Yemen 2016 onwards: an intractable war?

[OUTLAW 09]

Yemen #Houthis lost port town al-Mukha
http://wikimapia.org/#lang=de&lat=13...5920&z=13&m=b#

[OUTLAW 09]

The war in Yemen: 40 photos of the conflict pitting Iran-allied Houthis against a Saudi-led Sunni Arab coalition
http://reut.rs/2ks3QUe

[CrowBat]

Sorry but can't hear nor see this with 'Iranian-backed Houthis', 'Iranian proxies' etc. any more. Really, that's just plain nonsense.

It was already back in April 2015 that US SOCOM officers that used to serve in Yemen, have declared the entire Saudi-led operation for a 'bad idea', and clearly stated:

"These constant reports that the Houthis are working for the Iranians are nonsense, but the view is right out of the neocon playbook,” he said. “The Israelis have been touting this line that we lost Yemen to Iran. That’s absurd. The Houthis don’t need Iranian weapons. They have plenty of their own. And they don’t require military training. They’ve been fighting Al-Qaeda since at least 2012, and they’ve been winning. Why are we fighting a movement that’s fighting Al-Qaeda?”

Instead, Trump's and his odballs are now babbling about a 'major confrontation with Iran in Yemen' and 'defence against terrorism' and whatever else - and this at the time that 'Vice President' and 'Deputy Supreme Commander' of Hadi's 'Yemen government' - namely Major-General Ali Mohsen - is well-known for having close ties to jihadists and Moslem Brotherhood already since late 1980s, and direct links to the AQAP since this was established (in 2009).

Perhaps they could first show some evidence for at least one IRGC thug in Yemen: eight years since such claims were published for the first time (by Saudis and by Israelis), it would be about the time to do so.

[CrowBat]

And another Emirati base is about to emerge on the Horn of Africa, this time in Somaliland:

Somalia's breakaway northern territory of Somaliland has said the United Arab Emirates can establish a military base in its territory.

The Emirati government in January submitted a formal application seeking permission from the Somaliland government to open a military base in the port town of Berbera.

The parliament of Somaliland on Sunday approved the UAE plan. The plan is controversial and the neighboring countries of Ethiopia and Djibouti are opposed to it, according to local reports.

In Sunday's vote 144 lawmakers were in favor of the military base, two voted against and two abstained. Nine others opposed to the base shouted against President Ahmed Silanyo and were led out of the chamber by soldiers. Silanyo had spoken in favor of the base, saying it would create jobs in Somaliland.

The UAE government is planning to establish a naval base with warships that would be used to attack Shia Houthi fighters fighting the government in Yemen, according to a Somaliland official who insisted on anonymity because he is not authorized to speak to the press.

Speaking at the parliament session, Somaliland's president said that the military base would benefit Somaliland most and help create jobs.

The plan follows a multimillion dollar, 30-year contract for UAE's international ports operator, DP World, to manage Somaliland's largest port, Berbera.
...

What DailyStar missed is that the purpose of the same will be for the Emiratis to fight the AQAP in Yemen, though.

[CrowBat]

...before somebody starts to scream about 'total war between Saudi Arabia and Emirates in Yemen'...

Yesteday, a group of disgruntled members of the al-Hizam al-Amni - an UAE-set-up security service for Hadi, primarily responsible for defence from AQAP - opened fire at an UAEAF AH-64 Apache helicopter underway near the Aden IAP.

Media then reported that the 'Saudis opened fire at Emiratis' - which is pure BS.

Actually, the crew of the Apache in question returned fire and knocked out one of HA's vehicles. Perhaps killed three of dummies that fired at it (that's unclear). Those responsible for opening fire (including the head of the HA in Aden) were then arrested and Hadi meanwhile ordered the HA to be integrated into the Ministry of Interior.

It appears the entire affair was provoked by usual practices of such Yemeni 'generals' like Hadi, Ali Mohsen and others - though introduced and then happily spread by nobody less but Saleh, already back in early 1980s - along which commanders are pocketing pays of their troops. They do this so that they report their units at 100% of their authorised strength, while actually keeping them at anything between 50 and 70%. Thus they can pocket pays for between 30 and 50% of troops that are not there (so-called 'phantom troops'). Whenever one of thugs considers his cut for not enough then he goes further and out of, say, 12 monthly vages he should pay his their troops, he usually pays only 10.

