Yemen 2016 onwards: an intractable war?

**CrowBat** · 05-06-2016

A 'quick and dirty' review of (important) news from Yemen, of the last few days:

Another 'turn-over' in this war might be in the making: Are Saudis prepared to drop Hadi to make peace in Yemen?

...Although the current talks in Kuwait began over two weeks ago, there has been little progress. They had started with a wobble: the Houthi/Saleh delegation arrived three days late in protest at the fact the ceasefire nominally in place was not being respected by the other side. From the outset of the negotiations, they had always wanted a complete ceasefire, not a mere "cessation of hostilities". Once their delegates arrived in Kuwait, they spent the first two days arguing precisely this point.

Kuwait’s foreign affairs minister, who was desperate to secure a home-soil diplomatic coup for his country, immediately travelled to Riyadh for talks with the Saudis and, in the days since, despite reports of coalition jets patrolling Yemeni airspace, there have been relatively few air strikes since; a positive outcome already.

For many, this apparent shift in Saudi policy shows the urgency of reaching a settlement on their part. However, whilst there are mounting indications Riyadh desperately wants out of this conflict, several foreign diplomats I’ve spoken to insist that the Saudis are not willing to seek an exit at any cost; many are still expecting, or hoping for, some sort of victory.

Despite that initial three-day delay in Kuwait, direct talks between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia had been under way for weeks, already a major breakthrough. So far, these discussions have produced several confidence-building measures, including prisoner exchanges, and a ceasefire at the border. They have also delivered a cessation of hostilities – both of Houthi cross-border attacks and coalition bombings in North Yemen – that has held since.

“Riyadh is where the talks are really happening,” a senior diplomat told me. What about President Hadi and his government? I asked. “At some point, they will have to accept that they have to go,” he replied. I was reminded of recent reports from Yemen suggesting many of Hadi’s ministers have been busy selling their properties and assets in the country. I wanted to tell him they had seemingly come to terms with their fate, and are merely buying time now.
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But if the Houthis and the Saudis cut a deal, I asked the diplomat, what would happen to the forces on the ground fighting for Hadi, such as the militias in Taiz and Aden? “I think we have known for a while now that they aren’t under Hadi’s control, and they most certainly are not fighting for him,” he responded.

This was something I had considered, and written about, before but had always refused to believe. To hear it stated so bluntly by a senior diplomat was shocking. The notion that the dozens of armed militias currently operating across the country were under nobody’s control was too frightening to contemplate, and confirms fears that even if a peace deal is struck Yemen might not see peace for years, possibly decades to come.
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Al-Qaida withdrawing from 2 cities east of Yemen's Aden port

...Al-Qaida militants in Yemen are pulling out of two coastal cities east of the key southern port of Aden following tribal-led negotiations, security officials and witnesses said on Thursday.

The pullout from Zinjibar and Jaar is which is expected to take less than a week, they said. The officials spoke on condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to talk to reporters while the witnesses did so out of safety concerns.
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Meanwhile, Aden's civilian airport reopened on Thursday after months of closure due to security concerns, said Tarek Abdu Ali, the chief of the airport. The first passenger plane, coming from Jordan, landed around midday, he said.

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The FNA reports several 'Saudi' air strikes on targets in Sana'a area, the last two days:

...The Saudi Air Force has launched several air raids over the capital city of Sana'a in the last two days, causing damage in a number of residential areas, several sources said on Thursday.

"In addition to bombing Sana'a, the Saudi Air Force also targeted the Ansarullah-controlled Anad Camp and a number of districts in Ma'rib province, killing a number of civilians and fighters," the sources added.
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The Yemen Post reported five air strikes already on 3 May, and clashes in four different regions - including Hajjah and Ta'iz. Especially the latter should be heavily shelled by Houthis and YA.

Finally, UAE-trained Yemenis land on Socotra island

A contingent of Yemeni soldiers that has been trained in the United Arab Emirates (UAE) has landed on Socotra (Suqutra) island in the Arabian Sea, Yemeni media channels reported on 2 May.

