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Thread: Yemen in 2016-2018: an intractable war?

  1. #261
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    Default Update on Houthi SAMs vs. UAE F-16(s) - No Dice

    "Few hours ago, Houthi rebels tried to shoot down a UAE Air Force's F-16E Block 60 over Sanaa, Yemen by means of R-27T air to air missile launched from ground platform but they failed simply because the F-16 pilot launched flares."

    Source: https://twitter.com/BabakTaghvaee/st...61073078734854

  2. #262
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    Quote Originally Posted by CrowBat View Post
    'The Aviationist' & Taghvae.


    What can you see on this video (I've posted the link above): https://twitter.com/3gb_1/status/978...903754240?s=21

    ...a Patriot hitting some densely-populated place?

    Yes, like they always do - and although their own 'evidence' is proving them wrong, all the time.

    No clue why do they still insist on that legend.
    Yet you collaborated once with Taghvae, no? Is the town not big enough

    To be honest, I can't tell what is the Patriot and what is the Burkan from the videos, but the video you linked to shows a smaller warhead than the "fireworks" one, which would suggest a Patriot interceptor.

    Perhaps they are making the Houthis larger than life because the campaign has been harder than they imagined?

  3. #263
    Council Member CrowBat's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Azor View Post
    Yet you collaborated once with Taghvae, no? Is the town not big enough
    I tried to cooperate with both of them over the time, just like I always try to cooperate and support sincere research through networking.

    (That's, between others, why I'm meanwhile working as series-editor for four of Helion's @War book-series and helping with about 30 different projects covering diverse conflicts since 1945.)

    Sadly, it turned out one is horny for sensations, and the other not only prefers to fantasise along his illusions of grandeur, but is foremost a vocal proponent of specific supremacist ideas.

    #### happens, as they say: 2 on the 'minus side', 25+ on the 'plus side'...

    To be honest, I can't tell what is the Patriot and what is the Burkan from the videos, but the video you linked to shows a smaller warhead than the "fireworks" one, which would suggest a Patriot interceptor.
    Well, if a video taken in Saudi Arabia shows a missile being launched, turning around and then crashing next to the place where it was fired, it could be that the conclusion is on hand: that's no Burkan-2H.

  4. #264
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    Quote Originally Posted by CrowBat View Post
    I tried to cooperate with both of them over the time, just like I always try to cooperate and support sincere research through networking.

    (That's, between others, why I'm meanwhile working as series-editor for four of Helion's @War book-series and helping with about 30 different projects covering diverse conflicts since 1945.)

    Sadly, it turned out one is horny for sensations, and the other not only prefers to fantasise along his illusions of grandeur, but is foremost a vocal proponent of specific supremacist ideas.

    #### happens, as they say: 2 on the 'minus side', 25+ on the 'plus side'...
    Interesting. I still believe that your location has spelled "Clapsback, Snarkland" wrong...

    I see that you cover Arab air force performance during Yom Kippur 1973, however, have you written much on IDF-IAF vs. SAM performance during the War of Attrition and in 1973? What of Falklands 1982?

  5. #265
    Council Member CrowBat's Avatar
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    Well, I certainly do not like being repeatedly plagiarised by somebody who tends to sensationalise superficial info - and then declares me for arrogant when I complain.

    Anyway, re. 'IDF/AF vs SAMs': you might want to check this one (something like a 'review' of what can be found there, is available towards the bottom of the thread here). A more in-depth study is to follow the next year.

    'Falklands' is kind of 'interesting to read about, but not interesting to research' from my POV: there are people in far better position to research and write about that topic.

  6. #266
    Council Member CrowBat's Avatar
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    Back to the topic - and from: Yemen’s Terrorism Barrier - comes the best explanation for the crucial failure of the US, Western in general, but the Russian and so many other failures in the 30+ years of 'War on Terror' (of course, officially declared 'only' in 2001):

    Crucial points:

    Nadwa al-Dawsari discusses her recent Carnegie article on relations between tribes and Al-Qa‘eda in Bayda governorate.
    ...

    Michael Young: You recently wrote an article for Carnegie titled “Our Common Enemy: Ambiguous Ties Between al-Qaeda and Yemen’s Tribes.” What was your main argument in the article?