BTW, all of this is why nobody really knows the actual troop strength of all the Yemeni military branches, parties etc.

...some lovely allies there, Trump wants to fight for...

[CrowBat]

Here a short report about what has the potential of becoming quite an interesting issue. Namely, according to article a Shi'a Syrian-Iraqi militia, backed by Iran, threatened U.S. ships in the Red Sea in response to Trumps travel ban in a speech aired on an al Houthi news outlet from Hezbollah territory in Beirut (in Arabic), the Iraqi-Syrian Shi'a militia Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas (aka 'LAFA') intends to 'expand' to... well, at least the Red Sea, if not outright to Yemen.

This is not only surprising, but might point in direction of a major escalation.

Namely, the group in question is the Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas militia ('LAFA'). This was something like the 'core' of what subsequently developed into the Hezbollah/Syria and an entire myriad of additional Shi'a militias in Syria. Unlike Hezbollah and Harakat an-Nujba, they are allied but not subordinated to the IRGC. But, they are supported by the IRGC.

LAFA's militia was greatly expanded the last two years (from one into at least three brigades; majority of staff is meanwhile of Syrian origin, while about 700 remain Iraqi citizens).

So far, the primary difference between the LAFA and the IRGC/Hezbollah conglomerate is that the LAFA doesn't espouse the Khomeinist ideology of Wilayat al-Faqih, i.e. 'Guardianship of the Jurist'. If they are now 'represented' in Lebanon, and then issuing such threats, and if they now want to expand their activities even further, and then to Yemen... well, Trump might get his 'Iranians' he's looking for in that country.

[CrowBat]

Here comes the next hype: no, there are no 'Houthi air defences', and they didn't shot down a Saudi jet over Ma'rib.

Saudi (or, more likely: Emirati) air defences have shot down a Houthi/Saleh ballistic missile over Ma'rib.

And finally, thanks whomever, a sane assessment in following regards: Iran’s Small Hand in Yemen (though I wouldn't call that even a 'Iran's Small Finger in Yemen'):

Claims of Iran’s influence over the Houthis have been overblown. While the Houthis do receive some support from Iran, it is mostly political, with minimal financial and military assistance. However, since the Houthis took control of Sanaa, the group has increasingly been portrayed as “Iran-backed” or “Shia,” often suggesting a sectarian relationship with the Islamic Republic. Yet until after the 2011 upheavals, the term “Shia” was not used in the Yemeni public to refer to any Yemeni groups or individuals. The Houthis do not follow the Twelver Shia tradition predominant in Iran, but adhere to the Zaidiya, which in practice is closer to Sunni Islam, and had expressed no solidarity with other Shia communities.

Although Iran sees cooperation with non-state actors as an integral part of its foreign policy to protect and expand its influence in the region, its support for the Houthis has been marginal.
...

[Azor]

By Brian M. Perkins...

https://warontherocks.com/2017/03/th...nist-movement/

The botched special operations raid in al-Bayda that resulted in the death of William “Ryan” Owens and several Yemeni civilians on January 29 brought renewed attention to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and the Houthis’ war in Yemen. However, the media has all but forgotten about the Southern secessionists, Hirak, a movement that will be essential to establishing lasting peace in Yemen whenever hostilities finally end. Hirak, now frequently referred to as the Southern Resistance, is a movement comprised of several ideologically and politically fragmented factions that share a common desire for Southern independence, either through the creation of a southern federal region or outright secession. The movement shares some of the same grievances as those that led the Houthis to seize Sanaa in 2014, but the civil war that has raged since then has only stoked their desire for independence from the North.