The reports were supported by photographs showing soldiers at a location that could be identified as Soctra Airport. They were wearing a type of tricolour desert uniform that has been used by the UAE armed forces in the past. A Boeing C-17 Globemaster III - a heavy transport aircraft used by the UAE's air force - could be seen in the background.
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With other words: the cease-fire in Yemen is about to collapse.

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Earlier reports cited arrival of a 'US Special Forces team' in Mukalla, and meanwhile the Yemen Post is reporting arrival of no less but '100 (US Army) Rangers in southern Yemen.

Also, the US military is getting more-intensively involved against the AQAP in general:

... The U.S. military is helping Yemeni, Emirati and Arab Coalition forces that are battling al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula, and were recently able to retake the port city of Mukalla from AQAP control.

A senior U.S. official said that American special operations forces are advising the Yemeni and Emirati forces in the region, and that they are working at the headquarters level and are not near the conflict. The official was not authorized to discuss the issue publicly so spoke on condition of anonymity.

Navy Capt. Jeff Davis, a Pentagon spokesman, said the U.S. is providing "limited support" to the Arab Coalition and Yemeni operations in and around Mukalla. He said that includes planning, airborne surveillance, intelligence gathering, medical support, refueling and maritime interdiction.

Davis declined to discuss whether or not special operations forces were in the country. But he said the U.S. has sent a number of ships to the region including the USS Boxer amphibious ready group and the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit, which is embarked with the group. The USS Gravely and USS Gonzalez, both Navy destroyers, are also in the area.

"Trained and supported by an Arab Coalition led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Yemeni government forces and resistance fighters have retaken Mukalla and continue their offensive against AQAP in eastern Yemen," said Davis. "AQAP remains a significant security threat to the United States and to our regional partners and we welcome this effort to specifically remove AQAP from Mukalla and to degrade, disrupt and destroy AQAP in Yemen."
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**CrowBat** · 05-08-2016

While Yemeni peace-talks were suspended (again), it's meanwhile 'official': US sends troops to Yemen, steps up anti-Al Qaeda strikes

The Pentagon acknowledged for the first time on Friday it has deployed US troops to Yemen since the country's collapse last year to bolster government and Arab coalition forces battling Al Qaeda.

Spokesman Navy Captain Jeff Davis said the US military has also stepped up air strikes against fighters with Yemen-based Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

A "very small number" of American military personnel has been working from a "fixed location" with Yemeni and Arab coalition forces — especially the Emiratis — in recent weeks around Mukalla, a port city seized by AQAP a year ago, Davis said.

"This is of great interest to us. It does not serve our interests to have a terrorist organisation in charge of a port city, and so we are assisting in that," the spokesman added.

He said the troops were helping the Emiratis with "intelligence support", but declined to say if they are special operations forces.
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The Pentagon announced it has carried out a string of strikes on Al Qaeda in recent weeks, outside of Mukalla.

“We have conducted four counterterrorism strikes against AQAP since April 23, killing 10 Al Qaeda operatives and injuring another,” Davis said.
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Meanwhile, various other sources announce at least a 'moderate' - and certainly 'growing' US military presence in Yemen: US deploy over 200 soldiers in S Yemen, stations assault ship

The United States military has deployed more than 200 US Marines in the port city of Mukalla in the central province of Hadramout, Yemeni media say, APA reports quoting Press TV.

The forces were deployed in the important seaport and oil terminal on Saturday, Yemen's Arabic-language al-Masirah news website reported. The amphibious assault ship USS Boxer with more than 1,200 sailors and Marines as well as a group of vessels aboard were also stationed offshore in the Gulf of Aden.
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Finally, only now, more than a year after the start of the Saudi-led military intervention, are serious points in the USA starting to criticise the entire adventure: Former U.S. Diplomats Decry the U.S.-Backed Saudi War in Yemen

...“I don’t think you can restore a government, especially an unpopular one, from the air, and I don’t think the use of force in this matter does anything but create long-term enmity,” said Chas Freeman, who served as the ambassador to Saudi Arabia between 1989 and 1992. He noted that former President Hadi’s unpopularity was partly due to his deep ties to Saudi Arabia and the United States. Freeman is currently a senior fellow at the Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs at Brown University.