    Nadwa al-Dawsari: My main argument was that tribes are not in bed with Al-Qa‘eda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), as is often perceived. On the contrary, tribes have played a critical role in preventing AQAP from establishing a strong presence in the country and I gave an example from Bayda governorate. I argue that tribes still see AQAP as a threat but have come to tolerate the presence of the terrorist group during the war because they—the tribes and AQAP—have a common enemy in the Houthis. The essence of my argument is that for as long as the tribes are forced to push the Houthis outside their areas, they will not be able to keep AQAP at bay as they did before the war.

    MY: How extensive is AQAP’s integration into tribal culture, so that it’s difficult to isolate the group from tribal society?

    ND: The common narrative among Yemen analysts is that tribes are armed, violent, lawless, and anti-state. This perception has often led people to believe that tribes offer a welcoming environment to AQAP. This perception is also quite common among urban Yemeni elites who look down on tribes and see them as “uncivilized.” In reality, tribes are far from lawless and they are governed by customary law, a very sophisticated and well-developed system that helped them deal with conflict and maintain order over the centuries until today.

    Just because the tribes are armed, it doesn’t mean they are violent. Yemeni tribes have arms, but they also have rules and customs that regulate the use of arms so that they don’t cause harm to tribal communities. Today, a tribal area such as Ma’rib, which has historically had an abundance of arms and a limited state presence, is relatively stable and safe, compared to Ta‘iz and Aden that had little arms before the war and are now devastated by violence and internal conflicts. The difference is that tribes have rules to govern the use of arms. Urban areas don’t.

    Also, tribes resolve conflicts through mediation and peaceful conflict-resolution mechanisms. They rarely resort to violence and only do so when faced with a direct threat to their existence or when they want to defend their territories. What AQAP stands for—the ideology, the violence, the desire to undermine the state’s presence—goes against the essence of tribal culture and customary law.
    ...

    MY: How would you judge the role of the United States in trying to contain AQAP in Yemen? Has it been effective, or has it made matters worse?

    ND: I think if U.S. counterterrorism operations were effective we wouldn’t have sees AQAP still present in Yemen today. The U.S. has relied on short-term security operations in Yemen, rather than focusing on the underlying causes that allowed AQAP to expand. The drones have indeed killed most AQAP leaders in the country, but the group is hardly defeated. The U.S. provided military support to the late Ali Abdullah Saleh to fight AQAP. But Saleh was not serious about fighting the group and instead used it to undermine his political opponents and maintain a steady flow of counterterrorism assistance from the West. This, in turn, made him a stronger dictator, which fueled the grievances that AQAP tapped into to spread and gain influence in the country.
    ...
    ...which in turn means also that:

    - the Saudi policy of depending on ideology-driven groups (like Moslem Brotherhood, various Salafist movements etc.) for regaining influence in Yemen, is as wrong as that of the USA, but,

    - overall war effort against the Houthis is the right decision, simply because the Houthis have completely destroyed the tribal structure in northern central Yemen (just like the Marxists did the same in southern eastern Yemen of the 1970s-1980s); while,

    - the Emirati strategy of cooperating with local tribes might appear as 'wrongdoing', and 'supporting separatists', but is the key to success.

  7. #267
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    Default Houthi Missiles: The Iran Connection; Scuds Are Not Dead Yet

    The article asks:
    But are the Iranians really behind these, or are they modified missiles from North Korean in origin?
    I think this is a key passage:
    In this article I take a closer look at the Burkan 2-H and how its increased performance was achieved. I do this using computer simulations of ballistic missile trajectories, with missile parameters based on properties of the Scud from open sources and an analysis of photographs and a launch video. The simulations confirm the similarities with the Iranian missile: a Scud-variant with the size and initial acceleration of the Burkan 2-H can only fly from Northwest Yemen to Riyadh if it carries as much propellant as the Qiam-1. Other versions of the Scud do not fit the data.

    (Ends with) All in all, even without a detailed forensic investigation of the wreckage, it seems unlikely these missiles originate from anywhere other than Iran.
    The author is Ralph Savelsberg is an associate professor at the Netherlands Defense Academy in Den Helder, specializing in missile defense.
    Link:https://breakingdefense.com/2018/05/...-not-dead-yet/
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 1 Day Ago at 09:39 AM. Reason: 117,074v
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