The botched special operations raid in al-Bayda that resulted in the death of William “Ryan” Owens and several Yemeni civilians on January 29 brought renewed attention to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Houthis’ war in Yemen. However, the media has all but forgotten about the Southern secessionists, Hirak, a movement that will be essential to establishing lasting peace in Yemen whenever hostilities finally end. Hirak, now frequently referred to as the Southern Resistance, is a movement comprised of several ideologically and politically fragmented factions that share a common desire for Southern independence, either through the creation of a southern federal region or outright secession. The movement shares some of the same grievances as those that led the Houthis to seize Sanaa in 2014, but the civil war that has raged since then has only stoked their desire for independence from the North.
Civil wars create unusual alliances. Hirak has been a quiet force behind the Yemeni government and Saudi coalition’s military successes in the south, but the group’s military alliance with exiled President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi and Saudi Arabia does not presage a smooth transition when the war ends. Saudi Arabia, emboldened by signs of support from the #Trump administration, appears keen on securing a military victory rather than pursuing a political solution with the Houthis. However, there will eventually come a time when the Houthis, Hadi, and Saudi Arabia return to the table to end hostilities and establish the terms of a transitional Yemeni government. When that time does come, the pressures holding the Hirak-Hadi alliance together will dissipate as pre-conflict fractures reemerge. The United States, Saudi Arabia, and the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council# must involve Hirak in the process to avoid repeating the same mistakes made in the flawed agreement and National Dialogue Conference that followed Yemen’s Arab Spring uprising in 2011.
Shared Grievances, Different Approaches
Southern military and political leaders in Aden formed Hirak in 2007. The peaceful protest movement aimed to call attention to the exclusionary policies of northern elites who captured many key government and military positions following Yemen’s unification in 1990 and the civil war in 1994. After attempts to secede during the civil war, the movement spread east from Aden to al-Mahra and began addressing broader grievances such as the appropriation of southern land and resources. This helped build secessionist sentiment across the south. However, secessionist sentiment is still most popular in Aden and southwestern cities, where residents hold fond memories of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen’s socialist past. Southerners from more tribal southwestern governorates such as Hadramawt are skeptical of their counterpart’s socialist leanings and the idea of secession, but they share a common desire of greater independence from the north.
The Houthis and southerners were both politically and economically marginalized in their respective areas of the country by former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who sought to limit the power of those who might pose a threat to the ruling General People’s Congress. Saleh cracked down on the Houthis due to their advocacy for maintaining Zaydi religious traditions and outspoken criticism of the relationship between Yemen and the United States. Hirak was marginalized because of Saleh’s distrust of southern military officials and the region’s abundant resources, which were exploited to line the regime’s coffers. Both faced violent military crackdowns, but Hirak’s confrontations with the military pale in comparison to the six Saada Wars fought between Houthis and the Yemeni military between 2004 and 2009 .# Although Hirak’s grievances are tied to local political realities, the group’s disdain for the ruling elite led them to find common cause with the Houthis during the Arab Spring and while participating in the National Dialogue Conference.
Among the most important and elusive goals of the conference was the establishment of a new state structure that would reconcile tensions with the Houthis in Saada and satiate Hirak’s desire for southern independence. The “8+8 committee,” comprised of eight representatives from the north and eight from the south agreed to transform Yemen into a federal entity in December 2013 but did not agree on the boundaries or number of federal regions. Without consulting the 8+8 committee, a different committee appointed by Hadi created six new federal regions – Saba, Azal, al-Janad, Tihama, Aden, and Hadramawt – and sent the proposal to the Constitution Drafting Committee for acceptance in the conference outcomes.
Thus, although the National Dialogue Conference gave greater representation to Yemen’s youth and women, it still clearly favored the interests of the United States and the Gulf monarchies because it ensured that Yemen would be governed by a well-known, predictable political figure willing to support U.S. operations against al-Qaeda and mantain an amicable relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council. As a result, it was viewed by many Yemenis, not least the Houthis and Hirak, as an elite pact that sought to demobilize groups that participated in the Arab Spring uprisings. The entrenched political and bureaucratic structures that Yemenis fought so hard to dismantle were intentionally left intact by the Saudi-sponsored agreement, which favored maintaining the status quo over social justice and the creation of a progressive democracy.
Hirak and the Houthis immediately rejected the outcome. #While Hirak staged demonstrations across Southern Yemen, the Houthis were making their march toward Sanaa, where they seized control of the government. In September 2014, the Houthis signed the Peace and National Partnership Agreement with President Hadi. This called for the implementation of the National Dialogue Conference plan, provided that the state’s structure was revisited, and the formation of an inclusive government with Houthi and Hirak representatives serving as presidential advisors. Hirak supported the agreement and southern representatives engaged favorably in the short-lived process.
However, Hirak’s relationship with the Houthis soured when the latter’s forces began laying siege to southern towns in pursuit of Hadi, who resigned on January 22, 2015 before fleeing to Aden in February . The Houthi’s plundering of southern territory was too reminiscent of previous northern hostilities for Hirak to support the Houthis, pushing them into an uneasy relationship with Hadi and the Saudi coalition...
The risks of forgetting yemen’s southern secessionist movement
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