to individual tribesmen—have not allied with AQAP or agreed to give its fighters sanctuary. Tribes reject the group’s radical and violent ideology and tend to see AQAP as a serious challenge to their authority.

Because of tribal pushback, AQAP has only been able to seize territory and make other gains in parts of Yemen where the tribal structure is relatively weak. The failure of the Yemeni ruling elite to seriously confront the AQAP problem, and the civil war instigated by that same ruling elite, have been more significant factors in the group’s spread than any tribal action.

Link:http://pomed.org/wp-content/uploads/...NAL_180201.pdf

[CrowBat]

A slightly long article and the sub-title gives a clue why:Link:https://www.opendemocracy.net/north-...li-abdullah-s?

The more you read, the more Byzantine the Yemen seems. President Saleh was:

Rather tragically, such articles come much too late: nearly three years since everybody with a good insight there was warning about US decision-makers having no clue what are they doing in Yemen.

I really do not understand why do the USA always must do everything wrong in cases like this one?

Worst of all: why this insistence on specific ideas and turning these into dogmas?

At earlier times (say: Vietnam), the 'moment of realisation' - the 15th or 16th time the US hit the wall with the forehead - would've been enough to prompt a major change in the politics. In the cases like Afghanistan, Iraq, and now Syria and Yemen, not even this is happening any more...