Barbara Bodine, who served as ambassador to Yemen between 1997 and 2001, directed us to recent remarks she made on the Zogby Show about the impact of the bombings on Yemen’s social fabric.

“It’s just been pushed over the edge,” she told host James Zogby. “It’s been declared a level 3 humanitarian crisis, there’s only four of those in the world. … The devastation of the physical damage, infrastructure damage, … the water system to the extent it has existed has been completely destroyed.” Bodine is currently a professor of diplomacy at Georgetown University.
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All of the diplomats pointed out that, contrary to administration statements that the Saudi war is serving counterterrorism objectives, the war has actually undermined U.S. national security interests. In particular, they noted that the campaign against the Houthis has allowed one of its enemies – al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) – to seize more territory.
Grappo220

“No question about that, no question whatsoever, that the war has turned everyone’s attention away from what concerns us most, and that’s violent extremism and terrorist groups,” said Gary Grappo, a former deputy chief of mission to Saudi Arabia. “Al Qaeda has grown in strength, and in numbers, and in resources, and that’s directly related to the turning of attention to the internal instability and ultimately the war in Yemen.” Grappo is currently CEO & founder of Equilibrium International Consulting.
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“I would argue that the Houthis were not in the Iranian camp until they were driven into it by necessity,” Freeman said. “When they were attacked by the Saudis – or counter-attacked, depending on how you see it – they needed support from somewhere, and they got it from Tehran. So the Saudi effort to punish the Iranians [for the nuclear deal] by punishing the Houthis ironically cemented the relationship between Iran and the Houthis that otherwise probably would not have existed.”

Khoury also described the Houthi-Iranian relationship as having been advanced by the Saudi-led bombing campaign. “Once the Houthis got there, they thought … they are [also] against the Saudis so they must be good friends to Iran, so they started [cooperating],” he said.

Of course, nobody is commenting about this operation probably being a 'bargain' between Oblala and Salman: 'go to Yemen, leave Syria to Iranians'. Connecting dots was never an accepted way of thinking in the DC.

**CrowBat** · 05-10-2016

Here we go again:

- Saudi-led intergalactic coalition re-launched its air strikes on Houthis. One of primary targets was the Umaliqah Military Camp in northern Amran (south of Sa'ada). Up to 60 were flown in the last 48 hours. al-Bawaba reports 13 KIA there, including 5 para-medics, and 15 WIA.

- Houthis responded by at least one SSM fired at Khamis Mushayt in Saudi Arabia, during the night form Sunday to Monday (8-9 May); Saudis claim to have shoot down the same.

By now, the Royal Saudi Air Defence Force must be the most experienced military service around the world - at least in deploying PAC-2s and PAC-3s for defence from Scuds and Tochkas.

To make things really sarcastic: Saudi intercepts missile from Yemen but truce holds

Saudi Arabia intercepted a ballistic missile fired from Yemen on Monday, but a Saudi-led military coalition said it would maintain a shaky truce despite the "serious escalation" by the Houthi militia and its allies, state news agency SPA said.
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Sounds like both sides are rapidly learning - from Assadist and (especially) Russian behaviour.

**CrowBat** · 05-10-2016

Also of interest: Tip-offs helped accelerate Al Mukalla liberation

...Since government forces booted Al Qaida out of major port cities in the province of Hadramout on April 24, the governor of Hadramout, Major General Ahmad Bin Bourek, has come under the spotlight apparently for playing a role along with many generals in engineering the plan that pushed out Al Qaida at stunning speed. General Bin Bourek talked to Gulf News about the operation and post-Al Qaida Mukalla, the capital of Hadramout.

What is your general assessment of the situation in the recently liberated areas in Hadramout?

The situation is improving quickly. Today is better than yesterday and yesterday was better than the day before. We are working day and night to bring about security and stability in the city of Mukalla and other regions. The most important [achievement] is putting an end to theft and pillage gangs. The security situation in Mukalla would improve much more when we deploy policemen and army soldiers in their uniform at checkpoints in order for the people to see the features of a standing army that represents the state. Also, armed police officers in uniform would be deployed on streets and in police stations. We seek to present the liberated Mukalla’s culture and civilisation as a model.