Civil wars create unusual alliances. Hirak has been a quiet force behind the Yemeni government and Saudi coalition’s military successes in the south, but the group’s military alliance with exiled President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi and Saudi Arabia does not presage a smooth transition when the war ends. Saudi Arabia, emboldened by signs of support from the #Trump administration, appears keen on securing a military victory rather than pursuing a political solution with the Houthis. However, there will eventually come a time when the Houthis, Hadi, and Saudi Arabia return to the table to end hostilities and establish the terms of a transitional Yemeni government. When that time does come, the pressures holding the Hirak-Hadi alliance together will dissipate as pre-conflict fractures reemerge. The United States, Saudi Arabia, and the rest of the Gulf Cooperation Council# must involve Hirak in the process to avoid repeating the same mistakes made in the flawed agreement and National Dialogue Conference that followed Yemen’s Arab Spring uprising in 2011.

Shared Grievances, Different Approaches

Southern military and political leaders in Aden formed Hirak in 2007. The peaceful protest movement aimed to call attention to the exclusionary policies of northern elites who captured many key government and military positions following Yemen’s unification in 1990 and the civil war in 1994. After attempts to secede during the civil war, the movement spread east from Aden to al-Mahra and began addressing broader grievances such as the appropriation of southern land and resources. This helped build secessionist sentiment across the south. However, secessionist sentiment is still most popular in Aden and southwestern cities, where residents hold fond memories of the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen’s socialist past. Southerners from more tribal southwestern governorates such as Hadramawt are skeptical of their counterpart’s socialist leanings and the idea of secession, but they share a common desire of greater independence from the north.

The Houthis and southerners were both politically and economically marginalized in their respective areas of the country by former President Ali Abdullah Saleh, who sought to limit the power of those who might pose a threat to the ruling General People’s Congress. Saleh cracked down on the Houthis due to their advocacy for maintaining Zaydi religious traditions and outspoken criticism of the relationship between Yemen and the United States. Hirak was marginalized because of Saleh’s distrust of southern military officials and the region’s abundant resources, which were exploited to line the regime’s coffers. Both faced violent military crackdowns, but Hirak’s confrontations with the military pale in comparison to the six Saada Wars fought between Houthis and the Yemeni military between 2004 and 2009 .# Although Hirak’s grievances are tied to local political realities, the group’s disdain for the ruling elite led them to find common cause with the Houthis during the Arab Spring and while participating in the National Dialogue Conference.

Among the most important and elusive goals of the conference was the establishment of a new state structure that would reconcile tensions with the Houthis in Saada and satiate Hirak’s desire for southern independence. The “8+8 committee,” comprised of eight representatives from the north and eight from the south agreed to transform Yemen into a federal entity in December 2013 but did not agree on the boundaries or number of federal regions. Without consulting the 8+8 committee, a different committee appointed by Hadi created six new federal regions – Saba, Azal, al-Janad, Tihama, Aden, and Hadramawt – and sent the proposal to the Constitution Drafting Committee for acceptance in the conference outcomes.

Thus, although the National Dialogue Conference gave greater representation to Yemen’s youth and women, it still clearly favored the interests of the United States and the Gulf monarchies because it ensured that Yemen would be governed by a well-known, predictable political figure willing to support U.S. operations against al-Qaeda and mantain an amicable relationship with the Gulf Cooperation Council. As a result, it was viewed by many Yemenis, not least the Houthis and Hirak, as an elite pact that sought to demobilize groups that participated in the Arab Spring uprisings. The entrenched political and bureaucratic structures that Yemenis fought so hard to dismantle were intentionally left intact by the Saudi-sponsored agreement, which favored maintaining the status quo over social justice and the creation of a progressive democracy.

Hirak and the Houthis immediately rejected the outcome. #While Hirak staged demonstrations across Southern Yemen, the Houthis were making their march toward Sanaa, where they seized control of the government. In September 2014, the Houthis signed the Peace and National Partnership Agreement with President Hadi. This called for the implementation of the National Dialogue Conference plan, provided that the state’s structure was revisited, and the formation of an inclusive government with Houthi and Hirak representatives serving as presidential advisors. Hirak supported the agreement and southern representatives engaged favorably in the short-lived process.

However, Hirak’s relationship with the Houthis soured when the latter’s forces began laying siege to southern towns in pursuit of Hadi, who resigned on January 22, 2015 before fleeing to Aden in February . The Houthi’s plundering of southern territory was too reminiscent of previous northern hostilities for Hirak to support the Houthis, pushing them into an uneasy relationship with Hadi and the Saudi coalition...