The Night of the Generals

[SWJED]

April 2007 edition of Vanity Fair - The Night of the Generals by David Margolick.

The six retired generals who stepped forward last spring to publicly attack Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld's handling of the Iraq war had to overcome a culture of reticence based on civilian control of the military. But while each man acted separately, all shared one experience: a growing outrage over the administration's incompetence, leading some of the nation's finest soldiers to risk their reputations and cross a time-honored line.

By late 2001, briefing Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld was familiar territory for Lieutenant General Greg Newbold. As director of operations on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Newbold, a three-star in the Marines, had done it many times since Rumsfeld had arrived at the Pentagon earlier in the year, and had come to know the routine: the constant interruptions, the theatrics, the condescension. But, according to Newbold, there was something different, and alarming, about one particular briefing around that time: the topic. It was about going to war with Iraq...

Long article at the link...

[SWJED]

5 March Washington Post - At the Pentagon, Gates Seen as Liberator by Tom Ricks.

Robert M. Gates is finding Donald H. Rumsfeld an easy act to follow, as the new defense secretary wins hearts and minds throughout Washington and overseas.

"Stylistically, it's night and day," said Rep. Mark Udall (D-Colo.), a member of the House Armed Services Committee. With Gates's modest manner, Udall said, "He's the anti-Rumsfeld."

At the Pentagon, where Gates has been greeted as a liberator, "you can already feel the stability," said retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Charles F. Wald, formerly the deputy U.S. commander in Europe. He said he considers the appointment of Gates to be the Bush administration's best move in years.

At the same time, Gates has shown that he can act decisively, as when he fired Army Secretary Francis J. Harvey on Friday over the handling of the growing patient-care scandal at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Expressing disappointment, Gates said that "the problems at Walter Reed appear to be problems of leadership."

Former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft urged caution on Gates's honeymoon. "How much of it is Bob Gates as a personality, manager and leader, and how much of it is Rumsfeld being gone, is hard to say," said Scowcroft, who has known Gates for 30 years. "Rumsfeld was a difficult man to work for."...

More at the link.

[120mm]

I cringe whenever the press gives kudos to "Generals". With a few exceptions, I have found "Generals" to be very competent at advancing their own careers, with little to offer in terms of leadership and/or military competence.

Having said that, I personally know some very good leaders who happen to be Generals.

[SWJED]

I found this a very good read - the article gives background on each of the generals and a dissenting view by Richard Kohl who maintains that the retired generals violated the traditions of civilian control of the military.

The six generals are LtGen Greg Newbold (USMC), MG Paul Eaton (USA), MG John Batiste (USA), LTG John Riggs (USA), MG Charles Swannack Jr. (USA) and LtGen Paul Van Riper (USMC).

The 16 page (printed) article provides a brief background on each of the General's careers, some background on their thoughts while on active duty (excepting Van Riper) concerning the lead-in and the war in Iraq, reasoning behind their decision (or in one case another's decision) to retire, what prompted them to speak out and any regrets they may have in doing so.

Of particular interest were some of the parallels the article drew concerning the wars in Iraq and Vietnam. The oldest of the group, Van Riper, was the only one with Vietnam (two-tour) experience. Still, the legacy of the earlier war seemed to influence much of their opinions on Iraq.

Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld plays heavily in the article to include his styles of management and leadership.

Without passing judgment - I recommend this as a must read. I will say this though - I'm glad I did not have to "walk a mile" in their shoes. The decision to go or not to go public in dissent, both on active duty and in retirement, was not a decision these men took lightly.

[120mm]

I only know OF Batiste and Van Riper, and what I heard of them is generally good.

My opinion, of course, is colored by what "Generals" could've done post OIF I to improve the situation in Iraq, but failed to do, for whatever reason. I've always thought that a "Commander" who needed guidance from higher in order to recognize and execute what needs to be done is not a good "Commander", and we had a bunch of those....

[Smitten Eagle]

I only know OF Batiste and Van Riper, and what I heard of them is generally good.

My opinion, of course, is colored by what "Generals" could've done post OIF I to improve the situation in Iraq, but failed to do, for whatever reason. I've always thought that a "Commander" who needed guidance from higher in order to recognize and execute what needs to be done is not a good "Commander", and we had a bunch of those....