You are talking about your efforts to bring peace and security to the city of Mukalla. How about other liberated cities like Ghayel Bawazer and Sheher?

We have sent army troops to the two cities to replace local resistance committees who took charge of security after liberation. We are determined to entrench the state’s symbolism in these two cities through the presence of the army and security services. The army sappers are removing mines planted by Al Qaida in Sheher, and along roads between these two cities and interior localities.

The liberated areas, especially Mukalla, are weirdly peaceful. Many people thought that Al Qaida would retaliate for defeat by mounting deadly suicide attacks. But nothing has happened since liberation. Why?

The forces that were designated to liberate Mukalla were professionally trained in raids and clashes. During our stay outside Yemen, we prepared our plan based on intelligent information from inside Mukalla. We knew their locations and numbers. [Shortly before the operation] we were informed that Al Qaida’s professional fighters had departed the city to Hajjar valley [in Hadramout], Shabwa, Abyan and Marib. The accurate air strikes and their inability to fight off our forces prompted them into exiting.
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How about the UAE military’s support?

The Emirati brothers had played a vital role by providing air and logistical support that helped Hadrami forces during battles. They trained the elite forces for a year, paid their salaries, armed them and would continue helping us until we stand on our own feet and make sure that the Hadrami leaders would take Hadramout to safety.

Let’s talk about Mukalla liberation plan. How did you prepare it? Who helped you?

Before Al Qaida captured Mukalla in April 2015, we had intelligence that Al Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula was gathering in Hadramout and their leaders were flocking to training and recruiting camps. They were trained in making bombs. The militants were not only from Yemen but of many nationalities including Egyptian, Syrian, American, Australian, French, British and from GCC states. Some militants who plotted the blowing up of US airlines were trained in Hadramout. Our intelligence information showed that the armed men who attacked the French magazine Charlie Hebdo and some who plotted attacks in Belgium were trained in Hadramout and got their plans from here.

Practically, Hadramout has been classified as a central breeding ground for producing and financing terrorism worldwide. Their capture of Mukalla in April last year supported the overall impression about Al Qaida. So it was imperative to create a plan to purge Hadramout of them. But we lacked abilities and training.

So how did you set up this plan?

When Decisive Storm operation began, the coalition, mainly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, backed our plan. The first step was mobilising military forces from Hadramout as the people here would not welcome foreign forces. At the same time, we gathered information about them from our agents who penetrated them.

A month before the beginning of the liberation process, a group of people, who were misled by Al Qaida’s religious banners, contacted us and said they would part ways with Al Qaida if and only if we protected them. They tipped us off about Al Qaida car bombs and training camps. We managed to get rid of Al Qaida in 20 hours as the operation came within a series of military operations by the coalition in other provinces like Lahj, Abyan and Aden. The operations weakened them to a great extent and crippled their abilities for manoeuvring.

We succeeded because all walks of Hadrami society including tribes and Salafis regardless to their religious and political affiliations took part in liberation. We succeeded in record time because Al Qaida realised that no one would fight for or cover them. They found themselves exposed. A night before marching towards Mukalla, we landed some armed Salafis from the sea who controlled the seaport and airport.

Is it true that Al Qaida planted mines inside vital facilities in Mukalla?

They planted a huge number of mines because they felt that no one would stand by them. We are in need of help from brotherly and friendly countries to help us defuse them. They planted them inside police stations, government buildings, parks, the airport and Dhabah oil terminal. The UAE sappers would not be able to completely clear them before six months.

Some media reports say that militants retreated after mediation by local tribal and religious leaders. Can you confirm?

They pushed some forces into mediating with us. After realising that they cannot fight our forces, they demanded that they should be allowed to depart to one area. We refused, as per the directives from the president that there should not be any talks with the terrorists.

Hm... sounds like 'typical Arab-style warfare': short battle, then negotiate (or the other way around).

**CrowBat** · 05-12-2016

WINEP's Dr. Michael Knights goes on with a particularly interesting piece, discussing actual Saudi strategy against the AQAP: Gulf Coalition Targeting AQAP in Yemen

Centrepiece:

... Preparations for the current anti-AQAP campaign began as early as April 2015 with the opening of quiet negotiations between the Gulf coalition and key tribes in southern and eastern Yemen. By February 2016, the coalition was engaged in a major military effort to clear AQAP from al-Mukalla and the Lahij-Abyan coastal corridor.

To facilitate the campaign, units from the United Arab Emirates have brought to bear many of the lessons learned during deployments in Somalia, Afghanistan, and Libya. In Aden, the coalition developed six 100-man units of local resistance fighters bolstered by UAE special forces, while Gulf intelligence agencies worked with locals to create an AQAP and Islamic State target list. In early March, coalition airstrikes hit AQAP's leadership in Burayqah and in northern neighborhoods such as Salahuddin, Sheikh Othman, and Mansoura; on March 14, a UAE Mirage 2000 jet crashed in Burayqah during a low pass over Aden, reportedly downed by an AQAP 9K32 Strela man-portable air-defense system (MANPADS). On March 20, 600 Yemeni personnel mounted in UAE-supplied Nimr tactical vehicles launched ground operations against AQAP. With support from UAE Apache helicopters, they cleared the Mansoura district and dislodged AQAP fighters from their stronghold in the Mansoura central prison, killing an estimated 120 of them.

To the east, the coalition undertook a similar project in al-Mukalla, but on a far greater scale. A year ago, it began patiently developing a 10,000-strong force to recapture the city, including around 4,500 Yemeni army troops of the 2nd MRC, around 1,500 tribal fighters from the Hadramawt Tribal Confederation (HTC), and around 4,000 anti-AQAP rebels from within al-Mukalla itself. As in Aden, these forces eventually helped the coalition create a granular target list of AQAP operating locations, which were then hit by airstrikes and naval gunfire beginning on April 18, 2016. On April 20, army troops of the 1st MRC supported by UAE Apaches recaptured the PetroMasila oil facilities 190 kilometers north of al-Mukalla. And on April 23, the coalition launched ground operations to recapture the city itself and its nearby port and military bases. In two days of heavy fighting, AQAP tried to block the 2nd MRC and HTC forces from sweeping south into al-Mukalla, employing defensive positions on the three approach roads about 50 kilometers north. These blocking positions were defeated, allowing relief forces to link up with the anti-AQAP resistance inside the city on April 25, while UAE marines made ancillary landings along the coast to the east. An estimated 450 AQAP fighters were killed in these operations.

The campaigns in al-Mukalla and Aden have been complemented by follow-on efforts to prevent AQAP re-infiltration. Pursuit operations have spread east of Aden and west of al-Mukalla to break the group's hold on coastal towns and roads, and internal resistance forces are being retained as local police, with salaries paid by the coalition for now. In addition, even before liberating certain neighborhoods, coalition forces covertly surveyed the essential services needed by local communities, enabling them to immediately distribute food from warehouses and dispatch reconstruction teams in AQAP's wake to replace or improve on services the group and its tribal allies were providing.
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Curiously, the final chapter - 'Implications for US Policy' - falls rather short. It is not addressing the issue of negative repercussions for the US (and UK's) politics towards the KSA, allies and Yemen, in the light of what is de-facto a 'defeat' on the PR-plan.

Namely, while it now turns out there was a carefully orchestrated strategy for launching an offensive against the AQAP, run already since April 2015, nothing was done to prevent creation of impression that 'Saudis are not the least keen to fight AQAP', which came into being in the last 15 months.

Even less so to explain cases (especially in such places like Ta'iz) where there is no doubt that US-supported actions by Saudi-led coalitions resulted in support of the local branch of the AQAP too.

My conclusion is that part of reason for this situation is that militaries like those of the Saudis, Emiratis etc. remain 'public shy'. Essentially, for them everything military-related is de-facto OPSEC. However, their brass should either know better, or at least learn that nowadays it's not enough to spend a few billions to buy critical or potentially critical media: one has to take care for the actual message to reach the public too. In the case of this war, there was clearly a failure in this regards.

Correspondingly, a missing lesson from this campaign is that while specific 'Arab' militaries came of their age and are 'finally functioning', their and PR-skills and -relations of their political masters remain a major problem, exactly like in the last 70+ years.