Actually, LtGen Newbold's thoughts on the planning for OIF I are aired in Cobra II. He had some significant reservations and regrets not having aired them with enough volume during the planning phases. As such, OIF I began years before March 2003 when the planning for it began.

Cobra II also documents the lack of intent provided by Rumsfeld and the other political appointees on Phase IV operations in IZ. Yes, you want "commanders" who can make it happen when intelligence is hazy, and with limited intent. But planning Phase IV on the fly is a bit ridiculous.

At the same time, I am also always leary when the press starts citing "generals" as a monolithic group, as if there is no factionalism and as if there is a single, correct military opinion held by this cohort of professional. Hogwash.

[Stratiotes]

There seems to me a fine line between civilian control and not wanting to hear opinions that do not match your predetermined plan. The Marine Corps Command and Control book has a fair amount to say about that issue and is quite helpful. A more "civilian-oriented" book along the same lines that is quite good too, Corps Business.

It is, I think, dangerous ground to tread when we start using "civilian control" as a club to silence opinions we do not want to hear...as is often the case with politicians. I sometimes think they (political leaders) prefer yes-men rather than independent critical thinking.

[max161]

There seems to me a fine line between civilian control and not wanting to hear opinions that do not match your predetermined plan. The Marine Corps Command and Control book has a fair amount to say about that issue and is quite helpful. A more "civilian-oriented" book along the same lines that is quite good too, Corps Business.

It is, I think, dangerous ground to tread when we start using "civilian control" as a club to silence opinions we do not want to hear...as is often the case with politicians. I sometimes think they (political leaders) prefer yes-men rather than independent critical thinking.

The question I think needs to be asked is: "What does civilian control of our military mean?"

Does civilian control mean an office of the secretary of defense and all the civilian officials assigned to it? Or does it mean civilian control as in the President and the Congress and a Secretary of War (Defense)? When developing war plans for execution should they be developed by civilians (including some with no relavent military experience) or should they be developed by professional military personnel and then approved by the civilian leadership. Again, a further question should be asked: "Should civilian political appointees be developing war plans?"

Dave

[SWCAdmin]

http://www.votevets.org/

Features ads with Gens Batitste and Eaton sprinkled throughout the first couple of items, as of this writing.

Oh, and Clark too.

[Jedburgh]

Parameters, Spring '08: Revolt of the Generals: A Case Study in Professional Ethics

“Let’s see who we’ve got here tonight. General Moseley, Air Force Chief of Staff. General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They still support Rumsfeld. Right, you guys aren’t retired yet, right? Right, they still support Rumsfeld. Look, by the way, I’ve got a theory about how to handle these retired generals causing all this trouble: don’t let them retire! Come on, we’ve got a stop-loss program; let’s use it on these guys.”
– Comedian Stephen Colbert
2006 White House Correspondents’ Dinner

The fact that a joke like that could be told in front of an audience including the President, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force Chief of Staff, and many other Washington dignitaries spoke volumes for the state of relations between senior military leaders and their civilian superiors. For those recently retired general officers who chose to go public with their criticisms of then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (and by implication the Iraq policy), clearly the situation had reached a point where they felt it was part of their obligation to the profession of arms and the American people to dissent. Such intense criticismfrommilitary officerswho previously held positions of great responsibility in implementing the Administration’s policies is something rarely seen in American history. This article will attempt to assess the ethical considerations that bear on officers contemplating such action in any future civil-military crisis.....

[John T. Fishel]

retired officers of various ranks. While I haven't checked the law on the matter, we fall into to category called Retired Reserve - subject to recall to active duty for the convenience of the government (although why they would ever want old fogies like Ken and me is beyond me). As Retired Reserve members we are treated exactly like members of the Active Reserve not currently on active duty (at least in all ways that are relevant to this article). As a Reservist, not on active duty, I was never subject to any of the speaking and writing restrictions that applied to active duty members and civilian employees of DOD. So, de facto, retired military are just as civilian as active members of the RC - or any other civilian. As a result, if I am correct, then the Generals who went public did so in their capacity as civilians with extensive military expertise. BTW in the common law continuous practice can trump an unenforced or unenforcible statute especially if the aspect of the statute has never been enforced and there is question as to whether its enforcement was even intended. (I expect some lawyer among us will take issue.)

Cheers

JohnT